Luther Kirkwood v. Shelby County Government, d/b/a Shelby County Sheriff's Department, Jail Division
Employee of Shelby County Sheriff’s Department sought review of Civil Service Commission’s order upholding employee’s termination. The Chancery Court, Shelby County remanded the issue to the Civil Service Merit Review Board, and held that the Board’s failure to require any live testimony of Shelby County employees who made accusations against the former employee was a violation of employee’s due process rights to cross-examine his accusers, and that the obligation to call the accusers is that of the employer and not that of the employee. The matter came before this Court on a Rule 9 application for Interlocutory Appeal to consider only (1) whether the Civil Service Merit Review Board’s failure to require any live testimony of Shelby County employees who made accusations against former employee was a violation of former employee’s due process rights to cross-examine his accusers, and (2) whether the obligation to call the accusers is that of the employer, Shelby County, or that of the employee. We hold that the Civil Service Merit Review Board’s failure to require any live testimony of Shelby County employees who made accusations against former employee was not a denial of the employee’s due process rights due to the fact that the employee waived the opportunity to confront or cross-examine his accusers. Further, we find that there exist no obligation on the part of Shelby County to call the employee’s accusers, only that Shelby County must meet its burden of going forward and establishing a prima facie case against the employee. The chancery court order is vacated, and the order of the Civil Service Merit Board is |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Trustmark National Bank v. Alvis Miller
Trustmark National Bank (“Trustmark”) obtained a judgment of replevin in Mississippi for a truck in the possession of Alvis Miller (“Appellant”). Prior to the Mississippi hearing, Trustmark properly served Appellant with notice, and Appellant filed a hand-written statement informing the court that he had a possessory lien on the truck for repairs made by Appellant. Despite this, the Mississippi court held that Trustmark’s lien had priority over Appellant’s possessory lien. When Trustmark sought to enroll the Mississippi judgment in Tennessee, Appellant argued that Tennessee courts should not extend full faith and credit to the Mississippi judgment because under Tennessee law, common law possessory liens have priority over prior recorded interests. The trial court enrolled the judgment and Appellant appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Davis v. Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, et al.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court properly granted summary judgment to the appellees on the appellant’s claims of malicious harassment and malicious prosecution. When it granted summary judgment to the appellees, the chancery court found that the appellant did not have a cognizable claim for malicious harassment because his claim was not based on race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry and that the appellant’s claims for malicious prosecution failed because the appellees had not initiated the prosecution and probable cause existed to prosecute the appellant. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the statute granting a civil cause of action for malicious harassment is not limited to cases based on race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry and that no probable cause existed to prosecute the appellant. Further, the appellant argues that if he has stated a cognizable claim for malicious harassment, the appellees are not entitled to any absolute or qualified immunity for their actions. Additionally, although the appellees won on this issue at trial, the appellees have appealed whether section 39-17-309 of the Tennessee Code standing alone gives rise to a private cause of action. We affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Ivy Joe Clark, et al. v. Joyce Ann Shoaf, et al.
Husband sued for personal injury damages and Wife claimed damages for loss of consortium. The jury awarded Wife damages in an amount greater than damages awarded to Husband for the underlying personal injury claim. Appellant asserts the award to Wife is inconsistent and unsupportable as a matter of law. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ahmed Usso and Genet Ayele v. Bryan Winston - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion “that the plaintiffs acted in good faith and diligence, and are entitled to a refund of their earnest money.” I agree fully with everything in the majority’s opinion except this final conclusion. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Ahmed Usso and Genet Ayele v. Bryan Winston
Plaintiffs sued to recover earnest money tendered with a contract to purchase realty. Defendant counter-sued for breach of contract and damages. The Trial Court Ordered the return of the earnest money to plaintiffs. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
John Jay Hooker v. Bettye L. Nixon, et al.
Plaintiff filed this action to challenge the constitutionality of the Charter provision of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville Davidson County, Tennessee that imposes term limits on certain elected offices. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending the plaintiff did not have standing to maintain the action because he had not sustained a private injury distinct from other voters. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lawrence Lee Brown v. Kelly Sue Brown
This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute regarding child support and related issues. The trial court awarded Wife/Appellee all of her attorney’s fees and expenses, and couched one-half of that award as additional child support pursuant to T.C.A. §36-5-103(c)(2005). Husband/Appellant appeals asserting that the trial court erred in categorizing the attorney’s fees as child support and on the ground that the attorney’s fees are excessive. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Michael Harris v. Susan Taylor
This appeal stems from a suit to partition real estate. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the chancery court erred when it granted summary judgment and a judgment on the merits based on stipulated facts, evenly splitting the proceeds of the sale of property between joint tenants with rights of survivorship where one joint tenant paid more than her equitable share of the purchase money. Specifically, the appellant contends that she was entitled to contribution from the appellee for the excess of the purchase price paid by her and that she did not make a gift of the excess. In addition, Appellant requests that she was entitled to a credit of $2,000 pursuant to an interim consent order disposing of numerous issues between the parties. The appellee has requested attorney’s fees incurred as a result of this appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. We decline to award attorney’s fees to the appellee. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John L. Medearis v. Bonnie Baumgardner (Stoloff)
The mother sued to enforce Agreement with the father to pay college expenses for adult child of the parties. The Trial Court refused to enforce the terms of the Agreement on the equitable grounds of unclean hands and the lack of cooperation and fair dealings by the mother. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Marian L. Crull v. Donald R. Crull
This declaratory judgment action was filed by Donald R. Crull (“Husband”) on November 4, 2003. It seeks primarily a declaration as to the rights of Husband’s former spouse, Marian L. Crull (“Wife”), in and to Husband’s United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) retirement benefits, a subject addressed in the parties’ judgment of divorce entered in the trial court some 14 years and 3 months earlier, i.e., on July 11, 1989. In addition, Husband’s complaint seeks to terminate his alimony obligation effective when he retires at some unspecified time in the future. The trial court – interpreting the language of the judgment of divorce – held that the language mandates that Wife is entitled, without limitation, to one-half of Husband’s retirement benefits. The court, in its judgment, did not grant or deny Husband’s request for termination of his alimony obligation; but, in the incorporated memorandum opinion, the court did opine that Husband’s retirement, when it happens, would constitute a change in circumstances. Husband appeals, arguing that Wife’s entitlement with respect to the retirement benefits should be limited to a share of the benefits that accrued before the divorce. Wife, by way of a separate issue, contends that the trial court erred in stating that a retirement, which has not yet occurred, would constitute a change in circumstances when it takes place. We vacate this latter observation by the trial court but otherwise affirm the judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
C. Noelle Chaffin v. Marcus Ellis
This is a divorce and child custody case. The husband and the wife were married in February 1998. Throughout the marriage, they lived together with the husband’s mother. The parties’ relationship began to deteriorate soon after the wedding. The wife felt that the husband and his mother were controlling and oppressive, while the husband felt that the wife was unfit. One child was born of the marriage. In October 2000, the wife filed the instant petition for divorce. After a nine-day trial, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, and designated the wife as the primary residential parent of the parties’ child. The trial court also awarded the wife a portion of her attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. From that decision, the husband now appeals. We vacate a portion of the award of costs, and affirm as to the remaining issues, finding that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s opinion in all other respects. The cause is remanded for reconsideration of a portion of the award of costs for expert fees. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
C. Noelle Chaffin v. Marcus Ellis - Order Withdrawing Opinion
The Opinion filed by this Court on August 24, 2005, is hereby withdrawn, and a revised Opinion is being filed concurrently herewith. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Leslyn Elizabeth Miller Ballew v. John Michael Ballew
In this appeal, we are asked to determine the validity of a consent judgment entered by the chancery court granting a divorce to the parties. At trial, the parties voluntarily submitted their case to mediation. At the conclusion of the mediation, the mediator dictated the settlement terms onto a tape recorder, and the parties acknowledged onto the tape recorder that these terms were the understanding of the parties. The chancery court found that this acknowledgment was a modification of the mediation agreement and that the parties entered into a settlement agreement. On appeal, the husband asserts that the chancery court erred finding a settlement agreement because the mediation agreement specifically required that the parties would not be bound unless a written, executed settlement agreement was entered into by the parties. Second, the husband contends that, even if an oral settlement agreement was effective against the parties in this case, he had properly repudiated the agreement to his wife and the chancery court before the chancery court entered its judgment. In addition, both parties have requested attorney’s fees on appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings and decline to award attorney’s fees to either party. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joan Oates v. Chattanooga Publishing Company d/b/a Chattanooga Times Free Press
Joan Oates (“Plaintiff”) was employed by the Chattanooga Publishing Company (“Defendant”) for approximately twenty-three years. In January of 2004, Plaintiff was observed on Defendant’s security camera making obscene gestures with her middle finger toward the camera and then covering the security camera with a cup for a period of time. Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that she was terminated because of a disability. Plaintiff also claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and malicious harassment while employed by Defendant. Plaintiff also sued for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. D.H., et al. - Dissenting
I concur with the legal principles set forth in the majority opinion and particularly with the recognition of the importance of affording a parent an opportunity to request appointed counsel, and when appropriate, a hearing and due inquiry on the request for appointed counsel in dependent and neglect proceedings. I, however, respectfully dissent, believing the facts, particularly those demonstrating the irresponsible acts and omissions of David H. and Mary Ellen H. in seeking appointed counsel and then retaining separate counsel, are sufficient to affirm the trial court. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Giorgianna H., Stuart H., Sabrina H., Savannah H., Victoria H., Benjamin H., & Sarahanna H. - Concurring
I adhere to my longstanding view that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard and a |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
In Re. Giorgianna H., Stuart H., Sabrina H., Savannah H., Victoria H., Benjamin H., & Sarhanna H.
This appeal involves the parental rights of the biological parents of seven minor children. After the children had been removed from their biological parents’ custody for approximately one year, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Perry County seeking to terminate the parental rights of the biological parents. The trial court conducted a bench trial and then entered an order terminating the biological parents’ parental rights because the conditions that caused the children to be removed from the parents’ custody continued to persist and because the parents had committed severe child abuse. Both parents appealed. We have determined that the record contains substantial and material evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusions that the biological parents’ conduct provides substantive grounds for terminating their parental rights and that the termination of the biological parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best interests. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. David H., et al.
After a hearing, the Circuit Court declared seven children to be dependent and neglected and determined that their parents had committed severe child abuse. The parents claim on appeal that the court erred by refusing their request that counsel be appointed to represent them at the hearing. After carefully reviewing the record, we find that the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine whether or not the parents were financially able to retain their own counsel, and we accordingly vacate the order concluding that the children were dependent and neglected. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
Kerry C. Lyons v. Gregory M. Lyons
The trial court determined a material change of circumstances had occurred which warranted modification of the parties’ child visitation scheduled. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
United Color Lab & Digital Imaging, Inc. v. United Studios
In this case we are asked to review a trial court’s decision to hold the defendant in contempt of the court’s order. After the plaintiff filed its lawsuit to recover amounts allegedly owed on certain invoices, the trial court ordered the defendant to file a sworn statement setting forth any amounts it believed it owed to the plaintiff and the “basis” for that statement. The defendant submitted the affidavit of its president who asserted that it owed nothing to the plaintiff and that plaintiff breached the parties’ contract. The defendant subsequently filed an answer denying it owed the money and filed a counter-complaint for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and fraud. The plaintiff filed a petition seeking to hold the defendant in contempt of the court’s order, asserting that the affidavit filed by the defendant did not set forth specific facts. The chancery court granted the motion and found the defendant in contempt of the order holding that the affidavit did not contain enough “detail” as required by the order. The defendant appealed to this Court. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James L. Williams, et al. v. Jordan Lee Fox
James L. Williams, Brenda G. Williams, Charles Roberson, and Marjorie Roberson (“Plaintiffs”) sued Jordan Lee Fox (“Defendant”) claiming, in part, that Defendant was constructing a mobile home/modular home in the Oma Lee Williams subdivision in violation of the subdivision restrictions. Plaintiffs sought, among other things, a restraining order prohibiting Defendant from constructing and completing the mobile home/modular home. The case proceeded to trial. The Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that the structure in question is a modular home and that under existing case law Defendant was in violation of the subdivision restrictions. The Trial Court awarded Plaintiffs a permanent injunction and ordered Defendant to remove the structure. Defendant appeals to this Court claiming, in part, that the existing case law upon which the Trial Court based its decision dealt with double wide or manufactured homes, not modular homes. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Ronald Gifford
This is not the first time this case has been on appeal. In this appeal, we are asked to determine if the chancery court erred when it found that an insured individual was made whole by a settlement agreement with a third party tortfeasor so as to require the insured to reimburse his insurer. Specifically, Appellant contends that the chancery court erred in finding that the insured was not made whole because it failed to use the formula method used by federal courts for determining whether an insured is made whole and failed to engage in an analysis of the dollar amounts of the insured’s recovery and losses. We reverse and find that the insurer is entitled to reimbursement from the insured. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company v. Linda S. Rose, et al. - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment. I would reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company v. Linda S. Rose, et al.
Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company (“Tennessee Farmers”) brought this interpleader action seeking judicial guidance as to the person or persons entitled to receive benefits under a policy of insurance insuring the life of Brenda Gail Langley (“the deceased”). The deceased designated three of her four children and a grandchild as the beneficiaries of the policy; however, prior to the deceased’s death, her sister, Linda Sue Rose, acting under her authority as attorney in fact for the deceased, changed the beneficiary of the policy to herself. After the death of the deceased, Ms. Rose, the three children, and the deceased’s grandchild, Ethan E. Langley, all asserted rights to the proceeds of the subject policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the deceased’s children and grandchild, finding that they were entitled to the proceeds because – as found by the trial court – Ms. Rose did not have the authority under the deceased’s power of attorney to change the beneficiary on the policy. Ms. Rose appeals. We affirm. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals |
