Theresa Ann Walton v. Steven Ray Walton
This is an appeal of a modification of alimony. The parties were divorced in February 2003. In the decree, the trial court awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony for eighteen months, but reserved jurisdiction to evaluate and review the award at the end of the eighteen-month period based on competent medical proof, noting that the wife was expected to pursue disability benefits during that time. During the interim, the wife’s second application for Social Security disability benefits was denied on the grounds that she had not worked long enough to qualify for such benefits. Over a year after entry of the divorce decree, the wife filed a motion for the trial court to review the alimony award. The trial court conducted a hearing and the wife entered into evidence medical proof that she could not be rehabilitated. The trial court did not require the wife to show a material change in circumstances, explaining that it had mistakenly classified the original award as being “rehabilitative.” Therefore, based on the additional proof, the trial court reduced the monthly amount and designated the award as alimony in futuro. The husband now appeals, arguing that the wife was required to show a substantial and material change in circumstances to warrant a modification of the original rehabilitative alimony award. We affirm, finding that the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear the medical proof and did not err in changing the award to alimony in futuro. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Henrietta J. Q. Klutts, As Executrix of Estate of Henry Atlas Qualls, In re: the Estate of Henry Atlas Qualls
The pro se Appellant has asked this Court to review the lower court's denial of his petition contesting the manner in which the executrix administered the estate. Specifically, the Appellant seeks certain personal property from his father's estate he argues the Appellee, his sister, is unlawfully withholding as executrix. The Appellant filed a statement of the evidence with this Court in lieu of filing transcripts of the testimony. After the Appellee objected to the statement of the evidence, the trial court ruled that the Appellant's statement of the evidence was inaccurate or incomplete. Without a sufficient record, we cannot adequately review the trial court's decision to dismiss the Appellant's petition. We affirm.
|
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
Lee Pittman v. Williamson County
This appeal comes from the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s governmental tort liability claim |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby Abbott, et al. v. Blount County, Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that they had not been "made whole" in a settlement agreement with third-party tortfeasors and that any subrogation claim by Defendant insurer should be denied. The trial court awarded Plaintiffs summary judgment. Defendant insurer appeals. We reverse the award of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: J.L.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, J.L. The trial court terminated the mother's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, persistence of conditions, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The trial court also found the termination of the mother's parental rights was in the child's best interest. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Colby M. Reynaud v. John Koehler, et al.
This case arises out of a dispute between adjacent landowners regarding whether an easement can be obstructed by a locked gate. The plaintiff placed a locked gate across the easement and asserts that it is necessary for the protection of her person and property. The defendants disagree and argue that the locked gate unreasonably interferes with ingress and egress to their property. The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff. We find that the plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence that her person or property is at risk and that she has unsuccessfully attempted alternate means of protecting same and, therefore, it is our determination that plaintiff has failed to prove that the locked gate is necessary. We further find that the locked gate unreasonably interferes with the defendants' use of the easement. Based upon these findings, we reverse the judgment of the trial court in part, affirm in part, and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Edward Winn vs. Hallie Jones Winn
This is a divorce case. The husband filed a petition for divorce after five years of marriage. Following a trial, the trial court entered a final decree detailing the equitable distribution of the parties' property. The wife filed a motion to alter or amend the decree, arguing, among other things, that some of the property awarded to the husband was not marital property. The trial court denied that motion. The wife now appeals. We affirm, noting that, in the absence of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must presume that the evidence supported the trial court's rulings related to the equitable distribution of the parties' property. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Edmund R. Briley, et al. v. Gary W. Chapman, et al.
This appeal involves the question of the statute of limitation for an action for libel of title. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the proper statute of limitation was found at T.C.A. § 28-3-105. Without reaching a decision on the merits, an examination of the record indicates that the notice of appeal was not timely. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Gary W. Baker v. Joseph Smith & Deborah Smith, In the Matter of: T.M.S., A Child Under 18 Years of Age
In this appeal we are called upon to evaluate a juvenile court’s decision regarding a petition to |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of LaJuana Yvette Brown Delisa Provost v. Alton Brown And Ron Nance, Conservators
This appeal arises out of a petition filed by the conservators requesting the imposition of a constructive trust on assets received by the appellant after the decedent’s death. After issuing a temporary restraining order, testimony was taken and the trial court determined that the decedent intended for all funds received by the appellant upon decedent’s death to be held in trust for decedent’s daughter, the ward. The trial court imposed a constructive trust on these assets, ordered that the assets be paid over to the conservator of the ward’s estate, and determined that the appellant was an unsuitable trustee for the funds. The trial court further ordered that the appellant would bear the costs of the proceedings but the conservators were responsible for their attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of B.L.R., D.O.B. 10/14/02, a Child Under 18 Years of Age
This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological father to his infant daughter. The day after the daughter was born, the Department of Children’s Services became involved with the family and learned that both the mother and father were using methamphetamine. Shortly after the department became involved in this case, the mother took very little interest in her infant daughter. The department implemented several permanency plans calling for father to demonstrate that he remained drug free and was attending counseling to resolve his addiction. When the father failed to attend counseling on a regular basis and continually tested positive for methamphetamine, the department filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. Following a hearing on the petition, the trial court held that the department had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, all the grounds for termination alleged in the petition. The trial court also held that terminating father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Father appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the grounds for termination, however, we vacate the order and remand this case to the trial court for further action consistent with this opinion. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Becca Jo Maroney v. Brandon Lee Maroney
Becca Jo Maroney ("Mother") and Brandon Lee Maroney ("Father") were divorced in September of 2002. The parties agreed at that time for Mother to be the primary residential parent for the parties' son. In July of 2003, Father filed a petition for change of custody claiming there had been a material change in circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the minor child for custody to be transferred to Father. After a trial, the Trial Court concluded that there had been a material change in circumstances and that designating Father as the primary residential parent was in the best interest of the minor child. Mother appeals. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter Of: C.M.C., C.L.C., and D.A.M.
The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights based on abandonment, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and a finding that termination was in the best interests of the children. Mother appeals. We reverse. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
City of Jackson, Tennessee v. Walker-Hall, Inc., et al.
This is an action to recover for damage done to personal property. During the course of a road improvement project, the city placed some heavy equipment and debris alongside the roadway being repaired. An employee of the corporate owner of the land abutting the roadway noticed the debris and an excavator parked adjacent to the roadway during a route inspection of the property. Believing the debris and excavator to be on his employer’s land, the employee had the excavator towed. Apparently, the towing company selected by the landowner’s property manager severely damaged the excavator during the course of removing it. The city subsequently filed suit against the landowner and several other defendants claiming they had negligently harmed the city’s personal property. The trial court held that the landowner was negligent and committed a trespass against the city. The landowner appealed, and we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Gwendolyn Flowers v. Timothy Flowers
Husband in this divorce action appeals from the judgment entered in the trial court. Absent a transcript or statement of the evidence, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
ARC Lifemed, et al. v. AMC-Tennessee, Inc.
This is an action for breach of contract by a limited liability company against its managing member. The other members of the LLC joined as plaintiffs seeking recovery for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. The managing member counterclaimed against the LLC for breach of contract and, in the alternative, sought recovery in quantum meruit for unjust enrichment. The trial court held the managing member to be liable to all plaintiffs on all issues and dismissed the counterclaim. The action of the trial court is reversed as to breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to breach of contract and as to dismissal of the counterclaim. The findings of the trial court as to damages payable to the LLC is affirmed as is the distribution of the assets of the LLC. Prejudgment interest is disallowed, and costs are assessed to the managing member. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lawuan Stanford v. The Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development and Altama Footwear
This appeal arises out of a claim filed by the appellant for unemployment benefits after her termination from her employment. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development denied the appellant’s claim for unemployment benefits. The appellant filed an appeal to the Appeals Tribunal of the Department, and, after a hearing, the Appeals Tribunal denied the appellant’s claim for unemployment benefits. Subsequently, the appellant filed an appeal to the Board of Review, which also denied her claim for unemployment benefits and affirmed the Appeals Tribunal. After the Board denied the appellant’s petition to rehear, the appellant sought review by the chancery court. After reviewing the record, the chancery court denied the appellant’s claim for unemployment benefits and affirmed the Board of Review. The appellant now seeks review by this Court. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: M.W.M, W.W.M., S.M.M, & A.M.M. - Concurring
The evidence in this case, both as to termination of parental rights and to the best interest of the children, indicates that termination of parental rights would survive even the ultimate standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: M.W.M, W.W.M., S.M.M, & A.M.M.
This appeal involves an imprisoned mother’s efforts to retain her parental rights with regard to four of her eight children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Lawrence County seeking to terminate the mother’s parental rights with regard to four of her children residing in Tennessee. Following a bench trial, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights to the three older children based on abandonment under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2004) and terminated her rights to the youngest child based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). On this appeal, the mother asserts that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusions that she abandoned the three older children and that the interests of all four childrenwould be best served by terminating her parental rights. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned the three older children and that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of all four of the children involved in this case. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
James W. Clark v. Jim Rose
Petitioner/Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. This is the second appeal before this Court arising from the Appellant’s filing of the underlying pro se petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking review of the procedures used by the Tennessee Department of Correction in reaching its decision to keep Appellant confined in administrative segregation. This Court initially remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the inmate’s status was punitive or non-punitive in nature. Upon remand, the trial court determined that his status was non-punitive. Inmate appeals. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its determination that inmate’s status was nonpunitive and that, as such, the common law writ of certiorari was not the proper means of challenging his status, we affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clinton Burns, III
Clinton Burns, III, (DOB: 06/07/86), a juvenile, was adjudged delinquent by the Knox County Juvenile Court, having been found to have committed the adult offense of aggravated robbery. He appealed to the trial court, which, after a bench trial, affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the testimony of the victim because of the unduly suggestive nature of the procedure used to identify him. He further argues that the trial court erred in refusing to afford him a jury trial. We hold that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, but that it erred in denying the defendant a jury trial. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the motion to suppress, but reverse the judgment of the trial court affirming the judgment of the juvenile court. Case remanded for a new trial. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Trammell Cemetery Trust, by and through its duly appointed Trustees, Ralph S. Davis, Herman Trammell and Wendell Trammell vs. Ronnie Yancey and wife, Rita Yancey, and Joe Trammell, Jr., and wife, Linda Trammell, et al.
In this action, the Trial Court granted appellees summary judgment which adjudicated fewer than all of the claims or rights and liability of all of the parties. We dismiss the appeal from that Judgment and remand with instructions. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. AAB, In the Matter of : NAB, (7/27/99)
The Trial Court terminated the mother's parental rights on statutory grounds. On appeal, we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
I & L Investments, LLC et al. v. Cagle's Construction, LLC et al.
I & L Investments, LLC ("I & L"), and Wet Willy's Fireworks Supermarkets of Tennessee, Inc. ("Wet Willy's"), sued Cagle's Construction, LLC, and Ed Cagle (collectively the "Cagles"), seeking to enforce restrictive covenants with respect to real property owned by Cagle's Construction, LLC. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that the defendants' tender of $100,000 to I & L as liquidated damages pursuant to the provisions of a document entitled "Settlement and Mutual Release" barred the plaintiffs' attempt to enforce the restrictive covenants. The plaintiffs appeal the trial court's judgment, contending that the court erred in failing to enforce the restrictive covenants against the Cagles in of their plan to construct a building on the property for the purpose of selling fireworks. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Curtis Meredith v. Cruthchfield Surveys, et al.
Curtis Meredith sued Crutchfield Surveys and Jerry Crutchfield for damages allegedly sustained by the plaintiff as a result of incorrect surveys prepared by the defendants. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. He appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint. We hold that the plaintiff's suit was not filed within the time specified in the applicable statute of repose and that the plaintiff's generally-worded charge of fraud fails to satisfy the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 9.02. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals |
