COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

In Re Kansas B. et al.
M2025-00553-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Deana C. Hood

The appellant is a physician assistant accused by the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) of sexually abusing a stepchild. After one appeal of the dependency and neglect case, the appellant and DCS entered into an agreed order to resolve the matter. According to the appellant, he did not stipulate in the agreed order that he engaged in the alleged misconduct. In a related criminal case, the appellant was indicted by a grand jury and ultimately entered a no contest plea. He did not admit guilt, no conviction was entered, and all charges will be dismissed and expunged if he completes his probation. The Tennessee Department of Health (“DOH” or “the Department”) informed the appellant that it had opened a case against him before the Board of Physician Assistants regarding his fitness to practice “due to the allegations in the [dependency and neglect] matter.” The Department sought certain records from the juvenile court case, and the appellant opposed it. The trial court granted the Department’s motion, and the appellant appealed. We affirm.

Donald Batiste, et al. v. The Memphis and Shelby County Board of Adjustment, et al.
W2025-00836-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James R. Newsom

The president of a homeowner’s association filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision by a local zoning board. The chancery court dismissed the petition, finding that the petition was insufficiently verified. After review, we affirm.

Laura Kisana v. Isaac Caldiero
E2025-01350-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kyle E. Hedrick

The appellant, Isaac Caldiero (“Appellant”), filed a notice of appeal with this Court in September 2025, which states that Appellant is appealing the August 8, 2025 order of the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“the Trial Court”). Upon receiving the appellate record in this appeal, this Court reviewed the record on appeal to determine if the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(b).

SIGNAL PUMP, LLC D/B/A SIGNAL POWER v. ARROW ELECTRONICS, INC.
E2024-01376-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey M. Atherton

This appeal concerns an unsuccessful business relationship between two companies. Signal Pump, LLC (“Signal”), a company that builds LED light towers, contracted with Arrow Electronics, Inc. (“Arrow”), a major supplier of electronics components, for Arrow to become Signal’s exclusive supplier. The relationship broke down as Arrow failed to timely supply Signal with parts and Signal failed to pay Arrow. Signal sued Arrow in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) alleging, among other things, breach of contract and fraud. New York substantive law governed this lawsuit as provided for by the parties’ agreement. Arrow filed a counterclaim against Signal for breach of contract based on Signal’s alleged failure to fully compensate Arrow for its products and services. According to Signal, Arrow’s failure to timely supply parts per the agreement cost Signal massive losses in profits it otherwise would have earned. Arrow, in turn, has asserted throughout that Signal continually changed its requests for parts. After a bench trial, the Trial Court found that both parties breached the agreement. The Trial Court awarded Arrow damages for Signal’s failure to pay. However, the Trial Court declined to award Signal any damages for lost profits, citing a liability limitation clause in the parties’ agreement. Signal appeals. We hold that the liability limitation clause is an exculpatory clause. We modify the Trial Court’s judgment in that respect. Otherwise, we affirm.

Stanley H. Trezevant, et al. v. Collierville Auto Center, Inc.
W2024-01907-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cedrick D. Wooten

At the conclusion of proof in a bench trial in a breach of lease action, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that both plaintiffs lacked standing. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that the individual plaintiff’s lack of standing rendered his claim moot but vacate the trial court’s decision regarding the plaintiff company.

Monica D. Sorensen v. Jayson R. Sorensen
M2024-01651-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathryn Wall Olita

The trial court denied Husband’s timely motion to alter or amend a divorce decree involving child custody, child support, and the distribution of military retirement benefits. Several days later, the trial court entered a Military Retired Pay Division Order. Husband’s notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the former order, but within thirty days of the latter order. Because we determine that the time for filing an appeal from the order denying Husband’s motion was not affected by the entry of the Military Retired Pay Division Order, we conclude that Husband’s appeal was untimely. Without a timely filed notice of appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction, and the appeal is dismissed.

James William Rose et al. v. Patrick M. Malone
M2023-01239-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Binkley

In this grandparent visitation action, the grandparents filed a contempt petition, alleging that the child’s father had violated provisions of a previously entered visitation order. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court rendered an oral ruling and found the father in contempt. Before the trial court’s entry of a written order regarding contempt, however, the father filed a motion seeking the trial court judge’s recusal. The trial court entered orders adjudicating the contempt charges and the father’s bond before entering a written order adjudicating the recusal issue. The trial court then entered orders awarding attorney’s fees to the grandparents. The father has appealed. Upon review, we determine that the trial court erred by entering further orders before entering an order adjudicating the recusal motion. We therefore vacate the trial court’s August 2023 bond orders and the August 2023 order regarding the second contempt petition, which were entered while the motion to recuse was pending. We reverse the trial court’s orders awarding attorney’s fees to the grandparents. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

CHARLES EDWARD COPELAND ET AL. v. SCG IV-KARCH’S CROSSING, LLC
E2025-01018-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Deborah C. Stevens

This is an appeal from a premises liability, slip-and-fall claim against the owner of a shopping center. The husband slipped and fell while trying to get into his vehicle at a shopping center owned by the defendant company. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend, which the trial court denied. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Patrick Michael Wallen v. LC Germantown Owner, LLC
M2025-00873-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Steven W. Maroney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clifton David Briley

Because Appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal, and it is dismissed.

Joseph Heintz v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization
M2025-00707-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Steven W. Maroney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Patricia Head Moskal

Appellant filed a complaint for judicial review of the Tennessee State Board of Equalization’s decision to deny his request for property tax relief. Because Appellant sought review of an administrative order that had not become final under the applicable version of tax relief statutes, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(a)(1) (“A person who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review”) (emphasis added). Affirmed.

Gholam Reza Safaeih v. Reza Alizadegan
W2024-01154-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tony Childress

The parties entered into an agreement in which the defendant provided funds and the
plaintiff used those funds to trade stocks. At one point, the defendant agreed to make a
$50,000 loan to the plaintiff so that the trading could continue. The agreement was
evidenced by a promissory note in which the plaintiff agreed to repay the loan and to share
any losses incurred. The loan was secured by a deed of trust executed on the plaintiff’s
residence. Subsequently, the parties lost approximately $210,342. The plaintiff then filed
a declaratory judgment action in which he claimed that the deed of trust was void because
the loan funds had never been disbursed. The defendant filed an answer and counterclaim
alleging that the plaintiff owed him the balance of the loan plus interest. He also sought
reimbursement for a portion of the losses that the parties had incurred. The chancery court
determined that the defendant had never disbursed the loan funds. Accordingly, it held that
the deed of trust and the portion of the promissory note which required repayment of the
loan balance were void due to a lack of consideration. However, the chancery court also
held that the portion of the promissory note in which the plaintiff agreed to share losses
was effective and left the defendant entitled to damages. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Crain Law Group, LLC v. Jenna Renee Amacher
M2024-01369-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Valerie L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Thomas Carter

This appeal arises from a breach of contract claim. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment after Appellant’s counsel failed to respond or otherwise appear to oppose the motion. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Scott Keith Lannom v. Renee Alyce Lannom
M2024-01952-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge A. Ensley Hagan, Jr.

In this post-divorce action, the trial court conducted a two-day hearing regarding the mother’s petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan. At the conclusion of the hearing, the father moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41. The trial court granted the motion, determining that modification of the parenting plan was not warranted because the mother had not met her burden to prove that there had been a material change of circumstance affecting the minor child’s well-being. The trial court accordingly dismissed the mother’s petition with prejudice and awarded the father his reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We further determine that Father is entitled to his reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal.

In Re Braxton M.
W2024-00762-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Michael Mansfield

This appeal involves a mother and stepfather’s petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to his surviving child after the death of the parties’ other child. The petition alleged two grounds for termination of parental rights – abandonment by failure to support and severe child abuse. The chancery court found that neither ground had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The court also reviewed the statutory best interest factors and concluded that it was not in the best interest of the child for the father’s parental rights to be terminated. The mother and stepfather appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In Re Braxton M. - Concur in Part/Dissent in Part
W2024-00762-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Valerie L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Michael Mansfield

It is often said that “hard cases make bad law.” This case is more than hard — it is tragic. In circumstances such as these, which evoke strong emotions, this Court must resist the temptation to bypass the limits of our appellate review and re-try cases and re-evaluate facts to achieve what some deem to be a more just result. Unfortunately, in my view, the majority’s opinion does exactly this – essentially abrogating the role of the trial judge as a factfinder. Specifically, the majority opinion reverses the trial court’s determination that no grounds existed for termination, reverses the trial court’s conclusion that termination of parental rights is not in Braxton’s (“the Child’s”) best interest, reverses factual findings made by the trial court, and even disregards credibility findings made by the trial court. I agree that clear and convincing evidence exists to establish abandonment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). The majority and I then choose different paths. Although I would reverse the trial court’s ruling as to abandonment, I would affirm in all other respects. In my view the majority ignores the presumption of correctness in the standard of review and does not give sufficient weight to the trial court’s credibility findings to travel the path they deem just. I do not agree that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings of fact, nor that the aggregation of the individual facts amounts to clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest.

Hill Boren Properties, et al. v. Ricky Lee Boren, et al.
W2025-00675-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Lee Davies
The appellants seek to challenge the settlement agreement by which the action was dismissed as well as the trial court’s summary judgment rulings entered earlier in the litigation. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

KATHY DIANE BARKER COMPTON v. MICHAEL COMPTON
E2024-00549-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William K. Rogers

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The wife primarily challenges the trial court’s decision to deny her alimony. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

In Re Estate of Searcy V. Nicklos
W2025-00968-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Steven W. Maroney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathleen N. Gomes

This appeal presents issues relating to the probate court’s admission of a copy of a will for muniment of title. However, we do not reach the merits of the appeal due to Appellant’s failure to comply with the briefing requirements outlined in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a), and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee.

Harpeth Financial Services, LLC v. Corey Montez Lea, Sr.
M2025-00389-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clifton David Briley

The plaintiff filed an action in the Davidson County general sessions court to recover the balance of an unpaid loan from the defendant. An agreed final order was entered in favor of the plaintiff. Approximately six months later, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the judgment based on an alleged fraudulent misrepresentation perpetrated by the plaintiff. The general sessions court denied the motion. The defendant appealed the denial to the Davidson County circuit court. The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The circuit court held that because the defendant had failed to file the motion to set aside within the ten-day statutory period outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-15-727(b), the general sessions court had correctly dismissed the motion as it lacked jurisdiction to set aside the judgment. Likewise, the circuit court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal on the merits as an appeal had not been timely filed. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

In Re Brady R.
M2025-00691-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ronald Thurman

This appeal arises from a petition to terminate the parental rights of a father for the purposes of adoption. The petitioners, the child’s stepfather and mother, alleged that the father abandoned the child both by failing to visit and by failing to support. When father failed to participate in discovery, the petitioners moved for a default as a sanction. After granting the requested default and holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and that termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the termination of parental rights.

IN RE NIKKO E.L. ET AL.
E2025-01277-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: JOHN W. MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S.; THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J.; AND KRISTI M. DAVIS, J.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Kenlyn Foster

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

In Re Evalina H.
W2025-00405-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Michael Mansfield

Petitioners attempted to terminate the parental rights of the child’s biological father on the
grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support. The trial court found that neither
ground had been proven but proceeded to find that had grounds for termination been
proven, it would be in the child’s best interest for the biological father’s parental rights to
be terminated. Although we affirm the trial court’s finding that the biological father proved
that his failure to visit was not willful, we reverse the trial court’s finding as to the ground
of abandonment by failure to support. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that
termination is in the child’s best interest.

AJIT C. DESAI v. B. G. NAIK TRUST ET AL.
E2024-00873-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Valerie L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Pamela A. Fleenor

This appeal stems from a partition lawsuit. The real property at issue was sold at auction. The issues on appeal are whether Appellants have an ownership interest in the property and the proceeds from partition sale, and whether the trial court properly allocated the proceeds between the rightful owners. We reverse the trial court regarding ownership and hold that Appellants own one-half of the property. We affirm the trial court’s allocation of the funds from the partition sale. We vacate the trial court’s judgment as to whether Appellants’ attorneys’ fees should be paid from the partition proceeds and remand this issue for reconsideration in light of our Court’s determination of ownership.

JASON DONALDSON v. SUSAN DONALDSON
E2025-01117-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J.; AND KRISTI M. DAVIS, J.; AND WILLIAM E. PHILLIPS, II, J.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom McFarland

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc. v. BlueRoad Fontanel, LLC
M2024-01860-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

A gas company obtained an easement by eminent domain across a property owner’s land. A jury determined the amount of just compensation payable to the landowner. On appeal, the gas company argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear expert testimony from the landowner’s expert regarding the value of the property and that the jury verdict is not supported by material evidence. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.