In Re Estate of David Alan Beddingfield
This appeal arises from an order requiring a petitioner to pay a filing fee or face dismissal of his case. Because the order is not final, we lack subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Lori Jean McKee Kelly v. Christopher Roberts Kelly
In this divorce, the trial court sanctioned Husband for failing to participate in discovery. After a final hearing at which Husband failed to appear, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce that awarded Wife monetary judgments and alimony, divided the marital property, adopted Wife’s proposed parenting plan, and set child support. Husband filed a motion to set aside, alter, or amend the final decree, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Husband challenges the sanctions and complains that the trial court failed to consider the statutory best interest factors when fashioning the permanent parenting plan. Although the trial court’s factual findings concerning the children’s best interest are deficient, we can “soldier on” by conducting a de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. After that review, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
ROBERT "WOODY" DEW ET AL. v. ADRIAN'S INC. ET AL
Following mediation, family members signed a settlement agreement resolving their business dispute. One party then sought to withdraw from the agreement. The trial court determined that the party’s ability to withdraw was limited and ordered him to close on the transactions contemplated by the agreement. Because we conclude that the settlement agreement’s language was ambiguous, we vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Dorothy Ann Britton
This appeal involves of the administration of an estate. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order closing the estate as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Langford Farms Common Facilities Association, Inc. v. Paul A. Clark
A homeowners’ association sued a resident for violations of neighborhood regulations. The resident did not answer requests for admission. The trial court found that the requests were, therefore, admitted and granted a judgment for the association. The resident appealed. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Kyle Leath v. Angelea Nicole Flowers
Mother and Father entered into an Agreed Permanent Parenting Plan. Thereafter, Father learned of information he allegedly was not privy to before, namely, that the Mother’s new husband was physically abusive, had been using drugs, and has an extensive criminal record; additionally, new incidents involving domestic violence and other criminality occurred involving Mother’s new husband. In response, Father sought to modify the parenting plan. The Juvenile Court modified the plan, reducing the number of days of Mother’s visitation and limiting Mother to supervised visitation. Mother appeals the trial court’s modifications. We affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Keith Riddle v. Andrei Miclaus
A plaintiff was awarded a judgment against a defendant who failed to complete home improvement work. The defendant appeals; however, he has failed to provide an adequate record to allow for consideration of his arguments on appeal and has asked this court to perform fact-finding that is beyond the scope of our authority. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Milcrofton Utility District of Williamson County, Tennessee v. Non-Potable Well Water, Inc.
A utility district sued a private corporation alleging that the corporation was illegally providing water services to customers in the utility district’s service area. The trial court ruled in favor of the corporation. On appeal, the district asserts that the trial court erred in requiring the district to prove that the company qualified as a “public utility” under the pertinent statute. We have concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute. We, therefore, reverse and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE GABRIEL M.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found clear and convincing evidence to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home and (2) the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We now affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Kelly et al. v. Thomas A. Stewart
This case involves allegations of malfeasance by several members of a family business against another member. The plaintiffs asserted both derivative and individual claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the merits of the case but vacate and remand the portion of the trial court’s decision regarding damages and attorney fees. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
DONALD CHARLES BACHMAN V. JOANNE EVE MASSAS
Plaintiff sued Defendant for divorce. Defendant appeals challenging the trial court’s failure to award alimony. Without a transcript or statement of the evidence, appellate courts presume the record supports the trial court’s findings. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Vanessa Faddoul v. Edward James Beyer
Vanessa Faddoul sought an order of protection as a stalking victim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 against her neighbor, Edward James Beyer, in Williamson County General Sessions Court. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the general sessions court issued a one-year order of protection prohibiting Mr. Beyer from contacting or coming about the victim, Mrs. Faddoul, or her family, and restricting Mr. Beyer’s second amendment rights. Mr. Beyer appealed to the Williamson County Circuit Court. Upon a pre-trial motion of Mr. Beyer, the circuit court modified the general sessions order by restoring Mr. Beyer’s second amendment right to possess firearms. Following three days of hearings on the petition, but before the circuit court could rule on the merits of the de novo appeal, Mr. Beyer filed a “Notice of Voluntary Nonsuit and Dismissal of Appeal” to dismiss his appeal of the general sessions court ruling against him in Case No. 2022OP-176, purportedly pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41.01(1). Because Mr. Beyer dismissed his appeal, the circuit court entered an order “affirming” the judgment of the general sessions court, save the second amendment issue, dismissing the appeal, and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to apply for an award of attorney’s fees. Thereafter, Mrs. Faddoul requested attorney’s fees in the amount of $168,112.50 under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), discretionary costs in the amount of $5,248.62 under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), and $2,579.37 in “non-discretionary cost expenses.” The circuit court denied her request for attorney’s fees and discretionary costs in toto based on several findings. It found that she was not entitled to an award of mandatory attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 because, inter alia, stalking victims are not entitled to the same “enhanced protections” as domestic abuse victims, that it did not complete the hearing on the petition, which it found to be a prerequisite for fees, and that the amount of attorney’s fees requested was unreasonable. The circuit court also declined to award Mrs. Faddoul any discretionary costs. Both parties appeal. Contrary to Mr. Beyer’s argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to take any action after he purportedly “nonsuited” his appeal, we find that the circuit court retained jurisdiction and that it did not err in affirming the judgment of the general sessions court and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to request attorney’s fees. Because Mrs. Faddoul, as a stalking victim, is entitled to the same rights afforded to domestic abuse victims, and as mandated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), we hold that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees she incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings. Thus, we reverse the circuit court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees and remand for the circuit court to award Mrs. Faddoul her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1). We affirm in part and reverse in part the denial of Mrs. Faddoul’s request for discretionary costs, finding that some of the court reporters’ invoices clearly delineate the discretionary costs that she is entitled to recover pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). We also conclude that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1). |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Nancy Riss
This appeal arises from a will contest. Appellant David Riss (“Respondent”) and Appellee Adam Riss (“Petitioner”) dispute the validity of a typewritten codicil and holographic document that purportedly amended the last will and testament their mother, Nancy G. Riss (“Decedent”), executed on September 25, 2018 (“the Will”). After petitioning to admit the Will to probate and set aside the purported codicils, Petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. He argued that the typewritten codicil and holographic document do not meet applicable statutory requirements and thus should be given no testamentary effect. The trial court agreed with Petitioner and granted his motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that the typewritten codicil failed to meet the statutory requirements of a valid testamentary instrument under Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-104 because the witness signatures were affixed to an attesting affidavit but not to the codicil. The court further held that the holographic document failed to meet the statutory requirements of a valid holographic testamentary instrument under Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-105 because it did not contain any material provisions directing the distribution of Decedent’s estate. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Terence S. Roberts, et al. v. Kentucky National Insurance Co., et al.
The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against seven defendants. Their complaint asserted various counts arising out of the defendants’ involvement with a water loss claim the plaintiffs had reported to their insurer. Four of the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted their motions and simply stated at the end of its order of dismissal, “This is a final and appealable order and there is no just cause for delay.” The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. This Court entered two show cause orders, directing the appellants to either obtain a final judgment or show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed. We then entered an order deferring the matter to the panel of the Court deciding this appeal. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its order as final and dismiss this appeal. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Committee to Stop an Unfair Tax et al. v. Freddie O'Connell et al.
The plaintiffs brought an election contest and a declaratory judgment action against the defendants to enjoin the implementation of Metro Ordinance No. BL2024-427, which implements Metro’s transit improvement plan created pursuant to the Improving Manufacturing, Public Roads and Opportunities for a Vibrant Economy Act. The trial court found that the plan and ballot question complied with the Act in all respects. We affirm, except that we find that the surcharge in the transit improvement plan cannot be used for the acquisition of land for housing and parks. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
JEREMY JAMES DALTON v. BLOUNT COUNTY ET AL.
Because Appellant’s brief fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, he has waived review. Appeal dismissed. |
Court of Appeals | ||
John Lindberg v. TCIX Disciplinary Board, et al.
John Lindberg (“Lindberg”), an inmate at Turney Center Industrial Complex (“TCIX”), was convicted of introducing drugs into TCIX by the prison’s Disciplinary Board (“the Board”). After failed appeals to the TCIX Warden and Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) Commissioner, Lindberg filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court denied his petition. He appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
CHARLES MCCLELLAN CAMPBELL, ET AL v. JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (U.S.A.), ET AL.
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed by Christina Lemek Blackwell (“Petitioner”) seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner and finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Janice L. Ruiz v. Butts Foods, L.P., et al.
The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against her joint employers, asserting sexual harassment/ hostile work environment, retaliation, and other related claims. The employers filed a motion to compel arbitration. The plaintiff opposed the motion and invoked the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, 9 U.S.C. §§ 401- -402. The trial court deemed the Act applicable and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The employers appeal. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Todd Michael Perks v. Elizabeth Mundy (Perkins) Sloane
A husband and wife divorced a little over two years after marrying. On appeal, the wife asserts the trial court erred when it classified five real properties as the husband’s separate property. The wife also takes issue with the court’s division of attorney’s fees and requests her fees on appeal. We find the court failed to make adequate findings related to its division of attorney’s fees. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the order relating to fees and expenses and remand the matter for the court to make additional findings. We affirm the trial court in all other aspects and decline to award the wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Luke Buckley v. Kerry Buckley, et al.
A man sought to intervene as of right in a family member’s action for partition of real property. The trial court determined that the proposed intervenor did not have an interest in the subject property. So it denied his request to intervene and his other requests for relief. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. Samuel Crout
Appellant, City of Memphis, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on June 4, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Anne Elise Littleton Jakobik v. Erik Carter Jakobik
In this divorce with no children, the trial court declared the parties divorced and referred the property issues and requests for attorney’s fees to a special master. The special master recommended an equal division of the marital estate and that each party pay their own attorney’s fees. The wife objected to these recommendations. After a hearing, the trial court adopted the special master’s findings and recommendations, with one small exception. On appeal, the wife challenges the division of the marital estate and the failure to award attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Layton S.
In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child, the trial court found that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Brock Hill v. State of Tennessee
Richard Brock Hill, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), brought an action for defamation against the State regarding statements made in connection with a sexual harassment investigation that resulted in the termination of his employment. The Claims Commission dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. In reaching this conclusion, the Claims Commission analyzed the potentially defamatory statements and concluded that each statement was time-barred and/or failed as to an essential element of a defamation claim. Regarding statements contained in an “Investigation Summary Memorandum,” the Claims Commission also concluded that Mr. Hill’s defamation claim failed because the document was prepared by a Deputy Commissioner and was, accordingly, protected by absolute executive privilege. We conclude that Mr. Hill adequately alleged defamation such that dismissal of his claim was error and that the existent record and filings do not support a conclusion that, as a matter of law, absolute executive privilege protects the statements contained in the Investigation Summary Memorandum. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Court of Appeals |
