Saint Claude Renal, et al. v. Drexel Chemical Company
The Plaintiffs in this case, who live in the Dominican Republic, were allegedly injured by toxic herbicides used in the sugar cane industry. Following the Plaintiffs’ filing of a lawsuit against the Defendant, a Tennessee corporation, pursuant to the Tennessee Products Liability Act, the Defendant moved to dismiss the case on several grounds. Although the trial court rejected the viability of a number of these defenses asserted by the Defendant at the motion to dismiss stage, the trial court concluded that the case should be dismissed on the basis that “the TPLA does not have extraterritorial application.” The trial court also opined that, “even if a case were to proceed in Tennessee, the applicable law would be the law of the Dominican Republic” but noted that the Plaintiffs “have only set forth a specific claim under the TPLA.” For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Saint Claude Renal, et al. v. Drexel Chemical Company -Dissent
The primary question in this case is whether the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ action on the basis of extraterritoriality. In answering that question, the trial court ruled that because no Tennessee law was on point to address the issue, federal law provided an appropriate framework to resolve the dispute. Under that framework, a court is tasked with answering two questions. First, “whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 337 (2016). If the statute does not give a clear indication of extraterritoriality, all is not lost, however, so long as there can be a domestic application of the statute. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
83 Freight, LLC v. C4 Sourcing Solutions, LLC et al.
This appeal concerns counterclaims and third-party claims for breach of contract, violation of the Prompt Pay Act of 1991, and enforcement of a lien. The counter-plaintiff, C4 Sourcing Solutions, LLC, alleged that a third-party defendant, Capital City Construction, LLC, breached its agreement to purchase 171 custom-fabricated steel containers for use in an apartment complex. C4 also sought to enforce a lien against the complex property, which was owned by the plaintiff, 83 Freight, LLC. After a trial, the jury found Capital City breached its contract with C4 and awarded $866,000 in compensatory damages. And after a post-trial hearing, the court granted C4’s request to collect on its lien. Capital City and 83 Freight raise numerous issues on appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and modify in part. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
DERRY M. THOMPSON ET AL. v. TIMOTHY A. GRAHAM ET AL.
This appeal stems from a trial court’s order enforcing a settlement agreement regarding a |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
ROBERT BATES, ET AL. v. CITY OF CHATTANOOGA, ET AL.
This appeal involves statutory construction. Robert Bates and Laurel Diane Bates (“Mr. Bates” and “Ms. Bates,” “Plaintiffs” collectively) sued the City of Chattanooga, Individually and d/b/a the Brainerd Golf Course (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”), alleging personal injuries, loss of services, and loss of consortium stemming from Mr. Bates’ fall on Defendant’s golf course. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment relying on the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“the TRUS”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101, et seq., which provides immunity to landowners who open their property to recreational use. The Trial Court held that Defendant, the landowner, was immune under the TRUS because Mr. Bates was on Defendant’s property to play golf, and golf is comparable to the non-exclusive list of recreational activities found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. No exception to the TRUS was found to apply. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that golf is not an activity like those listed at Section 102 of the TRUS. Plaintiffs argue further that the fact Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course means Defendant is not entitled to immunity. We hold, inter alia, that golf is sufficiently comparable to Section 102 enumerated activities, particularly hiking, sightseeing, and target shooting, such that Defendant is entitled to immunity under the TRUS. In addition, the fact that Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course is not dispositive because the TRUS has no applicable consideration exception. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Poplar Avenue 1856 Center, LLC v. Nexus Exxon, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves a commercial lease of property operated as a convenience store in Memphis. The lease provided that it was to be construed and enforced in accordance with Georgia law. The lease was for an initial term of ten years, but it provided that the tenant had the option to renew the lease for two additional terms of five years commencing at the expiration of the initial term. Near the end of the initial ten-year term, the landlord sent a notice of nonrenewal to the tenant, notifying the tenant that the lease was scheduled to expire because the tenant had failed to timely exercise the option to renew it. One week later, the tenant sent the landlord written notice of its intent to exercise the option to extend the lease for an additional five years. The tenant’s letter asserted that the provision of the lease regarding when notice was to be provided “[did] not make any sense” and informed the landlord that the tenant was thereby exercising the option. The landlord filed this lawsuit, asking the trial court to hold that the lease had expired by its terms when the tenant did not timely exercise the option to extend it, and therefore, the landlord was entitled to possession of the property and a judgment for rent at the holdover rate provided in the lease. The tenant filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that the lease was ambiguous but that the only reasonable interpretation of the lease was that notice of intent to exercise the option was due ninety days before the end of the initial term. Because the tenant failed to provide notice by that date, the trial court concluded that the initial term of the lease expired, the landlord was entitled to possession, and the tenant was liable for holdover rent and attorney fees. The tenant appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
ROBYN HURVITZ V. WILLIAM SMITH, ET AL
A self-represented defendant moved to recuse the trial judge. This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal filed after the trial court’s denial of the motion. We dismiss the appeal because the defendant failed to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County et al. v. Bill Lee et al. (Dissenting in part)
I write separately to address what I consider to be an erroneous reading of Article VII, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution (the “Article”), which provides, in relevant part: The legislative body shall not exceed twenty-five members . . . Any county organized under the consolidated government provision of Article XI, Section 9, of this Constitution shall be exempt from having a county or legislative body as described in this paragraph. (Emphases added). It is undisputed that Metro qualifies for the exemption contained in the Article. The obvious reason for exempting a consolidated government from the restriction on the size of its membership is to accommodate the far larger population of a consolidated government as compared to a single county or municipality. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Cooper Hearn, as Trustee of the Cooper Family Trust v. Sharon Thomas f/k/a Sharon W. Cooper as Trustee of the Cooper Family Trust
In granting appellee’s motion to amend her petition over appellant’s objection, the trial court did not consider any of the factors relevant to a trial court’s determination of whether to grant a motion to amend. In the absence of any explanation in the trial court’s order concerning the basis for its decision, we are unable to conduct a meaningful review of whether the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion to amend. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order granting appellee leave to amend her petition and pretermit the remaining issues on appeal. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE ESTATE OF TIMOTHY R. CURTIS
This appeal arises from a verified claim against an estate seeking the repayment of a purported loan made to the decedent by his mother. The decedent’s surviving girlfriend, as executrix of the estate, claimed the funds provided to the decedent by his mother were a gift as opposed to a loan. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the funds were a loan and entered an order in favor of the mother. The estate timely appeals to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County et al. v. Bill Lee et al.
A three-judge panel was convened in this case to determine the constitutionality of 2023 Tennessee Public Chapter 21. While the case was pending, the trial court temporarily stayed implementation of subsection 1(b) of the legislation, the result of which was that the deadlines contained therein were rendered moot. In considering competing summary judgment motions, the trial court unanimously ruled that subsection 1(a) of the act was not also moot. In a divided decision, however, the trial court concluded that the legislation violated two provisions of the Tennessee Constitution: the home rule amendment and a clause exempting metropolitan governments from a twenty-five-member cap on county legislative bodies. Both parties appeal. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that subsection 1(a) is not moot. We reverse, however, its conclusion that the statute is barred by either constitutional provision at issue |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Pepper Black et al. v. Theresa Baldwin
The plaintiffs initiated this action based upon multiple theories of speech-related torts and emotional distress in response to the defendant’s statements made on her social media concerning them and their business. The defendant moved for dismissal, citing the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-17-101, et seq. The trial court dismissed the action, finding that the TPPA applied and operated to protect her right to free speech and to petition. We now affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Kyuhwan Hwang v. Jerry Quezada Arita, et al.
The trial court dismissed this case without prejudice after determining that the plaintiff failed to properly respond to the defendant’s discovery requests for over a year despite multiple extensions. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
JAMES ANDREW FISHER v. HAILEY ANN DAVIS
A mother appeals from the trial court’s decision regarding custody of her two minor children. However, because the mother filed a motion to recuse the trial court judge on which he failed to rule before entering a final order on the merits of the case, the judgment of the trial court must be vacated and remanded for further proceedings. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
DR. DAVID BRUCE COFFEY v. BUCKEYE HOME HEALTH CENTER, INC.
In the Circuit Court for Scott County (“the Trial Court”), Dr. David Bruce Coffey filed a complaint alleging that Buckeye Home Health Center, Inc. (“Buckeye”) breached its lease agreement with Dr. Coffey by failing to obtain fire insurance coverage on its leased portion of Dr. Coffey’s building. The building burned down during Buckeye’s tenancy. Buckeye filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was impossible to obtain fire insurance coverage for only a portion of the building as required by the lease. The Trial Court granted Buckeye’s motion. Dr. Coffey appealed. Upon our review, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact and reverse the Trial Court’s order dismissing Dr. Coffey’s complaint. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
ELEVATION OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, LLC v. CITY OF PIGEON FORGE, TENNESSEE
The plaintiff, Elevation Outdoor Advertising, LLC (“Elevation”), submitted six applications for billboard sign permits to the defendant, the City of Pigeon Forge, Tennessee (“the City”), and all six were denied by the City’s Planning Commission. In this action, Elevation sought a judgment (1) declaring the City’s former sign regulation ordinance and temporary moratorium on sign permits void and unenforceable, (2) declaring the City’s new sign regulation ordinance inapplicable, and (3) compelling the City by injunction or writ of mandamus to issue permits for Elevation’s proposed signs. Upon the City’s motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed Elevation’s complaint with prejudice. The trial court determined that the proper relief for Elevation would have been via common law certiorari review, for which Elevation had not met the procedural requirements of timeliness and filing under oath. Elevation has appealed. Upon careful review, we determine that Elevation’s complaint properly stated a claim for declaratory judgment rather than writ of certiorari. We therefore reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Elevation’s complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Court of Appeals | ||
BENJAMIN MCCURRY v. AGNESS MCCURRY
This appeal arises from an order of protection issued against the appellant/defendant, Agness McCurry, in Washington County Circuit Court case 42482. Although the defendant raises numerous issues and the record contains numerous documents that pertain to other cases filed in the general sessions and circuit court of Washington County, as well as federal court, in which defendant sued almost every judge in Washington County, this opinion is limited to Washington County Circuit Court case 42482. The defendant contends the order of protection was issued in violation of Tennessee law, constitutional due process, and judicial conduct standards. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
JOHN SCHMEECKLE v. HAMILTON COUNTY, TN ET AL.
Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to alter or amend was untimely and did not toll the time limit for filing his notice of appeal. As such, Appellant’s notice of appeal is untimely, and the appeal is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Heatley et al. v. Estate of David G. Gaither et al.
Appellants have filed three related lawsuits against appellee and other entities. Here, appellants claim a continuing nuisance stemming from the alleged discharge, onto appellants’ property, of e. coli-contaminated wastewater from a dismantled septic system, which previously serviced appellee’s property. In a previous appeal, this Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the appellees on appellants’ claim of trespass based on our finding of an existing easement appurtenant for the septic system. As relevant here, the trial court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on appellants’ claim of nuisance, and they appeal. Because appellants have failed to meet their burden of proof, at the summary judgment stage, to show that there is leaching of contaminated wastewater onto their property, they have failed to establish the existence of the nuisance averred in their complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of appellee’s motion for summary judgment. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Heather Marie Bailey v. Daniel Michael Bailey
Father and Mother divorced. In ruling upon various matters contested by the parties, the trial court evenly divided Father’s pension without determining whether a portion was separate property, awarded Mother rehabilitative alimony, and named Mother as the primary residential parent. Father appeals, asserting error as to all three determinations. We conclude that the trial court erred in failing to treat the pre-marriage portion of the pension as separate property. As for the trial court’s alimony award and primary residential parent decision, the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. Accordingly, we vacate the portions of the trial court’s order regarding the classification and division of assets, alimony, and primary residential status and remand. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Cory Randolph Cox v. Rebecca Lynne Thumm Cox
In this post-divorce action, the father sought a reduction of his child support obligation because he had recently lost his employment and two of the parties’ three minor children had become emancipated. Following a two-day hearing, the trial court removed the parties’ two emancipated children from the child support worksheet but increased the father’s child support payment upon finding that the father was willfully unemployed and imputing to him a salary commensurate with his previous wages. In calculating the father’s new child support obligation, the trial court considered the father’s recent tax information, his frequent job changes, his residential arrangements, his long-term failure to exercise his full weekend parenting time with the children, and the cost of his leisure travel. The trial court also imputed the proscribed statutory salary amount to the mother, who was not employed at the time of trial. Although both parties appeared pro se at the trial, the trial court entered an order granting the mother’s request for attorney’s fees without including an explanation of how the court determined the reasonableness of the fees. The father has appealed. Despite his pro se status before this Court, the father seeks attorney’s fees on appeal, claiming that an out-of-state attorney prepared his appellate briefs. Upon thorough review, we deny the father’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal because the attorney who allegedly prepared the father’s briefs did not sign the briefs or otherwise file an appearance with this Court as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the mother and remand that issue to the trial court for a written order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. In all other respects, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
ROHIT UPPAL v. NEERA UPPAL
A self-represented defendant in a divorce case moved to recuse the trial judge. After the trial judge denied the motion, this accelerated interlocutory appeal followed. Because the motion for recusal failed to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the denial of the motion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Gladys Claire Bowen v. Michael W. Nelson, M.D., et al.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to exclude the testimony of her proffered expert for failure to comply with the locality rule. Plaintiff also appeals the grant of summary of judgment based on the exclusion of that expert. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony, we affirm that ruling. Additionally, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment as the excluded testimony was the only evidence offered regarding the applicable standard of care. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline Payne v. Shelby County, Tennessee et al.
This is an appeal from a trial court’s award of damages to the plaintiff after a bench trial in an auto accident case. The trial court declined to award the plaintiff all of the damages she sought because it concluded that her most significant injury, a torn rotator cuff, was not caused by the auto accident at issue. The plaintiff then filed a motion to recuse and to set aside the judgment due to a friendship between the trial judge’s son and counsel for the defendant, but the trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Hutson Boone v. Paul Dale Boone
The main issues in this post-divorce appeal concern the trial court’s rulings on the parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. In addition to the post-divorce proceedings, the husband filed a declaratory judgment petition to determine the amount he owed the wife under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”). The husband and the wife then engaged in protracted litigation to determine the amount owed. The husband later amended the declaratory judgment petition to include a request to modify alimony. The parties resolved the declaratory judgment petition by providing the trial court with an amount upon which they agreed. The husband then voluntarily nonsuited the petition to modify alimony. Both parties sought an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the MDA. The trial court determined that the husband was the successful party in the declaratory judgment action and that there was no successful party in the request to modify alimony. The court declined to award either party attorney’s fees. The wife appealed, asserting that she was the successful party in both actions and that the court should have awarded her attorney’s fees to her. The wife also challenged discovery sanctions entered against her. First, we determine that the declaratory judgment action did not fall under the fee provision of the parties’ MDA. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the husband to be the successful party in that action; we affirm the portion of the order declining to award either party attorney’s fees. Next, based upon a recent decision of our Supreme Court, we determine that the wife was the successful party in the petition to modify alimony and reverse the trial court’s decision to the contrary. We affirm the imposition of discovery sanctions. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
