Genash, LLC v. Rose Legacy, LLC as successor in interest to Agnoletti Properties, LLC
In this commercial lease dispute, the tenant sued the landlord for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement, and the landlord counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial court granted the tenant’s motion for partial summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, concluding that the landlord breached the lease. The matter then proceeded to trial, where the jury returned a verdict on a list of issues, including damages on the tenant’s breach of contract claim, the landlord’s defenses to the breach of contract claim, the tenant’s fraudulent inducement claim, and the landlord’s breach of contract claim against the tenant. The jury found in favor of the tenant on both of its claims against the landlord but only awarded damages on the breach of contract claim. The jury concluded that the landlord had not proven its breach of contract claim. We have determined that the trial court erred in granting the tenant’s motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and, therefore, reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE AZALAYA J.
This action involves the termination of the parents’ parental rights to their minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish statutory grounds of termination as applied to each parent. The court found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the court’s termination decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE KANIEL Y.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish at least one statutory ground of termination. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court’s termination decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Helena Agri Enterprises, LLC v. Ted Rains d/b/a AG Services
Appellee filed a complaint against Appellant over a contract dispute, and Appellant failed to timely file a responsive pleading. The trial court granted a default judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant filed a motion for the trial court to set aside the default judgment, and the trial court denied that motion. On appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the default judgment by failing to properly consider all relevant factors and by disregarding an issue related to venue. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
JESSICA GARVIN v. MARIAH SHELTON
On remand from this Court, Appellant filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs in the trial court. As the basis for her motion, Appellant relied on Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119 (contemplating an award of attorney’s fees to a party on grant of his or her Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss), and on this Court’s mandate from the first appeal, wherein we remanded the case to the trial court for, inter alia, “collection of costs.” The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Jones-Mbuyi et al. v. Jill Fitcheard et al.
In this declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, the trial court allowed the Tennessee Attorney General to intervene on behalf of the State of Tennessee (“the State”). However, instead of allowing intervention for the limited purpose of defending the statute’s constitutionality, the trial court ordered that the State be made a party defendant in the action, thereby invoking the requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-18-101(a) that a three-judge panel be appointed. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Determining that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24, we vacate the trial court’s order directing the State’s intervention as a party defendant. We remand this matter to the trial court to determine whether the State is a necessary party or whether the State should be allowed to intervene for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-312. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Jones-Mbuyi et al. v. Jill Fitcheard et al. (Dissenting)
Appellants Kimberly Jones-Mbuyi and Horwitz Law, PLLC challenge the constitutionality of a provision of Tennessee Code Annotated § 38-8-312 and a provision of the Code of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. The question presented by this appeal is whether the State of Tennessee must be a party to the Appellants’ declaratory judgment action. The majority concludes that the State may intervene for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of the statute consistent with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24; yet it remands for a determination of whether the State is a necessary party. Because the State is not a necessary party, I would reverse the trial court with instructions to permit the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter to intervene on behalf of the State for the limited purpose of defending the statute’s constitutionality. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
JEFF HURST v. CITY OF MORRISTOWN
This is a Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) case, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101, et seq., alleging negligent operation of a street sweeper by a city employee. The trial court denied the city’s claims of immunity and entered judgment after a nonjury trial, apportioning 51 percent fault to the city’s employee who was driving the street sweeper and 49 percent fault to the driver of the pickup truck that was involved in a collision with the sweeper. The city appealed. We affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE WALTER G. ET AL.
Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interests of their three younger children. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Mother and Father committed severe abuse against a child and that the children’s best interests are served by termination, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
RENEGADE MOUNTAIN COMMUNITY CLUB, INC. v. MOY TOY, LLC
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for recusal of the trial judge. After carefully reviewing the limited record provided by the parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the motion. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
SETH DOWNING v. KNOX COUNTY BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS ET AL.
This appeal arises out of a local planning commission’s approval of a development plan application. The Plaintiff sought to appeal the planning commission’s approval of the application to the local board of zoning appeals; however, a local zoning ordinance permitted the plan applicant to opt out of the appeal before the board of zoning appeals, which he did. The plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the circuit court, challenging the planning commission’s approval of the application and the dismissal of his appeal by the board of zoning appeals. The plaintiff claimed that the opt-out provision violates his constitutional right; thus, by applying the opt-out provision, the board of zoning appeals acted illegally. The circuit court dismissed the petition, holding that the plaintiff impermissibly combined an original action with a petition for certiorari review. The circuit court also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim regarding the planning commission’s actions because the plaintiff did not sufficiently verify his petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Charlene Dreaden v. White & Rhodes, P.C.
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the petition, the appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Ferguson v. State of Tennessee
Following an automobile accident allegedly involving a State of Tennessee employee, claimant sought damages against the State based on alleged injuries arising from the accident. The Division of Claims and Risk Management denied the claim, and claimant appealed to the Claims Commission. Because claimant’s appeal was not filed within the ninety-day statutory time limit, the Claims Commission dismissed it. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Yvonne Bertrand v. Carlex Glass America, LLC
An employee discharged in a reduction-in-force claimed her employer discriminated against her. The trial court determined that the employee was unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and granted summary judgment to the employer. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn Summers-O'Rourke v. Patrick O'Rourke, Jr.
In this post-divorce proceeding, Appellant initiated a contempt action against Appellee for failure to make two alimony payments, as required under the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). After Appellee remitted payment, the sole issue to be tried was the amount of attorney’s fees Appellant expended enforcing the MDA. Appellant sought $14,289.50 in attorney’s fees and $396.36 in expenses. The trial court awarded her $2,500.00. Because the trial court made limited findings and failed to consider Rule 1.5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, we vacate its award of attorney’s fees. On remand, the trial court is instructed to reconsider Appellant’s attorney’s fee award in view of the Rule 1.5(a) factors and to make written findings consistent with these factors. Husband’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is denied. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Edwin Rushton v. Whitney Brooke Rushton
In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Father seeks to appeal the denial of his motion to recuse the trial court judge. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Joy Francine Mitchell Byrd v. Samuel Byrd, Jr.
Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sally McIver v. Keith Dessinger
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B by the defendant, Keith Dessinger, concerning his motion seeking recusal of the trial court judge. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Mr. Dessinger, we determine it to be fatally deficient. We therefore dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brady Daniels Et Al. v. Vince Trotter
In this constitutional challenge involving a non-judicial foreclosure, the trial court determined that Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-5-106 is not unconstitutional as applied because the City of Chattanooga acted in a proprietary capacity when it conducted a non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust. Thus, only private conduct is at issue and constitutional rights are not implicated. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jill Cheri Howe v. Donovan Todd Howe
This is a post-divorce civil contempt action stemming from a divorce that was finalized in 2014. At the hearing on the contempt petition in February 2024, the husband moved the trial court to dismiss the petition because the parties’ marital dissolution agreement was not in the record. The trial court granted this motion but later, upon motion by the wife, set aside the 2014 final decree pursuant to Rule 60.01. The trial court re-entered the final decree, nunc pro tunc, with the marital dissolution agreement attached. From this order, the husband timely appeals to this Court. We reverse. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Clarksville Montgomery County Education Association v. Clarksville Montgomery County Board of Education
In 2020, a local board of education adopted changes to its student code of conduct requiring, among other things, that teachers participate in a student discipline policy and engage in social and emotional learning support. The local teachers’ association filed suit, arguing that the board of education was required to engage in collaborative conferencing with the teachers’ association before adopting the changes because they constituted “working conditions” under the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011, Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-608(a). The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the teachers’ association. We reverse. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Gayla Henry v. Property Listing and Management Agency, Et Al.
In the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”), Gayla Henry filed a motion to vacate two 2019 judgments entered by the General Sessions Court for Washington County (“the General Sessions Court”) in favor of Jesse Street and Property Listing and Rental Agency (“Property Listing”) and to re-open a case dismissed by the Trial Court in 2020. She named Mr. Street; Property Listing; Robert Stacy, sole proprietor of Property Listing; and Kristi Shepard, a real estate agent employed by Property Listing (“Defendants”) as defendants in her motion. She alleged that the 2019 judgments had been procured through fraud by opposing counsel. The Trial Court denied the motion to vacate. Ms. Henry appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm and grant Defendants’ request for attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Skidmore Camm Garrett v. Jona McKeehan Garrett
A husband and wife disputed the value of the husband’s business for purposes of equitably dividing the marital estate in their divorce. The trial court adopted a value proposed by the wife’s expert. Because we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
VERNON LOWE v. ELISHA HARVEY
This appeal concerns service of process. Vernon Lowe (“Plaintiff”) sued Elisha Harvey (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) for personal injuries sustained in a car accident. Defendant lives out of state. Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendant via the Tennessee Secretary of State. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting insufficient service of process. The attempted service on Defendant occurred during the Covid-19 pandemic, when the signature requirement for return receipt mail was suspended by the postal service. The signature space on the proof of delivery shows “E Harvey” handwritten with “MRC1C19” underneath. Plaintiff does not argue that this represents Defendant’s signature. Instead, Plaintiff argues that his service upon the Secretary of State was sufficient in itself. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Calvin Leroy Whitehead
After the death of Calvin Leroy Whitehead, his daughter, Regina Whitehead, petitioned to probate the decedent’s December 2015 will and for permission to sell the decedent’s residence. The probate court admitted the will to probate and letters testamentary were issued to Ms. Whitehead as the executrix. The court also granted permission to sell the residence. Thereafter, the decedent’s step-niece, Elizabeth Otto, filed an intervening petition to probate a purportedly more recent will, from March 2016. The estate answered the petition, alleging fraud and, in its amended answer, requested attorney’s fees in defending the petition. The estate then filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the proffered will was a copy, with no explanation as to the absence of the original, that the post-death affidavits were not valid. The day before her scheduled deposition, Ms. Otto filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit of her petition. The estate responded by moving for an assessment of attorney’s fees and costs against Ms. Otto. The trial court then issued an order that dismissed Ms. Otto’s petition and denied the estate’s motion for attorney’s fees in defending the intervening petition. The estate appeals, arguing that the request for attorney’s fees in its motion to dismiss is a claim for affirmative relief that survives the dismissal. The estate also requests attorney’s fees under alternative legal grounds. For the reasons below, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the intervening petition and, finding no abuse of discretion, affirm the denial of attorney’s fees. We also deny the estate’s post-appeal Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 motion for sanctions, as well as Ms. Otto’s claim for attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |
