Amy Leanne Wilhite v. Seth Evan Wilhite
This post-divorce action concerns the distribution of proceeds from the sale of the parties’ former marital residence as specified in their marital dissolution agreement. The husband claimed a right under the MDA to, inter alia, one-half of the net proceeds, but the wife asserted that the MDA limited the husband’s equity interest to $40,000. The parties also disputed who was liable for income taxes, including interest and penalties, incurred and accruing after 2019, when the parties entered the MDA. Each party also asserted claims and entitlements to various credits and/or offsets resulting from the delay in the sale of the marital residence. The trial court held that the MDA limited the husband’s interest to $40,000. The court assessed $29,368.52 in post-divorce income taxes, including penalties and interest, against the husband. The court also ordered him to pay $20,543.10 for the wife’s attorney’s fees per the MDA’s fee-shifting provision. But the court granted the husband’s request for reimbursement for the cost of repairs to the property and awarded the husband credit for one-half of the utilities that he paid pending the sale of the property. The husband appeals, raising several issues. We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s finding that the MDA limited the husband’s equity interest to $40,000. We also conclude that the MDA obligated Husband to pay for all utilities and other expenses pending the sale of the property. For this reason, we reverse the trial court’s finding that Husband was entitled to a credit of one–half of those payments. Thus, we vacate the monetary awards that were based, in part, on these decisions, and remand with instructions to recalculate the parties’ respective entitlements to “the net proceeds.” We affirm the trial court in all other respects. We also find that the wife has a right to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal under § 15 of the MDA and remand with instructions for the trial court to make the appropriate award. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Lexington Charter, LP, et al. v. FBT of Tennessee, Inc.
This appeal arises from a dispute between a partnership and its limited partners concerning the payment of attorney’s fees under the parties’ limited liability agreement. The trial court held that the attorney’s fees were payable from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership’s property, and the limited partners appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rory Mills Sullivan v. AnneMarie Culp Allen, Individually, and as Trustee for The Tommy Ray Allen and AnneMarie Culp Allen Revocable Trust ET AL.
This appeal follows the dismissal of a proceeding brought in probate court. Because we cannot discern the basis for the trial court’s decision in the two orders that are at issue, we vacate both orders and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
24HR Home Buyers, LLC Et Al. v. Louis Roberts Et Al.
This appeal stems from a contract to purchase real property in Knox County, Tennessee, which ultimately fell through. The intended purchaser filed suit against the property owner seeking to enforce the contract. The property owner brought a counterclaim against the intended purchaser and a third-party claim against the intended purchaser’s principal averring that they fraudulently induced him to enter into the contract. After contentious litigation, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the property owner as a sanction for ongoing discovery abuses by the intended purchaser and its principal. The intended purchaser and its principal sought relief from the judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, which the trial court denied. Discerning no error by the trial court, we affirm |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John S. McMurtrie Et Al. v. Ransford Sarfo Et Al.
This is a consolidated appeal from the trial court’s denial of Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”) petitions filed by each of the named defendants in the underlying defamation lawsuit. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as to each defendant. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Willie Gordon v. Victor Murphy, et al.
Pro se Appellant, Willie Gordon, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on December 15, 2023. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tezozomoc Alcantar v. Dolgencorp, LLC
A shopper slipped and fell on a slippery liquid that was on a convenience store floor, resulting in injuries. The shopper sued the property owner. The property owner sought summary judgment, arguing the shopper had not provided sufficient evidence to establish how long the liquid had been on the floor prior to the slip and fall. The trial court granted summary judgment. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Steven Payne v. Estate of Wilmuth V. Groves Et Al.
In this probate matter, the plaintiff filed a petition to establish a lost will, submitting for admission to probate a copy of a handwritten document alleged to be the decedent’s holographic will. The trial court determined that the handwritten document met the requirements for a holographic will and that the plaintiff overcame the presumption of revocation afforded to a lost will. The decedent’s intestate heirs appealed. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Richard Wayne Penniman
This appeal arises out of the trial court’s removal of the appellant as co-personal representative of a probate estate. The appellant also appeals the trial court’s ruling that he forfeited his right to a share of the estate assets. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffery Riley v. State of Tennessee
A pro se litigant brought suit against the State of Tennessee in the Tennessee Claims Commission, where his suit was dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction and a failure to abide by the statute of limitations. We hold that the appellant has waived all issues on appeal by failing to set forth a legal argument, and we affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Victoria C. Jensen v. Tyler C. Jensen
In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court’s (1) distribution of the marital estate; (2) award to the wife of modifiable transitional alimony; and (3) two awards to the wife of alimony in solido, one for half of what the court found to be assets dissipated by the husband and one for attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting the divorce. The husband also appeals the trial court’s adoption of the wife’s proposed permanent parenting plan and a requirement that the husband attend in-person reunification therapy with the parties’ children in their home city of Chattanooga. Upon careful review, we determine that the trial court erred in failing to set a determinate time period for transitional alimony, and we accordingly modify the transitional alimony award to a five-year period. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. Exercising our discretion, we deny the wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kurt R. Et Al.
This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the statutory grounds of severe child abuse and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court’s termination decision. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Amiyah W. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the two minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) severe child abuse; (5) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also determined that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. As an initial matter, Mother asserts that, having surrendered her parental rights at the outset of the hearing (she later rescinded her surrender), the trial court was required to continue the hearing under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-112. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-112 does not require a trial court to either continue or delay a contested termination hearing when a parent surrenders his or her parental rights before or during the hearing. We reverse the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse. We affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights on all remaining grounds and on its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey L. Roberts v. Barry Lynn Carter, et al.
This is an appeal concerning the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, specifically to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-203, 29-20-204, and 29-20- 205 of the Act. At issue is the trial court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against a county government for damages sustained from an automobile accident allegedly caused by the washout of a road maintained by the county. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding the plaintiff’s claims under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-203 and 29-20-204. As to certain holdings the trial court made with respect to the pursuit of relief pursuant to section 29-20-205, we do not disturb the action of the trial court inasmuch as the plaintiff effectively abandons any reliance on that particular Code section on appeal. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Josephine H. et al.
This is a dependency and neglect case. Appellants/parents do not dispute the trial court’s finding that the children are dependent and neglected. Rather, the sole issue involves whether the trial court’s disposition, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-130, was made in compliance with section 37-1-130(c) and, if so, whether the placement of the children with their aunt was “best suited to the protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child[ren].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-130(a). Affirmed and remanded. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Brittany Lee-Ann Stanifer v. Derrick Tyler Stanifer
This appeal arises from a permanent parenting plan entered after the father requested a modification of the existing plan. The father argues that the trial court failed to properly weigh the evidence when establishing the plan. However, the plan did not include a determination of child support. Thus, the order appealed is not final, and we lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issue raised. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Millen v. Tennessee Department of Labor & Workforce Development, et al.
Pro se Appellant, Kevin Millen, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on April 19, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mia C.
There is much in the Majority Opinion with which I agree, including the reprehensibility of Father’s conduct toward Mother during their relationship and the inappropriate nature of his “discipline” of the Child. However, because the trial court relied heavily on witness credibility determinations in finding that the termination of Father’s parental rights was not in the Child’s best interest, I must respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion’s decision to terminate. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mia C.
I wholly concur with Judge Frierson’s well-reasoned conclusion that our de novo review of the underlying record in this case demonstrates that Mother and Stepfather have presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in Mia’s best interest. I write separately to address the important concerns raised by Judge Stafford in his thoughtful dissent. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Mia C.
This case involves termination of the parental rights of a biological father to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to support had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. However, the trial court declined to find that termination of the father’s rights was in the child’s best interest and accordingly denied the termination petition. The petitioners have appealed. Upon thorough review, we conclude that the trial court erred in its determination concerning the best interest analysis. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the termination petition, and we grant termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
SH Trelleborg Cadence, LLC v. Thomas Smythe et al.
Tenant appeals the trial court’s determination that (1) he breached his lease by failing to pay water bills for several years and (2) the apartment complex did not breach the lease by bringing the underlying eviction proceedings. The apartment complex also appeals the trial court’s grant of only some of its attorney’s fees. Because we conclude that there was no meeting of the minds regarding the payment for water services, we reverse the trial court’s finding of a breach of contract. We further determine that Cadence is entitled to quantum meruit relief, and we remand for a determination of the reasonable value of the utilities used by the tenant. We also vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and remand for the determination and calculation of those fees allowed. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Carlton J. Ditto v. City of Chattanooga Et Al.
This is an appeal from trial court proceedings in which a property owner sought to enjoin the City of Chattanooga from demolishing a condemned house. Because the property owner has since sold the property at issue to a third-party purchaser who is now renovating the property, the original property owner no longer has standing, and the issues he attempts to raise are moot. This appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen H. Bills Et Al. v. Joe B. Barton Et Al.
Litigation arose in connection with a dispute over an option agreement to purchase property. The parties agreed to settle the case and to allow a Tennessee-licensed real estate appraiser to set the purchase price. The purchasers, however, moved to set aside the price set by the appraiser. Relying on the opinions of a licensed real estate broker and a different licensed appraiser, the purchasers argued that the appraiser’s valuation deviated from the required professional standards to such an extent that it fell below the relevant standard of care. The trial court denied the motion, concluding: (1) the purchasers could not under the settlement agreement challenge the appraisal; (2) even if they could, the real estate broker’s lack of an appraisal license rendered him per se incompetent to testify; and (3) the purchasers failed to provide a declaration from their expert licensed real estate appraiser stating that the appraisal had not been conducted in accordance with professional standards. In response to a motion to alter or amend, the trial court judge recognized that the purchasers had, in fact, provided such a declaration, but, nevertheless, denied their motion. The purchasers appeal. We conclude that the purchasers can challenge the appraiser’s evaluation on the limited basis that he allegedly departed from the professional standard of care. We also conclude the Tennessee licensed real estate broker not holding a Tennessee real estate appraiser’s license does not per se render his testimony incompetent. We also conclude that even assuming the testimony from the real estate broker is inadmissible, the purchasers have presented evidence that the appraisal was not conducted in accordance with professional standards. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for the trial court to reassess the admissibility of the real estate broker’s testimony and to determine whether the appraiser violated the professional standard of care. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Taurick Boyd v. City of Memphis ET AL
Appellee’s employment as a City of Memphis Firefighter was terminated based on an offensive post to Appellee’s Facebook page. After receiving notice of his termination, Appellee requested an appeal hearing with the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission. Following the hearing, the Commissioner issued a decision affirming the termination, and Appellee sought review in the trial court. The trial court reversed the Commissioner’s decision, finding that substantial and material evidence did not support the decision, and that the decision was arbitrary and capricious and made in violation of Appellee’s right to equal protection. The City of Memphis appeals. We vacate the trial court’s decision reversing the Commission’s termination of Appellee’s employment. The case is remanded to the trial court for entry of an order vacating the Commissioner’s decision and ordering further proceedings in compliance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tucker R. Et Al.
The Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Meliah B. (“Mother”) to her children, Tucker R., Gracelynn R., and Roland R. (“the Children”). Mother has appealed, challenging only the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals |
