Patricia Frias v. Felipe Frias, Et Al.
Ex-husband appeals the entry in a Tennessee Chancery Court of an order authenticating a judgment entered against him in his California divorce proceeding; the judgment also imposed a constructive trust on real property he purchased in Tennessee in violation of orders of the California court. We discern no error in the judgment of the Chancery Court and accordingly, affirm. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Grady Cunningham, Et Al. v. Bedford County, Tennessee, Et Al.
A landowner filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that the Bedford County Board of Commissioners’ denial of his request to rezone his property was arbitrary and capricious, violated his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, constituted a regulatory taking, and that the Commission violated the Tennessee Open Meetings Act when it met with its counsel prior to taking the vote. The landowner requested compensatory damages for the manner in which his application to rezone his property was handled and compensation for the taking of his property. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the Commission’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and violated the landowner’s due process rights; the court ordered the property rezoned from residential to commercial and awarded the landowner damages. The court held that there had been no regulatory taking and no violation of the Open Meetings Act. Both parties appeal. Upon review, we have determined that the court erred in holding that the Commission’s decision to deny the application for rezoning was arbitrary and capricious and in ordering the property rezoned; in holding that the landowner’s due process rights were violated and in awarding damages and attorney fees to the landowner; we affirm the decision in all other respects. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Colton B.
This is a parental termination case. The trial court terminated the parental rights of a mother based on the statutory grounds of severe child abuse, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. The mother appeals. We reverse in part, with respect to one ground for termination, but otherwise affirm the trial court’s order terminating parental rights and remand for further proceedings. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Edward Poole v. Dealers Warehouse Corporation, Et Al.
This appeal concerns punitive damages. Skyco Staffing Services, Inc. (“Skyco”) provided Derrick Gilbert (“Gilbert”) to Dealers Warehouse Corporation (“Dealers”) for temporary work. On February 14, 2014, Gilbert was driving a Dealers truck when he collided with a truck driven by Charles Edward Poole (“Poole”). Poole1 sued Gilbert, Dealers, and later Skyco for damages in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”).2 Dealers filed a third-party claim against one-time Skyco affiliate People 2.0 Global, LLC (“People 2.0”), as well. Skyco and People 2.0 filed motions for summary judgment, which were granted. The jury returned a verdict for Poole against Dealers and Gilbert for compensatory damages of $431,508.71. In a second phase, the Trial Court directed a verdict in favor of Dealers regarding punitive damages. Finally, the jury returned a verdict for Poole against Gilbert in the amount of $250,000 in punitive damages. Poole appeals, arguing he is entitled to joint and several judgment against Dealers for the punitive damages assessed against Gilbert. Dealers, for its part, argues both that the Trial Court was correct and that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether it exercised supervision of Gilbert. We hold, inter alia, that Dealers is not jointly and severally liable for punitive damages assessed separately against Gilbert. We hold further that Dealers’ exclusive supervisory responsibility for Gilbert was laid out in unambiguous contractual terms. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ivan Michael Kanski v. Kelly Jean Kanski
This case involves a contentious divorce between parties who share one minor child. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The husband appealed raising numerous issues related to property classification, valuation, and division. He also challenges the alimony awards and child support determination. After our review of the record, we determine that the trial court erroneously set the husband’s income for the purpose of child support, and we therefore remand the case for a new determination of the husband’s income and calculation of his child support obligation. We affirm the trial court’s decision in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jonathan M.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to one child. The juvenile court found three statutory grounds for termination: (1) abandonment for failure to visit by an incarcerated parent; (2) abandonment by wanton disregard for the welfare of a child by an incarcerated parent; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child. The court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Marcella Ann Brecker v. Steven Charles Brecker
Husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony to Wife, as well as the trial court’s division of the parties’ 2017 tax refund. The trial court determined that Wife’s need was in the range of $17,500.00 per month and awarded Wife $15,000.00 per month in alimony in futuro, as well as $3,500.00 per month in rehabilitative alimony. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Wife’s need is in the range of $17,500.00 per month. We also affirm the trial court’s award of $15,000.00 per month in alimony in futuro. We vacate, however, the award of rehabilitative alimony and the division of the parties’ 2017 tax refund and remand for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Angie Renee Larsen v. George Giannakoulias
This is a divorce case. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision regarding: (1) the parenting plan for the minor children; (2) the enforcement of the parties’ prenuptial agreement in its denial of Husband’s request for alimony and a portion of Wife’s retirement accounts; and (3) the designation and division of property. Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, we vacate the trial court’s order enforcing the waiver of spousal support provision of the parties’ prenuptial agreement. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed, and the case is remanded for determination of whether alimony is warranted in this case and, if so, the amount thereof. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn Nicole Brown v. Tyler Matthew Brown
In this divorce action, the wife was shown to be economically disadvantaged compared to the husband, and the trial court awarded to the wife a slightly greater share of the marital estate in addition to rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $4,000.00 per month for a period of four years. The husband has appealed. Although we conclude that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed, we also modify that judgment to include an indemnification clause in the husband’s favor regarding the mortgage on the marital residence. We further grant the wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred in defending this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Langston Ford-Lincoln-Mer v. Corey Lea
This is a parental termination case. The juvenile court declined to terminate father’s parental rights, but it found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate mother’s on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and abandonment by willful failure to support. The juvenile court further found that termination was in the best interests of the children. We reverse as to the former two grounds, but affirm as to the latter two and further find that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Francis R. Et Al.
This is a parental termination case. The juvenile court declined to terminate father’s parental rights, but it found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate mother’s on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and abandonment by willful failure to support. The juvenile court further found that termination was in the best interests of the children. We reverse as to the former two grounds, but affirm as to the latter two and further find that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Dana Harper v. Annette Carrol Harper
This is a divorce case. Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of three tracts of land as Wife’s separate property and its valuation of Husband’s bank account. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon Burks, et al. v. Savannah Industrial Development Corporation of the City of Savannah, Tennessee
Appellants, owners of property near a proposed industrial park site, appeal the trial court’s grant of Appellee Savannah Industrial Development Corporation’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion. Appellants sought a declaratory judgment precluding the City of Savannah and, specifically, its industrial development corporation, from purchasing land outside the city’s corporate limits for development of an industrial park for the benefit of both the city and Hardin County. The trial court applied the Industrial Development Corporations Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-53-101, et seq. and the Industrial Park Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-16-201, et seq. and found that there was no prohibition against the industrial development corporation’s actions. The trial court, therefore, granted the industrial development corporation’s motion to dismiss and awarded the corporation its attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20- 12-119(c)(1). Because the industrial development corporation is a “governmental entity,” we hold that the trial court was precluded from awarding attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Destine Johnson, Et Al. v. General Motors Corporation, Et Al.
In this appeal, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to prevent new cars sold in Canada from being imported into Tennessee and the rest of the United States in violation of Tennessee’s antitrust and consumer protection laws. The plaintiffs contended that new car prices in Canada are significantly lower than prices for the same cars in the United States and that the effect of the conspiracy was to restrict competition and maintain significantly higher prices. The trial court approved a settlement agreement and dismissed the case with prejudice against certain defendants. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
City of Church Hill v. Roger Elliott
Roger Elliott (“Elliott”) appeals the January 23, 2018 order of the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) holding that Elliott had violated Church Hill Municipal Ordinance No. 11-101 and assessing a civil penalty of $25.00 against Elliott for the violation. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding that Elliott violated Church Hill Municipal Ordinance No. 11-101. We, therefore, affirm |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Christian S.
At issue in this appeal is the custody of an 8-year-old boy. On one side is his maternal grandmother and her husband, who have raised the child since he was one year old, pursuant to a court order placing him in their custody. On the other side is the child’s father, who was incarcerated at the time the child was placed with his grandparents. When the father was released from incarceration, he filed a petition seeking visitation with the child; over the course of proceedings, he sought custody of the child. The juvenile court awarded custody to the father, holding that the he did not forfeit his superior parental rights and that the grandparents did not prove that the child would suffer substantial harm in the father’s care and custody. The grandparents appeal; finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Natascha B
A father appeals the termination of parental rights to his daughter. The juvenile court found three statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by willful failure to visit, abandonment by willful failure to support, and substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans. The court also found that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. On appeal, DCS declines to defend the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit. We conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to all of the statutory grounds found with respect to the father. Thus, we reverse the termination of the father’s parental rights |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Bank of America v. Calvin Dee Aycock, et al.
This is a detainer action in which the plaintiff bank was awarded a judgment of possession of the defendant’s property in general sessions court. The defendant refused to vacate the property and appealed to the circuit court. The plaintiff bank sought summary judgment. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment and upheld the foreclosure sale. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lee A. Beaman v. Kelley Speer Beaman
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion for judicial recusal filed by Kelley Speer Beaman (“Wife”) in the parties’ high profile divorce proceedings. Having reviewed the Petition for Recusal Appeal filed by Wife, together with the supplement to the Petition and the response in opposition to the Petition filed by Lee A. Beaman (“Husband”), we conclude that the Trial Judge should have granted the motion. The Trial Judge in this case conducted an independent investigation into the facts surrounding how and when Wife’s Trial Brief came into the possession of the online media outlet known as Scoop: Nashville, and his comments on the record regarding the results of his investigation create an appearance of prejudice against Wife and her counsel that require the Trial Judge’s recusal. We therefore reverse the order of the Trial Court and remand the case for reassignment to a different judge. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
KT Group, LLC v. Robert Lowe Et Al.
This case involves a property dispute regarding a fifty-foot strip of land that was historically used for railroad purposes. KT Group, LLC (plaintiff) filed an action to quiet title, naming Robert Lowe and his wife, Velma Lowe, as defendants. Each side claims to own the strip of land in fee simple absolute. The trial court determined that plaintiff owned the land in fee simple. Defendants appealed. We affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: L.U.S.
In this termination of parental rights case, C.J.S. and K.R.S. (petitioners) filed a joint petition for adoption and petition to terminate the rights of C.C.S. (father) and W.J.N.R. (mother) with respect to their only child, L.U.S. Father joined the petition as a copetitioner, consenting to the termination of his rights and to the adoption of the child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate mother and father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and abandonment by failure to visit. By the same quantum of proof, the court found that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her rights. We vacate the court’s findings with respect to the ground of abandonment by failure to support; nevertheless, we affirm the court’s order terminating mother’s rights because there is clear and convincing evidence that termination is supported by the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and is in the best interest of L.U.S. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel James Finstad v. Jessica Ann Calfee Finstad
In this action for divorce, alimony was the only remaining issue at trial. After the hearing, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce declaring that wife is an economically disadvantaged spouse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f) and that husband is able to pay her alimony. The court held that there was no proof that wife was underemployed and no proof she could be rehabilitated; it therefore awarded wife alimony in futuro. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding wife alimony in futuro. We modify the trial court’s judgment so as to provide wife transitional alimony. As modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. We remand this case to the trial court with instructions. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Julie Ann Kendle v. Matthew Davis Kendle, Et Al.
This appeal arises from an Order for Conditional Judgment to enforce a routine garnishment of an obligor’s wages. The dispositive issue is whether an employer of an obligor has an affirmative duty to determine whether the aggregate amount of wages to be garnished from an obligor’s multiple employers exceeds the aggregate disposable earnings limits provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-106. An employer of the obligor, Blue Shield EMS (“Blue Shield”), was served with a garnishment while a pre-existing wage assignment of the obligor’s wages from another employer was still in effect. Although none of the obligor’s wages from Blue Shield had been previously garnished, Blue Shield filed an answer to the garnishment stating, “We cannot process any deductions from [the obligor’s] paycheck at this time due to his total income already being garnished greater than 25%.” Upon motion of the obligor’s former wife for a conditional judgment, the trial court found that “Blue Shield did not have a valid legal reason for failing to withhold twenty-five percent (25%) of the employee’s net wages” and ordered Blue Shield to pay into the court the wages that should have been garnished and to honor the garnishment going forward until the judgment was satisfied. Having determined that an employer has no duty to consider the aggregate effect of garnishments served on other employers when answering a garnishment, we affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Ricky L. Boren, et al. v. Hill Boren, PC, et al.
T. Robert Hill (“Hill”) and Hill Boren, P.C. (collectively “Defendants”) appeal the November 6, 2017 order of the Chancery Court for Madison County (“the Trial Court”) finding Defendants in civil contempt. Defendants raise multiple issues regarding whether Defendants received proper notice, whether damages may be awarded absent a finding of willful contempt, whether the Trial Court erred in awarding damages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-104, and whether the Trial Court erred in allowing Plaintiffs access to corporate documents. We find and hold that Defendants received sufficient notice, that damages may not be awarded absent a finding of willful contempt, that the Trial Court did not err in awarding damages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-104 for the willful failure to turn over a computer server, and that the Trial Court did not err in allowing access to corporate documents. We, therefore, vacate the awards of damages for failure to turn over the copy machine and failure to turn over the Copitraks. We affirm the Trial Court’s holding Defendants in civil contempt with regard to the failure to turn over the server and awarding damages for this contempt. The remainder of the Trial Court’s order is affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Leighanne Gordon v. Noah Adrian Gordon
In this post-divorce action, a mother filed a petition to modify the parenting plan, seeking modification of the residential parenting schedule. The father filed a counter-petition requesting that he be designated the primary residential parent. At the conclusion of the father’s direct examination, the mother moved for an involuntary dismissal of his counter-petition, arguing that he failed to prove a material change of circumstance that warranted a change in the primary residential parent. The trial court dismissed the father’s counter-petition and modified the residential parenting schedule. Because the trial court did not allow the father to complete his proof before granting the motion for involuntary dismissal, we vacate the trial court’s judgment in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
