In The Matter of Ian B. et al.
This is Father’s second appeal of the termination of his parental rights to the two children he had with his former wife (“Mother”). Father and Mother separated in 2008 when she moved from Alaska to Tennessee with the children, and they were granted a divorce in 2009. Father has not seen nor spoken with the children since 2008, and has not provided any financial support since November 2009. The petition to terminate Father’s parental rights was filed by Mother and her husband in 2012. In Father’s first appeal, we remanded the case in order to obtain a sufficient record for this court to review on appeal. In re Ian B., No. M2015-01079-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 2865875 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2016). On remand, the trial court found that the petitioners had proven grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and support and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. This appeal followed. Having determined that the record in this second appeal is sufficient for this court to conduct a proper review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Sheridan Nichols (formerly Crockett) v. Richard David Crockett, Jr.
This appeal results from a post-divorce criminal contempt conviction the plaintiff mother received for failing to adhere to a parenting plan that prohibits both parents from making disparaging remarks about the other parent. The trial court held that the plaintiff received sufficient notice under Rule 42(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and that she was guilty of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt for two separate instances of disparaging remarks made about the father in the presence of their children. We affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
ISI Holdings Of TN, LLC, et al. v. Mount Pleasant Regional Planning Commission, et al.
This is an appeal from a successful petition for a writ of certiorari involving land use. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners after finding that the location approved for the proposed power station violated an applicable zoning ordinance. After the trial court’s decision, the City of Mount Pleasant amended its ordinance to clarify that the zoning ordinance did not apply to public utilities. The City of Mount Pleasant Planning Commission thereafter approved the construction of the power station under the amended ordinance. The petitioners filed no writ of certiorari of the approval under the amended ordinance and therefore ask that this appeal be dismissed as moot. Because this case no longer serves to offer any meaningful relief to the parties and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine are present, we dismiss this appeal as moot. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
David C. Jayne v. Bass Annie Cosmetic Boat Repair
David C. Jayne (“Jayne”) appeals the trial court’s entry of a judgment against him for breach of contract for failure to pay Bass Annie Cosmetic Boat Repair (“Bass Annie”) for repairs made to his boat. Jayne entered into a contract with Bass Annie for the repair of his damaged boat. Before the agreed-upon repairs were completed, Jayne went to Bass Annie to check on the boat. After inspecting the boat, Jayne instructed Bass Annie to stop the repairs and return the boat to him. An argument ensued, and Jayne alleges he was assaulted by a Bass Annie employee. Both parties filed claims in the general sessions court which were subsequently appealed to circuit court. Following a de novo trial in the circuit court, the trial court dismissed Jayne’s claims and awarded Bass Annie damages for breach of contract for the work completed on the boat. Jayne appeals. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles E. Cunningham v. Tennessee Department of Commerce And Insurance, Insurance Division
This appeal involves the decision of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance (the “Commissioner”) to impose a civil fine and revoke the license of insurance agent Charles E. Cunningham (“Cunningham”), after concluding that Cunningham committed six (6) violations of applicable statutes in connection with his insurance practice. Cunningham filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the sufficiency of the evidence relied on by the Commissioner. The trial court found that the record supported the Commissioner’s decision and choice of penalty. Cunningham appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Outloud! INC. v. Dialysis Clinic, Inc., Et Al.
Appellant appeals the circuit court’s dismissal of its petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for a de novo review of an unlawful detainer action originally filed in general sessions court. The circuit court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion, dismissing Appellant’s petition on the ground that it was not timely filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-18-129 and Appellant did not have a sufficient excuse for filing the petition outside the 30 day statutory time period. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Annette Cecile Moore v. Brian Scott Moore
This is a post-divorce matter. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we observe that the case appealed from is not final. Given the absence of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jon Roozbeh Vazeen, AKA Hassan Vazin v. Michelle Smith Vazin
The trial court granted Wife a divorce; divided marital assets and liabilities; and awarded Husband five years of rehabilitative alimony. Husband appealed. Due to the deficiencies in Husband’s appellate brief, we do not reach Husband’s substantive issues and dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jon Roozbeh Vazeen, AKA Hassan Vazin v. Michelle Smith Vazin - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
I concur with the majority’s observation that “[g]iven the deficiencies in Husband[’s] brief,” we do not have the “[]ability to reach the substantive issues.” If we cannot reach the substantive issues — and I agree we cannot — I can only conclude that Husband’s appeal is “devoid of merit or . . . has no reasonable chance of success.” Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Goss et al., No E2010-01710-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1326234 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Apr. 7, 2011) (Susano, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Hence, by definition, this is a frivolous appeal. I would remand this case to the trial court for the purpose of holding a hearing to determine “just damages” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (2000). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Damon Holland v. Brian Sullivan, et al.
The issues in this appeal arise from two very unorthodox agreements and the defendants’ actions to avoid the consequences of the agreements. The agreements are unorthodox because, inter alia, each purports to be a “Bill of Sale” of an automobile when in fact each is a loan agreement for which the certificate of title is held by the lender as security. To complicate matters, the defendant who signed both agreements only owned one of the vehicles; his wife owned the other, and it is disputed whether the husband was authorized to act on her behalf. When the husband failed to pay either debt, the lender attempted unsuccessfully to possess the vehicles. Immediately thereafter, the husband and wife applied for and obtained new certificates of title and then used one of the duplicate titles to sell one of the automobiles to a third party. Thereafter, the lender commenced this action against the husband and wife for breach of contract, slander of title, and conspiracy to commit slander of title. The lender sought both compensatory and punitive damages. Following a bench trial, the court found the husband liable for breach of contract, and found the husband and wife jointly liable for slander of title and conspiracy to commit slander of title. The court then awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $32,456.89 and punitive damages in the amount of $30,000. The defendants appealed contending the trial court erred in failing to consider their affirmative defenses and in failing to hold that the Tennessee Title Pledge Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 45-15-101 to -120 barred any recovery. They also contend that the evidence does not support a finding that the husband breached the contract or that they were jointly liable for slander of title and for conspiracy to commit slander of title. They further argue the trial court erred in awarding punitive damages. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jordan Franklin-Mansuo, et al. v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc. d/b/a Saint Francis Hospital, et al.
This is a health care liability case. Appellant filed suit against Appellee, a medical doctor, alleging that Appellee’s supervision of a physician assistant fell below the standard of care, which resulted in the injury and death of Appellant’s mother. Appellee moved for summary judgment on the basis that Appellant had not provided competent expert testimony regarding the applicable standard of care or a causal link between Appellee’s actions and the subsequent injury and death of the patient at issue. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion due to Appellant’s lack of expert testimony to satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tennessee Walking Horse Forfeiture Litigation
This is the second appeal involving the attempted forfeiture of horses that had allegedly been the victims of animal abuse. The State appeals the trial court’s finding that Appellee owners had standing to contest the forfeiture and the grant of summary judgment to Appellee owners on the ground that the State failed to comply with applicable procedural requirements. We conclude that because Appellees are “owners” as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-702(3), they have standing to contest the forfeiture. We also conclude that the undisputed facts establish that the attempted forfeiture did not comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of the applicable forfeiture statutes. The trial court’s ruling is, therefore, affirmed. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn J. Reitz v. City of Mt. Juliet
Plaintiff alleged that the City of Mt. Juliet breached a settlement agreement with her by violating a non-disparagement agreement. Because Plaintiff failed to prove the existence of damages, summary judgment was appropriate. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re A.L.H., et al.
This is an appeal from an order finding two children of S.B. (mother) and R.H. (father) to be the victims of severe child abuse in the couple’s care and control. On July 24, 2015, the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) received a referral alleging, in part, that the parties’ three children, A.L.H., A.G.B., and A.R.B. (collectively the children), were drug-exposed. On August 27, 2015, the children underwent hair follicle drug testing. A.G.B. and A.R.B. tested positive for methamphetamine. A.L.H. was negative for all substances. On September 23, 2015, DCS filed a petition to declare the children dependent and neglected. Mother and father stipulated that the children were dependent and neglected, but they expressly did not agree with the finding of severe child abuse. The Juvenile Court for Wayne County (the juvenile court) entered an order finding A.G.B. and A.R.B. to be the victims of severe abuse. Mother and father appealed to the Circuit Court for Wayne County (the trial court). On July 14, 2016, the trial court entered an order finding A.G.B. and A.R.B. to be the victims of severe child abuse in the care and control of mother and father. Mother and father appeal. We affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Allstate Insurance Company v. Kaigler & Associates, Inc.
Declaratory judgment action in which an insurance company seeks a determination of its coverage obligations arising out of a business insurance policy it issued relative to a class action suit brought against the insured for sending unsolicited faxes in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in part, holding that the insurance company had no duty to indemnify under the “accidental event” coverage or the “personal injury” coverage, that the company had a duty to defend under the “advertising injury” coverage, and that the company had a duty to defend against all claims. The insured filed a motion to alter or amend, which was denied by the court. On appeal, the insured argues that the court issued an improper advisory opinion, erred in holding the company had no duty to indemnify under the “accidental event” coverage, and abused its discretion by failing to consider new evidence proffered in the insured’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Savanna C.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the father, Jason C. (“Father”), to his minor child, Savanna C. (“the Child”), who was two years of age at the time of trial. The Child was born in 2014 to Father and Katie N. (“Mother”). On November 10, 2014, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the maternal grandmother, Kathryn N. (“Maternal Grandmother”). The maternal grandfather, Tommy N. (“Maternal Grandfather”), was later added as a joint petitioner. The juvenile court adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected on August 20, 2015, and ordered that the Child remain in the custody of the Maternal Grandmother and Maternal Grandfather (collectively, “Maternal Grandparents”). On September 21, 2015, Maternal Grandparents filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child in the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial court”). Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Father has appealed.1 Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Tate v. Tennessee Department Of Correction
Kevin Tate was convicted of a first degree murder that took place on March 22, 1993. On November 22, 1995, he was sentenced to life in prison. In the current litigation, he filed a petition for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to review his release eligibility date as calculated by the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Petitioner claimed that TDOC incorrectly calculated his release eligibility date, and, in doing so, violated his rights under the ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court found that TDOC correctly calculated his release eligibility date. As a consequence, the court dismissed the petition. We modify the judgment of the trial court by vacating the court’s statement that “as Mr. Tate is serving a sentence of life for first degree murder, in no event can he become eligible for release prior to serving 25 years.” In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Domingo C. L.
Obispo C.L. (“the Minor’s Uncle”) appeals the determination of the Chancery Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”) finding that it lacked jurisdiction to make a finding regarding whether it is in the best interest of Domingo C.L. (“the Minor”) to be returned to his home country of Guatemala. We find and hold that the Trial Court had jurisdiction to make this finding, that the petition specifically requested a finding with regard to this issue, and that it was error to refuse to make a finding with regard to whether it was in the Minor’s best interest to be returned to Guatemala. We, therefore, modify the Trial Court’s October 31, 2016 Order Appointing Guardian Of A Minor by remanding this case to the Trial Court for a determination of whether it is in the Minor’s best interest to be returned to Guatemala. We affirm the remainder of the Trial Court’s order. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Miracle M., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant Father’s parental rights to two minor children. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination based on the statutory grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support, abandonment by willful failure to visit, and persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal to state custody. The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Father appeals. As to the ground of persistence of conditions, we conclude that the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) has not met its burden of proof, and therefore we reverse termination of Father’s parental rights on this ground. The Court affirms the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and abandonment by willful failure to visit. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory White, et al. v. Jack Miller, et al.
Sellers of home and their listing agent brought suit against a real estate brokerage firm and an agent employed by the firm to recover for alleged violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and Real Estate Broker License Act, undisclosed dual agency, and breach of fiduciary duty, arising from the sale of plaintiffs’ home. The brokerage firm agent procured a contract whereby the sellers agreed to purchase the buyers’ home, with the purchase price for the buyers’ home to be treated as a credit on the purchase price of the sellers’ home. Upon learning that the agent was also representing the buyers, the sellers brought suit, seeking forfeiture of the agent’s and brokerage firm’s commission; the sellers’ listing agent joined in the suit to recover the commission the brokerage firm agreed to pay her as a referral fee. The trial court dismissed all claims filed by the seller husband for lack of standing, granted summary judgment to seller wife on her claim of undisclosed dual agency, and ordered that the brokerage firm and agent forfeit the commission from the sale. The court awarded the listing agent the commission she sought and granted summary judgment to brokerage firm and agent on the seller wife’s claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and on the seller wife’s claim that she was entitled to the commission generated by the sale of the buyers’ home. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment in part and reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Wagoner-Angelin v. Randall Jon Angelin
This appeal concerns post-divorce matters pertaining to a marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”) and a parenting plan. Mary Wagoner-Angelin (“Mother”) filed a petition seeking modification of the parenting plan against ex-husband Randall Jon Angelin (“Father”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Father filed an answer and counterclaim challenging the alimony provision in the MDA. Mother later amended her petition to include allegations of civil contempt for Husband’s alleged failures to abide by the MDA and parenting plan. After a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, found Father in contempt. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court in its determination that Father is bound by the provisions of the MDA. We affirm the Trial Court in its finding an upward deviation for the parties’ daughter Rachel’s private school tuition. Regarding the other issues, we remand with instructions. The judgment of the Trial Court therefore is affirmed, in part, vacated, in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Down D/B/A Knoxville Lifestyle v. Steve Hall D/B/A Greater Tennessee Flooring
After the trial court entered a final judgment awarding plaintiff damages and attorney’s fees, defendant filed a timely motion requesting additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court then entered a second judgment incorporating the requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. After entry of the second judgment, plaintiff filed a motion for an award of additional attorney’s fees, which the trial court treated as a motion to alter or amend. The plaintiff later withdrew his motion for additional attorney’s fees, and the trial court entered an order authorizing the withdrawal. Later, in response to a motion to quash a garnishment, the trial court entered a third judgment, which granted the motion but otherwise incorporated by reference the court’s previous rulings. Defendant filed a notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the third judgment but more than thirty days after the order granting plaintiff leave to withdraw his motion for additional attorney’s fees. Because we conclude the notice of appeal was untimely, we dismiss the appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Wanda Katz v. The Sports Authority Of The Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, TN, et al - Dissent
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Marie Krogman v. Bob Goodall, et al
In this appeal, the plaintiff sued her former real estate agent and his real estate company for malpractice and negligence in the attempted sale of her home. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants upon holding (1) that the plaintiff failed to effectuate service of process on the defendants; (2) that the defendants did not waive the affirmative defense by filing their answers more than 30 days after the complaint was filed, by filing a notice of appearance, and by participating in the litigation; and (3) that the defendants properly pled the affirmative defense in their answers. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David Chase v. Chris Stewart, et al.
Appellants sought disqualification of the trial court judge pursuant to Tennessee Supreme court Rule 10B based primarily on an order entered by the trial court in March 2016. Because Appellants waited approximately one year to seek disqualification of the trial court judge, they have waived their rights under Rule 10B. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
