Patrick R. Miller v. Vanderbilt University - Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
I concur in so much of the majority opinion that affirms the trial court’s exclusion of testimony regarding Mr. Miller’s health insurance status and grant of a directed verdict on the claim for punitive damages. I dissent from the grant of a directed verdict on the remaining claims, however, because I believe the proof introduced was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of liability. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Mitchell v. State of Tennessee
Joe Mitchell (“Mitchell”) appeals the July 22, 2016 order of the Claims Commission for the Middle Division (“the Claims Commission”) granting summary judgment to the State of Tennessee (“the State”) on Mitchell’s claim for negligence. We find and hold that the State made a properly supported motion for summary judgment negating an essential element of Mitchell’s claim, i.e., injury or loss, and that Mitchell failed to produce evidence showing a genuine disputed issue of material fact. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Michael Lee Givens v. Tristine Ann Givens
Michael Lee Givens (“Husband”) sued Tristine Ann Givens (“Wife”) for divorce. The case was tried, and the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) entered its order on January 12, 2016, inter alia, granting a divorce and distributing the marital property. Wife appeals raising issues regarding the classification and distribution of the marital property. We find and hold that the Trial Court erred in categorizing the real property located on Taggart Drive (“Taggart”) as Husband’s separate property. We, therefore, modify the categorization of Taggart to reflect that Taggart is marital property and remand this case for an equitable distribution of the marital estate taking Taggart into account as a marital asset. We affirm the remainder of the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Shayla Nicole Purifoy v. Devine Mafa
After a lengthy hearing, the trial court granted an order of protection to the appellee based upon its finding that the appellant was stalking and harassing her. The trial court denied the appellant’s counter-petition for an order of protection. The appellant raises ten issues on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Heather Kailoni Lawson (Stewart) v. Michael Sherman Stewart
This is a post-divorce proceeding commenced by Mother to modify an existing permanent parenting plan. The trial court entered a default judgment, and then, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, adopted the parenting plan attached to Mother’s petition, decreased Father’s visitation time, and increased his monthly child support obligation. Father filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court treated as a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and denied the motion. Father timely appealed. Because the trial court’s order does not contain sufficient findings regarding the modification, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Annie Davis, et al. v. Grange Mutual Casualty Group, et al.
This case involves the interplay between the statute of limitations, Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, and Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206(d), allowing direct actions against uninsured motorist insurance carriers. The trial court granted the defendant uninsured motorist insurance carrier’s motion to dismiss. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Fredrick Sledge v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Appellant, an inmate in the custody of Appellee Tennessee Department of Correction, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment. Specifically, Appellant challenges the Tennessee Department of Correction’s calculation of his jail credit on his criminal sentence. We conclude that the calculation of Appellant’s jail credit comports with the judgment of the criminal court. Affirmed and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ruby C. Roggli, et al.
Decedent’s nephews by marriage filed a petition seeking to recognize and establish a copy of a lost will as Decedent’s last will and testament. The trial court determined that the will was still in existence at the time Decedent lost testamentary capacity, and that Decedent did not have exclusive access and control of her will. Appellants appeal the trial court’s order establishing the lost will. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Hailey C., et al.
This is an appeal of the termination of a father’s parental rights to his two minor daughters. The father is currently serving a thirty-four year prison sentence for criminal acts committed against his daughters. The children’s mother filed a petition to terminate the father’s rights to the children. Following a bench trial, the court below held that statutory grounds existed to terminate the father’s parental rights and that it was in the children’s best interest to do so. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Youngblood Ex Rel. Estate of Daniel Vaughn v. River Park Hospital, LLC
On July 11, 2015, Daniel Vaughn, an 86-year-old patient, was recovering from surgery in the intensive care unit of the defendant River Park Hospital. A nurse brought Mr. Vaughn some coffee, after which she left the room. He spilled the coffee on himself, suffering burns to his body. Nancy Youngblood, the executor of Mr. Vaughn’s estate, brought this action alleging that, given his condition, he “should not have been left alone to manage an extremely hot beverage.” River Park, arguing that her claim is a health care liability action subject to the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (THCLA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101 et seq. (2012 & Supp. 2017), moved to dismiss based on plaintiff’s failure to provide pre-suit notice and a certificate of good faith as required by the THCLA. Plaintiff argued that her claim does not fall within the definition of a “health care liability action.” The trial court disagreed and dismissed her action. We hold that the trial court correctly held her claim to be a health care liability complaint. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re L.M.H., et al.
In this termination of parental rights case, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of J.M.F. (father) with respect to L.M.H. and K.K.F. (the children). DCS alleged the following grounds for termination: (1) persistence of conditions; and (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. DCS also sought to terminate father’s rights with respect to L.M.H. on the ground of severe child abuse. The trial court entered an order finding clear and convincing evidence supporting each ground for termination. By the same quantum of proof, the trial court found that termination of father’s rights is in the best interest of the children. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Grace N.
This appeal stems from a juvenile court proceeding in Davidson County. Mother challenges the entered parenting schedule and raises a number of issues pertaining to the trial court’s child support calculations. For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Preston L.
Mother and stepfather filed a parental termination action against the father of a minor child, and the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights on the following grounds: (1) incarceration under a sentence of ten years or more and the child was under the age of eight when the sentence was entered; (2) willful failure to support during the four months prior to incarceration; and (3) wanton disregard. We reverse the trial court’s determination that the petitioners presented clear and convincing evidence to support grounds of willful failure to support and wanton disregard. We affirm as to the ground of incarceration under a sentence of ten years or more and as to the trial court’s best interest determination. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James Keith Owen
In this case challenging the trial court’s interpretation of the notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-306(d), we find the notice issue moot because the trial court found that the petitioner’s claim was without merit. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Oliver Wood et al. v. Jefferson County Economic Development Oversight Committee, Inc.
In 2009 and 2010, the legislative bodies of Jefferson County, Jefferson City, and Dandridge enacted resolutions requesting that the Jefferson County Chamber of Commerce create a non-profit corporation to be called the Jefferson County Economic Development Oversight Committee (EDOC). Its purpose was to promote economic development in the county. In 2013, a group of citizens filed this action seeking a declaration that EDOC is subject to the provisions of the Tennessee Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 (2012), and the Open Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 44-101 et seq. (2016). After a bench trial, the court denied the plaintiffs’ requested relief. They appealed. We find and hold that the undisputed facts establish that EDOC performs a governmental function, recieves a substantial amount of taxpayer funding, and is significantly involved with and regulated by the governing city and county legislative bodies. In light of our duty to broadly construe and interpret the Public Records and Open Meetings Acts in favor of governmental transparency and accountability, we hold that the EDOC is subject to these acts. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Yuletide Office Supply, Inc. v. Justin Miller, et al.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Erika Louise Dewald v. Baya Paul Dewald
This is a divorce case involving numerous pleadings. Because the order appealed is not final in that it fails to adjudicate husband’s petition for contempt and motion for sanctions, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Ferryl Theresita McClain v. Richard Perry McClain
This is a post-divorce child custody action involving two children, who were sixteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the most recent trial. The parties were divorced by order of the Sullivan County Law Court (“divorce court”) in July 2001. Concomitant with the divorce decree, the divorce court entered a permanent parenting plan designating the father as the primary residential parent. Although the permanent parenting plan was modified in 2003 and 2007, the divorce court had most recently modified the permanent parenting plan in February 2009 (“2009 PPP”) upon the parties’ stipulation that a material change in circumstance had occurred. The divorce court maintained the father’s designation as the primary residential parent and awarded to the father 268 days of annual residential co-parenting time as compared to Mother’s 97 days. At some point following entry of the 2009 PPP, the mother relocated to Texas, and the father and the children relocated to Washington County, Tennessee. Upon the mother’s request, the case was transferred to the Washington County Circuit Court (“trial court”) in April 2014. On March 20, 2015, the mother filed a motion in the trial court to modify custody and child support, as well as a motion for civil and criminal contempt against the father, alleging various violations of the 2009 PPP. Following a hearing regarding the contempt allegations, the trial court entered an order on June 30, 2015, finding the father in “technical contempt” and directing him to pay an expert witness fee as a sanction. Following participation in mediation, the parties announced an agreement, which the trial court ratified in a permanent parenting plan order entered on June 30, 2015 (“2015 PPP”). The 2015 PPP maintained the father’s designation as the primary residential parent and provided the mother with 85 days of residential co-parenting time, a great part of which was to be exercised at her residence in Texas. On October 2, 2015, the mother filed an “emergency motion” for modification of the 2015 PPP, as well as for criminal and civil contempt against the father, averring violations of the 2015 PPP. The parties subsequently filed competing “emergency” motions concerning physical custody of the younger child, who under one temporary order entered by the trial court in October 2015, was to reside primarily with the mother. Following a two-day bench trial in October 2015, the trial court maintained the prior designation of Father as the primary residentialparent for both children pending further order, but the court took the custody matter under advisement pending receipt of a court-ordered assessment of the parties and the children by a forensic psychologist. Upon receipt of the psychologist’s report, the trial court conducted a second two-day bench trial in June 2016, ultimately finding that this was a case of severe parental alienation in which the father had actively supported the children’s alienation from the mother without reasonable cause. The court awarded exclusive custody of the children to the mother and directed that the children participate with the mother in a workshop in California that had been recommended by the forensic psychologist as a therapeutic methodology for parental alienation at an estimated cost of approximately $28,000.00. The court directed that the workshop costs, including a mandatory post-workshop vacation for the mother and the children, would be substantially paid by the father. The court further found, inter alia, that the father was in contempt of court for failing to follow certain provisions of the 2015 PPP and sentenced the father to eight days in jail, with the sentence suspended provided no further violations occurred. Also finding that the mother was entitled to attorney’s fees, the court reduced the $38,594.99 fee amount requested by the mother to an award of $20,000.00 to offset the amount paid by the father toward the workshop. The father has appealed. Having determined that the father was not provided with sufficient notice of criminal contempt charges pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b), we vacate the trial court’s order finding the father in contempt. We remand for a determination of whether the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the mother was appropriate given our vacation of the contempt finding against the father. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. The mother’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Mardoche Olivier v. City of Clarksville, et al
The trial court dismissed this action as a matter of law for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Eric S. Stone v. Tennessee Board of Parole
Petition for writ of certiorari; inmate appeals the trial court’s order affirming the Tennessee Board of Parole’s decision to rescind its earlier grant of parole and deny parole. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Halley M.
Jerome V. and Teresa V. (“Petitioners”) appeal the May 26, 2015 order of the Circuit Court for Sumner County (“the Trial Court”) dismissing their Petition for Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights (“the Petition”) based upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-119. We find and hold that Petitioners have shown good cause why the Petition should not be dismissed, and we vacate the Trial Court’s May 26, 2015 order, reinstate the Petition, and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Alan Thigpen v. Trousdale County Highway Department, et al.
Jerry Thigpen sued the Trousdale County Highway Department and two individuals, alleging damage to his home caused by roadway resurfacing. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that the claims were barred by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). We affirm. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin J. Mamon v. Geico Indemnity Insurance Company, et al.
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claims against all three defendants and the award of $400 to defendant Master Muffler on its counterclaim following a bench trial. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Brittany Nicole Vandyke v. Brooke E. Foulk, M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice action1 in which the plaintiff filed suit against the hospital and her physicians following the death of her newborn son hours after his delivery. The case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found in favor of the defendants. Following the denial of post-trial motions, the plaintiff appeals, claiming the trial court erred in excluding testimony and when it gave a jury instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine. We reverse and remand for a new trial. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Shay Simpson, et al. v. National Fitness Center, Inc., et al.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit filed by plaintiffs Shay and Brian Simpson (“the Simpsons,” collectively, or “Ms.” or “Mr. Simpson,” respectively) against defendants National Fitness Center, Inc. and National Fitness Center, LLC (“National Fitness,” collectively). Ms. Simpson and National Fitness orally contracted to allow the Simpsons “a couple of weeks” additional time to consider whether to cancel their club membership. After more than two weeks elapsed, the Simpsons elected to cancel but National Fitness refused to accept the cancellation. This case was tried before the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court found that National Fitness breached the contract and committed a deceptive act under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The Trial Court ordered “a return of all monies paid [by the Simpsons] to [National Fitness] . . .” and awarded attorney’s fees to the Simpsons. National Fitness appealed to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court in its determination that the Simpsons effectively exercised their right to cancel and that they were entitled to a refund of any monies paid. However, we reverse the Trial Court in its determination that National Fitness violated the TCPA. We, therefore, reverse the award of attorney’s fees. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
