Brandon Barnes v. U.S. Bank National Association
A musician/composer borrowed money from a bank and assigned performance royalties as collateral. He later filed for bankruptcy, and his debt to the bank was discharged. The bank, however, continued to collect royalties during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. The musician/composer filed suit against the bank seeking recovery of the royalties collected by the bank after the filing of the bankruptcy petition based on theories of unjust enrichment and conversion. The musician/composer also sought damages from the bank for violation of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. The bank moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted the motion. Because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, we vacate the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David W. Anderson v. Edward Poltorak, et al
This appeal arises from a civil action in which the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Defendants appeal contending the trial court committed reversible error by limiting their impeachment of Plaintiff regarding three felony convictions. After applying the balancing test under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 to determine if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the trial court allowed Defendants “to question the plaintiff about whether he has been convicted of three felonies” but barred any questions about “the details regarding the nature of the convictions, types of convictions or the facts and circumstances surrounding the convictions.” The dispositive issue is whether a party to a civil action has an absolute right under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609 to impeach a witness with evidence of prior felony convictions including the details regarding the nature of his convictions, the types of convictions, or the facts and circumstances surrounding the convictions. Defendants contend the evidence was admissible as a matter of right under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609; therefore, the trial court did not have the discretion to conduct a balancing test under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. Having determined that the trial judge had the discretion to conduct a balancing test under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 and that the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of Defendants’ impeachment of Plaintiff, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Maddox P.
This appeal arises from a dispute over a residential parenting schedule. Joshua Parker (“Father”) filed a petition against Anna Marsh (“Mother”) in the Juvenile Court for Sumner County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to modify the parenting plan regarding their minor child, Maddox (“the Child”). Mother filed a counter-petition. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court made certain modifications to the existing parenting plan but otherwise left it in place. Mother appeals to this Court, arguing in part that the Juvenile Court should have established specific days each month that Father may exercise visitation with the Child. Father, an airline pilot, has a shifting work schedule. We hold that Mother’s requested schedule would have the practical effect of unduly limiting the Child’s time with Father and that the Juvenile Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s requested modification. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In re Cameron H.
The Final Order of Parentage and Adoption in this case reserved the issue of attorney’s fees for further hearing. As such, it is clear that the order appealed from does not resolve all of the issues raised in the proceedings below. As a result, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Holmes v. City of Memphis Civil Service Commission
An employee of the Memphis Fire Department was terminated following his involvement in a physical altercation in which he struck a business associate in the face with a hammer. The City of Memphis Civil Service Commission upheld the termination, and the employee filed a petition for judicial review. The chancery court reversed the termination, holding that the Civil Service Commission erred in not allowing the employee the benefit of Tennessee’s self-defense statute, in excluding certain evidence of disparate treatment, and in entering a decision not supported by substantial and material evidence. Having reviewed the record, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court in all respects and remand the case for such further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Hobbs Purnell Oil Company, Inc., et al v. Thomas Butler, et al
This contract action was initiated by the plaintiff oil company, Hobbs Purnell Oil Company, Inc. (“Hobbs Purnell”), alleging that the defendants, Gedith Butler and Thomas Butler, individually and d/b/a GG’s Market (collectively, “the Butlers”), breached their contract with Hobbs Purnell by failing to pay three invoices for fuel, which had been provided to the Butlers on a consignment basis. The Butlers filed a counterclaim against Hobbs Purnell and a third-party complaint against the president of the oil company, Tommy Porter. Prior to trial, the trial court granted Hobbs Purnell’s motion in limine and excluded all invoices that were not listed in the Butlers’ discovery response. At trial, the Butlers chose to proceed in the action pro se following the trial court’s grant of their previous counsel’s motion for withdrawal. During a bench trial, the trial court excluded the testimony of the Butlers’ expert witness upon finding that they had failed to qualify him as an expert. Ultimately, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Hobbs Purnell and against the Butlers in the amount of $46,135.93, which included $27,059.10 for the three unpaid invoices plus prejudgment interest in the amount of $19,076.83. The trial court dismissed the Butlers’ counterclaim and third-party complaint. The Butlers thereafter filed two pleadings that were treated collectively by the trial court as a motion for new trial, alleging that the trial judge had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. The Butlers have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Josephine Phelps, et al v. Vern Benke, Jr.
The appellants Josephine Phelps and Roy Smith (the “Appellants”) filed suit to assert rights to a tract of real property by adverse possession. On appeal, they claim that the trial court erred in concluding that they have no possessory rights to the land at issue. In part, they argue that the appellee’s counterclaim for ejectment was untimely because it was not filed within seven years of the beginning of their adverse possession. We disagree and conclude that the trial court was correct in ordering the Appellants to vacate the disputed property. The Appellants’ petition for adverse possession was filed before they had adversely possessed the property for a total of seven years. Moreover, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-114, the appellee’s counterclaim for ejectment related back to the filing of the Appellants’ original petition. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re A.B. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. On December 17, 2014, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of M.L.F. (Mother) and H.W.B. (Father) with respect to their two children, A.M.B. (Child 1) and O.R.F. (Child 2) (collectively the Children). As to Mother, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of three grounds supporting termination – abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. By the same quantum of proof, the trial court found that termination of Mother’s rights is in the best interest of the Children. As to Father, the trial court held that DCS had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the alleged grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and grounds applicable to a putative father. Consequently, the court declined to terminate Father’s parental rights. Mother and DCS appeal. We reverse the trial court’s holding as to Father and affirm the court’s termination of Mother’s rights. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Bettina Luise Lippert Engh v. Daniel James Engh
Father appeals the trial court’s designation of Mother as the primary residential parent for their daughter. Applying the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) to the testimony, the trial court determined, inter alia, that Mother acted as the primary caregiver, formed a stronger emotional bond with the child, and showed a greater willingness to foster a relationship between the child and Father. Following a thorough review of the record, we have determined that the trial court correctly identified and properly applied the relevant legal principles and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to make Mother the primary residential parent. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Crystal Blackwell, As Next Friend To Jacob Blackwell, A Minor v. Sky High Sports Nashville Operations, LLC.
In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant trampoline park argues that the trial court erred by refusing to enforce a forum selection clause, a choice of law provision, and a waiver of liability and indemnity clause against the minor plaintiff. Additionally, the minor plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to alter or amend his complaint to allow him to claim pre-majority medical expenses. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the minor plaintiff’s motion to amend only to the extent that the minor plaintiff may be permitted to assert pre-majority medical expenses that were paid by him or that he is legally obligated to pay. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Wheeler Mabie, MD v. Carla Jennings Mabie
This case arises out of a divorce action. After fourteen years of marriage, the husband filed a complaint for divorce. Following a brief and unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation, the wife filed a counter-claim for divorce. Throughout the marriage, the husband worked as a medical doctor and was a partner in a highly successful medical practice. The wife's primary role in the family was as a stay-at-home mother. The trial court declared the parties divorced and awarded the wife, among other things, rehabilitative alimony, alimony in futuro, and attorney's fees. The husband appeals the trial court's awards of alimony, the valuation of his interest in his medical practice, the award of attorney's fees to the wife, and the court's decision to not punish the wife for civil contempt of court. The wife seeks attorney's fees for defending this appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We deny the wife's request for attorney's fees on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Emilio Cisneros v. Lindsey Dianna Cisneros
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right from the denial of a motion for recusal. Because the petition for recusal appeal fails to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the appeal. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
In re Yariel S., et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her four minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of her rights to all four children on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, the persistence of conditions which led to removal, and substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan. The court also found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of her rights to the youngest child on the statutory ground of severe child abuse. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals. We reverse the trial court on its finding of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home. On all other findings, we affirm the trial court's rulings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Chazz Alden Hughes, et al. v. R Allen Hughes
This appeal concerns a dispute over the proceeds of a decedent's federal group life insurance policy. The decedent presumably intended to designate his brother, the appellee in this matter, as the sole beneficiary. The appellants, children of the decedent, allege fraud on the part of the brother and seek to impose a constructive trust upon the funds he received. The trial court granted summary judgment for the brother based on the application of the federal preemption doctrine as well as the Tennessee and federal law of fraud and the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. The appellants appeal. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Valerie Israel, et al. v. Bryan York, et al.
The pro se appellants, Bryan York and Anna Eastwood, appeal from a final order entered on October 17, 2016. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until November 18, 2016, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the final order. The appellees, Valerie Israel and Russ Israel, have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing, among other things, that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. Because it appears from the attachments to the motion that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Greer Craig et al. v. Peoples Community Bank
The plaintiffs, Greer Craig and Lana Kaye Craig, brought an action against Peoples Community Bank (the Bank). Their cause of action is essentially identical to Mr. Craig’s two prior actions, each of which previously had been dismissed with prejudice and not appealed. In the present action, the trial court applied the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and granted the Bank summary judgment. We affirm. Furthermore, we find this appeal to be frivolous. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court so it can award the Bank its reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses on appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Sonya Mae Stanley v. Colin Richard Stanley
This appeal arises from a father’s petition to relocate with his minor children. The father sought to relocate to Oklahoma in order to work on his family’s farm, which he hoped to eventually inherit. The father, as the parent spending the greater amount of time with the children, sent the children’s mother a notice of intent to move. The father then filed a petition to relocate with the minor children to Oklahoma. The trial court concluded that, because he was the petitioner, the father bore the burden of proof on whether the move was for a reasonable purpose. After both parents presented their proof, the trial court denied the request to relocate. The court found the father lacked a reasonable purpose for the proposed move. Because we conclude the burden of proof rested with the mother, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hyundai Motor America v. Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission, et al.
This appeal arises from a proceeding initiated by two automobile dealers who challenged the location of a proposed dealership in a contested case proceeding before the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission (the “Commission”); the manufacturer contended that the dealers were not located in the “relevant market area,” as required by statute and moved to dismiss the proceeding for lack of standing. The administrative law judge overruled the manufacturer’s motion, and the manufacturer filed a petition in Chancery Court seeking interlocutory review. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the administrative judge’s ruling on the motion. The motor vehicle manufacturer appeals the dismissal of its petition for judicial review of the denial of its motion to dismiss the contested case proceeding. Concluding that the manufacturer did not meet the threshold requirement for immediate judicial review as set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Renaldo M. Jr., et al.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of a Mother to her three children on the grounds of abandonment by engaging in conduct evidencing a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals, contending that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the termination of her rights. Concluding that the evidence of Mother’s pre-incarceration conduct does not clearly and convincingly prove a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare, we reverse the trial court’s finding in that regard. There is clear and convincing evidence supporting holding that the conditions which led to the children’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted and that termination of her rights is in the best interest of the children; accordingly, we affirm the termination of Mother’s rights on that ground. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In re Cheyanna B.
John B. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child Cheyanna B. (“the Child”) after finding and holding that grounds for termination for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the Child’s best interest. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Yariel S., et al.
This appeal arises from a termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Yaron L. (“Father”) to his four minor children Yariel, Yaron, Yariyana, and YariAsia (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of persistent conditions and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The Juvenile Court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. Father argues that he was not properly notified of the trial, that counsel should have been appointed, and that termination of his parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest. We hold that that the evidence in the record on appeal shows, as found by the Juvenile Court, that Father was notified of trial, that Father failed to appear at trial, and that the Juvenile Court did not err in declining to appoint Father counsel when he failed to appear. We also find and hold that the Juvenile Court’s determinations regarding grounds for termination and the Children’s best interest are supported by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ken Buckner, et al. v. Mike Goodman, et al.
This case involves a contract to purchase a home on the sellers‟ condition that the home be removed from the sellers‟ real property at the buyers‟ expense. The sellers and the buyers entered into a written contract on January 25, 2013, at which time the buyers paid a $2,500 deposit toward an agreed price of $5,000 for the home. The contract did not set forth a deadline for the home to be removed from the sellers‟ property, although the sellers were required to demonstrate to the lender financing their new construction loan that the home had been removed. The buyers contacted several potential house movers to transport the home but did not execute a final written contract with any of them. The sellers subsequently entered into a written agreement with movers who had originally been contacted by the buyers, retaining the movers to “take possession” of the home and transport it but providing the original buyers a first option to purchase. After learning of the agreement between the sellers and the movers, the buyers contacted the movers, “firing” them. The sellers then had the home demolished. The buyers filed a complaint against the sellers, alleging breach of a home sales contract. The sellers filed a counter-complaint, alleging that the buyers had materially breached the contract first by failing to timely remove the home. The buyers subsequently filed a second complaint against the movers, alleging intentional interference with contractual relations. The trial court consolidated the two actions. Following presentation of the buyers‟ proof during a bench trial, the trial court found that the buyers had materially breached the contract. The court granted the sellers‟ and the movers‟ respective motions for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02. Upon hearing the sellers‟ evidence regarding damages, the court entered a judgment in favor of the sellers in the amount of $5,200, comprised of $7,700 in total damages offset by the $2,500 previously paid by the buyers. The buyers timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Neylan H.
Terri W.H. (“Mother”) and Justin H. (“Stepfather”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of James P. (“Father”) to the minor child Neylan H. (“the Child”) in order to allow Stepfather to adopt the Child. After a trial, the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) entered its order denying the petition after finding and holding, inter alia, that Mother and Stepfather had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the Child by willful failure to provide support. Mother appeals to this Court. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings made by the Trial Court, and we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
William Stuart Davis v. Cathy Denise Davis
This is an appeal from the divorce in a 26-year marriage. The court awarded the divorce to Wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and awarded Wife approximately 62 percent of the marital estate. The court ordered Husband to pay alimony in futuro and Wife’s attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Husband appeals the court’s division of the marital estate, the award of alimony in solido, and the amount of alimony in futuro awarded. We have determined that the division of the marital estate, under the circumstances presented, was equitable and that the record supports the determination to award alimony in futuro and alimony in solido; we vacate the amount awarded as alimony in futuro and remand the case for further reconsideration of the amount awarded. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
WM Capital Partners, LLC v. Anthony W. Thornton, et al.
A secured creditor filed suit against a trucking company and two guarantors seeking a deficiency judgment after disposition of the collateral securing payment of the debt. The trial court granted the secured creditor summary judgment in the amount of the deficiency. On appeal, the trucking company and the guarantors argue that (1) the delay in repossessing the collateral rendered its disposition commercially unreasonable and (2) the secured creditor failed to present sufficient evidence of the amount of its damages. We conclude that the requirement of a commercially reasonable disposition found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-9-610 only applies once the secured party has actual or constructive possession of the collateral. The secured creditor’s refusal to repossess the collateral at the trucking company’s request did not amount to actual or constructive possession. Nonetheless, in light of the challenge to the time aspect of the disposition, the secured creditor failed to meet its burden of production on summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
