Lori Kay Jones Trigg v. Richard Darrell Trigg
This is an irreconcilable differences divorce case. The trial court entered a final judgment of divorce that incorporated the parties’ mediated marital dissolution agreement. Shortly thereafter, Husband filed a motion to set aside or to alter or amend the final judgment, claiming he was under duress when he entered into the marital dissolution agreement and also claiming that the trial court was required to conduct a hearing before entering the final judgment. The trial court disagreed and denied Husband’s motion. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy Turnbo Franks v. Ronald Franks
This appeal involves various financial issues relative to a divorce. Husband appeals the trial court’s determination of several factual findings relative to alimony, including Wife’s ability to secure employment, Husband’s ability to earn in the future, the award of attorney’s fees to Wife, and the value of several marital assets divided in the property division, including the value of an LLC jointly owned by the parties. Wife also appeals the trial court’s determination of value and the division of the parties’ joint interest in the LLC, which the trial court awarded to Husband without assigning a value. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Bryce F.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Lori D.F.P. (“Mother”) to the minor child Bryce F. (“the Child”). After a trial the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child after finding and holding, inter alia, that grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights for abandonment by willful failure to pay child support pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); for failure to substantially comply with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and for severe child abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), and that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Turner et al v. City of Bean Station et al
Dennis Turner was injured while playing softball in a charity tournament at Marvin Rich Field in Bean Station. He sued the City of Bean Station, among other defendants, alleging that the City negligently failed to properly maintain the pitcher’s mound, pitcher’s rubber, and the field as a whole, resulting in his injury. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that its governmental immunity is not removed by the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), which removes immunity for “any injury caused by the dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement owned and controlled by [a] governmental entity.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-204(a)(2012) (emphasis added). The City presented proof establishing that it does not own Marvin Rich Field. The trial court denied the motion but granted permission for an interlocutory appeal. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and grant the City’s motion for summary judgment. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
In Re V.L.J. et al
This is a parental termination case. It focuses on the three children of a married couple, D.G.B. (Mother) and D.C.B. (Father), and Mother’s child (V.L.J.) from an earlier relationship. The four children came into the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) in 2009. Nearly four years later, DCS filed a petition to terminate the rights of the parents. Following a trial, the court granted the petition based upon its finding (1) that multiple grounds for termination exist and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the children. Both findings were said by the trial court to be made by clear and convincing evidence. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Leon Dickson, Sr. v. Sidney H. Kriger, M.D.
Patient brought a health care liability action against his eye surgeon, alleging that the surgeon’s negligence in performing a LASIK procedure resulted in several eye injuries. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the surgeon, finding the patient failed to present evidence establishing the standard of care and causation. Because we find the evidence was sufficient to create an issue for the jury, we reverse and remand to the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Yvette D. Woody, et al.
In this detainer action, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the loan servicing company. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dietrich Hill, et al. v. City of Memphis, et al
This case arises out of an investigation by the Memphis police department of a business suspected of selling illegal inhalants. The business owner was arrested and charged with the criminal sale of inhalants. The police seized bank accounts belonging to the owner and two corporations related to the business and instituted forfeiture proceedings regarding the funds in those accounts. The bank account owner and the two corporations filed suit against the city and multiple police officers seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The trial court granted the city’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In denying the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court stated that the amended complaint failed to allege any Fourth or Fifth Amendment violations, the grounds upon which the plaintiffs sought relief. With respect to the only remaining individual defendant, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the first amended complaint, holding, in part, that the existence of adequate post-deprivation remedies precluded any Fourth or Fifth Amendment claims. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
George Ernest Diggs v. David Lingo, et al.
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. The beneficiaries of a trust filed this lawsuit against the trustee alleging trustee self-dealing arising from a transaction in which the trustee and his wife purchased certain real property from the trust as tenants by the entirety. The beneficiaries sought to set aside a portion of the sale. The trustee filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the trust agreement. The beneficiaries opposed the motion, arguing that they could not be compelled to arbitrate their claims against the trustee’s wife. The trial court agreed and denied the motion. The court found that the trustee’s wife was a necessary party to the resolution of the dispute, but because she was not a party to the trust agreement, there was no enforceable arbitration agreement between her and the beneficiaries. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville, et al. v. Robert W. Donaldson, Jr.
Defendant appeals a judgment holding that he ran a stop sign, contending that the court did not have subjectmatter or in personam jurisdiction over the matter, and that the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County lacked standing to bring the action. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Sirbaugh v. Vanderbilt University, d/b/a Vanderbilt University Medical Center, et al.
The plaintiff in this interlocutory appeal filed a complaint asserting health care liability claims against the original defendants, at which time she included a certificate of good faith in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122. The original defendants asserted comparative fault against non-party health care providers. The plaintiff waived compliance by the original defendants with section 29-26-122(b), which required the defendants to file a certificate of good faith regarding the non-party health care providers. The plaintiff thereafter amended her complaint to add the named non-party health care providers as new defendants but did not file a new certificate of good faith. The new defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The trial court denied the motions and granted this interlocutory appeal. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bryan Dewayne Clark v. Jennifer Inez Clark
This appeal arises from divorced parents’ child custody dispute. After Mother was arrested twice for driving under the influence, Father requested that he be designated as the primary residential parent and that Mother have supervised parenting time only. Without making any specific factual findings, the trial court found that there had been a “substantial and material change in circumstances” since the prior custody order, and the trial court designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother’s parenting time was decreased by 196 days, her decision-making authoritywas removed, and she was ordered to pay child support to Father. Because the trial court’s order fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Donald C., et al
Mother’s parental rights to her children were terminated on grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, persistence of conditions, and noncompliance with a permanency plan. Mother challenged the ground of abandonment, arguing there was a no contact order in place that prevented her from visiting her children. When the no contact order was put into place, Mother was informed she would be able to visit her children if she passed drug tests and took parenting classes. Mother continued to test positive for illegal drugs and failed to take advantage of services offered by the Department of Children’s Services. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that Mother abandoned her children by failing to visit them and that it is in their best interest to terminate her rights. A petition for custody that may have been pending when Mother’s rights were terminated is part of a different proceeding and does not render the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s rights premature. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Cedric Jones, Sr. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Suit for breach of contract to recover on a homeowners policy for losses sustained when policyholder’s home was allegedly burglarized and was allegedly damaged as a result of a storm. Upon defendant’s motion, the trial court granted summary judgment, holding that the insurance company defendant had demonstrated that policyholder could not meet his burden of proof as to any of his claims. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Aimee Lorraine Howell v. Clint Austin Howell
In this divorce action, Father appeals the rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido awarded to Mother, the amount of parenting time he received, the designation of Mother as sole decision-maker and the failure of the trial court to find that Mother was voluntarily underemployed. We affirm the award of rehabilitative alimony and alimony in solido and the designation of Mother as primary residential parent; we vacate and remand for further consideration the residential parenting schedule,the allocation of decision-making authority, and the determination of Mother’s income. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Graham v. Crye-Leike Realty Corporation et al.
At an earlier time, in 2011, Betty Graham had filed a lawsuit arising out of a failed real estate transaction against (1) her real estate agent, Ginny Hall; (2) Crye-Leike Realty Corporation; (3) S&J Southeast Investments, LLC, the potential buyer of her condominium with whom she had unsuccessfully negotiated a contract; and (4) attorney Ellie Hill, her trial court appointed guardian ad litem. The trial court granted the defendants’ Rule 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Graham appealed, but later voluntarily dismissed her appeal. Following her dismissal, our mandate, see Tenn. R. App. P. 42, 43, was issued on January 4, 2013. On April 26, 2013, Graham, acting pro se, “refiled” a lawsuit that is functionally identical to her first complaint. In her second suit, she relied upon the saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105(a) (2000). The trial court dismissed her second complaint on the ground of res judicata. We affirm that dismissal. Furthermore, we conclude that Graham’s suit is frivolous. Hence, this case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the defendants’ reasonable fees and expenses associated with this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
City of Athens Board Of Education et al v. McMinn County, Tennessee et al.
This litigation is a dispute between the boards of education of the cities of Athens and Etowah (“the City School Boards”) on the one hand and McMinn County (“the County”) over the distribution of tax revenues among the various school systems within the county. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-3-315(a) (2013) mandates that “[a]ll school funds for current operation and maintenance purposes collected by any county . . . shall be apportioned by the county trustee” among the local education agencies in the county based upon average daily school attendance. Over the years spanning from 1996 to 2011, the County apportioned funds in the account designated “general purpose school fund” to the City School Boards, but did not apportion funds from the County’s “educational capital projects fund.” The County argues that funds appropriated for and spent on school capital projects are not “school funds for current operation and maintenance purposes” under the language of the statute. The trial court agreed and granted the County summary judgment. It dismissed the complaint of the City School Boards. We affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Teven A.
This appeal arises from the modification of Father’s parenting time and the juvenile court’s allocation of child support obligations. Father petitioned to modify custody or, alternatively, the residential parenting schedule. The juvenile court found that there had been no material change in circumstance and did not modify the primary residential parent designation. However, the court decreased Father’s parenting time and increased his child support obligation. Father appeals the juvenile court’s finding of no materialchange in circumstance, the modification of his parenting time, and the juvenile court’s failure to apply a credit for transportation costs against his child support obligation. Because we find the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard and failed to comply with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the judgment and remand for entry of an order with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Nicole Goeser, et al v. Live Holdings Corporation, et al
Defendant in wrongful death action appeals the grant of a default judgment entered against him on the ground that he did not receive a copy of the motion prior to the hearing and, consequently, could not present a defense. Upon consideration of the entire record, we affirm the judgment in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
C. Eddie Shoffner v. Tenneseee Consolidated Retirement System
An individual employed by Claiborne County as Director of Schools was terminated over two years earlier than the employment term set forth in the parties’ contract. The county and the individual entered into another contract (“modified contract”) whereby the individual agreed to work as Safety Coordinator for five months and be compensated in an amount equal to the amount he would have been paid had the prior contract not been terminated. This resulted in a salary increase of nearly $40,000 per month for each of the five months the individual was employed as Safety Coordinator. The modified contract provided that the employee would be paid whether he performed any work or not, and the employee agreed to waive and release any claims he might have against the county. When the employee applied for retirement benefits,the agencyin charge of calculating the amount of benefits did not treat the nearly $40,000 increase in compensation as “earnable compensation” because the additional compensation was not for “services rendered,” as required by the statute. The employee contested this decision, and the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ruled in favor of the agency, granting the agency’s motion for summary judgment. The employee filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The employee appeals the trial court’s judgment to this Court, and we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Eidson v. City of Portland, et al
Plaintiff in suit to recover damages for injuries allegedly suffered in the course of his arrest appeals the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed on behalf of the City and Police Chief and the grant of summary judgment to the police officers who participated in his arrest. In responding to the motions, plaintiff acknowledged that the claims against City, Police Chief and two of the officers should be dismissed; we affirm the dismissal of those claims and parties. The order granting summary judgment to the remaining officer does not state the legal ground therefor or make findings of fact relative thereto; consequently, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. We reverse the denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend to substitute one of the officers for the defendant named John Doe. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Energy Corporation v. Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation
This is a breach of contract and promissory estoppel action in which Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for failure to fulfill an oral modification of leases for several pieces of earthmoving equipment. Defendant denied wrongdoing and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, in part, and dismissed the promissory estoppel claim. The case proceeded to a jury trial on the breach of contract claim, but the jury failed to render a verdict. The court declared a mistrial, and Defendant filed a renewed motion for a directed verdict. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jaden W.
This is a termination of parental rights case brought by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents on the grounds of severe child abuse and wanton disregard for the welfare of the child. Parents appeal. There is clear and convincing evidence to support the grounds of wanton disregard with respect to both parents and severe child abuse with regard to the father. However, we do not find that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the ground of severe child abuse with regard to the mother. There is clear and convincing evidence that termination of both parents’ rights is in the child’s best interest. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin Barnes v. Larry Salsberry, et al.
Defendants appeal a jury award in favor of Plaintiff. Finding material evidence to support the verdict, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Patrick J., et al
This case involves the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The trial court found multiple statutory grounds for the termination of Mother’s and Father’s rights. The court also found termination of the parents’ rights to be in the children’s best interest. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding that Mother and Father abandoned their children by willfully failing to support them. Because the parents appealed fewer than all of the multiple grounds relied upon by the trial court for termination, the trial court’s decision as to the other grounds is final. Because a finding of only one statutory ground is necessary for termination, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals |
