James C. Williams, Individually and on behalf of the heirs at law of Gayle Ann Williams, Deceased v. SMZ Specialists, P.C., et al.
This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to T.C.A. 29-26-121, which requires notice to defendants prior to the commencement of a health care liability lawsuit. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit asserting health care liability against the defendant health care providers within the applicable statute of limitations, but without providing the defendants with prior notice as required under Section 29-26-121. In ruling on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that Section 29-26-121 conflicted with Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. On this basis, it held that the statute infringed upon the authority of the judicial branch to enact rules governing the procedures for commencing a lawsuit, and thus violated the separation of powers clause of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendant health care providers were granted permission for this interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse, holding that pre-lawsuit notice requirement in Section 29-26-121 does not contravene the separation of powers clause of the Tennessee Constitution. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William D. Stalker and Stephen L. Young v. David R. Nutter and Tamara D. Nutter
This appeal arises out of a breach of contract action. Following the presentation of the plaintiffs’ proof, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. We vacate the decision of the trial court and remand the case for findings of fact required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2) and 52. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Brandon T. et al
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his four biological children. The trial court terminated his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. Finding that at least two of the grounds for termination are supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the Department of Children’s Services exerted reasonable efforts to reunite the family, we affirm the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dallas G.
The Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of the mother of a child on the ground of severe abuse; the court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals, contending that the evidence is not clear and convincing that termination of her rights is in the child’s best interest. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Webb and Evangeline Webb, Individually and as Husband and Wife v. Charles Roberson, M.D., et al.
In this interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, which requires a medical malpractice claimant to provide certain notice sixty days prior to filing suit. We conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 is not an unconstitutional infringement upon the courts’ rule-making authority, that it is not preempted by HIPAA, and that it does not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of state and federal law. Affirmed and Remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Deon S.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights on several grounds, including abandonment by willful failure to visit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). We conclude that the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit is met by clear and convincing evidence in the record and that there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Affirmed and remanded. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Kelley Higgins v. Bobby Higgins
In this divorce case, the trial court’s judgment ended the twenty-year marriage of Kelley Higgins (“Wife”) and Bobby Higgins (“Husband”). Husband appeals. He challenges the trial court’s classification and division of the parties’ property. He also contends that alimony was improperly awarded to Wife. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Ryne W. Brown v. Catherine L. Brown, Trustee, et al.
This case involves a trust. In a previous appeal, this Court remanded for the appointment of a corporate co-trustee as specifically required by the terms of the trust. Thereafter, the defendant existing trustee, who is also a beneficiary, unilaterally appointed a corporate cotrustee and then sought to have the trial court “ratify” her appointment. The plaintiff beneficiary challenged the appointment, claiming that the trustee was not authorized to unilaterally appoint a corporate co-trustee and arguing that the corporate co-trustee who was chosen did not meet the qualifications listed in the trust agreement. After hearing some testimony about the proposed co-trustee, the trial court decided that the plaintiff beneficiary lacked standing to participate in the selection or ratification of a corporate co-trustee. The trial court then granted the defendant trustee’s motion to ratify her appointment of the cotrustee. The plaintiff beneficiary appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Holly D. Butler v. Timothy K. Vinsant
Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Holly D. Butler v. Timothy K. Vinsant - Dissent
I must respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion in this case. I agree with the majority’s holding on whether Father presented a meritorious defense in support of his Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the default judgment. However, I must disagree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’ s finding that Father’s failure to respond or appear in the default proceedings was willful, and its affirmance of the trial court’s denial of Father’s Rule 60.02 motion to set aside.. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Leo Holt v. Alma Jean Holt
This is an appeal from a divorce action in which the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. The trial court refused, however, to order Husband to pay for the costs of providing COBRA benefits for Wife. Husband and Wife appeal. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pledged Property II, LLC v. Maurice Morris
The trial court dismissed this matter on appeal from general sessions court upon finding that Appellant failed to perfect his appeal where he failed to file a bond for good surety or pauper’s oath. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Andrea Blackwell and Frederick Blackwell, Co-Conservators for the Estate and Person of Robert Blackwell v. Comanche Construction, Inc. and Comanche Construction of Georgia, Inc.
This interlocutory appeal concerns the statutory employer rule under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act. The defendant subcontractor rented a crane from a construction rental company. The crane rental company sent its employee to the job site to operate the crane. On the job site, the crane rental company’s employee sustained crippling injuries. The employee’s co-conservators sued the subcontractor in tort. The subcontractor filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was a statutory employer of the crane rental company’s employee, pursuant to the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically T.C.A. § 50-6-113, and thus was immune from liability under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, T.C.A. § 50-6-108. The trial court held that the subcontractor was not a statutory employer and therefore was not shielded by the exclusive remedy provision. The subcontractor was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether it is a statutory employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act. We hold that, to reach the issue of whether the subcontractor is a statutory employer, it is first necessary to determine if the crane rental company was a subcontractor within the meaning of the Act, an issue not addressed by the trial court. Consequently, as we are unable on this record to consider the issue raised on appeal, we hold that this Court improvidently granted permission for this interlocutory appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9 and dismiss the appeal. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Department of Health and the Division of Health Related Boards v. Kandala Chary, et al
The Tennessee Department of Health appeals from the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to four doctors following the dismissal of its administrative action against the doctors. Following a contested case hearing in which all material facts were stipulated, the Board of Medical Examiners dismissed all charges upon the finding that “the Department had not proven facts sufficient to establish that Respondent[s] violated Tenn.Code Ann.§§ 63-6-101 et seq., 63-6-214, and Tenn Comp. R. [and] Regs.” When the Department did not seek judicial review of the dismissal, the doctors requested and were awarded their attorneys’ fees and costs. The Department then filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the award. The chancery court affirmed the award and this appeal followed. Finding there is substantial and material evidence to support the administrative law judge’s decision to award the attorneys’ fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-325, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Keith A. Davis v. Shaw Industries Group, Inc. et al
Plaintiff was terminated from his at-will employment for violating company policy by allegedly lying during an investigation into whether he was involved in a romantic relationship with a human resources manager. Plaintiff filed this action against his former supervisor, and his former employer, for intentional interference with his employment. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, the corporate employer cannot be held liable for intentionally interfering with its own employment contracts, and that the undisputed facts established the supervisor did not act outside the scope of his authority in assisting in the investigation; thus, he could not be held liable. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion. We affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Holly Geneace Garrett v. Mark Anthony Garrett
This post-divorce appeal concerns the agreed-upon parenting plan designating Mother as the primary residential parent. When Mother registered the Children in a new school district, Father objected. The trial court entered an order requiring the Children to remain in their current school district, despite the Cumberland County Board of Education’s policy providing otherwise. The Cumberland County Board of Education filed a motion to intervene, which was granted. Following a limited hearing, the court designated Father as the primary residential parent, allowing the Children to remain in their current school district per the applicable policy. Mother appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Alysia M. S.
A couple who had cared for a minor child filed a petition alleging that the child was dependent and neglected. The juvenile court awarded the couple temporary custody, and after finding that the child was dependent and neglected, directed custody to remain with the couple. Mother appealed. Grandparents filed an intervening petition. After a trial de novo, the circuit court found that the child was not dependent and neglected, dismissed both petitions, and directed the juvenile court to implement Mother and child’s reunification. The couple appealed. Discerning no error and finding no clear and convincing evidence of dependence and neglect, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jamie Dickerson, et al v. Rutherford County, Tennessee
Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s award of summary judgment to Rutherford County on the basis of foreseeability and comparative fault in this negligence action under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Paul J. Frankenberg, III v. River City Resort, Inc., et al
The former president and chief operating officer of a corporation brought this action against the corporation and its CEO, alleging that Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-13-101, which grants “employees and laborers of any corporation . . . a lien upon the corporate and firm property . . . for any sums due them for labor and service performed for the corporation,” provided him a lien in the amount of his alleged unpaid bonus and severance payments. The trial court dismissed the statutory lien claim, holding that the claimant was not included in the statutory definition of “employee.” The claimant has appealed. We hold that the Supreme Court’s ruling in State ex rel. McConnell v. People’s Bank & Trust Co., 296 S.W. 12 (Tenn. 1927) that a corporation’s “managing officers” are not “employees” as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-13-101 controls. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sylvia Susana Marquez v. Pedro Marquez
This appeal arises from a post-divorce dispute over custody of five children. Sylvia Susana Marquez (“Mother”) and Pedro Marquez (“Father”), divorced in 2003, are mother and father of the five minor children (“the Children,” collectively). Father was designated the primary residential parent of the Children. Mother filed a petition in the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) to modify the parenting plan and for emergency custody based on allegations of violence involving Father. In her petition, Mother also argued that a material change of circumstances had occurred such as to justify her being designated the primary residential parent of the Children. The Trial Court found an emergency had arisen and awarded temporary emergency custody of the Children to Mother. Later, after a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order restoring custody to Father after stating that the emergency had been “removed by [Father].” Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jaiden C.W. and Caiden J.W.
This is the second appeal of this case, involving the issue of child support and arrears. In In re Jaiden C.W., No. M2010-01105-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL 2306057 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2011), this Court vacated the trial court’s determination of Appellant Father’s child support obligation because the trial court did not base its determination on Father’s actual income. Upon remand, the trial court interpreted the law of the case to limit its review only to Father’s income,and to negate any consideration of other variables affecting child support. Because the trial court misinterpreted the law of the case to limit its review of the parties’ actual circumstances, we vacate the order on child support and remand for reconsideration. Vacated and remanded. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Morris L. Marsh v. NECX Disciplinary Board, et al
The order from which the pro se incarcerated appellant, Morris L. Marsh, seeks to appeal was entered on November 28, 2012. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the November 28, 2012 order, even considering the date upon which the appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (February 10, 2013). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Mackenzy Ruth Murdock, et al. v. Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center, et al
After a defense verdict in this medical malpractice case, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the trial court, sitting as the thirteenth juror, to determine that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and grant them a new trial. The court denied the motion. The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court’s remarks from the bench show that it did not properly perform its role as the thirteenth juror. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Hazel N. Ledford
Hazel N. Ledford died on June 22, 1991. Her will (“the Will”) was a joint holographic one made with her husband, Wilson A. Ledford, who predeceased her. Her stepdaughter, Martha Ledford Powell, became the sole personal representative (“the Personal Representative”) and executor of her stepmother’s estate (“the Estate”). The Will was admitted to probate in July 1991, but the Personal Representative did not file her first accounting until 2009. The final accounting was filed in February 2010. The final accounting revealed that the Estate had paid approximately $350,000 toward remediation of soil contamination caused by underground petroleum storage tanks (“the USTs”) on a parcel of land Mr. Ledford conveyed before his death to a family trust. While Mrs. Ledford was never a title owner of the property, she did join in the execution of the deed to the trust. The Will left a portion of Mrs. Ledford’s residuary estate to a charitable trust. The charitable trust and the Tennessee Attorney General (sometimes referred to collectively as “the Objectors”) objected to the final accounting on the ground that the remediation payments were not a proper expense of the Estate. The court denied the objections and approved the final accounting. The court also approved, in part, the Personal Representative’s request for attorney’s fees. The Objectors appeal. We reverse. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Kenner D. Ensey v. Karla Davis, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development et al
Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision upholding the decision of the designee of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, which denied appellant unemployment benefits. We reverse, finding that, while appellant did quit his job voluntarily, he had good cause for doing so. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals |
