In Re: Wesley S.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Wesley S. (“the Child”), the minor child of Wesley K.S. (“Father”) and Kari F. (“Mother”). The parents were runaway teenagers when the Child was born in August 2007. Father was incarcerated several times during the Child’s first two years. Father’s latest incarceration began on May 14, 2009, and he has been in jail continuously since that date. The Child was taken into custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on December 17, 2010. On May 31, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father. The sole ground alleged was abandonment, based on his conduct prior to incarceration exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Child due to his pre- incarceration conduct. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Hughes, et al vs. Clifford R. Barbee, et al
Donald Hughes and Donna Hughes (“Plaintiffs”) sued Clifford R. Barbee and Anna Melissa Barbee (“Defendants”) seeking, among other things, an order restraining Defendants from obstructing an alleged public roadway. After a trial the Trial Court entered its order on May 29, 2012 finding and holding, inter alia, that the road at issue “was a public road which had been in existence (and used by the public) for a number of years,” that Defendants had failed to prove that the road had been abandoned, and that the road was to “be opened for use by the public.” Defendants appeal to this Court. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
John Wesley Green, et al. v. Champs-Elysees, Inc., et al.
In this case, Plaintiff filed a petition for criminal contempt against Counsel, alleging that Counsel allowed Defendant to portray herself as unrepresented when Counsel assisted her with her testimony and pleadings. The court dismissed the petition, finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the motion when Plaintiff had alleged an ethical violation that did not rise to the level of criminal contempt. The court also denied a subsequent motion to alter or amend its judgment and a motion for recusal. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel., Mary Saucier v. Matthew Parker
State of Tennessee filed petition under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act to enforce a child support order entered in a California divorce proceeding against the father of the children. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
William H. Thomas, Jr. v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
An applicant for billboard permits sought judicial review of the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny the applications. We have concluded, as did the trial court, that the grandfathering provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 did not apply in this case. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision upholding the Department’s denial of the billboard permit applications. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stacey Mitchell and Bryan Mitchell, For themselves, and as next friend to Lauren Mitchell, a minor, v. The Jackson Clinic, P.A., et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees, the doctors and clinic, on the basis that the Appellants’ only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29–26–115. Appellants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding their expert. Under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011), we affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the expert’s testimony and its grant of summary judgment. Affirmed and remanded. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
William H. Thomas, Jr. v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
An applicant for billboard permits sought judicial review of the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny the applications. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision upholding the Department’s denial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Francesca Maria Pier v. Katherine Jungkind, et al.
The trial court awarded Defendants summary judgment in this action for legal malpractice. We affirm based on expiry of the applicable statute of limitations. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jarrod Justin Jacobsen v. Olga Alekseenko Jacobsen
Mother appeals the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child, the parenting plan, and the division of marital property. The trial court found that the majority of the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106 weighed equally in favor of both parents but designated Father as the primary residential parent primarily because the court awarded Father the marital residence, which provides stability for the child. The trial court, however, did not make any findings concerning a wealth of evidence of physical and emotional abuse by Father, some of which Father admitted, and we have determined that the preponderance of the evidence established that Father was abusive of Mother, sometimes in the child’s presence. Because Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406(a) mandates that a parent’s parenting time shall be limited if the parent is found to have engaged in abuse, we reverse the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, as well as the parenting plan adopted by the court, and remand with instructions to designate Mother as the primary residential parent and establish a new parenting plan considering all applicable factors. As for the division of the marital estate, the trial court awarded Father 68% of the marital estate and Mother 32%, which Mother contends is inequitable. She asserts the inequitable distribution is due to Father being awarded the marital residence, which was unencumbered and valued at $216,000, with Mother receiving $55,000, being 26% of the equity, as her share of the marital residence. Considering the length of the marriage, that each spouse contributed substantially to satisfying the mortgage on the residence, and the relatively equal earning capacities of the parties, inter alia, we have determined it is inequitable to award Father 74% of the equity in the marital residence, the result of which awards him 68% of the marital estate. Therefore, we remand with instructions to modify the award by ordering Father to pay Mother $97,200, instead of $55,000, for her interest in the marital residence. As for attorney’s fees, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Father’s request for his attorney’s fees at trial and we deny each party’s request for attorneys’ fees on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Brewer et al. v. Kitchen Designs and Cabinetry et al.
General contractor filed breach of contract action against homeowners, alleging the homeowners failed to pay invoices on an extensive home renovation project. The homeowners denied there were outstanding invoices and filed counterclaims for breach of contract and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act against the general contractor and its owner, in his individual capacity, who contractually agreed to supervise the project for an additional fee. The homeowners alleged the general contractor failed to perform the contract in a workmanlike manner; they also asserted a claim against the owner asserting that he agreed to personally supervise the project for a percentage of the contract and that he breached his agreement by failing to properly supervise the work. The trial court, Judge Barbara Haynes presiding, awarded summary judgment to the homeowners on all claims and counterclaims. On the homeowners’ counterclaims, Judge Haynes also awarded treble damages, attorney’s fees, and costs, pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The counter-defendants filed a motion to alter or amend the decision as to the counterclaims; however, Judge Haynes retired before ruling on the motion. The case was then assigned to Judge Hamilton Gayden and, following a hearing, he denied the motion to alter or amend. The counter-defendants appealed. We affirm the summary dismissal of the general contractor’s breach of contract claim for it is undisputed the homeowners paid the contract amount in full. As for the homeowners’ counterclaims, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners on their breach of contract claim against the general contractor and the award of damages for failing to perform the contract in a workmanlike manner. We also affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners against the supervisor for failing to properly supervise the work; however, we find the evidence insufficient to establish the damages that proximately resulted from the supervisor’s breach as distinguished from the damages resulting from the general contractor’s breach. As for the homeowners’ claims that the general contractor and the supervisor violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, we have determined there are material facts in dispute concerning whether the contractor or the supervisor used or employed unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the TCPA; therefore, summary judgment as to the TCPA claims was not appropriate. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment on the TCPA claims as to the contractor and the supervisor and remand these claims, and the determination of damages for failing to properly supervise, for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Islamic Community of TDOC v. Derrick Schofield, Commissioner et al.
Two inmates in the custody of the Department of Correction have filed a notice of appeal from an order entered on January 4, 2013, denying their post-judgment motions. Because the inmates did not file their notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ramin Saeedpour v. Virtual Medical Solutions, LLC, et al.
Doctor sued Seller of medical equipment for a refund of the purchase price of the equipment pursuant to a money back guarantee; Seller counterclaimed for attorney’s fees and litigation costs pursuant to a separate purchase agreement. The trial court granted Seller’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the guarantee on the basis that Doctor failed to meet a condition precedent; the trial court also granted Doctor’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Seller’s request for fees and costs on the basis that the guarantee and the purchase agreement were separate contracts. Doctor and Seller appeal. Finding no error, we affirm both judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Reginald M. Mudd and Mary Anne Mudd, d/b/a Mudd Properties v. Rexford L. Goostree, Jr. and Liberty Cabinets and Millwork, Inc.
In suit to recover rent due and owing under a lease agreement in which a corporation was named as tenant, trial court entered judgment in favor of landlord against individual who had signed the lease in the space in the signature box designated “Tenant.” Individual appeals, contending that his signature on the lease is not sufficient to bind him personally to the obligations under the lease. Landlord appeals award of damages. We affirm the holding that the individual’s signature on the lease renders him personally liable and remand the case for a determination of whether the landlord is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest and for an award of attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Desiree M. Beyer v. Erik A. Beyer
This appeal arises from a prolonged divorce action. On appeal, Father challenges the trial court’s determinations regarding parenting time, child support, alimony, and the division of the marital estate. Father further challenges the trial court’s decision finding him in both civil and criminal contempt. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Leslie Wooten, Jr. v. Clay Barnett, CFE Corporate Security, First Horizon National Corporation
This appeal involves a lawsuit against a bank. Representing himself, the plaintiff customer filed this lawsuit against the defendant bank. The defendant bank filed a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff customer filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the customer’s motion for summary judgment and granted the bank’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff customer now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dhyanna Muro Ramirez, et al. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., et al
These personal injury cases against Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., and Ford Motor Company (collectively "the Defendants") were consolidated below for all pre-trial proceedings. They have been before this court twice before, first pursuant to a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal and later by way of a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal. They have generated two published opinions. In re Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford Motor Company Tire Litigation, 138 S.W.3d 202 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), perm. app. den. Jun. 1, 2004 ("Firestone I"); In re Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford Motor Company Litigation, 286 S.W.3d 898 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008), perm. app. den. Mar. 23, 2009 ("Firestone II"). In Firestone I, we held that these cases should have been filed in Mexico. We dismissed them on the ground of forum non conveniens. In Firestone II, we held that unsuccessful attempts to file in Mexico could possibly establish that Mexico was not an available alternative forum,contrary to the assumption made by us in Firestone I. We remanded the cases for a hearing on the issue of whether the dismissals in Mexico took place in spite of the plaintiffs’ good faith efforts or, rather, occurred because of the plaintiffs’ manipulation of the cases in order to secure the dismissals in Mexico and thereby have an excuse to refile in Tennessee. The trial court dismissed eight of 26 pending cases. The cases that were dismissed fall into two distinct groups. One group involves tires ("the FR 480 tire cases"), specifically Firestone 480 tires, that were actually manufactured in Mexico. The trial court concluded that the failure to join the entity in Mexico that actually made the tires there showed that the plaintiffs in those cases should not be permitted to litigate whether Mexico was an available forum. The other group consists of two cases which were filed in Mexico on more than one occasion, only one of which was disclosed in discovery ("the Ramirez and Flores cases"). The plaintiffs in both groups (collectively "the Plaintiffs") appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen H. Cook, et al v. David L. Alley, Sr., et al.
This appeal concerns the statute of limitation for the extension of a judgment. J. Waymon Ellison (“Plaintiff”) obtained a judgment in the Chancery Court for Loudon County (“the Trial Court”) against David L. Alley, Sr. and David L. Alley, Jr. (“the Defendants”) in an action related to a real estate transaction. Years later, Plaintiff’s successors-in-interest (“the Successors”) sought to extend the judgment a second time for another ten years. The Trial Court extended the judgment, holding that the first ten year extension of the judgment began to run upon the expiration of ten years from the date the judgment was entered, and, that the initial ten year period in this case began to run from the date the judgment actually was entered rather than the nunc pro tunc date indicated in the judgment. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Demetry Michele Allen v. Harry Lee Allen Jr.
The question presented by this appeal is which parent should be named the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child. The trial court named Appellee Mother primary residential parent. Appellant Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hayley T. et al
The mother of two minor children appeals the order placing her children and a stepdaughter in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services and limiting her to supervised visitation following a determination that the mother’s husband severely sexually abused another child in the home and the determination that the children were dependent and neglected. We affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Taliah L.B.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which Custodial Parents sought termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Child. The trial court granted the termination petition, finding that Mother willfully failed to support and visit the Child and that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel Kathlene Waldo v. Jennifer Waldo
This is an appeal by a mother from the juvenile court’s judgment finding her in civil contempt for failure to pay child support and incarcerating her until she paid $400 toward the arrearage to purge the contempt. Finding the evidence inadequate to support a finding that the mother had the ability to pay child support when it was due or that she had the ability to pay $400 at the time of the hearing in order to purge the sentence, we reverse. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
H.A.S. v. H.D.S.
Lillian (“the Child”) is the offspring of H.A.S. (“Father”) and H.D.S. (“Mother”). The parties were never married to each other. They entered into two mediated agreements regarding Father’s co-parenting time with the Child. The agreements were never presented to or approved by a court. The parties followed the agreements for a time but conflicts developed and Father filed a petition seeking review and modification of the agreements. He asserted that there had been a material change in circumstances and that he should be awarded primary custody of the Child. Following a bench trial, the court found and approved the mediated agreements as being in the Child’s best interest. The court further determined that there had been no change in circumstances warranting a change in custody; but the court did find and hold that Father’s co-parenting time should be revised. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Maria B.S., et al
Matthew V. and Carlene V. (“the Foster Parents”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Lewis S. (“Father”), father to the minor twin children Maria B. S. and Anna J. S. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Trial Court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding that grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113 (g)(1), (g)(3), and (g)(9) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Children’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. We affirm as modified. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Alma B. Long v. Raymond G. Creekmore
This appeal concerns Mother’s reservation of a life estate in property she conveyed to Son pursuant to a warranty deed. After the initial conveyance in 1983, Son resided on the property for years before renting the property to others. Mother prohibited the use of the property by certain tenants, who complied with her demand to vacate. In 2008, Mother objected to the current tenant’s occupation and filed suit to enforce her right to possession of the property. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the claim was barred by a ten-year statute of limitations. Mother appeals. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Joseph Owen Boote, Jr., Helen Boote Shivers and Linda Boote, Co-Executors v. Richard H. Roberts, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Revenue
This appeal involves a claim for interest on inheritance and estate tax refunds. In 2002, the decedent’s estate filed a Tennessee inheritance tax return and paid an estimated amount of taxes due. Over the next several years, the estate was embroiled in litigation; the litigation expenses diminished the size of the estate. Once the litigation concluded, the estate became entitled to more deductions on its inheritance tax return. To obtain the benefit of the deductions, the estate filed two amended Tennessee inheritance tax returns, one in 2009 and one in 2010, claiming that it was entitled to substantial tax refunds based on its overpayment of inheritance and estate taxes in 2002. The defendant Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue paid the refunds claimed in the estate’s amended returns, plus a pittance of interest on the refunds. The estate filed this lawsuit against the commissioner, claiming that it was entitled to additional interest on the inheritance and estate tax refunds under the applicable law. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; each agreed that the facts are undisputed and each claimed that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the commissioner. The estate now appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
