In Re Lilah G.
In this termination of parental rights case, the trial court determined that (1) the father had abandoned his child by willfully failing to pay child support and (2) termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed, contending that his failure to pay child support was not willful because the mother intentionally blocked his access to the child and because he was actively seeking visitation rights with the child in two separate juvenile court actions when the petition for termination was filed. The father also argues that the trial court did not properly evaluate and weigh the evidence in its analysis of the best interest factors. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Derek S. ET AL.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights with respect to her two children. The trial court concluded that three grounds for termination were established, and thereafter, it determined that it was in the best interests of the children for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the establishment of three grounds for termination as well as the finding that termination was in the best interests of both children, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ryan B.
The Juvenile Court for Franklin County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Chasity R. (“Mother”) to her son, Ryan B. (“the Child”). Mother has appealed, challenging only the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Hamid Houbbadi v. Chase T. Smith
While incarcerated for first-degree murder, Appellant filed suit against Appellee, an attorney who represented Appellant during his criminal trial, for legal malpractice. Shortly after filing the complaint, Appellant filed a motion to appear for hearings by video. The trial court did not rule on the motion to appear by video and proceeded to enter several orders on other motions on the pleadings only, including an order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. Because the trial court failed to address Appellant’s motion to appear by video, we vacate specific orders of the trial court in their entirety, including the final order dismissing the complaint. The case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to consider Appellant’s motion to appear by video. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kandy Page v. Holly Cikalo et al.
This appeal arises from a finding of dependency and neglect and dismissal of adoption proceedings. Adoption petitioner contends that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address dependency and neglect, which the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear. Concluding that the chancery court had exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption petitions, we affirm the trial court. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Shira Skopp Levy v. Alan Louis Levy
This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the issues on appeal principally concern the award of alimony in futuro and the allocation of the children’s optional school or extracurricular expenses. Prior to trial, the parties agreed to a parenting schedule and that the husband would pay $4,100 per month in child support, but they did not agree on the wife’s claim for alimony, the allocation of optional expenses for the children’s school or extracurricular activities, or the division of the marital estate. Following a multi-day trial, the trial court divided the approximately $12 million marital estate equally between the parties and awarded the wife $2,000 a month in alimony in futuro. The award of alimony in futuro was based, in principal part, on the court’s finding that the wife had an earning capacity of $160,000 a year—although the most the wife had ever earned was $80,000 a year—and that some of the wife’s claimed monthly expenses were “overstated” or unsubstantiated. The court also allocated 20% of the children’s optional expenses for school and extracurricular activities to the wife and 80% to the husband. The wife challenges the award of alimony in futuro and the allocation of the children’s optional expenses, contending that the trial court “grossly overestimated” her earning capacity and erred by reducing her claimed expenses. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination of the wife’s earning capacity, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and the court’s order that the wife pay 20% of the children’s optional expenses for school or extracurricular activities, and remand both issues for further consideration. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Lucas Et Al. v. Joseph Berryman
The attorneys for a deceased defendant appeal the trial court’s order dismissing this action pursuant to Rule 12.02(6). Because the attorneys do not have standing, this appeal is dismissed. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
PMC Squared, LLC v. Rita Gallo Et Al.
Tenants filed action against their former landlord in the form of a Countercomplaint, alleging that they had |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Elizabeth Y.
In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his child, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence four statutory grounds supporting termination. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence established that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in its entirety, including termination of the father’s parental rights. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Allison Cooper v. Tony Cooper
This post-divorce appeal concerns the trial court’s classification, valuation, and equitable division of marital property. Following our review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Berkeley Research Group, LLC v. Southern Advanced Materials, LLC
Defendant appeals the trial court’s decision to deny its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and grant the plaintiff’s motion to confirm an arbitration award. Because we conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish that the trial court had either specific or general jurisdiction over this matter, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sheryl Galison v. Jennifer Brownell, et al.
After a jury trial, Appellant received a $500.00 award. She then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the exclusion of certain testimony, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Appellant again argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony. Because Appellant failed to properly raise these issues post-trial, the issues are waived, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Vicki Ann Giro v. Kaleb Wilburn Et Al.
This appeal concerns service of process and the statute of limitations. Vicki Ann Giro (“Giro”) sued Kaleb Wilburn (“Wilburn”) in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) for injuries Giro sustained in a car accident with Wilburn. Giro failed to timely serve the summons in compliance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 and failed to issue new process before the statute of limitations expired. Giro filed a motion for enlargement of time. In opposition to Giro’s motion, the Trial Court was furnished with an altered copy of Hollis ex rel. Nicole N. v. Sanchez, No. M2022-01190-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 5920145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2023), no appl. perm. appeal filed. The altered copy of Hollis retains the heading “MEMORANDUM OPINION” but omits Footnote 1 stating that, as a memorandum opinion, Hollis is not to be cited or relied on in any unrelated case pursuant to Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10. The Trial Court, which had been furnished on Wilburn’s behalf with the altered copy missing the explanatory footnote, relied heavily on Hollis to deny Giro’s motion for enlargement of time. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for the Trial Court to exercise its discretion on whether to grant Giro’s motion for enlargement of time without considering Hollis or any other opinion designated by this Court as a memorandum opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Hardison (Stokes) Williams v. Ernest K. Hardison, III et al.
This is a breach of trust action by a trust beneficiary, Nancy Hardison (Stokes) Williams (“Plaintiff”), against the co-trustees, Ernest K. Hardison, III, and Cumberland Trust and Investment Company (collectively “Defendants”). The issues raised in this appeal only pertain to Plaintiff’s claims against Cumberland Trust and Investment Company (“Cumberland”). Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Cumberland committed a breach of trust by failing to properly manage and invest trust assets resulting in the trust sustaining significant financial losses. In her effort to recover damages against Cumberland, Plaintiff also sought to declare two trust indemnity and investment agreements—which she and all qualified beneficiaries entered into with Cumberland in 2006 and 2009—void ab initio on the basis that they are unenforceable pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1008 because they violate a material purpose of the trust. She also contended that the agreements are unenforceable because they constitute “an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1008(b). Upon the motion of Defendants for partial summary judgment, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims arising prior to July 1, 2016, as barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1005(a). Additionally, upon the finding that Plaintiff and the qualified beneficiaries had released Cumberland from liability pursuant to the indemnity and investment agreements, the trial court summarily dismissed all remaining claims against Cumberland. The court then awarded Cumberland its attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $45,594.70 pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-1004(a). This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects. We also find that Cumberland is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses it has incurred in this appeal and remand this issue to the trial court to make the appropriate award. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Merritt v. Christian Fahey, et al.
Bringing a suit pro se, a Patient sued his healthcare providers under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. The trial court dismissed the Patient’s claims, deeming them time-barred. Instead of promptly appealing that order, the Patient serially submitted various motions over the course of approximately a year. The trial court denied the Patient’s motions. The Patient appeals. Concluding that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss the Patient’s appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Small et al. v. Jon Law et al.
This began as an immediate appeal of an order dismissing a suit under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the appeal, the only issue that remains is the request of the defendants, now proceeding as appellants, for an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses incurred on appeal. Because an award is mandatory, we grant the request and remand to the trial court to determine the amount. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Elijah G.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court terminated his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. It also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Jacob Cipolla v. Sylvia Coutras
This appeal stems from a petition for a parenting plan modification filed by Jacob Cipolla (“Father”). Father shares one child with Sylvia Coutras (“Mother”). The parties engaged in contentious and protracted litigation over the custody of their child. In October of 2022, a juvenile court magistrate entered an order naming Father as the child’s primary residential parent. Mother sought a rehearing before the juvenile court judge pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-107 but later withdrew that request. The juvenile court subsequently entered an order awarding Father his attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. Mother appeals that ruling to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Ethan Rashad Holmes, as surviving child and next of kin of Ephraim Holmes v. Stacy L. Shipp
This is a personal injury case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, and because the order was improperly certified as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Charles Johnson v. Elizabeth Kay Johnson
Stephen Charles Johnson (“Husband”) filed for divorce against Elizabeth Kay Johnson (“Wife”) in the Chancery |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Greywood Crossing Owners Association, Inc. v. Barbara Holleman
Greywood Crossing Owners Association, Inc. (“Greywood”) commenced this action to enforce the |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Raven Cobins v. Crystal Murray
Appellant, Raven Cobins, appealed a February 16, 2023 order of the Shelby County Circuit Court. Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). The appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Billy Hawk, Jr. Et Al v. Chambliss Bahner & Stophel, P.C.
The appellants sued the appellee, a law firm, alleging that the law firm committed legal malpractice when it gave the appellants legal advice with regard to the tax implications of a stock sale. The law firm filed two motions for summary judgment arguing that the legal malpractice case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Both motions were denied when the trial court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found that the legal malpractice case was timely filed but that the law firm had not committed legal malpractice. Upon our diligent review of the record, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Cartier H., Et Al.
This is the second appeal involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her two children. In the first appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s finding that the mother failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children and that termination was in the children’s best interest. We remanded the case for the trial court to make additional factual findings and conclusions of law. On remand, the trial court entered an amended order with additional findings and conclusions. The mother appeals again. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Violet R.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the father abandoned his child by failure to visit. The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
