Delwin L. Huggins, John P. Konvalinka et al. v. R. Ellsworth McKee, et al.
This appeal arises from a dispute over setoff claims related to a bankruptcy proceeding. Delwin Huggins (“Huggins”) sued R. Ellsworth McKee (“McKee”) and Alternative Fuels, LLC (“AF”) (McKee and AF as “the Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Huggins filed for bankruptcy. Konvalinka later purchased the claims asserted by Huggins in this lawsuit. The Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that, even if Konvalinka’s claim for damages was successful, McKee had an offset far in excess of these damages which rendered any further proceedings useless. The Trial Court agreed with the Defendants and dismissed the case. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Fork Union Medical Investors Limited Partnership; Goochland Medical Investors Limited Partnership; Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. HR Acquisition of Virginia Limited Partnership; HRT Holdings, Inc.
This is a dispute over a claim for rent reimbursements in a lease agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the undisputed facts showed that a limitation of remedy provision in the lease relieved the defendant from any liability. We affirm the judgment of the court below. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Darla Bullock, as next of kin and sole surviving heir of Linda H. Lobertini v. University Health Systems, Inc.
This is an appeal in a medical malpractice case. The original plaintiff, the decedent, filed the initial malpractice action against the defendant, but the case was dismissed after the decedent passed away during the pendency of the suit. Her sole surviving heir re-filed the action without complying with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 122, which require a plaintiff who files a medical malpractice suit (1) to give a health care provider who is to be named in the suit notice of the claim sixty days before filing the suit, and (2) to file with the medical malpractice complaint a certificate of good faith confirming that the plaintiff has consulted with an expert who has provided a signed written statement that there is a good-faith basis to maintain the action. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and the trial court dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
William H . Thomas, Jr. v. Tennessee Department of Transportation et al.
Petitioner challenges the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation denying his application for a billboard permit because his proposed location was within 1000 feet of another permit location. He contends the Department erroneously deviated from its regulation requiring permit applications for locations within 1000 feet of each other to be considered on a “first come first served” basis, insisting he submitted a “complete” application before the applicant who was granted a permit for the nearby location. The Chancery Court summarily dismissed the petition, finding it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the Department’s decision to grant a permit to the other applicant. The court also found that the Department complied with its rules in issuing the permit to the other applicant and denying the petitioner’s application because petitioner’s location was less than 1000 feet away from the other applicant’s location. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Advantage Personnel Consultants, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Commerce et al.
This matter involves a disagreement between an insurer and an insured over the proper classification of employees for the purpose of workers’ compensation insurance. The decision of the Department of Commerce and Insurance was in favor of the insurer. The insured appealed to the trial court, which affirmed the Department. We find that the decision of the Department of Commerce and Insurance is supported by substantial and material evidence and affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI Limited Partnership, et al. v. Carl Mabry
Appellant takes exception to the trial court’s order, enforcing a settlement agreement. ollowing a judicial settlement conference, the parties signed a written agreement, which contemplated the execution of more formal settlement documents. When the formal documents were presented to Appellant, he refused to sign. Upon Appellees’ motion, the trial court enforced the settlement and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Federal National Mortgage Association v. Brett Stokes
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant, occupant of the property which had been foreclosed. Plaintiff held a deed of ownership. Plaintiff sued for possession and for damages for unlawful detainer of the property. The Trial Court granted plaintiff summary judgment for possession and damages for unlawful detainer pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-120. On appeal, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James Lueking, et al., v. Cambridge Resources, Inc., et al.
In this case the Trial Court entered a "Final Judgment". The Judgment did not resolve defendant's Counter-Claim. On appeal, we hold we are without jurisdiction to consider the Appeal and dismiss the Appeal. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Hanson v. J.C. Hobbs Company, Inc.
This case arises out of the sale of a tractor. The plaintiff purchaser bought a tractor online from the defendant company, which specializes in the sale of tractors. The company advertised the tractor as having many fewer hours of use than it actually had. After taking possession of the tractor and learning the tractor’s true condition, the purchaser filed this lawsuit against the company, alleging breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, rescission, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the purchaser, and awarded compensatory damages and attorney fees. The company now appeals, arguing inter alia that the evidence does not support an award of compensatory damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Stonebridge Life Insurance Company, Gwendolyn R. Williams v. Onzie O. Horne, III
This is an interpleader action resulting from competing claims to the proceeds of a life insurance policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Insured’s mother, finding that, because she was the only named beneficiary of the policy, she was entitled to the proceeds. Insured’s husband appeals, arguing that, because Insured’s mother was only named as a contingent beneficiary, the default provisions of the policy remained in effect, resulting in him being the primary beneficiary of the policy. Husband also appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his bad faith claim against the insurer. We affirm the dismissal of the bad faith claim, but conclude that the contract at issue is ambiguous and the issue in this case is not properly decided on summary judgment. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dylan P.
The trial court determined that the minor children in this case were dependent and neglected upon finding that one of the children was the victim of severe child abuse. Mother appeals. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Tamala Teague, as successor personal representative of the Estate of Lola Lee Duggan v. Garnette Kidd, et al.
This appeal involves a claim filed by the Administrator of Decedent’s estate to recover monetary assets that were misappropriated from Decedent prior to her death. Administrator alleged that the Kidds depleted Decedent’s monetary assets, thereby breaching a confidential relationship they held with her. The trial court agreed and issued a judgment against the Kidds with prejudgment interest. We affirm the judgment against Wife as modified but reverse the judgment against Husband. The case is remanded. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Maurice M. Acree, Jr., et al. v. Nancy Acree, et al.
In this action a Petition was filed and a conservator was appointed for Dr. Maurice M. Acree, |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Christopher A. D.
The mother brought a petition to modify support and for contempt, alleging that the father |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Margaret L. Swift
This appeal involves the interpretation of a will. The named residuary beneficiary predeceased the testatrix. The executrix of the decedent’s estate argued that a survivorship requirement in the will applies to the named residuary beneficiary, so her interest lapsed. The issue of the residuary beneficiary argued that the survivorship requirement did not apply to the residuary beneficiary, so Tennessee’s anti-lapse statute operates to pass the beneficiary’s interest to her issue. The trial court held for the executrix, construing the will so as to apply the survivorship requirement to the residuary beneficiary. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the will, and so affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Margaret L. Swift - Dissenting
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Sherman Lane Pierce, et al. v. James H. Delashmitt, et al.
Sherman Lane Pierce and Cathryn Pierce (“the Pierces”) own real property in Meigs County, Tennessee. James H. Delashmitt and Minnie C. Delashmitt (“the Delashmitts”) own real property that adjoins the Pierces’ property. The Pierces sued the Delashmitts alleging, among other things, that the Delashmitts had trespassed upon the Pierces’ property and attempted to fence off a portion of the Pierces’ driveway. The Delashmitts answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim asserting that the Pierces had trespassed on the Delashmitt’s property. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the Pierces had adversely possessed a portion of the disputed property. The Pierces appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding and holding that the Pierces failed to prove adverse possession as to the entire disputed area. The Delashmitts raise an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding and holding that the Pierces adversely possessed any portion of the disputed property. We affirm. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Bridget Michelle Agee v. Jason Forest Agee
In this post-divorce dispute, Father challenges the trial court’s modification of the parenting plan to designate Mother as primary residential parent and the trial court’s calculation of his income and monthly child support obligation. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Anna Ruth Collins (Eisenberg) v. The Estate of Harvey L. Collins
This is an action to collect child support ordered in the parties’ 1965 divorce decree. The Trial Court held that the ten year statute of limitations contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3- 110(2) acted as a bar to this action and dismissed the case. Anna Ruth Collins (Eisenberg) appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Joshua Hilliard v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board, et al.
Inmate appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of certiorari. The chancery court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and because inmate failed to show that the prison disciplinary board acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily. We affirm, finding the inmate failed to show that the disciplinary board exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Rick Earl, et al. v. Dr. Raquel Hatter, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Human Services, et al.
Married couple sought judicial review of decision of Department of Human Services holding that they were not eligible for medicaid under an amendment to the Social Security Act known as the “Pickle Amendment.” Upon consideration of the record we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Labor Standards Division - CONCUR
I fully concur in parts A and B of the opinion’s analysis section; however, I have some reservations regarding part C. I have chosen to write separately to highlight my concerns about the implications of this opinion for administrative inspections generally. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shirleen Nevels v. Joseph Contarino, M.D. et al.
The trial court dismissed this medical malpractice claim on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss, after excluding the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness. Because the trial court erred in its application of the locality rule and Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence, we reverse. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Labor Standards Division
This is an administrative appeal in which an employer challenges the decision of the Tennessee Department of Labor & Workforce Development finding the employer in violation of the Tennessee Child Labor Act for failing to furnish, within one hour of demand, personnel files of each of its minor employees. The trial court affirmed the decision of the Department and this appeal followed. Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-5-111(1) & (4) require employers to “make, keep and preserve a separate and independent file record for each minor employed, which shall be kept at the location of the minor’s employment” and to “furnish” the records relative to the minor employees. On appeal, the employer contends it maintained the records on site as required, thus it did not violate Subsection (1) of the statute. The employer also asserts that it has a Fourth Amendment right to object to a warrantless search by the Department and it may not be penalized for asserting its constitutional right. We have determined the Department’s decision to assess penalties for violating Subsection (1) of Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-5-111 is not supported by substantial and material evidence and the inference drawn by the Department that the records were not maintained on site based upon a mere inference drawn from the fact they were not produced within one hour of demand is insufficient. Therefore, the assessments for allegedly failing to maintain personnel records of minor employees on site is reversed. As for the requirement under Subsection (4) of Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-5-111 that employers of minor employees furnish and allow inspection of the separate and independent file records for each minor employed upon request by the Department, the Act expressly provides that if the Department is denied permission to make an inspection, Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-4-101 provides that the Department employee or official may obtain an administrative inspection warrant in accordance with the procedures outlined in the statute; the Department did not seek to obtain a warrant in this case. As for refusing the Department’s request to inspect the records without an administrative warrant, in order for a warrantless search or inspection to be constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment, the Department must establish that the employer was part of a pervasively regulated industry or that the employer had weakened or reduced privacy expectations that are significantly overshadowed by the Department’s interests in regulating the employer’s industry. We have determined the Department failed to establish either; accordingly, the Department cannot assess a penalty against an employer for asserting its constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.Thus, the penalty assessed for allegedly violating Subsection (4) of the statute is reversed. Pursuant to the foregoing, we remand with instructions for the trial court to order the Department to vacate the citations and penalties against the employer. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Linda M. Pettigrew v. Dennis A. Pettigrew
In this divorce case, the Trial Court awarded the wife her attorney's fees as alimony in solido. The husband appeals this issue arguing that the wife's property settlement was such that she should pay her attorney's fees out of the property settlement. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals |
