In Re Cera B., Kellie B., and Donald B.
In this appeal,the Mother and Father of three children appeal the termination of their parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support. We reverse the termination of parental rights on the ground of abandonment by failure to support; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel K. Robinson v. Candace Whisman et al.
Former inmate challenged the calculation of his prison sentence, contending the Tennessee Department of Correction erred in failing to award him pretrial jail credit. The orders of judgment TDOC relied upon to calculate the prison sentence apparently did not indicate the inmate had earned pretrial jail credit. The former inmate filed a complaint against individuals employed by the prison and TDOC, contending they violated his constitutional rights and were liable to him for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). The trial court dismissed the former inmate’s complaint because the defendants calculated the former inmate’s sentence based on the judgments as they were required to do by statute. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Charles B. Lehman
Claimant filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission to recover for the wrongful death of his father, a resident of Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute; the Commission awarded damages for loss of consortium, pain and suffering, and medical and funeral expenses. Claimant appeals the amount of damages awarded for loss of consortium and pain and suffering. We affirm the damages awarded for loss of consortium and modify the award of damages for pain and suffering. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In the Matter of Michael R.O., Jr.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child at issue. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had committed severe child abuse, had been sentenced to prison for the child abuse, and had been sentenced to confinement for more than ten years. The trial court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Affirmed |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Andre Dotson v. Contemporary Media, Inc., d/b/a The Memphis Flyer, and John Branston
This is a libelous defamation case that was dismissed on grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, a newspaper and its reporter. Appellant, who was a then-incarcerated inmate, filed the instant lawsuit, purportedly in forma pauperis. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on grounds that: (1) Appellant’s failure to pay all fees and costs in other lawsuits, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 41-21-812, required dismissal of the lawsuit; (2) Appellant could not renounce his indigency in order to avoid the operation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 41-21-812; (3) Appellant failed to issue service of process on the newspaper, thus requiring dismissal of this Defendant/Appellee; (4) the allegedly defamatory statement was protected by the fair reporting privilege. After review, we hold that: (1) because there is no Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 29 uniform affidavit of indigency in this record, we cannot conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 41-21-812 was triggered; (2) having failed to establish in the record that he was, in fact, proceeding as a pauper in this case, Appellant’s attempt to renounce his indigency was a nullity; (3) Appellee newspaper was properly dismissed from the lawsuit for lack of service of process; and (4) it was error for the trial court to rule on the motion for summary judgment without first lifting the stay on discovery to allow Appellant to conduct discovery. Vacated in part, reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Hannah Ann Culbertson v. Randall Eric Culbertson
This extraordinary appeal arises from the trial court’s order granting Wife’s motion for disclosure of Husband’s psychological records. After thorough consideration, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to consider Husband’s claims that his psychological records were protected from disclosure by the psychologist-client privilege, and that he did not waive the privilege. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Petschonek v. The Catholic Diocese of Memphis, et al.
Defendant employer moved for summary judgment in this common law retaliatory discharge action on the grounds that Plaintiff employee was not an employee-at-will and that Plaintiff had failed to identify any law or clear public policy allegedly violated by Defendant. The trial court denied the motion. We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, Defendant raises the issue of whether the courts lack jurisdiction under the ministerial exception. We hold that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. We also hold that Plaintiff was not an at-will employee, and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of common law retaliatory discharge. The trial court’s judgment denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is reversed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Petschonek v. The Catholic Diocese of Memphis, et al. - Separate Concurrence
I concur with the majority opinion in this case, and submit this separate concurrence only to make an additional point. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James R. Oliphant v. The State of Tennessee
This common law writ of certiorari was filed by an inmate, who asserted that the parole board violated his rights by returning him to jail for violating his parole. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice because the inmate failed to pay any portion of the initial filing fee or to issue a summons to the parole board. Affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dawn Louise Burnett v. Dennis Ervin Burnett
This case involves the sufficiency of notice given to an incarcerated party in a divorce proceeding. Wife filed for divorce and sent Husband notice of a hearing for approval of Wife’s temporary parenting plan. Although Father was not present at the hearing, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce in favor of Wife, assigning the majority of the marital debt to Husband. Husband appealed, asserting that he was not properly notified that the hearing would concern issues other than a temporary parenting plan. Vacated and remanded. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip Sullivan v. Wilson County, et al.
An employee was terminated by a local power board after a detective sent his employer a letter stating the employee sold narcotic drugs from the truck the employee used during his shift and that the employee admitted selling the drugs. The employee denied selling illegal drugs or making such an admission to the detective, but the administrative law judge in charge of the evidentiaryhearing determined the statements inthedetective’sletterweretrue. The employee later filed suit against the detective who authored the letter, his supervisors, and the county employing the individual defendants. The former employee asserted causes of action fordefamation,negligence,false lightinvasionofprivacy,and intentionalinfliction of emotional distress. The trial court concluded the former employee was collaterally estopped from relitigating the veracity of the statements in the detective’s letter leading to the former employee’s termination and dismissed the complaint in toto. We affirm. All of the employee’s causes of action were based upon statements the detective made in his letter to the employer, which the employee alleged were false. Because the employee is estopped from denying the truth of those statements, he has no basis on which to pursue any of the causes of action set forth in his complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Diane R. Cannon Kellon and William T. Kellon v. Marsha Lee, M.D. and Semmes-Murphey Clinic
This is a medical malpractice case wherein a patient suffered permanent neurological impairment after delay of surgery to correct a ruptured disc in her spine. The patient sued the doctor who treated her at a minor medical clinic, and a neurological clinic, alleging that both failed to ensure that the patient was treated promptly. The jury found that the doctor did not breach the standard of care, but awarded damages against the neurological clinic. The neurological clinic moved for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the patient failed to prove causation. The trial court granted the motion, as well as a conditional motion for new trial as to the neurological clinic only. The trial court concurred in the jury verdict in favor of the doctor. We reverse the grant of the motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict and affirm the grant of a new trial as to the neurological clinic only. The jury verdict in favor of the minor medical clinic doctor, as concurred in by the trial court, is affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Alan Wilsey and Sandra Wilsey
This appeal involves an unlawful detainer action. After foreclosure, the defendants refused to leave the subject property. The plaintiff filed this unlawful detainer action against the defendants, and ultimately filed a motion for summary judgment. In response, the defendants, acting pro se, filed documents suggesting fraud and/or unlawful foreclosure practices. The defendants filed no evidence to support their claims and no other response to the plaintiff’s motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants now appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jacob R.R., Brady E.R., and Kacey C.R.
The Department of Children's Services filed a Petition inter alia, to terminate the mother's parental rights to her three minor children. Following trial on the issues, the Trial Court ruled there were several statutory grounds for terminating the mother's parental rights, including that the mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan requirements, and abandonment of the children. The Court also determined that the evidence established that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the mother's parental rights. The mother has appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Romalis Gray v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al
Appellant, Romalis Gray,pro se, filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court and Motions. On April 19, 2012 this Court ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed and recites that the record reveals that the Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 days following the Final Judgment in the Trial Court. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Marquise T. G.
Father filed petition to modify custody, and maternal grandmother objected to Tennessee court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because she had cared for child in Indiana for preceding thirty months. Grandmother also sought to intervene in father’s action. The trial court concluded it had jurisdiction to determine the child’s custody pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-217(a) because both parents reside in Tennessee and the child has significant contact with Tennessee. The trial court allowed Grandmother to intervene only to protect her visitation rights. Grandmother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. Grandmother’s only rights with respect to the child are any visitation rights she may be entitled to under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Ann Claudia Short Bowers v. Frederick Allen Bowers
This post-divorce appeal concerns the classification and division of property, namely a house Wife owned prior to the marriage and a house purchased during the marriage. Following the grant of Wife’s request for divorce, the trial court classified the pre-marital house as Wife’s separate property and the house purchased during the marriage as marital property. The court ruled that Husband had dissipated the proceeds from the sale of the pre-marital house and ordered Husband to reimburse Wife. The court awarded Wife two-thirds of the equity in the marital house, leaving one-third of the equity to Husband. Husband appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas James Milam, Jr. v. Donna Lisa Vinson Milam
This appeal involves a post-divorce petition to modify child support. The trial court reduced Father’s child support obligation from $4,500 monthly to $2,500. Mother appeals. Finding that the trial court erred in the calculation of Father’s income and the number of days of his parenting time, we vacate the child support award and remand for a redetermination of the appropriate award under the Child Support Guidelines. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Melinda B. Busler (Lee) v. John C. Lee
Father appeals the trial court’s decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction and to transfer his petition to modify custody to a Florida court pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Lindsi Allison Connors v. Jeremy Phillip Lawson
In this appeal, the biological father sought to revise the permanent parenting plan to be named the child’s primary residential parent. The child had been conceived during illegal sexual contact meeting this State’s definition of statutory rape; the mother, however, allowed the father to have a relationship with the child. Upon remand after an earlier appeal by the father, the trial court determined that the mother, now married and living in Florida with the child, was in contempt for failing to cooperate with the father regarding certain co-parenting issues. Despite this finding, the court refrained from imposing any punishment on the mother. The court additionally denied the father’s request to modify custody, made a modest award of attorney’s fees to the father, and held that further proceedings relating to the child be conducted in Florida. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Alene S. Neal v. The State of Tennessee, Department of Human Services
The Department of Human Services determined that Plaintiff’s available resources exceeded he resource limit for purposes of Medicaid benefits in the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary category. The trial court affirmed the Department’s determination. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James H. Harris, III v. Edward K. White, III
This is a dispute between two attorneys. Attorney 1 hired attorney 2 to represent him. Attorney 2 sued attorney 1 for attorney fees, and attorney 1 counterclaimed for legal malpractice. The trial court granted attorney 2 summary judgment on the attorney fee claim, and a jury found in favor of attorney 2 on the legal malpractice claim. On appeal, attorney 1 challenges both decisions on multiple grounds. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of George H. Steil, II
The only issue in this case is whether a divorced wife was entitled to continue to receive alimony after the untimely death of her former husband. The wife argued that the support award was in the nature of alimony in solido, which is for a fixed total amount that does not abate upon the death of the obligor. She relies upon an Agreed Interim Order that provided that the husband would pay the wife “spousal support in the amount of $500 per month for a period of three years. . . .” The executrix of her former husband’s estate contended that the terms of the Agreed Interim Order were irrelevant, because the order was superseded by the Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA), which was incorporated into the final decree of divorce. The MDA included the $500 per month alimony provision, but provided that the husband’s alimony obligation would end if the wife remarried, and it did not mention the three year period or any other time limitation. The executrix accordingly argued that the MDA award was in the nature of alimony in futuro, which abates upon the death of the obligor by operation of law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(1). The trial court found that the omission of the three year period from the MDA was an inadvertent oversight, that the parties intended the alimony award to be in solido, and that the wife was accordingly entitled to receive support from her former husband’s estate. We reverse, because the MDA establishes the award and provided for alimony in futuro. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Shandra Kay Hattaway v. Kevin Todd Hattaway
In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the trial court’s division of marital property, alimony award, permanent parenting plan, award of discretionary costs, and award of attorney fees to Wife. We have determined that the trial court erred in requiring Husband to pay more rehabilitative alimony than he can afford, in awarding him only 28 days a year in parenting time, and in awarding discretionary costs for expert fees for case preparation. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Claudine Holland v. Robert Shields Holland
This appeal involves the “spousal impoverishment” provision of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. Mary Claudine Holland and Robert Shields Holland were married in 1967. Robert Shields Holland was placed in a nursing home for health-related problems in 2009. Mary Claudine Holland filed a complaint for separate maintenance in which she sought division of the marital assets and income. The trial court granted her request and filed an order reflecting its decision. The Tennessee Department of Human Services filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the order. The trial court denied the motions. The Tennessee Department of Human Services appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instruction to the court to reconsider the complaint for separate maintenance with the Tennessee Department of Human Services present as an intervening party. |
Union | Court of Appeals |
