In Re: Rebekah R. W.
Perley W. Jr., (“Father”) appeals the termination of his rights to his minor daughter, Rebekah R.W. (DOB: Oct. 7, 2005) (“the Child”). The petition to terminate was filed by Arlin H. and Emma H. (collectively “the Grandparents”), the Child’s maternal grandparents, who were the Child’s temporary custodians. At the time of the bench trial, Father was serving an effective 40-year prison sentence pursuant to two convictions for attempted murder and a conviction for attempted aggravated arson. The court terminated Father’s rights based upon the ground that Father was incarcerated under a sentence of ten or more years while the Child was under eight years of age, and its finding that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals the trial court’s best interest determination. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Christa Goddard v. Thomas E. Goddard
This is a post-divorce case. Thomas E. Goddard (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order granting Christa Goddard (“Mother”) permission to move to Florida with the parties’ minor child, Emma Elizabeth (DOB: July 1, 2004)(“the Child”). Based upon finding that Mother was spending the greater amount of time with the Child, the court applied Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(d)(1)(2010). The court found that the proposed relocation (1) had a reasonable purpose, (2) posed no threat of specific and serious harm to the Child, and (3) was not motivated by a vindictive effort to defeat Father’s parenting rights. Father appeals. We affirm . |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. U.S. Golf & Tennis Centers, Inc., et al
Wilson Sporting Goods Company brought suit in the Cumberland County General Sessions Court on an open account against U.S. Golf & Tennis Centers, Inc. (“the Company”) and its owners, Arthur H. Bell and Louise Bell (collectively “the Guarantors”). The account resulted from a large shipment of golf balls. After delivery, the Company questioned the price charged and refused and failed to make any payments. In response to Wilson’s suit, the defendants filed a counterclaim in which they denied owing the amount sought and moved the court to modify or rescind the contract with Wilson. Following a bench trial, the general sessions court entered judgment in favor of Wilson. On appeal to the trial court, both sides sought summary judgment; both motions were denied. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of Wilson for $33,099.28. The defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick Edward Reeder v. Jo Beth (Curtis) Reeder
In this post-divorce action, a father seeks to have his child support obligation reduced following the emancipation of the parties’ older child.Mother opposes a reduction due to the expense of the younger child’s extracurricular activities and Father’s failure to exercise visitation with the younger child. Mother also seeks payment for unpaid child support from 2002. The trial court held Father was entitled to a reduction in his child support obligation, and that the circumstances justified the creation of a new parenting plan with less visitation time for Father, and an upward deviation from the Child Support Guidelines for Father’s child support obligation for the younger child. Further, the court held Father in “willful civil contempt” for the unpaid support from 2002, and ordered Father to pay the arrearage and a portion of Mother’s attorney fees. We affirm the trial court in all but two respects. We reverse the decision holding Father in contempt for failing to satisfy his support obligation in 2002, because it was not willful. Father was out of work due to an injury. We also reverse the decision denying prejudgment interest on the child support arrearage from 2002, finding that Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-101(f)(1) mandates that interest on unpaid child support shall accrue from the date the ordered support was due, at a rate of 12% per year. We also find Mother is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal and remand for determination of the amount. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Davis Jeremy Uselton v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Shawn Harris v. Tennessee Department of Correction et al.
This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing an inmate’s petition for writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Julie Leamon Tomlin v. Nathan Leamon
This case arises from a dispute over which parent should be the primary residential parent of two minor children, Julian and Tristen (“the Children,” collectively). Julie Leamon Tomlin (“Mother”) and Nathan Leamon (“Father”) are the parents of the Children. Mother and Father divorced several years ago and both have since remarried. Some time after the divorce, Mother, with whom the Children spent the majority of their time, filed a petition for correct child support and to modify the existing permanent parenting plan in the Circuit Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”). Father filed an answer and counterclaim, requesting that he be made the primary residential parent, or, in the alternative, that he have equal parenting time with the Children. Following trial, the Trial Court found that a material change of circumstances had occurred and that it was in the Children’s best interests that Father be made primary residential parent of the Children. Mother appeals, arguing, in part, that no material change of circumstances had occurred that could support making Father the primary residential parent. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Homer P. Norton
This lawsuit was filed by the decedent’s nephew and the nephew’s wife alleging that the caretakers of the decedent improperly influenced him to change his will. The proponents of the decedent’s will filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that no confidential relationship existed between the decedent and the caretakers in regard to the will. The trial court granted the proponents’ motion, finding that proof of a confidential relationship was necessary to pursue a will contest on the ground of undue influence, and that no such confidential relationship existed between decedent and the caretakers. The contestants appeal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Angela T., Ekene T., and Ember T.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights that was filed in 2005. At the hearing, the Father consented to the termination of his parental rights, so the trial court entered an order terminating his parental rights without making findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding grounds for termination and the children’s best interest. Father subsequently challenged the trial court’s order on appeal, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to hold a new hearing and prepare an order with the requisite findings. On remand, the trial court found that Father had not abandoned the children by willfully failing to visit them or by willfully failing to support them, and therefore it declined to terminate his parental rights. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Angela T., Ekene T., and Ember T. - Concurring in Part and Partial Dissent
I concur fully in the majority’s finding that Father abandoned his children by willful failure to visit them. I must reluctantly dissent from the majority’s finding that Father’s child support payments during the pivotal four-month period amounted to abandonment by willful failure to support. The trial court viewed Father’s testimony and considered his payment history during the four-month period, and found no willful intent to abandon. While Father clearly had the means to pay his full child support obligation, in view of the trial court’s finding and the evidence on his payments, I must respectfully disagree that the record shows by clear and convincing evidence abandonment by failure to support. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Crisel v. Thomas Crisel
This appeal involves the “spousal impoverishment” provision of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (“MCCA”). Thomas Crisel (“Husband”) was placed in a nursing home for health-related problems. Subsequently, Carol Crisel (“Wife”) filed a complaint against Husband in which she sought spousal support in the form of a transfer of the family residence and all of his income. The trial court granted Wife’s request and filed an order reflecting its decision. Upon receiving notice of the order, the Tennessee Department of Human Services (“TDHS”) filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the order pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motion. TDHS appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instruction to the trial court to reconsider Wife’s complaint for spousal support with TDHS participating as an intervening party. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Charmaine Eason v. Phillip L. Swinger
Father appeals from his conviction of eighteen counts of criminalcontempt for willful failure to pay bi-weekly child support obligations over a thirteen-month period. The record demonstrates that Father was hospitalized and incarcerated for a portion of the relevant period, and unable to make some of the payments, but the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to sixteen (16) counts. We therefore, affirm the conviction of sixteen (16) of the eighteen (18) counts of criminal contempt and revise the total sentence from 180 days to 160 days. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Alexia R.L.H. and Tristan S.M.R.
In this case the grandparents were awarded temporary custody of the mother's two minor children after the Court determined the children were dependent and neglected in the mother's care. Subsequently, the Trial Court set child support payments from the mother to the grandparents based on the mother's social security disability benefits income. The mother has appealed to this Court, and argues that the Trial Court erred in setting the amount of the mother's child support payments and contends that social security benefits are not subject to garnishment. We affirm the Trial Judge on all issues and remand. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
FSGBank, N.A. v. Sushan K. Anand
In this action based on a contract, the Trial Court granted plaintiff summary judgment and ultimately certified the judgment as final, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. Defendant had filed a counterclaim against plaintiff based on the same contracts that was the basis of plaintiff's summary judgment. Defendant has appealed, insisting the Trial Court abused its discretion in certifying the judgment as final. We hold the Trial Court abused its discretion in certifying the judgment as final and dismiss the appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Alstom Power, Inc. v. Sue Ann Head, Administrator, Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Workers' Compensation Division, et al.
Plaintiff employer confronted with a worker's compensation claim by its employee filed an action for declaratory judgment, injunction relief, and a petition for certiorari against the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and the employee. Plaintiff's principal contention was that the Department of Labor prepared an order for medical benefits directing the employer to provide the employee with additional panels of physicians from which he could choose for treatment, and concluded by averring that it was threatened with a $10,000 penalty if it did not comply. The Trial Court initially issued a restraining order, but the Trial Court ultimately concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the issues because suit had been filed before the administrative review process was exhausted. Plaintiff appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court, and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Bernie Cheatham d/b/a Universal Builders, et al. v. The Federal Materials Company, LLC, et al.
Builder was hired to construct a commercial building, and it purchased the concrete for the building’s concrete slab from Supplier. The concrete slab developed major cracks, which led to this lawsuit between Builder and Supplier. After a two-day bench trial, the trial court found that Supplier had delivered defective concrete, and it entered judgment in favor of |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
State Of Tennessee, Department Of Children's Services v. Misty Byrd; In The Matter Of: Morgan R., DOB 12/14/02; Braden R., DOB 6/22/05; Zakary R., DOB 9/23/08
This appeal arises out of dependency and neglect proceedings regarding three minor children. The circuit court found all three children dependent and neglected, and it found the youngest child had been severely abused. We affirm |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Marsha McDonald v. Paul F. Shea, M.D. and Shea Ear Clinic
This is a medical malpractice appeal. The plaintiff patient was treated by the defendant physician for ear problems. After the treatment, she had a complete loss of hearing in one ear. The plaintiff patient filed this lawsuit against the physician, alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent. After potential experts in Tennessee and contiguous states declined to testify against the defendant physician, the trial court permitted the plaintiff to use an expert physician witness from a non-contiguous state. At the jury trial, after the jury was sworn and counsel gave opening statements, a juror notified the trial judge of the her concern about an upcoming social event she planned to attend, at which a relative of the defendant physician would be present. After voir dire, the trial judge noted that the plaintiff patient had unused remaining peremptory challenges and excused the juror. The trial court denied the defendant physician’s motion for directed verdict on informed consent. The jury awarded the plaintiff substantial compensatory damages. The defendant physician now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff to obtain an expert from a non-contiguous state, in allowing the plaintiff to exercise a peremptory challenge after trial was underway, in permitting the informed consent claim to go to the jury, and in denying the defendants’ motion to exclude the expert retained by the plaintiff. We affirm on all issues except the dismissal of the juror. We hold it would be error to permit the exercise of a peremptory challenge after the trial is underway, but find that any error was harmless under the facts of this case. Therefore, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Marsha McDonald v. Paul F. Shea, M.D. and Shea Ear Clinic - Concurrence/Partial Dissent
I agree with the result reached in this case, but I disagree with the majority’s statement that “it is unclear whether Juror H was excluded based on a peremptory strike or for cause.” The record is unequivocally plain in this case that the trial judge permitted the exercise of a |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Larry D. Williams v. City of Burns, Tennessee
A former employee broughta retaliatorydischarge action againstthe employer city,asserting a claim under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in the city’s favor and the employee appealed. Because genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, we reverse. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
James Coleman v. Lauderdale County, Tennessee, et al., Steve Sanders, Sheriff of Lauderdale County; and Harry R. Hopkins, Jr., Deputy Sheriff of Lauderdale County
This is a malicious prosecution case arising out of a dispute between neighbors. A dispute arose when the plaintiff neighbor hired a tree service to trim the branches of a tree near the border between the two neighbors’ properties. After a confrontation, the police were called. After they arrived, the police cited both neighbors on charges of disorderly conduct. After the charges against the plaintiff neighbor were dismissed, he filed this malicious prosecution action against the defendant county and two of the police officers involved. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff neighbor now appeals. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Masquerade Fundraising, Inc. v. Steve Stott
The Trial Judge held that venue for the cause of action was not in Knox County. Plaintiff, on appeal, contends that defendant either waived the issue of venue, or the record establishes that Knox County was the proper venue for the cause of action. On appeal, we hold that venue is properly in Knox County and reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Pee Wee Wisdom Child Development Center and Vivian Braxton v. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General & Reporter for the State of Tennessee
This extraordinary appeal involves proceedings to dissolve a nonprofit corporation. After the case had been pending in the trial court for seven years, with a court-appointed receiver in control of the nonprofit corporation’s assets, the trial court dismissed the case in its entirety based upon a motion to dismiss that was filed early in the proceedings but never heard. We conclude that the trial court erred in doing so, and therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings, to include an orderly winding up of the nonprofit corporation’s affairs and a proper termination of the receivership when appropriate. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pee Wee Wisdom Child Development Center and Vivian Braxton v. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General & Reporter for the State of Tennessee - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I would hold that the Shelby County trial court properly found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit against the Attorney General. Because the lawsuit named the Attorney General as the defendant and sought substantial relief against the Attorney General, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-4-104, I would hold that only the Davidson County court had jurisdiction over the lawsuit. I would hold that the trial court erred only in declining to transfer the case to Davidson County in the interests of justice. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Abbington Center, LLC v. Town of Collierville
The two billboards at issue in the case were erected in 1979, prior to Collierville’s prohibition of billboards. Plaintiff sought to re-construct the billboards, and he received assurances from the Town that he could do so. However, the Town subsequently questioned whether the billboards were legal, non-conforming uses protected by the “grandfather clause” set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208, and it issued stop work orders on the billboards’ reconstruction and it refused to issue the building permits necessary for reconstruction. Plaintiff appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which affirmed the Town’s actions. Plaintiff then filed a writ of certiorari in the chancery court, which, prior to trial, remanded to the BZA. On remand, the BZA affirmed its prior decision, and Plaintiff subsequently filed a second writ of certiorari in the chancery court. The chancery court found that the BZA acted illegally, arbitrarily, and capriciously, and it invalidated the stop work orders and it declared that Plaintiff could re-construct the billboards. Based on Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that the billboards were legal uses prior to the 1982 amendment, we find that the BZA was justified in upholding the Town’s stop work orders and in upholding the Town’s denial of Plaintiff’s requested building permits. Accordingly, we find that the BZA’s decisions were not illegal, arbitrary, or capricious. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
