Mahmoud Awad Mohammad v. Nairman Faraj Meri
This post-divorce appeal concerns a one-time, one-week extension of parenting time. The trial court granted the mother’s petition to extend her parenting time from one week to two weeks for a vacation with her family. After the mother’s vacation was over, the father filed his appeal. We dismiss the appeal on grounds of mootness. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Ann Fiorazo Beck v. James Martin Beck
This is a post-divorce action, concerning the Appellant Husband’s obligation to pay alimony in futuro to Appellee Wife. Husband and Wife entered into a marital dissolution agreement “MDA”), which was incorporated and made part of the final decree of divorce. The MDA provided that both parties would exchange tax returns each year and that, if these returns were not proferred, then alimony would be suspended until they were. Wife provided her tax returns after redacting her personal information. Husband concluded that the redaction was breach of contract and, without prior court approval, unilaterally stopped making alimony payments. Because the MDA provision for alimony in futuro lost its contractual nature upon being incorporated into the trial court’s order, and because Husband failed to obtain court approval before he suspended payments, we conclude that he lacked authority to stop those payments. Therefore, the award of arrears was proper. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Jean Langford v. James Harvey Harrison, Jr., et al.
Following appellant’s petition to eject from real property, appellees counterclaimed seeking a declaration of the boundaries between their properties and those of appellant, sole possession of their properties, a permanent injunction against appellant, and damages for libel or slander of title. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellees and find this appeal to be frivolous. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Allen, et al. v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, et al.
Plaintiffs attempted to challenge annexation Ordinance 4321 via a complaint for declaratory judgment based upon alleged violations of the Open Meetings Act. Summary judgment was granted to the City of Memphis, but this Court reversed the grant and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, a trial was held and judgment entered in favor of the City. Because Plaintiffs failed to file a timely quo warranto action, which was the proper vehicle for Plaintiffs’ challenge, we dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the City and thus, we affirm the trial court’s upholding of Ordinance 4321. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Dale, single, Brian Lawhorn and wife, Pamela Lawhorn; and William Jenkins and wife, Elaine Jenkins v. B & J Enterprises, et al.
Homeowners filed this lawsuit against various individuals and entities shortly after purchasing their homes, when they discovered that their properties are affected by numerous sink holes. Original defendants identified a surveyor as a comparative tortfeasor, and the homeowners amended their complaint to add the surveyor as a defendant. The surveyor filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the homeowners’ claims were barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-114, which provides that all actions to recover damages against any person engaged in the practice of surveying for any deficiency, defect, omission, error or miscalculation shall be brought within four years from the date the survey is recorded on the plat, or else be forever barred. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs were subsequently granted permission by the trial court and this Court to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Finding that section 28-3-114 governs the homeowners’ claims, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Carlton J. Ditto v. Shapiro and Kirsch, LLP, et al.
In this action, a Show Cause Order was issued by the Court on April 13, 2012, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant responded to the Show Cause and acknowledged that the Notice of Appeal was filed late. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley Herman v. Daniel Herman
Two years after the divorce, Father sought to be named primary residential parent due to Mother’s alleged deteriorating mental health. Father sought discovery of Mother’s mental health records. Mother objected. The trial court ordered production of the records for in camera inspection. Mother filed an appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10, which this court granted. We reverse the trial court’s order. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kyler R.C.H., et al.
In this case for parental termination, the Trial Court found statutory grounds for terminating the parents' parental rights to their three minor children. Only the father has appealed, and we hold that the evidence preponderates in favor of the Trial Court's finding for grounds of abandonment, as well as termination of parental rights being in the best interest of the children. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Lee Coleman v. Andrea Gibson Coleman
In this divorce action the parties engaged in mediation and resolved several issues in the case. The Trial Court entered a Divorce Decree without conducting an evidentiary hearing on the disputed issues remaining. The father appealed to this Court. We affirm that part of the |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tommy Hinton and wife, Jean Marie Hinton v. Jerry L.Edmonds and wife, Susan D. Edmonds
Adjoining property owners dispute the validity of an Agreement which placed restrictions upon a roadway across one property which provided access to the other property. The trial court, after making specific factual findings, found the Agreement invalid and non-binding upon the parties. We affirm the trial court’s factual findings as well as its ultimate determination of invalidity. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Ann Barrett Goodman v. Jeffery Wayne Goodman
This divorce case deals primarily with child support. The parties entered into a consent order n the amount of child support to be paid. Father subsequently lost his job and sought modification of his obligation. The divorce referee modified the support based on Father’s alleged earning capacity rather than on his actual income. Father appealed the ruling of the referee, but did not file a transcript of the hearing with the trial court. The trial court entered a final decree of divorce, finding all property to be marital, affirming the ruling of the referee, setting permanent child support based on Father’s alleged earning capacity, and awarding attorney fees to Mother. We reverse the judgment setting child support based on Father’s earning capacity and remand for a determination of Father’s child support based on his actual income. Additionally, we vacate the judgment of the trial court awarding Mother $35,000.00 in attorney fees, award Mother $7,675.00 in attorney fees and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the remaining portion of the attorney fees in light of this opinion. This case is affirmed in all other respects. Reversed in part, vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Christina K. Deweese Richmond v. Gregory Alan Richmond
Christina K. Deweese Richmond (“Wife”) and Gregory Alan Richmond (“Husband”) were divorced in June of 1999. In March of 2011, Wife filed a motion to clarify the parties’ Final Decree of Divorce. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered its order holding, inter alia, that Wife was awarded 42.5% of Husband’s disposable military retired pay. The Trial Court also ordered that Husband shall pay to Wife her share of his military retirement accruing from August 2010 through June 2011 in the amount of $4,915.90 less federal taxes. Husband appeals raising issues regarding whether Husband should be entitled to the protection of the unclean hands doctrine and whether Wife waived her rights to past payments of Husband’s military retirement. We find neither unclean hands nor waiver, and we affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
PNC Multifamily Capital Institutional Fund XXVI Limited Partnership, et al. v. Bluff City Community Development Corporation, et al.
This is an appeal from the grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss in favor of Appellees, an attorney, her professional limited liability company (“PLLC”), a title company, and a law firm. As to the law firm, the trial court found that the causes of action, if any, sounded in legal malpractice and were barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations found at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-3-104(a)(2). As to the attorney, the PLLC, and the title company, the trial court found that any causes of action alleged against these Appellees sounded in tort and were claims for unliquidated damages; thus the court held that it lacked jurisdiction under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 16-11-102. After reviewing the Complaint, we conclude that: (1) the trial court did not apply the discovery rule in reaching its conclusion that Appellants’ claims that sound in legal malpractice are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) applying the discovery rule, there is nothing in the pleadings from which to infer that the Appellants’ knowledge of breach or misappropriation on the part of the general partner also means that Appellants knew, or should have known, about any wrongdoing on the part of the law firm, the PLLC, and the attorney; (3) therefore, any claims sounding in legal malpractice, against the law firm, the attorney, and her PLLC, survive the motion to dismiss; however, because there was no attorney-client relationship between the Appellants and the title company, claims for legal malpractice cannot lie against the title company; (4) many of the claims against the law firm, the PLLC, and the title company that sound in tort are not sufficiently pled under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01 or, where they sound in fraud, are not pled with particularity as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 9.02; these claims were properly dismissed with the following exceptions: (a) the Complaint does sufficiently plead a cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty against the title company, the law firm, the attorney, and her PLLC; to the extent that the alleged aiding and abetting was the result of a plan or design by the Appellees, conspiracy may also lie for that tort; (b) the Complaint does sufficiently plead causes of action for misappropriation or conversion and conspiracy against the Appellee attorney, individually, but not against the law firm, the title company, or the PLLC (due to lack of particularity in the pleadings as to these Appellees); (5) because the amounts of the alleged misappropriations are known, the damages sought are not all unliquidated; therefore, the chancery court has jurisdiction. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brandi Nicole Sosebee v. John Charles Sosebee, Jr.
In March of 2011, John Charles Sosebee, Jr. (“Husband”) was found guilty of 69 counts of criminal contempt for violating an order of protection in favor of Brandi Nicole Sosebee (“Wife”). Husband was sentenced to 10 days in jail for each violation, for a total of 690 days. Husband appeals raising several issues including whether he received proper notice that Wife was seeking criminal contempt. We find and hold that Husband did not receive proper notice that criminal contempt was being pursued and should not have been convicted and sentenced accordingly. We, however, hold that the record on appeal supports a finding that Husband violated the order of protection on 69 occasions. We, therefore, modify the judgment to reflect that Husband committed civil contempt, and remand to the Trial Court with direction to set a purge amount and proceed accordingly. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Wilson Reynolds v. Lee Roy Roberson
This appeal involves a contract dispute over the purchase of more than 100 acres of rustic property adjacent to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Wilson Reynolds offered to purchase the property from Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. for 3 million dollars. The parties formed a contract evidencing their agreement. Following the closing date, Wilson Reynolds filed suit, alleging breach of contract. The trial court ruled that Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. breached the contract and awarded Wilson Reynolds $600,000 in damages plus interest, attorney fees, and other costs. Lee Roy Roberson, Jr. appeals. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Sheila Shults, et al. v. Johnny Richard Talley
A show cause order was entered in this case on April 13, 2012, directing the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has responded to the show cause order, but the argument presented in the response does not appear to present good cause for maintaining this case in this court. The review of the record reveals that the order to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Alessa E.N., Cassondra N.A.N. and Moses C.N.
A show cause order was entered in this case on March 23, 2012, directing the appellants to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellants have responded to the show cause order, but the argument presented in the response does not appear to present good cause for maintaining this case in this court. The review of the record reveals that the order to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
LVNV Funding, LLC as Assignee of Sears Gold Mastercard v. Kevin Mastaw
This appeal concerns the collection of credit card debt. The plaintiff, a subsequent purchaser of the debt, filed this collection action against the appellant debtor. On appeal, the appellant debtor argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence various documents from a previous owner of the debt, pursuant to the hearsay exception for business records under Tenn. R. Evid. Rule 803(6). We hold that two of the exhibits were not appropriately admitted into evidence under the business records exception. Without those exhibits, we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s judgment in favor of the creditor, and reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
H. Jewell Tindell v. Callie A. West, et al.
A dispute over the extent of lawn being mowed and the manner in which it was being mowed |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Priscilla Lee Slagle v. Lawrence Fred Slagle
This is a divorce case. The parties are Priscilla Lee Slagle (“Wife”) and Lawrence Fred Slagle (“Husband”). They were married for more than thirty years and, prior to the entry of the divorce judgment, they shared the custody of their adopted grandson (“the Child”). Wife sued for divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and irreconcilable differences. Husband filed a counterclaim on the same grounds. At a pre-trial hearing, the court held Husband in contempt for violating the statutorily-mandated injunction prohibiting, among other things, the transferring of or the borrowing against “any marital property.” Following the trial, the court additionally found Husband in contempt (1) for failing to comply with discovery requests and (2) for dissipating marital assets. Husband left the country and did not appear at trial. The court granted Wife a divorce predicated on Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct; designated Wife as the Child’s primary residential parent; and prohibited any contact between Husband and the Child until he had purged himself of contempt. The court classified and divided the parties’ assets, awarded Wife $5,000 a month in alimony in futuro, and set Husband’s child support obligation. Husband appeals. He challenges the contempt findings and some financial aspects of the court’s decree. We reverse that part of the judgment barring contact between Husband and the child and downwardly adjust the award of alimony to $3,200 per month. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Roni M.H.
The Juvenile Court for Bradley County (“the Juvenile Court”), upon a petition by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and following a trial, terminated the parental rights of Debbie D. (“Mother”) to the minor child Roni M.H. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) (2010). Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Bellomy v. AutoZone, Inc.
The plaintiff in this case is Donna Bellomy. The defendant is a prior employer of hers, AutoZone, Inc. In Bellomy v. AutoZone, Inc., No. E2009-00351-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4059158 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Nov. 24, 2009) (“Bellomy I”), we vacated, in part, a summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff’s entire complaint. We held that the Plaintiff had created genuine issues of material fact with respect to her Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) claims. On remand, the case progressed through discovery and opening statements, following which the trial court granted a mistrial, holding that the Plaintiff had violated certain rulings made by the court on AutoZone’s motions in limine. The court later granted the defendant partial summary judgment and dismissed the constructive discharge aspect of the Plaintiff’s THRA claims. In the same order, the trial court held the Plaintiff in civil contempt and ruled that the dismissal of the constructive discharge claim was also appropriate as a sanction for violating the court’s rulings entered on AutoZone’s motions. The Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the judgment of dismissal and all other orders of the trial court inconsistent with this opinion and remand for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Johnson v. Beverly Nunis and Farmer's Insurance Exchange
This appeal involves remittitur of a jury verdict. The defendant driver caused a vehicular accident that resulted in substantial personal injuries to the plaintiff. At trial, several witnesses testified to the amount of the plaintiff’s economic damages as well as the noneconomic impact of her injuries. After a trial, the jury returned a special verdict with awards for various categories of economic and non-economic damages. The trial court denied the defendant insurance company’s motion for a new trial but suggested an overall remittitur as to the total verdict. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest and filed this appeal. We affirm the denial of a new trial, reverse the suggestion of remittitur, and reinstate the original jury verdict. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Vincent Giannini v. Amanda Proffitt
This appeal involves a limitation of liability in an insurance policy. The plaintiff was working in a volunteer capacity for the city. While doing so, the plaintiff sustained injuries in an accident caused by the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff’s medical expenses were paid through the city’s on-the-job-injury program. The plaintiff had uninsured motorist coverage under his insurance policy with the appellee insurance company. The appellee insurance company denied the plaintiff’s claim based on language in the policy reducing the insurance company’s liability by sums paid under laws similar to workers’ compensation laws. The insurance company asserted that the city’s on-the-job-injury program was similar to workers’ compensation. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit, and the plaintiff and the insurance company filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, finding that the plaintiff’s benefits under the city’s on-the-job-injury program were similar to workers’ compensation. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm the grant of summary judgment, for the reason stated by the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marie McPeake v. Edna Dickson and Bridgette Collette Dickson; and Danny Dickson and wife, Vickie Dickson v. Marie McPeake
This appeal arises out of a four-day trial over a boundary line dispute. Numerous surveyors and other witnesses testified at trial, and many maps, aerial photographs, survey plats, deeds, and other documents were entered into evidence. The chancellor personally viewed the property in question as well. Thereafter, the court established the boundary line as set forth in the survey plat prepared by the defendants’ surveyor. The plaintiff contends that this was error. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals |
