Young Bok Song v. Kathryn Lehman and James C. Thornton
Plaintiff was involved in a previous lawsuit in North Carolina in which he sued several police officers. Plaintiff then instituted the present case against two North Carolina attorneys who represented the police officers in the North Carolina litigation. The trial court granted the attorneys’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. It also denied Plaintiff’s request for the appointment of an attorney and an interpreter. We affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Diana (Schutts) Gilbert v. Drew Edward Gilbert
In this divorce case, the husband appeals the trial court’s division and valuation of the marital estate. On appeal, the husband raises several issues and essentially argues that the trial court should have restored the parties to their respective premarital situations due to the short duration of the marriage. The wife also challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate. After an extensive review of the record, we find no error in the trial court’s division and valuation of the marital estate in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1). Therefore, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Bottei v. GAyle E. Ray, Commissioner Tennessee Department of Correction et al.
Plaintiff sought access to a plethora of public records from several state prison officials. Access was granted, but the name(s) of the supplier(s) of the substances necessary to carry out lethal injection executions and the employees who procured those substances were redacted based on the defendants’ interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(h)(1). Plaintiff filed suit under the Public Records Act and the trial court determined that the names were not to be redacted. Defendants filed a notice of appeal and sought a stay under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(e), but the trial court ruled it did not have jurisdiction. Defendants moved this court for a stay, which this court granted. We affirm the trial court’s decision as to the redaction of the names but reverse the trial court’s decision as to its jurisdiction to provide the certification under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(e). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Koczera, et al. v. Christi Lenay Fields Steele, et al.
Plaintiffs' action was dismissed by the Trial Court by summary judgment. Plaintiffs then appealed to this Court and defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Judgment entered by the Trial Court was not a final judgment. Plaintiffs responded to that Motion, acknowledging that the final judgment had not been entered in the case below, but sought a stay of the appeal. We grant the Motion to Dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the Judgment below is not final and this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Susan Rehrer v. Mark Elwyn Rehrer
In this case petitioner wife obtained an order of protection against her husband. The husband, following trial, filed a Motion to reopen the proof, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59, and attached numerous affidavits contradicting some of petitioner's evidence presented at trial. The Trial Court overruled the Motion and the husband has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Michael D. Williams v. George M. Little, et al.
Inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging his conviction of the prison disciplinary offense of conspiracy to violate state law. The chancery court considered the merits of the inmate’s petition and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Tracey Chandler and Kelly Wilson v. Charleston Volunteer Fire Department
The trial court reformed a lease agreement, finding certain terms had been erroneously transposed. Appellants contend the reformation was error. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Jeanette Rae Jackson v. Bradley Kent Smith
This is a grandparent visitation case. Following the death of her daughter (the minor child’s mother), the Appellant grandmother petitioned the trial court for visitation rights with her granddaughter pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-306. The trial court denied visitation based upon its finding that Appellant had not carried her burden to demonstrate a danger of substantial harm to the child. No appeal was taken from this order. Subsequently, the Legislature amended Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-306 to create a rebuttable presumption of substantial harm based upon the cessation of the relationship between the child and grandparent. After the law was changed, Appellant filed a second petition for visitation with her granddaughter, citing the amended statute as grounds for re-visiting the issue of visitation. The trial court granted Appellee father’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion to dismiss the second petition on the ground of res judicata. We conclude that the doctrine of res judicata may apply even though there has been an intervening change in the substantive law. However, because the prior order, upon which the trial court based its res judicata finding, is not in the appellate record, this Court cannot review the question of whether the motion to dismiss was properly granted. Affirmed. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Misty Nanette Brooks v. Stephen Earl Brooks
This case involves the filing of three separate orders of protection that were requested by Misty Nanette Brooks (“Wife”) seeking protection from Stephen Earl Brooks (“Husband”). Based upon Wife’s initial petition, the trial court issued the first order of protection, which included a provision regarding the division of the mortgage payment for the marital home. Wife subsequently filed a motion to show cause as to why Husband should not be held in contempt for violating the protective order, and the trial court entered a second order of protection that also included the mortgage rovision. Wife subsequently filed two motions to show cause as to why Husband should not be held in contempt for violating the second protective order. The first motion related to Husband’s unwanted contact with Wife, while the second motion related to the mortgage payment. Following a hearing on the first motion, the trial court entered a third order of protection that did not include the mortgage provision. Following a hearing on the second motion, an order was entered by the trial court evidencing an agreement between the parties that Husband was to pay his portion of the mortgage payment. Wife then filed another motion to show cause as to why Husband should not be held in contempt for his failure to pay his portion of the mortgage, and a hearing was held on that motion. The trial court dismissed the motion, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order directing Husband to pay his portion of the mortgage. Wife appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: London V.P.
The Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of Andre T. (“Father”) to the minor child London V. P. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and § 36-1-113 (g)(6) (2010). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to this Court. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and § 36-1-113 (g)(6), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s January 3, 2011 order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby Murray, et al. v. Dennis Miracle, et al.
The plaintiffs, Bobby Murray and Loretta Murray (“the Murrays”), asserted a complaint against the defendants, Dennis Miracle and Robert Daniel Smith, for denying them access to a road and interfering with their use and enjoyment of their property. After several hearings, the trial court concluded that the Murrays were not following the court’s orders and dismissed their claims against both Mr. Miracle and Mr. Smith without prejudice. The Murrays appeal. We reverse. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
James Eldridge v. Katie Hundley
Father filed a petition to modify the juvenile court’s order naming Mother primary residential parent and establishing a visitation schedule. The trial court modified the visitation schedule, but did not establish visitation as requested by Father. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Boyd L. Hughes et al v. Curtis E. Hughes, Executor Of The Estate Of Lucille C. Luttrell
This is a will contest case in which the plaintiffs attempt to invalidate the will of Lucille C. Luttrell due to her supposed lack of testamentary capacity. The executor of Ms.Luttrell’s estate filed two motions for summary judgment. The first one was denied; the second one was granted. The court ultimately held that the affidavits of medical doctors who evaluated the testator’s mental faculties approximately six months before she signed her will do not create a genuine issue of fact regarding her testamentary capacity at the time she signed the will. The plaintiffs appeal. We vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
O'Rane M. Cornish, Sr. v. The City of Memphis, et al.
Petitioner filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the city council’s decision one year earlier to grant a special use permit was arbitrary and capricious. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon concluding that the petitioner should have challenged the decision by filing a petition for writ of certiorari within sixty days. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel H. Jones v. Mark Gwyn, Director, et al.
Daniel H. Jones (“Jones”) filed a petition for writ of mandamus against Mark Gwyn and Avis Stone (“Respondents”), Director and Coordinator, respectively, of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”), in the Circuit Court for Sullivan County (“the Trial Court”).1 Jones sought to have the Trial Court direct Respondents to act on an earlier order by the Criminal Court for Sullivan County at Blountville, Tennessee (“the Criminal Court”) to expunge all public records related to a dismissed rape charge against Jones. Respondents moved to dismiss. The Trial Court granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue. Jones appeals. We find that the Trial Court did not err in dismissing Jones’s petition. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Don Juan J.H., et al.
Petitioners filed a Petition to Adopt the minor child, Don Juan J.H., and the Department of Children's Services then filed a Waiver of Guardianship stating that DCS approved of adoption by the petitioners. The Trial Court granted petitioners partial guardianship of the child before trial, and the appellants filed a Petition to Intervene in the adoption proceeding which the Trial Court granted. Upon trial of the case, the Trial Court dismissed appellants' intervening petition and granted the adoption. Appellants appealed, arguing that the Trial Court refused to conduct a comparative fitness analysis between petitioners and appellants to determine the best interests of the child. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court because appellants were required to contest the guardianship before they would have been eligible to petition for adoption of the child. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Danielle Harris v. Tennessee Department of Children's Services
This appeal results from the trial court’s order, finding six of Appellant’s children dependent and neglected. Because there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings of dependency and neglect and severe child abuse, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
American Bonding Company v. Sandra Vaughn
This dispute involves a bail bond contract which the Appellant contends should be invalidated due to illegality, lack of mutual consent and because she allegedly executed the contract under duress. The trial court found the contract to be enforceable and entered a $4,000.00 judgment against Appellant. Appellee appeals the trial court’s denial of its application for counsel fees as provided for in the contract. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Madison K. P.
This application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9 arises from the trial court’s decision to stay the implementation of the parenting plan that the trial court was directed to adopt pursuant to our decision in In re Madison K.P., No. M2009-02331-COA-R3-JV, 2010 WL 4810665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2010). The Supreme Court denied the father’s application for permission to appeal on April 14, 2011 and the mandate of this court was issued on April 27, 2011. Despite this, the ruling of this court has yet to be put into effect, because the parenting plan that was to be approved and entered by the trial court, and which was approved and entered, was immediately stayed by the trial court following its entry, rendering our decision and the parenting plan of no effect. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Ann Winn v. Welch Farm, LLC, et al.
The buyer of unimproved real property sued the sellers for breach of implied warranties, imposition of a permanent nuisance, and diminution in value of the property; buyer also sought damages for alleged violations of the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act, the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and negligence. The trial court held that Tennessee does not provide a cause of action for breach of implied warranty in the sale of unimproved real property; the court also held that buyer had not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the lot was “unbuildable.” The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the buyer appealed. Buyer asserts that the sellers had a duty to disclose “possible adverse soil conditions.” She also urges this Court to adopt a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of suitability for residential construction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Hartman v. Tennessee Board of Regents d/b/a Tennessee Tech University
In this employment dispute, a former employee claims she was unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of her gender. The plaintiff, a long time employee, was terminated after failing to adhere to her employer’s policies and procedures concerning the purchase of inventory and equipment. Claiming this reason was pretextual, she filed this action pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. After discovery, the employer moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding the employer demonstrated that the plaintiff could not establish that a similarly situated male employee was treated more favorably. We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
John Griff Lucas v. City of Waverly, Tennessee, et al.
In this inverse condemnation action, the trial court granted summary judgment to condemning authority on ground that statute of limitations barred suit; landowner appeals. Condemning authority urges affirmance of the dismissal on alternative grounds. Finding that the action is not barred by the statute of limitations and that genuine issue of material fact exists which precludes summary judgment, we reverse the dismissal of this action and remand for further proceedings. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Mitchell Eads, TDOC #243729 v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al
Petitioner filed a Common Law Writ of Certiorari, alleging he was convicted of a disciplinary infraction while incarcerated, and that the conviction was illegal, arbitrary and fraudulent. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Petition contained no oath or affirmation and did not state it was the first application for a writ pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §27-8-104(a) and 106. Further that petitioner failed to file a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §41-21-807(a). The Trial Court entered an Order of Dismissal for the deficiencies set forth in the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner has appealed and we affirm the Trial Court's Order of Dismissal on the grounds set forth in that Order. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Almeta Ellis, as the Administratrix of the Estate of Jonah Ellis, and the Estate of Jonah Ellis, Individually v. Minder Music Limited, Lonnie Simmons and Robert Louis Whitfield
This appeal concerns venue in an action to recover royalties. The plaintiff songwriter resided in Shelby County, Tennessee. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in Shelby County against the defendant music company to recover past-due royalties, asserting that he was the sole author of three musical compositions. The defendant music company, domiciled in the United Kingdom, filed a motion to dismiss based on, inter alia, improper venue. The trial court held that venue was improper and granted the motion to dismiss. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Valerie Cossar Clark and Estate of Ricky Cossar v. Donnie Houston, Larry Sisco, and Brenda Sisco
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal more than thirty (30) days after the order appealed was entered by the trial court. Consequently, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals |
