Archie Story v. Civil Service Commission of the State of Tennessee, et al.
A highway patrolman was terminated for allegedly deploying a tire deflation device without prior authorization in violation of General Order 412 and for untruthfulness regarding such. On appeal, the trooper argues that his partial extension of the device did not constitute a “deployment.” Thus, he contends he did not violate General Order 412, nor was he untruthful when he denied deployment. We affirm the ALJ’s finding that the trooper “deployed” the device in violation of General Order 412 and that he was untruthful about doing so. Accordingly, we find there existed substantial and material evidence to support his termination. Additionally, we find that the trial court did not err in denying the trooper’s request to admit additional evidence and to supplement his brief. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Angelia Lynette Maupin v. Paul Wayne Maupin
The order of the trial court entered February 16, 2011, from which the appellant Angelia Lynette Maupin seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth E. Ramsey
The order of the trial court entered February 9, 2011, from which the appellant Kenneth E. Ramsey seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Santiago Toscani v. Nader Rahbe
The order from which the appellant Nader Rahbe seeks to appeal was entered on Wednesday, January 5, 2011. A notice of appeal was filed by the appellant on Tuesday, February 8, 2011, the 34th day following the entry of the trial court’s order. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, the motion of the appellee to dismiss is granted. This appeal is dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Stabler v. Ramie Stabler-Marston
The order from which the appellant Ramie Stabler-Marston seeks to appeal was entered on February 24, 2010. Notices of appeal were filed by the appellant on October 18, 2010, and October 20, 2010. Because neither of the notices of appeal was timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
John L. Houston v. Rhey Houston, et al.
The order of the trial court entered November 29, 2010, from which the appellant John L. Houston seeks to appeal, is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Emily L.
In this Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father to two minor children, the Trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing, terminated the parental rights of the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment and held that it was in the best interests of the children that the father's parental rights be terminated. The father appealed, and upon our review we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: D.L.
In this Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father to two minor children, the Trial Court, following an evidentiary hearing, terminated the parental rights of the father on the statutory grounds of abandonment and held that it was in the best interests of the children that the father's parental rights be terminated. The father appealed, and upon our review we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
The Bank of Fayette County v. Simon M. Woody, Jr., d/b/a Royal Kingdom Builders
This is an action by the bank to recover against the debtor for defaulting on a loan. The plaintiff bank made a loan to the defendant debtor for the purchase of real property, and the property was pledged to secure the loan. The debtor defaulted on the loan, the property was sold, and the proceeds were applied to the debt. The bank filed this lawsuit against the debtor for the deficiency. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the bank. The debtor now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant him a continuance in order to obtain counsel. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Epps v. Civil Service Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, and the Metropolitan Action Commission
This appeal arises out of a dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari in which review was sought of the denial of a grievance filed by an employee of the Metropolitan Action Commission’s Head Start program. The grievance was initially denied by the Executive Director of the Metropolitan Action Commission. The employee then appealed the grievance to the Metropolitan Civil Service Commission, which assigned the appeal to an administrative law judge; after a hearing, the administrative law judge denied the grievance. Upon further appeal, the Civil Service Commission overturned the administrative law judge’s decision and held in favor of the employee; the Civil Service Commission transmitted its decision to the Board of Commissioners of the Metropolitan Action Commission as a recommended final order. The Board of Commissioners rejected the recommended decision and voted to deny the grievance. When the employee sought to appeal the Board of Commissioner’s decision to the Civil Service Commission, that Commission responded that it had no further authority to hear the appeal because the employee was not an employee in classified service and because the Metropolitan Action Commission had final authority on grievance decisions involving employees of the Head Start program. The employee then sought review by writ of certiorari in chancery court, which found that the employee was not a civil service employee and was, therefore, not entitled to a second appeal to the Civil Service Commission; the court also found that the Metropolitan Action Commission had conformed to the applicable grievance process. On appeal, the employee asserts that she was employed in a civil service position and entitled to the grievance process set forth in the civil service rules. Finding that the grievance procedure applicable to employees in the classified service is not applicable to the employee and that the Action Commission properly exercised final authority on the grievance, we affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Bruce Colston v. Melinda Kay Colston
In this post-divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to pay an alimony arrearage of $86,000.00. We affirm the judgment for the arrearage and remand the case for reconsideration of the requirement that Husband pay the arrearage at $1,500.00 per month. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy H. Wright v. James Charles Wright
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court granted the father sole custody and decision making authority over the parties’ minor children. The mother appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on all issues. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Cadlerock, LLC v. Sheila R. Weber
The plaintiff, an assignee to a foreign judgment, filed a petition to domesticate the judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-101 et seq. The defendant objected to the enrollment of the foreign judgment because it was assigned. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to domesticate the foreign judgment and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. Our review of the record reveals that the plaintiff properly followed the statutory requirements to enroll a foreign judgment. Accordingly, the trial court erred. We reverse. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Marla H., Individually and as Next Best Friend to her Daughter Moriah F. H. v. Knox County, et al.
This is an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The mother of a middle school student filed suit against Knox County, the Knox County Board of Education, and the City of Knoxville after her daughter viewed graphic photographs of her dead father during a presentation on the dangers of drunk driving. The trial court found the City of Knoxville liable for the student’s emotional injuries because the school resource officer who distributed the photographs intended to evoke an emotional response. We conclude it was generally foreseeable that providing graphic accident scene photographs to seventh grade students could cause serious or severe emotional harm in a student related to a victim depicted therein. Thus, the school resource officer owed a duty to exercise reasonable care when displaying the photographs to a class that potentially included students related to the victims. The evidence, however, preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the school resource officer failed to exercise reasonable care. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sally Jo Witty v. Christopher Cantrell et al.
Sally Jo Witty is a teacher employed by the Blount County School System. She filed this action after her request to draw pay from a pool of donated sick leave was denied. She named as defendants the trustees appointed to administer the pool (collectively “the Trustees”). She also sued the Blount County Board of Education (“the School Board”) and alleged it is vicariously liable. She demanded the full monetary value of the requested sick leave and also asked for damages to compensate her for the mental suffering resulting from the “wrongful” decision to deny her benefits. The trial court held that the Trustees were an independent body for which the School Board could not be held vicariously liable. It also held that the Trustees were immune from liability in their individual capacities and that the action filed against the Trustees in their official capacity was a petition for writ of certiorari that was not timely filed. Therefore, it dismissed the complaint. Witty appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and vacate it in part. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Faye Roland Camp v. Randy Coleman Camp
This post-divorce appeal involves recusal of the trial judge. In the initial divorce proceedings, the trial judge recused himself based in part on friendship with the parties. A special judge was appointed to hear the case. The special judge tried the divorce, divided the parties’ property, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. Several years later, the husband filed a petition to terminate or modify his alimony obligation. The trial judge who had previously recused himself declined to do so for the post-divorce proceedings. After a hearing, the trial judge terminated the husband’s alimony obligation. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial judge should have recused himself and that he erred in terminating the alimony. We reverse the trial court’s decision on recusal, and therefore vacate the trial court’s ruling on the husband’s petition to modify. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Jordan Ashton Danelz v. John Gayden
This is a parentage action in which an adult child seeks retroactive child support from his biological father. The juvenile court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we vacate the judgment of the juvenile court for failure to join a party pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Denise Jeremiah and Timothy Jeremiah v. William Blaylock
The plaintiff home buyer and defendant home seller entered into an agreement to repair a drain at some future date because it had been improperly piped out of the buyer’s house. When the time for performance came, the drain was not moved, resulting in damages to the buyer’s home. The buyer sued for breach of contract. The circuit court granted a directed verdict to the defendant on the ground that there was no consideration to support the contract. We find that the mutual promises made by the parties constituted adequate consideration. We accordingly reverse the trial court and remand this case for such further proceedings as necessary. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Richard A. Demonbreun
Property owner seeks review of the trial court’s decision that two citations were properly issued against him because he did not have a permit for hosting historic home events on his property as required by the Metropolitan Government. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, by and through Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter for the State of Tennessee v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Company
This appeal involves in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Appellant State of Tennessee brought suit against Appellee tobacco product manufacturer, under the Tobacco Escrow Fund Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 47-31-101 et seq., alleging that Appellee had failed to make escrow deposits, as required under the Act, for cigarettes sold in Tennessee. Based upon the trial court’s finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Appellee, it entered summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer. The State appeals. Upon review, we conclude that: (1) the facts of this case show that the manufacturer intentionally used a distribution system with the desired result of selling its product in all fifty states, including Tennessee, so as to support a finding that the manufacturer had minimum contacts with the State necessary to invoke the exercise of personal jurisdiction; (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction, under the facts of this case, is reasonable and fair; (3) the manufacturer is subject to regulation under the Act; and (4) the Act is not unconstitutional. Moreover, we conclude that: (1) Appellee is a tobacco products manufacturer, as defined by the Escrow Fund Act; (2) Appellee’s cigarettes were sold in Tennessee; and (3) Appellee is, therefore, liable for escrow payments under the Escrow Fund Act. Consequently, we grant the State’s motion for summary judgment. The order of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellant State and for calculation of the escrow amount owed by Appellee and entry of judgment thereon. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Venus L. Lowery v. Larry G. Womble, II
In this child-support matter, Father appeals the trial court’s determination of his parenting time and income for the purpose of setting his child support obligation. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Fuller, by His Next Friend, Theresa-Vay Smith v. Mark Emkes, Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration
Petitioner, a teenager enrolled in the TennCare program, was denied coverage for orthodontic braces by the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration (“TDFA”). Petitioner contends he qualifies for orthodontic treatment under Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg. 1200-13-13-.04(1)(b)6 due to a severe misalignment that constitutes a medical necessity. He also contends that Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1200-13-13.04(1)(b)6, which limits orthodontic treatment to persons with “a handicapping malocclusion or another developmental anomaly or injury resulting in severe misalignment or handicapping malocclusion of teeth,” is in conflict with the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment program in 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) and in violation of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5). TDFA contends that TennCare regulations provide orthodontic coverage consistent with federal law, that it correctly interpreted and applied its own regulations regarding Petitioner’s request for orthodontic braces, and that the courts are to defer to the agency’s interpretation of its own rules. The Chancery Court for Davidson County affirmed the administrative decision. We also affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
H.J. Heinz Company, L.P. v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioiner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
Plaintiff/Appellant H.J. Heinz Company, LP, is a Delaware limited partnership that manufactures, sells and distributes food products. Plaintiff operates a facility in Nashville, Tennessee. The issue in this case is whether Plaintiff’s income from its investment in HJH One, LLC, is subject to taxation, on an apportionment basis, in Tennessee. The trial court determined that the earnings constituted business earnings as defined by the relevant statutes, and that the Department of Revenue’s assessment of franchise and excise taxes on the earnings was constitutional. The trial court further determined that the apportionment formula used by the Department was correct. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the Commissioner, and Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Senior Housing Alternatives, Inc. v. Bernard Global Loan Investors, LTD.
Senior Housing Alternatives, Inc. (“the Borrower”) filed this action against Bernard Global Loan Investors, Ltd. (“the Secured Party”) asking the trial court to enjoin the Secured Party from foreclosing on a deed of trust that secured several notes on which the Borrower had defaulted. In essence, the Borrower’s complaint alleges that its original lender had defrauded the Borrower and inflated the balance owed on the notes and that the Secured Party had knowledge of the fraud when it took ownership of the notes and deed of trust. The complaint alleges that the merits of the case are at issue in a federal district court in Georgia. Despite expressing reservations about the Borrower’s ability to prevail on the merits, the trial court granted it a temporary injunction to preserve the status quo in an order entered February 15, 2010. The court noted that developments in the federal court action could affect the equities and set a hearing for August 13, 2010, to “review the entire matter.” Two days before the hearing date, the Secured Party filed a brief, with supporting affidavits, asking the court to dissolve the injunction. The court heard proof at a status conference and thereafter issued a memorandum opinion explaining that it was dissolving the injunction because, among other things, the court did not believe the Borrower could prevail on the merits. The Borrower appeals from the order dissolving the injunction and dismissing the complaint. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re T.C.E.
This is a biological father’s appeal from a judgment terminating his parental rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence (1) that he had abandoned the child by willfully failing to visit during the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate; (2) that he had not substantially complied with his obligations under a court-approved permanency plan despite reasonable efforts to reunite him with the child; and (3) that termination is in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Union | Court of Appeals |
