Frederica April Dawn Bell v. Dennis Lynn Bell
This is an appeal from an order returning temporary custody of the parties’ child to the father pending a further hearing. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Benjamin M. Bates and Estate of Pearl Bates
This appeal arises from a claim filed against two decedents’ estates to recover the value of improvements made to real estate since 2000. The claimant is one of nine children of the decedents, husband and wife, who died in 1959 and 1962, respectively. The court granted the appellee’s claim for the value of improvements made since 2000 to the decedents’ former home place. Because the decedents died intestate, their real property immediately vested in their heirs in 1962. Therefore, the real estate the claimant improved beginning in 2000 was not owned by either decedent at that time or thereafter; thus, the award of a claim against the estates of these two decedents is a nullity. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Anne Chavez v. James Albert Chavez, Jr.
Wife sought a divorce and Husband counterclaimed for a divorce. The trial court granted the divorce to both parties. Wife was designated the primary residential parent and was awarded transitional alimony and alimony in solido. Husband appeals. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William N. Nusbaum v. Lucile E. Nusbaum
In this divorce appeal, wife challenges the distribution of husband’s federal retirement benefits, the award of transitional alimony, and the court’s failure to award her attorneyfees. Because of an error in the percentage of husband’s FERS classified as marital assets, we reverse the trial court’s decision. As to transitional alimony, we affirm the award of $500 per month but extend the award until the time of husband’s retirement. We affirm the trial court’s decision regarding attorney fees. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
2850 Parkway General Partnership v. C. Dan Scott, et al
Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory judgment, asking the Court to declare that while plaintiff's sublease required it to pay the property taxes, the master lease required the lessor to pay the property taxes, and asked the Court to declare the lessor liable for the property taxes. Following trial, the Trial Court declared that the sublessee was liable for the property taxes, as it agreed to pay under the sublease. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court on the grounds that under the fact of this case, plaintiff is equitably estopped to avoid paying property taxes, as agreed to in the sublease. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel Alexandria Price v. Christopher Childers
The State brought this action against the defendant to establish paternity and require support for the dependent child. A default judgment was taken against defendant, which determined that he was the father of the child and he was ordered to pay child support, and it was ordered that the child support be withheld from his paycheck. During these proceedings the defendant was a member of the United States military, and he subsequently filed a pro se motion for DNA testing. The DNA test established that he was not the biological father of the child, and the support withheld from his paycheck was ordered reimbursed to defendant. The State appealed, and we hold that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to require the State to reimburse defendant for the child support withheld from his paycheck. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Rheaetta F. Wilson, et al. v. Americare Systems, Inc., et al.
Decedent’s next of kin filed this wrongful death action against an assisted living facility, two nurses, and the facility’s management company for failure to provide proper care and treatment. This appeal concerns only the jury verdict and judgment finding the management company directly liable for failure to provide adequate staff at the assisted living facility. We find no material evidence to support a conclusion that any staffing deficiency proximately caused the decedent’s death. We therefore reverse the judgment finding direct liability on the part of the management company. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline L. Shultz v. Kirby Fuller
Upon the divorce of the parties, the permanent parenting plan designated the mother as the primary residential parent of the couple’s daughter. Both parties eventually filed petitions to modify the permanent parenting plan. The trial court concluded that there had been a material change of circumstance and that it was in the best interest of the daughter that her parenting be shared equally between the parties. Mother appeals the trial court’s modification decision. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings regarding the best interest of the child. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Steven Devore v. Rhonda M. Devore
This is a post-divorce case in which Mark Steven Devore (“Husband”) petitioned for modification of child support. Rhonda M. Devore (“Wife”) counter-petitioned for contempt. The trial court held that Husband was no longer liable for child support because the children had reached the age of majority but that the amount of overpayment was offset by obligations provided for in the marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). The court also held that Husband was liable for future college expenses. Following Wife’s motion to reconsider, the court held that Husband owed $11,230.43 for past due college expenses. Husband appeals. We hold that the court erred because it did not use a child support worksheet to calculate the amount of support owed. We vacate and remand for the court to utilize a worksheet. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, et al. v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and Workers' Compensation Division
This action was filed pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322, for contested cases. The petitioner challenges a penalty assessed by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers’ Compensation.The stated reason for the penaltywas the failure to file Form C-20,Tennessee Employer’s First Report of Work Injury, regarding eighteen injuries that occurred in January and February 2003 which were medical only injuries, meaning no disability benefits were owing. The trial court affirmed the penalty. We find the petitioner was not afforded proper notice of the Department’s basis for issuing the penalty in violation of the petitioner’s due process rights under the UAPA, Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-307. We also find that the Department exceeded its authority by changing its “interpretation” of Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-2-1-.06, a rule that was unambiguous and, thus, not subject to interpretation. The trial court’s holding is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions to vacate the penalty assessed against the petitioner. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Billy D. H.
Mother’s parental rights to her son were terminated on grounds that she was mentally incompetent to provide for the child and that the conditions which led to the child’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted. She appeals, contending that the grounds are not supported by the evidence and that termination of her rights was not in the best interest of the child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of John Daniel Tate
This is the second appeal arising from a disputed “temporary” conservatorship. Three issues are presented: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of the protection and supervision of the court; which party is responsible for the costs of the proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a); and which party is responsible for discretionary costs under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). The petitioner was appointed “Temporary Conservator” and served in this fiduciary capacity for thirty-one months until June of 2010, at which time the trial court terminated the conservatorship upon the finding that the respondent was no longer a “disabled person” as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-101(7). Over the objection of the ward, the trial court assessed the costs of the conservatorship against the respondent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a “fiduciary” was appointed, and discretionary costs pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2) upon the finding that the petitioner was the “prevailing party.” The respondent contends this was error because the conservator was merely appointed the “temporary conservator” and the petition to create the conservatorship was ultimately dismissed. We find the evidence presented to the trial court on November 14, 2007, clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservator of his person and property; we find no error with the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to recover the costs of the proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a conservator was appointed; and we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs against the respondent under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). Thus, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Geoffrey Todd Krasner v. John Arnold
This appeal involves claims of defamation. After words were exchanged in the course of a parenting dispute, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant father of the plaintiff’s girlfriend’s daughter. A bench trial was held in which both parties were self-represented. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Chandra Pearson v. Victor Ross
This appeal involves a nuisance claim. The parties own adjoining homes in a neighborhood of zero-lot line homes. The defendant’s air conditioning condenser unit is outside his home, between the parties’ homes. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the noise of the defendant’s air conditioning unit constituted a nuisance, and seeking abatement of the nuisance, money damages, and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Grand Valley Lakes Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Dennis Burrow
Appellant, the owner of several lots in a subdivision managed and maintained by the Appellee home owners association, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee on the question of whether Appellant owed an increase in dues and fees on his lots, and the denial of his counter-claims for fraud, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, outrageous conduct, and invalidity of the restrictive covenants on grounds that these causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation or the doctrine of laches. We conclude that the Appellee followed the correct procedure in amending its restrictive covenants to increase the amount of dues. However, because the trial court did not make findings, as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, concerning the grounds for its application of laches, we cannot review the question of whether Appellant’s counter-claims were properly dismissed. Vacated and remanded. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Michelle Brown v. Brookdale Senior Living, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on her claims for statutory procurement of breach of contract, common law inducement of breach of contract, and tortious interference with business relationship. Finding that plaintiff failed to establish one or more essential element of each claim, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Thomas Grady Chastain
We granted the application of June Chastain Patterson (“the Proponent”), which sought permission to appeal an order of the trial court holding, as a matter of law, that the “will” of Thomas Grady Chastain (“the Deceased”) was not executed in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104 (2007). The Deceased signed the affidavit of attesting witnesses on September 4, 2004, which affidavit was attached to the purported will of the same date; he also initialed the bottom of the first page of the “will,” but did not sign the second page of the two-page “will.” The Proponent appeals. We reverse. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Thomas Grady Chastain - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s Opinion. I believe that the answer to the issue of “Whether the Will was signed in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104” is a simple no. The majority, however, strives mightily to arrive at a conclusion that the Testator’s signature on a document other than the purported Will somehow satisfies the statutory requirement that the Testator signed the purported Will. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Bivins, as next of kin and natural parent of Brandon Bivins, deceased v. City of Murfreesboro
Plaintiff filed an action against the City of Murfreesboro pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, claiming a dangerous and unsafe roadway caused an automobile accident in which her son was killed. The trial court determined the City had no notice of an unsafe or dangerous condition, and entered judgment in favor of the City. Upon appeal, we reversed on the issue of notice, holding that previous accidents on adjacent areas of the roadway provided sufficient notice to the City of a potentially dangerous condition. Upon remand, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and assessed 60% fault to the City. We vacate and remand for further findings consistent with Rule 52 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
James Watry v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation
Insured was injured by an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. Insured filed a claim with Insurer seeking uninsured motorist coverage benefits and settled for an amount that was less than his actual damages. Insured then sued Insurer seeking damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Act. Insurer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because Insured failed to allege sufficient facts to support any of his causes of action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tish Walker, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Lisa Jo Abbott v. Dr. Shant Garabedian
This appeal concerns the application of the locality rule in a medical malpractice case. The trial court excluded the testimony of the plaintiff’s medical expert, based on the locality rule. On this basis, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant physician. The plaintiff appeals. We vacate the order excluding the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert and the grant of summary judgment, and remand for reconsideration in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s recent decision Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011). |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
G. Kenneth Campbell, et al v. James E. Huddleston et al.
James E. Huddleston and his wife, Patricia M. Huddleston (“the Sellers”), sold their house to G. Kenneth Campbell and his wife, Teresa J. Campbell (“the Buyers’). The Buyers inquired of the Sellers as to whether there had been flooding in the house. The Sellers disclosed that there had been one flood in the basement to a depth of six inches. During the course of some later renovations, the Buyers became aware the Sellers had indicated, on a wall stud, that there had been a 1998 flood in the basement to a depth of 38 inches. They |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
FILMtech, Inc. v. Charlie McAnally, d/b/a Grainger Paving
Plaintiff brought this action against this contractor alleging breach of contract to construct an asphalt parking lot for plaintiff. The Trial Court determined that defendant breached the contract and awarded damages. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Donald W. Owen and Jennifer Owen v. Long Tire, LLC; Leon Long; and Nancy Long v. Owen Alignment, Inc.
This is a breach of contract and conversion case. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint and conducted a bench trial on the defendants’ counterclaim for breach of contract and conversion. The trial court held in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs now appeal. We find the plaintiffs’ appellate brief to be in substantial violation of Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure; in light of this, we decline to address the merits of the case and dismiss the appeal. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Cassandra Lynn Rudd v. Howard Thomas Rudd
This appeal concerns post-divorce parenting time. In the first appeal in this case, this Court reviewed the trial court’s denial of any parenting time for the appellant father with his daughter. This Court remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether parenting time |
Hardin | Court of Appeals |
