In Re: The Estate of Franklin Steadman Murdaugh, Barbara Murdaugh Warner v. Rudy W. Young
This case arises from a will contest. Appellant, the executor and sole beneficiary of the contested will, appeals the trial court’s finding that Appellant did not met his burden to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption of undue influence based upon the existence of a confidential relationship between Appellant and Decedent. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Prime Locations, Inc. v. Shelby County and the City of Memphis
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendants Shelby County and the City of Memphis upon determining that, under Tennessee Code Annotated 37-7-210, Defendants have authority to regulate billboards pursuant to private acts applicable to Memphis and Shelby County. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm entry of a judgment in favor of Defendants on the grounds of standing and ripeness. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Janice Brooks, et al. v. Rivertown On The Island Homeowner Association, Inc.
Appellee filed an action to set aside Defendant Homeowners’ Association non-judicial foreclosure sale of a condo unit for allegedly unpaid homeowners’ association fees. The trial court set aside the sale upon determining that there was no credible basis upon which to determine the amount due at the time of the sale. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donna F. Smith Thompson v. Ameriquest Mortgage Company
Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale of her property. The trial court dismissed the case based on Plaintiff’s failure to effect service of process on the Defendant. We affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Smith, as Devisee of Ronnie Crabtree v. Linda D. Hatfield
This is a breach of contract case. The defendant seller entered into a contract to sell a mobile home to the plaintiff’s decedent. The contract required the decedent to make monthly payments by a date certain for eighty-four months, and if he failed to do so, all of his payments would be forfeited as rent. The decedent failed to make all of his payments in a timely manner. Later, the decedent died. The plaintiff, the decedent’s sole devisee, offered to pay the contract off by making a lump-sum payment to the defendant. The defendant rejected this offer. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, seeking to require the defendant to accept the lump-sum payment and convey the property to her. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims upon the close of her proof, because the undisputed evidence showed that she had not made the required monthly payments under the contract. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm and award attorney fees for a frivolous appeal. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Chanda Keith v. Regas Real Estate Company, et al.
This is a negligence case in which Chanda Keith (“Ms. Keith”) filed suit against Regas Real Estate Company (“Regas”) and LDB Corporation operating in Tennessee as Mr. Gatti’s Incorporated formerly doing business as Mr. Gatti’s and/or Mr. Gatti’s, L.P. (“Mr. Gatti’s”). The trial court dismissed the suit against Regas. Approximately ten years after the initial suit was filed, the trial court dismissed the suit against Mr. Gatti’s without prejudice, finding that Ms. Keith failed to comply with an order. One year later, Ms. Keith filed a new suit against Regas and Mr. Gatti’s. The trial court dismissed both suits. Ms. Keith appeals. We affirm the trial court relative to the dismissal of the suit against Regas but reverse the trial court relative to the dismissal of the suit against Mr. Gatti’s. The case is remanded. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hannah M. N.
This is an appeal from a child support action. A juvenile court magistrate found the father to be willfully and voluntarily unemployed and imputed income to him for the purposes of calculating his child support obligation. The magistrate refused to consider a motion to modify or vacate. On appeal to the juvenile court judge, the father was refused review on the basis that the magistrate had heard the motion to modify or vacate pursuant to Rule 34(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure. The father appealed. We vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and remand for further proceedings. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy A. Moore v. Hugh A. Butler, Individually and as Agent and Servant of Anthony Wommack d/b/a Wommack Trucking, and Anthony Wommack d/b/a Wommack Trucking, and McCoy's Heating & Air, Inc.
This appeal involves summary judgment in a vehicular accident case. In a line of vehicles, the defendant service vehicle was first, followed by the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer, and then by the co-defendant’s tractor-trailer. The defendant’s service vehicle allegedly made a left turn without braking or using a turn signal, forcing the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer to brake quickly. This resulted in the co-defendant’s tractor-trailer rear-ending the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer. The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant tractor-trailer for rear-ending him, and against the defendant service vehicle that turned in front of him. The defendant service vehicle owner filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the defendant service vehicle owner had negated the element of proximate cause. The defendant tractor-trailer owner appeals. We reverse under the summary judgment standard in Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
John Ruff v. Reddoch Management, LLC, et al.
Tenant filed suit against his former landlord and the current owner of premises that tenant leased alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and violations of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Trial court dismissed tenant’s claim against the former landlord holding that the landlord was exempt from suit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-305. The court dismissed the claim against the current owner because tenant failed to complywith the fourteen day pre-suit notice requirement at Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-501(a). Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nicolle Elizabeth Anderson v. Donald W. Anderson
In this divorce action, the husband appeals the entry of a default judgment and the resulting Order of Divorce and Permanent Parenting Plan. The husband was properlyserved but never filed an answer. Months later, upon motion of the wife, the trial court granted a default judgment against the husband as he had not filed an answer to the complaint for divorce when the motion was heard. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
Walton Cunningham & Phyllis Cunningham ex rel. Phillip Walton Cunningham v. Williamson County Hospital District, et al.
Defendants, Williamson Medical Center and five of its employees, appeal from the denial of their motion to dismiss this medical malpractice action. They contend the action is time barred because it was filed more than one year after the cause of action accrued, in violation of the one year statute of limitations applicable to Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act actions, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-305(b). The trial court, however, found that the action was timely filed because it was commenced within the 120-day extension afforded to the plaintiffs pursuant to an amendment to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(c) (2009). We have determined that the amendment codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)-(c) applies, notwithstanding the one-year statute of limitations provision under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, that the plaintiffs’ compliance with the pre-suit notification provision in Tennessee Code Annotate § 29-26-121(a) extended the statute of limitations by 120 days, and that this action was timely filed within the 120-day extension. Therefore, were affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
W. Turner Boone et al v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of The Tennessee Department of Revenue
W. Turner Boone and wife, Sally-Bruce M. Boone (“the Taxpayers”), are Tennessee residents who own stock in South Carolina corporations. In 2001, the Taxpayers paid South Carolina income tax of $43,328 based on pass-through income of $623,941. The Taxpayers received dividend distributions of $204,988 on the same income. They filed a 2001 Tennessee Hall Income Tax return reporting the dividends with a resulting tax of $12,288, against which they claimed a credit for a like amount based upon their payment of the South Carolina income tax. Their claimed credit is based upon a deduction allowed by statute for “tax paid to [another] state . . . provided, that there exists a tax credit reciprocity agreement between Tennessee and the other state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-2-122 (2011). Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue (“the Commissioner”) declined to allow the credit. She gave notice of an outstanding tax liability for 2001 in the amount of $15,017.93, including penalties and interest. The Taxpayers paid the assessment under protest and filed this action against the Commissioner after they demanded and were denied a refund. The trial court upheld the Commissioner’s denial. The Taxpayers appeal. We affirm. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Fisk University - Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s grant of cy pres relief. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Corin Mucha Wilkinson v. Thomas Gregg Wilkinson
Corin Mucha Wilkinson (“Wife”) filed a petition for criminal contempt in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against Thomas Gregg Wilkinson (“Husband”). Wife and Husband were in the midst of a divorce. Wife, in her petition for contempt, alleged that Husband had willfully failed to pay his monthly pendente lite support as ordered. The Trial Court found Husband guiltyof two counts of criminal contempt. Husband appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Corin Mucha Wilkinson v. Thomas Gregg Wilkinson
This case concerns the divorce of Thomas Gregg Wilkinson (“Husband”) and Corin Mucha Wilkinson (“Wife”). Wife filed for divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court, in its final decree granting the divorce, inter alia, divided the marital estate and awarded Wife alimony. Husband appeals, contesting the division of the marital estate, the award of alimony to Wife, the award of attorney’s fees to Wife, and a judgment against him for pendente lite support arrearages. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court as it relates to the Trial Court’s marital debt allocation/alimony in solido and the amount of arrearages Husband owes. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Fisk University
After finding that cy pres relief was available to modify conditions imposed by donor of artwork which had been gifted to Fisk University, the trial court approved agreements whereby the Crystal Bridges Museum would purchase a fifty percent interest in the art for $30 million and would thereafter share in the display and maintenance of the artwork. The court conditioned approval of the agreements on the requirement that Fisk establish an endowment of $20 million from the proceeds of sale in furtherance of the donor’s intent to make the art available for the citizens of Nashville. The Attorney General of Tennessee appeals, contending that the trial court exceeded the scope of remand and that the court erred in determining that the agreement with the Crystal Bridges Museum most closely reflects the donor’sintent. Fisk seeks review of trialcourt’s requirementthatitestablish the endowment. We affirm the trial court’s decision in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jess L. Rogers v. Knox County Criminal Court
Jesse L. Rogers (“Plaintiff”) appeals an order from the Chancery Court for Johnson County (“Chancery Court”) dismissing his Petition for Access to Public Records. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s petition. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Marcella E. May v. Donald B. May, et al.
After twenty-five years of marriage, Marcella E. May (“Wife”) sued Donald B. May (“Husband”) for divorce. Husband’s adult son Donald P. May (“Son”) was added later to the suit as a defendant concerning a real property transfer. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree of Divorce, inter alia, awarding Wife a divorce, dividing the marital property, awarding Wife transitional alimony, and awarding Wife judgment for attorney’s fees against Husband. After further hearing, the Trial Court entered subsequent orders awarding Wife $63,474.34 in attorney’s fees and $2,965.77 in costs against Husband, and $4,083.50 in attorney’s fees against Son. Husband and Son appeal to this Court raising issues regarding the classification and distribution of specific property, and the awards of alimony and attorney’s fees. We affirm with regard to the classification and distribution of property, the award of alimony, and the award of attorney’s fees against Husband. We find and hold that no contractual or statutory basis allowed for an award of attorney’s fees against Son, and we, therefore, vacate the award to Wife of a judgment for attorney’s fees against Son. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
Becky Cooper v. Jason Powers, et al.
At its core, this case is about the application of an offset provision in an uninsured motorist (“UM”) policy to an individual’s claim for damages arising out of an automobile accident in the course and scope of her employment. The plaintiff Becky Cooper’s workers’ compensation claim arising out of the accident, along with another workers’ compensation claim, this one for injuries sustained by the plaintiff “while getting a briefcase from her car,” were settled and approved by the Chancery Court for Hamilton County. The “final order” of that court recites that the court acted upon the “joint petition of the employer, . . . the insurer, . . . and the employee, . . . for the approval of a proposed settlement under the . . . Workers’ Compensation [Law].” The order does not expressly state that the plaintiff was paid any benefits for the injuries sustained in the automobile accident; but it does recite that she received all of the benefits to which she was due with respect to the two claims. The plaintiff filed the present action against the driver and owner of the other vehicle involved in the accident and served a copy of the complaint on Pacific Employers Insurance Company, the UM carrier of the company whose automobile the plaintiff was driving at the time of the accident. The UM carrier filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting that it is entitled to an offset corresponding to the workers’ compensation benefits to which the plaintiff was entitled under the Workers’ Compensation Law with respect to the automobile accident. The trial court granted the UM carrier partial summary judgment in an order that states simply, without further elaboration, “[t]his is a final order.” For several reasons, we hold that the court’s order is not a final order under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. However, in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, see Tenn. R. App. P. 1, we exercise our discretion to treat this appeal as if it were before us pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. App. P. 9. With respect to the merits of this case, we affirm the trial court’s order granting partial summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Becky Cooper v. Jason Powers, et al. - Dissenting
This case was appealed pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3. The appellee raised the issue that the appeal was not from a final judgment pursuant to any rules of the Court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth E. Diggs v. DNA Diagnostic Center
The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s action for fraud based on the statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pauletta C. Crawford, et al. v. Eugene Kavanaugh, M.D.
This is a medical malpractice case in which Pauletta C. Crawford (“Wife”) and James Crawford (“Husband”) filed suit against Eugene Kavanaugh, M.D. (“Doctor”). While the suit was pending, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122 was amended to require the contemporaneous filing of a certificate of good faith with complaints alleging medical malpractice. Husband and Wife (collectively the “Crawfords”) dismissed their suit and filed a new complaint that did not include a certificate of good faith. Doctor filed a motion to dismiss, and the court dismissed the case. The Crawfords appeal. We affirm the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Caine D.J.S.
The Department of Children's Services petitioned the Trial Court to terminate the parental rights of the mother, DJ, and the presumptive father, TH, who was married to the mother at the time of the child's birth. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court terminated the parental rights of the mother DJ and her husband at the time of the child's birth, TH. Both parties appealed to this Court and we affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights and vacate the Judgment terminating TH's parental rights on the grounds that the statutory grounds for termination was not established by the evidence. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Roy L. Lawhon v. Mountain Life Insurance Company
Plaintiff made claim for credit disability insurance coverage after he became disabled, and defendant insurance company denied benefits on the grounds of misrepresentations in the application for insurance, which he had executed. The Trial Court ruled in favor of plaintiff on the grounds that misrepresentations in the application did not increase the risk of loss. On appeal, we reverse the Trial Court's Judgment because the misrepresentations contained in the application for insurance increase defendant's risk of loss under the statute. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Robin Campbell Armbrister v. Edwin C. Armbrister, Jr.
At issue in this appeal is the amount of income that can be imputed to the father for child support, as well as whether the mother should be charged with the attorney fees and costs in regard to an order of protection. The trial court found that the father was voluntarily underemployed. Finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding of voluntary underemployment, we affirm the trial court as to that matter. We reverse the trial court’s ruling regarding the attorney fees and costs. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals |
