Ron Littlefield v. Hamilton County Election Commission, et al .
Chattanooga’s mayor, the subject of a recall petition, filed suit against the county election commission, seeking a declaratory judgment that the petition process was flawed and to enjoin the election commission from placing the recall issue on the November 2010 election ballot. The trial court found the election commission could not lawfully certify the recall petition due to noncompliance with applicable statutory provisions and enjoined the placement of the recall issue on the ballot. The leader of the recall effort appeals. We find that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in entering an injunction against the election commission. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and the complaint dismissed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Breanna A.L.
The Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”), upon a petition by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and following a trial, terminated the parental rights of Troy L. (“Father”) to the minor child Breanna A. L. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) (2010). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 13 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence existed such that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Braun v. Nita Lynn Braun
In this divorce case involving a minor child of the parties and the appellant Charles Braun’s stepson, the record before us does not contain a permanent parenting plan certified by the trial court clerk as being entered by that court. Furthermore, the record affirmatively shows that the trial court has not yet made a final decision as to an amount of child support to be paid by Charles Braun. Therefore, we are persuaded that there is no final judgment in this case. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Rhea Helton v. Gregory Herbert Helton
This is a divorce case. Gregory Herbert Helton appeals from the “final” judgment of divorce entered April 29, 2011. That judgment is not a final judgment. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Gloria G. Neuenschwander v. Roy P. Neuenschwander
This appeal is being pursued from the trial court’s order of August 9, 2011. That order is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant Gloria G. Neuenschwander’s appeal is hereby dismissed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Matter of the Conservatorship of Mittie T. Alexander v. JB Partners, A Tennessee General Partnership
Plaintiff Conservator filed an action seeking rescission of a warranty deed executed by her Ward prior to the establishment of the conservatorship. The deed conveyed real property in Nashville to Defendant without consideration, but retained a life-estate. Plaintiff alleged incapacity to contract as grounds for recision. Prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s action, Defendant and Appellee Intervener executed a contractfor sale of the property, subject to the life-estate. The trial court determined that the Intervener held superior title to the real property under the doctrine of equitable conversion. The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Intervener pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Randstad North America, L.P. v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development
This appeal involves the constitutionality of a statute on temporary disability benefits,T.C.A. § 50-6-238. The plaintiff employment agency refused to pay temporary disability benefits to an employee who claimed that she was disabled from an on-the-job injury. The employee filed a request for assistance with the defendant Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development pursuant to T.C.A.§ 50-6-238. A workers’compensation specialist entered an order requiring the employer to pay temporary disability benefits to the employee. The employer filed an unsuccessful administrative appeal. The employer then filed the instant petition for common law writ of certiorari alleging, inter alia, that the procedures in T.C.A. § 50-6-238 violate the employer’s right to procedural due process. The trial court agreed and held the statute to be unconstitutional on its face. The State appeals. In light of this Court’s recent decision in Tyson Foods v. TDOL, No. M2010-0227-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4790980 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2011), we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Town of Smyrna, Tennessee v. Perry Bell
The Town of Smyrna annexed land in 1991 that included a retail furniture store. The owner of that business kept a number of tractor-trailers parked on his property to store some of his inventory. Several years after the annexation, the town cited the owner in an attempt to enforce a municipal ordinance regulating the parking of tractor-trailers on commercially zoned property. The municipal court ruled against the owner. He appealed to the Circuit Court,which held that the ordinance in question was a zoning regulation and that the owner’s use of the tractor- trailers was protected bythe grandfathering provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-7-208(b)(1). The town contends on appeal to this court that the ordinance is a property maintenance regulation rather than a zoning regulation and that the owner’s use of the tractor-trailers is therefore not entitled to the protection of the grandfather clause. We agree, and we reverse the Circuit Court because the proof does not indicate that compliance with the ordinance would substantially interfere with the store owner’s use of the property as a retail furniture business. Thus, it cannot be considered a zoning ordinance as applied to him under the standard established by our Supreme Court in Cherokee Country Club v. City of Knoxville, 152 S.W.2d 466 (Tenn. 2004). |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
ICG Link, Inc. v. Philip Steen, et al. v. TN Sports, LLC v. ICG Link, Inc.
This is a dispute concerning payment for website development services. The plaintiff, a website development company, filed suit against the defendants, an LLC and its managing member in his individual capacity, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court found there was no express contract between the parties due to a lack of mutual assent. The court found there was a quasi-contract and that plaintiff was entitled to the reasonable value of its services, minus the costs incurred by defendants in attempting to repair the defects in the website. Last, the court held the individual defendant personally liable for the judgment. We affirm the finding of a quasi-contract and the personal liability of the individual defendant; however, we modify the trial court’s monetary award, finding the plaintiff is entitled to recover a judgment of $13,952.88. The court’s holding is affirmed in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mamakeh Mamadi Jawara v. Latoya Michelle Jawara
This is an appeal from a divorce decree entered on August 5, 2008. Because the appellant voluntarily dismissed her first appeal from the same divorce decree in 2008, and did not file her current notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert R. Smith, As Conservator for the Estate of H. Boyd Israel, Ward v. Mark Israel
Petitioner sought to domesticate four orders entered by a probate court in Georgia for the payment of money pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §26-6-101, et seq. The trial court granted the petitioner the relief he sought, and the debtor appealed, arguing Tennessee public policy should prevent the orders from being enforced based on the unusual circumstances surrounding the issuance of the orders and his attorney’s misconduct in the Georgia proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because the Georgia court had jurisdiction to enter the orders and Tennessee courts are not in a position to review the facts leading to a foreign court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Jeff Dayton, et al. v. James Ackerman d/b/a Home Design, Inc., et al.
Sellers of a house provided the purchasers with a Limited Warranty in which different aspects of the house were warranted to be without defects for a term not to exceed one year. The purchasers testified theycomplained two months following the closing that the windows did not operate properly, and the sellers testified the purchasers did not complain about the windows until after more than two years. The trial court found the purchasers’ testimony more credible, and based on the purchasers’ expert and other evidence, concluded the installation of the windows was defective. The court awarded the purchasers damages, consisting of the replacement cost for all the windows, even though not all the windows were defective. The sellers alleged the trial court erred by excluding its expert from testifying, by determining the window installation was defective, and in the way it calculated the purchasers’ damages. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified to correct a computational error in the calculation of damages. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kendra D. Carter, et al. v. Retha Batts
Plaintiffs prevailed in personal injury action against Defendant in Shelby County General Sessions Court. On appeal in Shelby County Circuit Court, the matter was tried before a jury and a judgment was rendered in favor of Defendant. Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The circuit court granted Plaintiff’s motion, but the parties settled the matter before retrial and signed a release memorializing the settlement. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(3) alleging that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and thus its judgment was void, because the Defendant failed to perfect the appeal from general sessions court. The circuit court denied the motion and Plaintiffs appealed. Finding that Defendant properly perfected the appeal from general sessions court, and that the release executed by the parties encompassed Plaintiffs’ claim, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Aubrey E. Givens, et al. v. Vanderbilt University, et al.
The question in this case is whether the trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs’ medical malpractice action. Because the lawsuit before this court was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Roy L. Hamilton v. Elizabeth K. Hamilton
The trial court denied Father’s petition to modify custody, restore telephone privileges, and re-evaluate income assignment. It found Father to be in contempt, and denied Mother’s request for attorney’s fees under Rule 11. The trial court awarded Mother a portion of her attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Junkans v. Alamo Rentals, Inc. v. Pamela Junkans
Plaintiff and third-partydefendant appeal the circuitcourt’s denial of third-partydefendant’s motion to dismiss, grant of defendant/third-party plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against third-party defendant, and dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. Finding that defendant/thirdparty plaintiff’s complaint makes out a claim for relief as a matter of law, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss. Finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the grant of the motion for sanctions. Finding that defendant negated an element of plaintiff’s claim, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s case against the defendant. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Taylor BW, and Ashley NW
The father and his wife petitioned the Court to terminate the parental rights of the two minor children's mother and allow the father's wife to adopt the two minor children. After a myriad of pleadings, the Trial Court held an evidentiary hearing and ruled that the father had proved statutory grounds to terminate the mother's parental rights, and that it was in the best interest of the two minor children that her parental rights be terminated. The mother petitioned to reconsider, and upon further consideration the Trial Court reversed its ruling and held that it was not in the children's best interest to terminate her rights as a parent of the two children. Petitioners appealed, and on appeal we hold that clear and convincing evidence established the statutory grounds for termination and clear and convincing evidence established that it was in the children's best interest to terminate the mother's parental rights. Further, that the Trial Judge in reversing her findings that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the parental rights of the mother, focused on the rights of the mother rather than the rights of the children, as required by the statute and authorities. We reinstate the original Judgment of the Trial Court terminating the mother's parental rights. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Biggers v. Laurence K. Houchin
In the previous appeal of this case, we determined that the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff the opportunity to appeal the dismissal of his case and in awarding $1,151.75 in sanctions to Defendant. The case was remanded and, on remand, the trial court directed the Defendant to return the monetary sanction by depositing the money with the Clerk and Master. Plaintiff appeals and contends that the trial court erred in not distributing the funds to him directly. We affirm the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Franklin Bank v. J. Alan Riggs, et al.
In this case, the trial court entered a default judgment against J. Alan Riggs (“Husband”) and Deborah D. Riggs (“Wife”) and against Husband and Preston Park Development, LLC (“Preston Park”). Husband, Wife, and Preston Park (collectively “the Defendants”) filed a motion for a new trial or to set aside the default judgment. The trial court granted the motion, in part, holding that Wife was not liable for one of the counts in the judgment entered against her. The trial court upheld the entirety of the other counts as they related to each of the Defendants. The Defendants appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
William W. Stebbins v. Funderburk Management Company, LLC, et al.
Restaurant patron who was served food in which he found a tooth sued the restaurant for negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. He sought compensatory and punitive damages. At trial, the court granted a directed verdict to defendant on the punitive damages and Consumer Protection Act claims and denied plaintiff’s special request that the court instruct the jury that recoverable damages for mental and emotional distress could also include anxiety or concern for others. Plaintiff appeals the grant of the directed verdicts and the failure to give the requested instruction. Finding no error, we affirm. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Whitney Marie MacRae v. Thomas Paul MacRae
The trial court granted Whitney Marie MacRae (“Wife”) a divorce by default against Thomas Paul MacRae (“Husband”). The default was based upon Husband’s failure to comply with an order compelling him to respond to Wife’s discovery requests. Shortly after Wife remarried – which was nearly a year after the divorce judgment was entered – Husband filed a motion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 to set aside the judgment. The trial court denied the motion. Husband appeals from that denial. Wife argues that the judgment should not be set aside; she seeks damages for a frivolous appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. We also find the appeal to be frivolous and remand to the trial court for a determination of the damages due Wife pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 1-122 (2000). |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Eva Weaver v. Priscilla Deverell, et al.
This is a case involving life insurance and a Power of Attorney. After Decedent named Appellant as his attorney-in-fact through a Power of Attorney, the Appellant changed Decedent’s life insurance policy to name herself as primary beneficiary. Appellee, the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William James Jekot v. Pennie Christine Jekot
Wife appeals the trial court’s decision to substantially reduce her alimony, contending there has not been a substantial and material change of circumstances. The parties were divorced in 2005 following a thirty year marriage. In 2008, Husband filed a petition for modification of alimony. The trial court held that a decrease in Husband’s income constituted a substantial and material change of circumstance, which warranted the reduction in alimony. The trial court also held that Husband was entitled to interest on overpayments of alimony. Wife appealed. We reverse based on the finding that there was not a substantial and material change of circumstance. We also find that although Husband is entitled to recover overpayments of alimony following the first appeal, he is not entitled to interest on the overpayments. Wife has requested her attorney’s fees. Applying the principles stated in Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, __S.W.3d __, 2011 WL 4116654 (Tenn. Sept. 16, 2011), we find Wife is not entitled to recover her attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Elaina M.
In this modification of child custody case, Father petitioned the court to change custody based on Mother’s relocation and the subsequent interference with his visitation. Finding a material change in circumstances, the juvenile court named Father primary residential parent. Mother appeals. Concluding that a material change in circumstances existed and the change in custody was in the child’s best interest, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
U.S. Bank National Association, ad trustee v. Rodney T. Rzezutko, et al .
Rodney T. Rzezutko and Sandra Rzezutko (“Defendants”) appeal a Circuit Court order dismissing Defendants’ appeal of a General Sessions Court interlocutory order dated September 21, 2010. U.S. Bank National Association, as trustee (“Plaintiff”) raises an issue on appeal with regard to the Circuit Court vacating the General Sessions Court’s September 21, 2010 order. We find and hold that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of a General Sessions Court order. The Circuit Court, therefore, correctly dismissed Defendants’ appeal. We affirm this dismissal. However, as the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction, it was error to vacate the September 21, 2010 General Sessions Court order. We, therefore, vacate that portion of the Circuit Court order vacating the September 21, 2010 order, and reinstate the September 21, 2010 General Sessions Court interlocutory order. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
