First Tennessee Bank N.A. v. Harold Woodward et al.
First Tennessee Bank, N.A. (“the Trustee”) is the trustee of a testamentary trust established under the will of Steve Woodward (“the Deceased”) for the benefit of his son, Jeffrey Clinton Woodward (“the Son”). Steve Woodward died in 2005. The Deceased’s will (“the Will”) provides that at his death a trust was to be created for the benefit of the Son. The Son is to receive a monthly payment from the trust and, at age 50, the Son is to receive the corpus of the trust. The Deceased’s brother, Harold Woodward (“the Brother”), is the recipient under the Will of “all of the property that would make up my residual estate and not named herein. . . .” The trust was created and payments were being made to the Son until he died in 2009 at the age of 33. The Trustee filed this action asking the court to determine its obligations as trustee with respect to the corpus of the trust. The suit named all parties with a possible interest in the outcome as defendants, including the Son’s estranged wife, Andrea Woodward (“the Wife”). The trial court ordered the Trustee to distribute the corpus of the trust to the Brother. The Wife appeals. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Janice W. Winkler v. Charles S. Winkler
This is a divorce case. The parties had a long marriage and one minor child. The wife obtained an order of protection against the husband on behalf of herself and the child and filed for divorce. After a trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce, extended the order of protection against the husband, and divided the marital assets. The trial court did not award the husband parenting time, and required the husband to attend anger management classes and pay child support. The wife was awarded the marital home subject to a lien in favor of the husband. The husband appeals the child support and the failure to award him parenting time. The wife appeals the trial court’s award of a lien on the parties’ marital residence in favor of the husband. We affirm as to parenting time and child support, and reverse as to the lien on the marital residence. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Zeylon T.S.
This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The mother is appealing the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parental rights. The child at issue was initially taken from his mother’s custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services after his school reported excessive tardiness and absences. The juvenile court determined that the child was homeless, and that the mother would not provide for his needs. The child was placed with a relative. Lengthy proceedings ensued. The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s rights, which was eventually tried by the juvenile court. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights, and the mother now appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence any statutory grounds for termination, failed to prove that it made reasonable efforts to reunify, and failed to prove that the termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Lynn Jackman v. Kenneth Robert Jackman
This is an appeal of an alimony award. The trial court entered an order declaring Husband and Wife divorced, but reserved all financial issues, including alimony, for trial at a later date. After the trial, the trial court entered a final order awarding Wife rehabilitative alimony and ordering her to undergo a vocational rehabilitation evaluation. Husband filed a petition for contempt and to modify the final order based on Wife’s failure to file proof of her completion of a vocational rehabilitation evaluation. In response, Wife filed proof of her completed vocational rehabilitation evaluation, and filed a counter-petition for contempt and to modify the final order seeking alimony in futuro. Subsequently, Wife filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01, arguing that the language of the final order failed to include the trial court’s findings that the alimony award was not final, and was subject to change based on the results of the vocational rehabilitation evaluation. The trial court granted Wife’s Rule 60.01 motion, and conducted a hearing to determine the appropriate nature and amount of alimony to be awarded based on the results of the vocational rehabilitation evaluation. Following the hearing, the trial court awarded Wife alimony in futuro, increased the amount of alimony awarded, and required Husband to maintain additional life insurance to secure his alimony in futuro obligation. Husband appeals the order granting Wife’s Rule 60.01 motion, and further argues that Wife was required to show a substantial and material change of circumstances to warrant a modification of the original rehabilitative alimony award. Finding that the trial court’s alimony award was not final, and therefore the trial court retained jurisdiction to consider the results of the vocational rehabilitation evaluation, we affirm the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen W. Mencer v. David V. Lee
The plaintiff in this automobile accident case has filed a notice of appeal from an order entered on July 26, 2011, granting him a judgment in the amount of $250,000. Because the trial court has set aside the judgment and set the case for a jury trial, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Marquette Weaver v. Four Maples Homeowners Association and Westwood Management Corporation
This is a premises liability case in which the Plaintiff/Appellant, a resident of Defendants/Appellees’ condominium complex, was assaulted by unknown individuals. Appellant filed suit, asserting negligence on the part of Appellees in failing to timely repair a vehicle access gate on the property. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees, finding that Appellees owed no duty to Appellant as the harm was not reasonably foreseeable. We conclude that the evidence creates a dispute as to whether the underlying assault was foreseeable and, therefore, the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Reversed and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alan Howard Peters et al. v. Casey Burgess et al.
Alan Howard Peters was seriously injured when his vehicle collided with logs that had rolled off a truck. He and his wife filed this personal injury action and thereafter settled their claims against the defendant tortfeasors for policy limits of $1 million. In doing so, they reserved their claim against the uninsured motorist (“UM”) carrier, Cincinnati Insurance Company (“CIC”). The UM provisions in effect with CIC were set forth in an endorsement to a 2005 renewal of an umbrella policy. The UM endorsement to the original policy issued in 1999 and to the first renewal issued in 2002 expressly limited UM coverage to $1 million. A space in the 2005 renewal endorsement form that was intended for insertion of the UM policy limits was left blank, which, by default, rendered the limits of the UM endorsement equal to the $2 million liability limits of the umbrella policy. After the dismissal of the claims against the tortfeasors, CIC amended its answer to include a counterclaim asking the court to reform the policy to make the UM limits equal to the $1 million limits of the previous policies. The trial court entered an order reforming the policy. Subsequently the court entered an order dismissing the remaining claim against CIC. Mr. and Mrs. Peters appeal. We affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
American Express Bank, FSB v. Michael Fitzgibbons
American Express Bank, FSB, sued Michael Fitzgibbons on a sworn account for unpaid credit card debt. It later sought summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and entered a judgment against Fitzgibbons for $25,766.70 plus attorney’s fees and costs. Fitzgibbons appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Cox, D.V.M. v. Tennessee Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners
This is an appeal from an administrative decision against Appellant, a licensed veterinarian. Appellee Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners sanctioned Appellant for improperly prescribing medications to farms. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Clifton A. Lake and Charleen J. Lake et al. v. The Memphis Landsmen, L.L.C., et al.
This case is before us upon mandate from the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration of our previous opinion, Clifton Lake, et. al. v. Memphis Landsmen, L.L.C., et al., No. W2009-00526-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 891867 (Tenn. Ct. App. March 15, 2010), in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., et al., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 179 L. Ed.2d 75 (2011). Our conclusion, in Lake, that Appellants’ claims, based upon the type of glass and the lack of passenger seatbelts, are pre-empted is not disturbed by the Williamson decision because the basis of our holding involved more than preservation of the manufacturers’ ability to choose under the safety regulations. Under the law of the case doctrine, and because further review would exceed the scope of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s mandate, we decline to revisit our decision concerning the perimeter seating issue. Reversed and Remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth E. Diggs v. Genetic Profiles Corporation
Appellant failed to timely file his Notice of Appeal. Thus, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth A. (Hayes)(Falin) Finch v. Timothy A. Hayes
In this post-divorce change of custody case, Elizabeth A. (Hayes) (Falin) Finch (“Mother”) and Timothy A. Hayes (“Father”) sought to modify their parenting plan regarding their daughter (“the Child”), who was born on July 13, 2000. At the time of the divorce, the parties designated Mother as the primary residential parent and provided Father with regularly scheduled visitation. Following a hearing in response to the parties’ motions for modification, the court designated Father as the primary residential parent and awarded Mother co-parenting time. Mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Dick Broadcasting Co., Inc. of Tennessee v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., et al
The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants for causes of action sounding in contract after the defendants refused to consent to the assignment of certain agreements relating to the programming of a radio station. The parties filed competing summary judgment motions. The trial court dismissed the case, finding as a matter of law that the defendants did not breach one of the contracts at issue. The plaintiff appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of : Elizabeth N. M., et al.
The mother of two minor children appeals the termination of her parental rights. She contends the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish a statutory ground supporting termination of her rights or that termination was in the children’s best interests. We have determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s findings and, thus, affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
James W. Sharp v. Greg Wilson, et al.
Essentially, plaintiff's Complaint sets forth numerous refusals by the prison in denying him appropriate and proper medical treatment for his conditions. In their Answer, defendants denied the Complaint's allegations and subsequently moved for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. On appeal, we hold there are disputed issues of material facts and the summary judgment is reversed, as to the health administrator and the nurse practitioner. The summary judgment granted to the Warden of the Southeastern Tennessee State Correctional Facility is affirmed. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Natalie R.C.
Janet S. (“Grandmother”), maternal grandmother and custodian of the minor child Natalie R. C. (“the Child”), filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Kenneth C. (“Father”) in the Juvenile Court for Blount County (“the Juvenile Court”). Christy S. (“Mother”), the Child’s mother, is deceased. The Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of failure to pay child support and failure to visit the Child. Father appeals, arguing, among other things, that the petition to terminate his parental rights was fatally defective because of numerous deficiencies and therefore should have been dismissed. We hold that the petition to terminate parental rights was defective, although not fatally so, due to multiple deficiencies. We vacate the judgment of the Juvenile Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with our Opinion. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Rondal Akers, et al. v. Prime Succession of Tennessee, Inc, et al.
This case is before us for the second time on appeal. In our first Opinion, Akers v. Buckner- Rush Enterprises, Inc., we held, inter alia, that Rondal D. Akers, Jr. and Lucinda Akers had standing to pursue their claims against T. Ray Brent Marsh; Marsh’s former business, Tri- State Crematory (“Tri-State”); and Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc. Akers v. Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc., 270 S.W.3d 67, 73-75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). We remanded the case for trial. The Trial Court entered judgment upon the jury’s verdict finding that Marsh had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon the Akers, that Marsh had violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and that Marsh had violated a bailment responsibility to the Akers. The jury awarded Dr. Akers $275,000 in damages and Mrs. Akers $475,000 in damages. Marsh filed a motion for new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Marsh a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict reversing the judgment for the claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and bailment, and denied Marsh’s motion as to the remaining claims. Marsh appeals to this Court. The Akers raise an issue on appeal regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and dismissing their claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and bailment. We affirm the judgment in its entirety. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Bettye Grooms, et al. v. The City of Newport, Tennessee
The City of Newport (“Newport”) sought to annex certain properties in Cocke County. A number of affected parties (“the Plaintiffs”) objected to the annexation and filed a complaint against Newport in the Chancery Court for Cocke County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court held that the Plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proving that the annexation was unreasonable or that the health, safety and welfare of the relevant citizens would not be materially retarded without the annexation. The Plaintiffs then sought to amend their complaint to allege that Newport was barred from annexation because of Newport’s allegedly having defaulted on a prior plan of services from an earlier annexation. The Trial Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion to amend on the basis, in part, that the issue was not timely raised, pled, or tried. The Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the udgment of the Trial Court. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara A. Lynch, deceased, by her sister and next of kin, Celine Hayes, and Celine Hayes as an individual v. Loudon County, Tennessee, et al.
In this wrongful death action, plaintiff alleged that deceased was involved in a one car accident and the investigating officer, after her car was removed from the guardrail by the wrecker, allowed her to continue driving when he knew or should have known that she was impaired and was a danger to herself, and he violated his duties to her and shortly thereafter she had yet another one-vehicle accident which resulted in her death. The Trial Court, responding to defendants' motion for summary judgment, found that the public duty doctrine applied and if the officer did undertake to protect deceased, she did not rely upon his undertaking. He granted defendants summary judgment. On appeal, we hold that under the public duty doctrine, plaintiff owed no specific duty to deceased, unless he undertook to assume such duty. We hold that there is disputed material evidence as to whether he assumed such duty to deceased but discontinued his aid and protection to deceased which left her in a worse position than she was before he intervened. We reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline G. Furlong v. Kevin Keane Furlong
Kevin Keane Furlong (“Husband”) is the estranged husband of Jacqueline G. Furlong(“Wife”). Wife secured an order of protection in Sevier County that generally prohibits Husband from committing any untoward act against Wife and having any contact with her. As later amended in the Knox County Circuit Court (“the trial court”), the order also states that Husband could come to the marital residence to repair Wife’s automobile. In addition, the court identified two dated time periods, and, with respect to each period, specified which of the parties would have the use of the “inside” of the marital home and when they would have that use, and which would have the use of the “outside,” i.e., presumably the parties’ realty surrounding the house, and when. When Husband came to the residence to repair Wife’s automobile at 7:10 p.m., which, according to the order of protection, was arguably ten minutes beyond the time within which the vehicle was to be repaired, Wife filed a motion asking that he be held in contempt for not repairing the vehicle and for coming about her outside the allowed time frame. The trial court held Husband in criminal contempt, sentenced him to ten days in jail, and extended the order of protection for five years. He was not to be released from jail unless and until he complied with a statute requiring him to post a bond in the minimum amount of $2,500. He served his sentence and obtained a stay of the bond requirement pending appeal. Husband appeals challenging the finding of contempt as well as the constitutionality of the statutory bond requirement. The Tennessee Attorney General ade an appearance on appeal to support the constitutionality of the statute. We reverse, in its entirety, the last order of protection and judgment of criminal contempt entered by the trial court on November 23, 2010. It is held for naught. In view of our reversal, we do not find it necessary or appropriate to reach the constitutional issues. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Triangle American Homes v. Samuel B. Harrison, et al
In this indemnity case, Jere Krieg (“Builder”), through Triangle American Homes, Inc., initially filed a complaint for attachment and damages against Samuel and Lauren Harrison (collectively “the Harrisons”) relating to the construction of a modular home. When the Harrisons filed a counterclaim, arguing that Builder had failed to perform pursuant to their contract, Builder brought a third-party complaint against All American Homes of Tennessee, LLC (“Seller”), alleging that Seller should indemnify Builder. Builder and the Harrisons entered into a settlement agreement. In the remaining suit for indemnification, Seller argued that Builder was not entitled to indemnity because the damages and losses sustained by Builder were a result of Builder’s actions. Following a bench trial, the trial court held that Builder was entitled to damages in the amount of $45,000 and attorney fees in the amount of $45,000, for a total award of $90,000. Seller appeals. We modify the award of attorney fees to $18,084 and affirm the decision of the trial court in all other respects. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Kristie Jackson v. Williamson & Sons Funeral Home, et al
In this negligence case, Kristie Jackson sued Williamson & Sons Funeral Home (the “Funeral Home”) for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress following the burial of her mother, Edna Louise Lewis. Ms. Jackson alleged that the Funeral Home was negligent in failing to delay the burial after learning that she objected to the arrangements that had been made and that the Funeral Home’s actions caused her emotional distress. The Funeral Home moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, finding that the Funeral Home had affirmatively negated an essential element of Ms. Jackson’s claim by showing that it did not owe a duty to her under the circumstances of the case. Ms. Jackson appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Leroy Jackson, Jr. v. Purdy Brothers Trucking Co., Inc., et al
This appeal arises from a tractor-trailer (“truck”) collision involving two professional drivers, Leroy Jackson, Jr., who was driving as an owner operator for USA Trucking, and Blair B. Greene, who was employed by Purdy Brothers Trucking Company, Incorporated (“PBTCI”) and Loudon County Trucking (“LCT”), both formerly doing business as Purdy Brothers Trucking (“PBT”). Mr. Jackson’s truck was repossessed shortly after it was repaired, and he filed suit against Mr. Greene, PBTCI, and LCT (collectively “Trucking Company”) for property damage, loss of income, lost equity in his truck, incidental expenses, and punitive damages. Trucking Company filed a motion for partial summary judgment. 1 The trial court granted the motion, in part, holding that Trucking Company was not liable for the lost equity in the truck but that the case could proceed on the remaining issues. Trucking Company made an offer of judgment, which was accepted by Mr. Jackson and set forth in the court’s final order. Mr. Jackson appeals, contending that the court erred in granting partial summary judgment. We dismiss the appeal because Mr. Jackson accepted the offer of judgment without reserving the right to appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Nichols v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al.
This is an appeal from a final judgment dismissing an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Marceline Lasater v. Kenneth J. Hawkins, et al.
A contract for the sale of a sixty-four acre tract of land provided that a vacant house on the tract and the lot immediately surrounding it would automatically revert to the seller if the buyers did not install a water line across the property within a year of the contract’s execution. The same condition was set out in the warranty deed. The buyers failed to install the water line, but the seller, a Texas resident, did not immediately attempt to retake possession of the house and lot. Five years after the contract was signed, the seller filed a “notice of automatic reverter of title,” followed by a declaratory judgment suit to quiet title and to recover damages. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the seller, ruling that the contract and the deed created a fee simple determinable and, therefore, that ownership of the disputed property reverted to her by operation of law one year after the contract of sale was executed. A hearing on damages resulted in an award to the seller of about $142,000 in compensatory damages, which included income that the buyers had collected from renting out the house prior to the filing of the notice of reverter. Buyers contend on appeal that the estate created by the contract of sale was not a fee simple determinable, but rather a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, a form of future interest under which the property does not revert to the seller until the seller takes some action to retake possession of the property. Such an interest would result in a much smaller award of damages against the buyers under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the contract of sale created a fee simple determinable, but we modify its award of damages to correct an error. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals |
