Tyson Foods (Re: Sandra Gibson) v. Tennessee Department of Labor & Workforce Development, Workers' Compensation Division
Employer filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari to challenge the order of the Tennessee Department of Labor, issued pursuant to the Request for Assistance protocol, that it provide temporary disability and medical workers’ compensation benefits. Upon the motion of the Departmentof Labor,the trial court dismissed the petition on two grounds: that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Department’s decision and that the employer possessed another adequate remedy at law under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6238(b)(6). We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lori Ann Stiles Estes v. Randy Lee Estes
The trial court granted a divorce to the parents of three minor children. The permanent parenting plan incorporated into the decree of divorce designated the mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ twin sons and younger daughter and granted the father standard visitation. The parties lived in Warren County prior to the divorce, in close proximityto the school the children attended. Two years after divorce, Father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan, and Mother moved to another county. The children all testified in chambers that they wanted to spend half the time with their father and to remain enrolled in the Warren County schools. The court concluded that there had been a material change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the two boys that their parenting be shared equally between the parties, with custody alternating weekly. The residential plan for the nine year-old girl was left unchanged. Mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that there had been a material change of circumstances, and she asks us to restore the previous parenting plan. We affirm the trial court, but modify the judgment to designate Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ sons. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Berchie Marie Wiser v. Raymond Winfred Wiser
The husband and wife had separated, and the wife then filed for an Order of Protection against the husband, which was granted by the Trial Court. The wife then filed a Complaint for divorce, which was ultimately granted and in the final divorce decree the Trial Court incorporated the Marital Dissolution Agreement which contained a mutual restraining order which restrained the parties from coming about, harassing or threatening or assaulting each other. Subsequently, the wife filed a motion in this case to extend the Order of Protection, and after an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court extended the Order of Protection for five years, as allowed by statute. The husband appealed, and on appeal argues that the divorce decree, voided the Order of Protection. We hold that the Trial Judge acted in accordance with the statute in extending the Order of Protection, and the divorce decree did not remove jurisdiction from the Trial Court to issue the extended Order of Protection. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Askia K. B.
This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. While the appellant father was incarcerated, the child was taken into protective custody because of the mother’s drug use. The mother surrendered her parental rights. The father remained incarcerated. After a trial, the father’s parental rights were terminated on several grounds, including failure to comply with the permanency plan. The father appeals, and on appeal the State waives all grounds except for failure to comply with the permanency plan. After review of the record, we conclude that this ground for termination was not established because the record does not show clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to assist the father and to reunify parent and child. Therefore, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Tiphani H.
This is a parental termination case. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of mother and father on the grounds of persistence of the conditions that required the child’s removal and substantial noncompliance with the terms of the permanency plans. Both parents appealed. The mother and father argue the Department of Children’s Services did not clearly and convincingly prove grounds for termination of parental rights and did not clearly and convincingly prove termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the child. The mother also argues the trial court erred in determining she waived her right to appear at the termination hearing. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Brittany M. A.
The petition filed by the father asked that the father become primary residential parent of the child, and that child support be set pursuant to Tennessee child support guidelines. At an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Judge granted the father temporary custody of the child and gave the mother parenting time with the child on two weekends each month. The father's obligation of child support was suspended, and the Trial Court set the matter for further hearing five months later. At the conclusion of that hearing the Trial Court determined that the mother's income was "not less than $90,000.00 per year" and ordered child support and a back judgment pendente lite for child support. The mother appealed. We hold the Trial Court's Judgment should be modified because the evidence does not support income at the level set by the Trial Court. We modify the amount downward to $52,000.00 a year and remand for the purposes of establishing child support in accordance with these guidelines. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
W. Allen Barrett v. Giles County, et al.
The losing candidate filed an election contest alleging that the election commission made a mistake byplacing the candidate who eventually won the election on the ballot. The election commission admitted iterred in determining thatthe candidate who later won had a sufficient number of valid signatures on her nominating petition. The trial court found that the losing candidate failed to carry his burden of proof and dismissed the case. He appealed. We affirm, finding that this was not a proper election contest and that a challenge to a person’s appearance on a ballot should ordinarily be filed before the election. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Angelica S.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Angelica S. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Irene S. (“Mother”) and Jose S. “Father”). When the Child was five, Mother left her with Father. Mother never returned. Father, an illegal immigrant, subsequently married Melissa S. (“Stepmother”) and made her the Child’s legal custodian. In 2009, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took custody of the Child after the Child alleged that Stepmother had abused her. The following year, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Following a bench trial, the court granted 1 the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that both parents had abandoned the Child by failing to visit her in the relevant four-month time period and that termination is in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly L. Smith v. Gary E. Mills, M.D., et al
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. The jury entered a judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Ina Ruth Brown
This appeal arises from a dispute concerning a contract to execute mutual wills. Ina Ruth Brown(“Mrs. Brown”), and her husband, Roy Brown, Jr. (“Mr. Brown”), executed mutual wills as agreed by contract. After Mr. Brown’s death, Mrs. Brown executed a new will. Mrs. Brown died. Rockford Evan Estes (“Defendant”), Mrs. Brown’s son, submitted the new will for probate. Mr. Brown’s adult children, Roy E. Brown, III, Joan Brown Moyers, and Donna Brown Ellis (“the Plaintiffs”) filed this will contest suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County, Probate Division (“the Trial Court”), contesting the new will on the basis that, among other things, the mutual wills between Mr. Brown and Mrs. Brown were irrevocable. Both the Plaintiffs and Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court denied Defendant’s motion, granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and voided the new will created by Mrs. Brown. Defendant appeals. We hold that the Trial Court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the Trial Court did have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this will contest based on this breach of contract claim. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in granting the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment after also finding that the June 13, 2002 contract to execute mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Mary Tucker v. Randy Simmons
When Father failed to pay child support as ordered, the State filed a petition for contempt against him. The juvenile court found him in civil contempt based upon his willful nonpayment. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Michael G. McCall v. Jennifer Sue McCall a/k/a Jennifer Sue Jordan
Mother and Father, the divorced parents of two minor children, filed a joint motion in the trial court to modify the permanent parenting plan. The trial court denied the joint motion and Mother appeals. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Bobby D. Green
A pro se litigant failed to pay the court costs resulting from complaints he had filed, and the Circuit Court entered an order in 2006 that allowed it to refer future complaints by that litigant to a Special Master for screening. The court’s order directed the Special Master to determine whether the court costs had been satisfied and to file a written report recommending whether the complaint should be allowed to proceed or be dismissed. The trial court was empowered to dismiss the complaint without a hearing if the recommendation of the Special Master was that the case not proceed. In the appeal before us, the litigant appealed from a general sessions judgment that denied him any relief for the purchase of a lawn mower that he alleged was defective. The Special Master’s investigation revealed that the litigant had failed to pay any of the court costs previously assessed against him and that additional costs had accrued since then. In accordance with the Special Master’s recommendation, the court dismissed his complaint. We find that the trial court acted within its authority, and we accordingly affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ashley King v. Kenneth J. Wulff
In this dispute over child support arrearage, father argues that the trial court erred in increasing the amount of his monthly payment. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Burnette, Individually and Next Friend of Sons, Joshua Burnette, and Jacob Burnette v. Joel Porter, Jr., et al.
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees on claims of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion, and conspiracy to commit that tort. Appellees were invitees, and there is no evidence that they exceeded the scope of the invitation despite the fact that Appellees had ulterior motives in procuring admission. Appellants failed to show that Appellees’ actions were objectionably unreasonable or highly offensive, which are essential elements of the invasion of privacy tort. Furthermore, in the absence of an underlying tort, there can be no conspiracy to commit the tort. Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bob Keith Watson v. Tennessee Department of Safety
This appeal involves the forfeiture of personal property seized in connection with a criminal investigation. The petitioner’s home was searched pursuant to a search warrant executed on his home. Items of his personal property were seized by authorities, and later forfeited and sold. The petitioner property owner filed this lawsuit, arguing that administrative protocols regarding forfeiture proceedings were not followed and contesting the forfeiture of his personal property. The administrative law judge held that the forfeiture and sale were valid, and the property owner appealed to the trial court. The trial court affirmed. The property owner now appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Marsha Bordes v. Julian Bordes
Husband filed a petition to modify the amount of alimony in futuro set in the divorce decree, asserting that health problems and a decrease in his income arising after the divorce constituted a substantial and material change in circumstances that warranted a reduction in the amount of alimony. Husband appeals the denial of the petition and award of attorneyfees to Wife. Finding that Husband was entitled to modification and that the award of attorney fees was inappropriate, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and modify the award of alimony. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Doyle Sweeney v. David Tenney - Dissenting in part and Concurring in part
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J., dissenting in part and concurring in part. I agree with the majority that Tenny raised at trial the defense of the statute of frauds. I also agree with the majority that Tenny is liable to Sweeney in the uncontested amount of $4,500. I disagree with the majority’s reliance on the partial performance exception to the statute of frauds as I find such reliance unnecessary. In my judgment, a writing was not required in this case under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101(a)(5) (Supp. 2010) because we are dealing with an agreement that could have been performed within one year. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Rhoden v. Donald D. Rhoden
This is an action for unlawful detainer. The property at issue was deeded to the plaintiff and his father “as tenants in common with the right of survivorship.” For a time, the father, the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s brother all lived together on the property. The father died intestate. After the father’s death, the plaintiff asked his brother to leave the property, and the brother refused. The plaintiff then filed this action against his brother for unlawful detainer, claiming that he was the sole owner of the property after their father’s death based on his right of survivorship. After a bench trial, the trial court agreed and held in favor of the plaintiff. The brother now appeals. We affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
David Dawson Johnson v. Madison County, Tennessee
Madison County allegedly erroneously mis-assigned and sold a portion of Appellant’s property. Many years later, in 2006, Appellant learned of the alleged mistake and filed suit to quiet title against Madison County, two former owners, and the then-current property owner. In 2010, the matter was settled prior to trial, and the property was returned to Appellant. Appellant then filed suit against Madison County seeking to recover his litigation expenses incurred in the action to quiet title. The trial court, however, dismissed his claims as time-barred. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Larry E. Parrish, P.C. v. Dodson, et al.
The former attorney of a client filed a seldom used “In Rem Complaint to Trace and Recover Res” to prosecute a chose-in-action assigned by the former client in payment of attorney’s fees. The funds to be recovered by this action were being held in trust by another law firm following the resolution of a separate, but related action. The former client filed an answer asserting that the assignment was unconscionable, thus, unenforceable; she also filed a counter-claim against her former attorney for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that certain provisions of the assignment were unconscionable and others were not and granted partial summary judgment to each party. Finding that the provision awarding $50,000 to the plaintiff was not unconscionable, the trial court granted a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor for that amount plus interest. The trial court also awarded the former client $10,000 in attorney’s fees upon a finding that she was the “prevailing party” in this action. Both parties appeal. We reverse upon a finding that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude a grant of summary judgment to either party and remand for further proceedings. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Doyle Sweeney v. David Tenney
Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging defendant owed money on a loan. Defendant defended on the ground that the contract was oral and the statute of frauds barred any collection. The Trial Court awarded Judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $4,500.00. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jozie C.C.
This is a modification of child custody case. Mother and Father entered into a consent order naming Father primary residential parent and giving Mother visitation. Mother petitioned the juvenile court to change custody. The court denied the petition to change custody, but modified Mother’s visitation. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Bradford v. Abe Stephens
The appellant, the former business partner of the appellee, appeals the trial court’s determination that the appellee did not breach their partnership agreement, as well as the trial court’s distribution of partnership profits. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial. We affirm the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial as well as its determination that the appellee did not breach the partnership agreement. We adjust the amount of the court’s awards to account for $5,000 of an $8,000 sale which the appellee kept rather than depositing it into the partnership account. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Wanda Leaver Williams, et al. v. Brandon Leaver, et al.
The trial court imposed a constructive trust on a six-acre parcel of real property to carry out the intent of the father that his son and daughter would divide the property. The court ordered the sale of the property and division of the proceeds. We have concluded that the more appropriate equitable remedy is a resulting trust and have modified the judgment with regard to the disposition of the sale proceeds. Otherwise, we affirm the result reached by the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |
