Maston G. Lyons, III, et al. v. Kimberly G. Leffew, et al.
Plaintiffs appeal from the denial of a second Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion. Eight months after the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute, Plaintiffs filed the first of two Rule 60.02 motions alleging they did not receive notice of the motion to dismiss their case and that they did not receive the order dismissing the case. The trial court denied the first Rule 60.02 motion and plaintiffs did not appeal that ruling. Plaintiffs then filed a second Rule 60.02 motion, asserting the same grounds as in the first motion. The trial court denied the second Rule 60.02 motion, which is the ruling at issue in this appeal. We have determined the issues presented in the second motion are res judicata because no new issues were presented in the second motion and, therefore, affirm the trial court. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals | |
Lonnie E. Roberts, et al. v. Claude Russell Bridges, a/k/a Leon Russell, et ux.
This appeal involves the enforcement of a restrictive covenant. A group of neighbors filed suit seeking permanently to enjoin a musician and his wife from using their property for nonresidential purposes. The trial court ruled in favor of the neighbors after a bench trial, prohibiting the homeowners from parking a tour bus, two panel trucks, and several employee vehicles on their property and ordering the homeowners to remove a portion of a parking lot and driveway built to accommodate the vehicles. The court later awarded discretionary costs to the neighbors. We reverse the grant of injunctive relief requiring the homeowners to remove a portion of the parking lot and driveway but affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Dana Moulton, et al. v. Delores Moulton, et al.
In this action plaintiff alleged she was injured when the roof on the deck at defendant's house fell upon her, causing injuries. Defendant denied any responsibility for plaintiff's injuries and moved for summary judgment. The Trial Court, in sustaining the summary judgment motion, held that none of the parties knew of any defect in the patio roof, and there was no evidence in the record of what actually caused the collapse of the roof. The defendant possessed no constructive notice of any defective condition causing the collapse. Plaintiffs have appealed and we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Anne Lavoie and Jodee Lavoie v. Franklin County Publishing Company, Inc.
These consolidated actions are before this Court on a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. We are asked to consider whether, as a matter of law, a plaintiff is barred from maintaining a suit against an employer under a sole theory of respondeat superior where the plaintiff settles her claim against the employee, executes a release of all claims as to the employee, but reserves her claim against the employer in a court order dismissing the employee with prejudice. We hold that the plaintiff’s suit is barred. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, summary judgment is granted to the employer, and the case is dismissed. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Joshua Cooper, et al. v. Logistics Insight Corp., et al.
This appeal arises out of a personal injury lawsuit, wherein plaintiff filed suit for injuries suffered in the course of his employment. Plaintiff's employer was allowed to intervene to assert a subrogation lien to recover workers’ compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff settled his claim against the defendants, and an order of voluntary dismissal was entered. The intervenors moved to set the case for trial, asserting that the settlement between plaintiffs and defendants was negotiated without the consent of the intervenors and did not take into account plaintiff’s future medical expenses, for which intervenors would be responsible. The trial court granted the intervenors’ motion to set the case for trial, but subsequently dismissed the intervening petition, finding that the settlement resolved all claims against the defendants and that the intervening petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finding that dismissal of the intervening petition was error, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jean Garman v. Guy Garman
This is a divorce case. Wife appeals the trial court’s order concerning: (1) the valuation of Husband’s medical practice; (2) the division of certain marital debt; and (3) the award of transitional alimony, rather than alimony in futuro, and the amount thereof. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Marshall H. Murdock, v. State of Tennessee, et al.
Petitioner brought this action styled: "Petition for Declaratory Judgment", naming the Tennessee Department of Corrections and the Tennessee Board of Paroles as defendants. The Trial Judge, responding to a Motion to Dismiss, dismissed the Department of Corrections on the grounds that it was not a proper party to challenge a parole board decision. The Trial Court then treated the Petition as a common law writ of certiorari, and held that the writ was not timely filed. Petitioner has appealed to this Court and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. Clifton Cattron, Jr., and Civil Service Commission
This is an appeal from the decision of the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission reversing the decision to terminate Clifton Cattron’s employment with the City of Memphis. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the Civil Service Commission’s decision that the City of Memphis lacked a reasonable basis for terminating Mr. Cattron’s employment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Randall C. Hagy v. State of Tennessee, et al.
A show cause order was entered in this case on January 31, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based upon the untimely filing of the notice of appeal. The appellant has failed to respond to the show cause order. The record supports that the notice of appeal was filed untimely. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Greg Lance v. Randall York, District Attorney General, 13th Judicial District
This is an appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition for access to public records under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 10-7-505. The trial court dismissed the petition upon its finding that: (1) the Appellee records custodian responded to Appellant’s records request; (2) the fee charged to Appellant was reasonable and in compliance with those set by the open records counsel; and (3) Appellant had, in fact, received the records that he requested. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Shaolin P. et al.
The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to provide support and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. Because we have concluded that the Department of Children’s Services failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father’s failure to pay support was willful or that the Department’s efforts to help Father find housing were reasonable, we reverse the juvenile court’s decision. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Bryce L.H. and Alexis D.H.
In this action to terminate the parental rights of the mother to the two minor children, the Trial Court, after hearing evidence, held that the statutory grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence, and that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother's parental rights be terminated. The mother appealed and on appeal we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Harold B. Schaffer v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Appellant was found guilty of a disciplinary offense while in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. The chancery court granted Appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari, and, finding no entitlement to relief based upon the administrative record, it dismissed the petition. Appellant appeals, and we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Tony Williams, et al. v. Tennessee Farmers Life Reassurance Company, et al.
Defendant insurance company denied benefits under policy of life insurance, alleging the decedent made material misrepresentations in her application for insurance. The trial court found the decedent did not make misrepresentations on her application, and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant insurance company appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
John Hughes, Jr. v. The City of Memphis, et al.
An MPD patrolman appealed his “separation” from employment to the Civil Service Commission. The Commission found the separation was “administrative” in nature, and, therefore, that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The chancery court denied the patrolman’s petition to reverse and/or modify the Commission’s decision, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Eric Crain v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc.
This case stems from an employment contract dispute. James Eric Crain (“Crain”) was terminated by his employer, CRST Van Expedited, Inc. (“CRST”). CRST demanded payment from Crain pursuant to a clause in his employment contract. Crain filed suit in the Knox County Chancery Court (the “Trial Court”), seeking, among other things, injunctive relief. CRST filed an answer and counterclaim in the Trial Court seeking damages, among other things. CRST also filed a lawsuit, based on the same facts and issues, against Crain in Iowa. CRST prevailed in the Iowa lawsuit before the suit in Tennessee went to judgment. CRST filed a motion for summary judgment in the Trial Court, which was granted. Crain appeals, raising a number of issues. We hold that the Trial Court did not err in granting CRST’s motion for summary judgment relying on the doctrine of res judicata. We further hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding that CRST also was entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Creative Label, Inc. v. David Tuck, Weakley County Assessor of Property, et al.
The trial court affirmed the determination of the State Board of Equalization that taxpayer’s leasehold interest in tax-exempt property belonging to an Industrial Development Board was not exempt from ad valorem taxation where the parties had executed a payment in lieu of taxes agreement under Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-53-305 as it existed during the relevant tax period. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
CNX Gas Company, LLC v. Miller Petroleum, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves a business transaction for the assignment of oil and gas leases. The parties are sophisticated in the oil and gas industry and include CNX Gas Company, LLC (“CNX”), Miller Petroleum, Inc. (“Miller”), Atlas America, LLC (“Atlas”), and Wind City Oil & Gas, LLC (“Wind City”). CNX and Miller entered into a binding Letter of Intent (“LOI”) for the assignment of oil and gas leases owned by Miller. Prior to signing the LOI, CNX knew that the leases were the subject of pending litigation between Miller and Wind City. The letter of intent outlined the details of the transaction and a closing date. On the closing date, Miller refused to close the transaction with CNX, claiming that it did not have possession of the leases. Approximately one week later, Miller entered into a similar deal for the assignment of those leases with Atlas. The transaction between Miller and Atlas was worth substantially more than the transaction with CNX. Thereafter, CNX sued Miller for breach of contract; CNX also sued Atlas and Wind City for inducement to breach a contract. Miller and Atlas filed motions for summary judgment following discovery that involved depositions. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment finding that the LOI permitted Miller to opt out of the closing. CNX appeals. After reviewing the record, we find the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. The LOI only provided CNX with the option to opt out of the transaction. Accordingly, we reverse. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Cheryl Ann Gunn v. Nicholas Graham Gunn
In this post-divorce proceeding, the mother appeals the trial court’s calculation of the father’s child support obligation. The trial court found that residential lease and car lease payments paid by father’s employer should be excluded from the calculation of father’s income for child support purposes. Finding that the trial court erred in excluding the payments from the calculation of the father’s income, the judgment is vacated in part and the case remanded for reconsideration of the father’s support obligation. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Vivien v. Keith W. Campbell
This appeal involves child support arising out of a paternity action. After paternity was established, the mother sought discovery regarding the father’s income. After protracted discovery disputes, the juvenile court set child support based on income that included the father’s winnings from gambling. The juvenile court did not permit the gambling winnings to be offset by the father’s gambling losses. After the father requested a rehearing on child support, years of delay ensued, and his rehearing request was ultimately dismissed. The father now appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand, holding inter alia, that in determining an obligor parent’s income for child support purposes, provable gambling losses may offset gambling winnings, up to the amount of the gambling winnings for the year in question. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Christine Heyne, et al. v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education
This is a common law writ of certiorari review of a student’s ten-day suspension for a violation of the Student-Parent Code of Conduct for reckless endangerment. The student was suspended by the school principal following an incident where he drove his vehicle toward a group of students resulting in injury to one student. The suspension was appealed to a disciplinary panel, then to a discipline administrator, and lastly to the school board. The suspension was upheld at each level. Thereafter, this petition for common law writ of certiorari was filed. The trial court found that the suspended student’s due process rights were violated by the failure to provide an impartial panel and that the decision was arbitrary as it was not supported by the evidence. The court also awarded the petitioners their attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse finding the student’s due process rights were not violated and that the decision was not arbitrary because it is supported by material evidence. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David Macklin v. Dollar General Corporation, d/b/a Dollar General Store #2311
This is a premises liability case. The plaintiff slipped and fell on a clear liquid at the defendant’s store. The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing it did not have a reasonable opportunity to clean the floor, warn the customer of the clear liquid, or take adequate precautionary measures upon receiving notice of the dangerous condition. The trial court granted the motion and the plaintiff appealed. Having determined the defendant effectively moved for and received only partial summary judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Mubashir Mahmood v. Maryam Mubashir
This is a divorce case. Mubashir Mahmood (“Husband”) appeals from a judgment of the trial court raising four issues, including an issue challenging the trial court’s decree awarding Maryam Mubashir (“Wife”) attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. The judgment from which Husband seeks to appeal is not a final judgment. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Elmer Elliott, Jr. v. Pearl Elliott, et al.
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding that plaintiff was ousted from the property at issue, that defendant Pearl Elliott was the presumptive owner of the property due to recordation and payment of property taxes, and that plaintiff’s suit was statutorily barred. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Caleb L. C.
This is a dependency and neglect case. The child’s mother is deceased, and the child’s father has a long history of physically abusing family members. Both the juvenile court and the circuit court, on de novo appeal, found the child to be dependent and neglected and determined that the child’s best interests were served by remaining in the custody of his maternal uncle and aunt. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals |
