Teresa Lynn Stanfield, et al. v. John Neblett, Jr., M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Cynthia M-M, Et Al.
Father of child appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to continue hearing to terminate his parental rights and subsequent termination of his rights on the grounds of abandonment and failure to establish/exercise paternity. Finding that the court erred not recessing the hearing to allow Father to be present at the termination hearing, we vacate the judgment terminating Father's parental rights and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Cynthia M-M, Et Al. - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by denying Father’s request for a continuance and proceeding with the trial on the petition to terminate his parental rights. I reach my decision based on two factors: (1) the decision to grant a continuance or to proceed with the trial was within the discretion of the trial court, a decision that will be upheld so long as reasonable minds can disagree as to the propriety of the decision made; and (2) the fact that Father was arrested three weeks prior to trial and knew he would be unable to attend, yet he did not inform his attorney until the night before trial. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tristyn K. - Concurring
I agree with the majority that the absence of any evidence of the requirements of the permanency plan[s] sounds the “death knell” for the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to comply with those requirements. If we do not know what the requirements were – and we clearly do not – we cannot intelligently determine whether those requirements were satisfied or not. I completely concur in the majority’s decision to vacate the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to the extent that decision is based upon a finding that she failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the plan(s). |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tristyn K.
This parental rights termination case was filed by Christopher W. ("Father") and Sara R. ("Stepmother") seeking to terminate the parental rights of Linsie K. ("Mother") to her daughter Tristyn K. ("the Child"). Stepmother also seeks to adopt the Child, who currently is four years old. Following a trial, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights after finding various grounds had been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Child's best interest. For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, we vacate the trial court's judgment finding grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights, and we remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Danielle Christine Reinagel vs Alan N. Reinagel
After the parties were divorced for two years, the father sought to reduce his child support obligation and change the custody of the child which had been agreed upon at the time of the divorce. The trial court heard evidence and modified the visitation schedule, but vested the mother with primary custody all based on Tenn. Code Ann. _36-6-101(a)(2)(C). He also increased the child support obligation of the father, and the father has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, A Municipal Corporation, et al., v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority, et al
Tennessee Regulatory Authority - The City of Chattanooga has appealed the decision by the Tennessee Regulatory Authority establishing a rate for the appellee, Tennessee American Water Company. The Tennessee American Water Company filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the issues before this Court are moot. We hold the issues on appeal are moot and in our discretion decline to consider the issues as an exception to the mootness doctrine. The appeal is dismissed. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Berkeley Park Homeowners Association, Inc., et al vs. John Tabor, et al
Berkeley Park Homeowners Association, Inc., and Southern Traditions Partners, LLC (collectively referred to as "Berkeley Park") filed a motion for contempt against John Tabor and Tabor Construction, Inc. (collectively called "Tabor"), seeking 1 to enforce a 2006 mediated settlement agreement governing the construction of a house being built by Tabor in Southern Traditions' development known as Berkeley Park Subdivision. Berkeley Park alleged that Tabor was in violation of numerous provisions of the mediated agreement, while Tabor contended that the parties had reached another agreement in 2007 that superseded the earlier agreement. Following a bench trial, the court held that there was no superseding agreement and that the evidence clearly and convincingly showed Tabor had violated the provisions of the mediated agreement. The court entered judgment in favor of Berkeley Park, awarding it damages of $34,042.11, including attorney's fees. Tabor appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Rob Matlock d/b/a Rob Matlock Construction vs. Regina M. Rourk
A homeowner and a contractor agreed to use mediation to resolve their disagreement over the contractor's bill for home renovations. The mediation resulted in an agreement, signed by both parties and their attorneys, which provided that the homeowner would pay the contractor $14,000 and that the parties would release each other from any and all claims. The homeowner paid $11,000, but refused to pay the rest. The contractor sued for the deficiency and filed a motion for summary judgment. The homeowner argued that she did not owe the money because the mediation procedure was unfair and because it did not comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 31. The trial court granted summary judgment to the contractor and ordered the homeowner to pay him $3,000. We affirm the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Thelma Morris vs John Morris
Husband appeals trial court's finding of substantial and material change in circumstances and modification of alimony awarded Wife in the parties' divorce. Finding no error, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Lou Gammo vs. Richard Rolen, et al
The parties were previously before this Court in an appeal by reason of an easement claim by the plaintiff. This Court ruled that plaintiff had an easement, and we remanded the case to the trial court and defendants filed a motion to determine the extent of the easement. A trial ensued and the trial judge ordered defendants to remove a gate and a fence which impaired plaintiff's use of her easement. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, as modified. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Miller Gentile vs Michael Charles Gentile
Husband appeals the trial court's order under Rule 35 requiring the parties in this divorce action to undergo a mental examination and the court's alleged reliance on that examination. He also appeals the trial court's finding that the home titled solely to husband had transmuted to marital property. We affirm the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Warren A. Hakanson, et al vs. Judith K. Holland, Trustee of the G.W. Hakanson Living Trust, et al
Warren A. Hakanson and Sylvia Harris sued Judith K. Holland both as Trustee of the G.W. Hakanson Living Trust dated November 19, 1996 ("the Trust"), and individually, seeking, among other things, to have Ms. Holland removed as Trustee and to have the Trust correctly administered. The case was tried, and the trial court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that the Trust, as written, did not comport with the intent of G.W. Hakanson, that Ms. Holland had proposed a distribution which she believed met G.W. Hakanson's intent, that Ms. Holland remain as Trustee, and that prior distributions to Mr. Hakanson and Ms. Harris should be added back into the Trust with Mr. Hakanson and Ms. Harris each to receive $247,800 from the Trust and then the remaining Trust assets divided equally three ways with Mr. Hakanson, Ms. Harris, and Ms. Holland each to receive one-third. Mr. Hakanson and Ms. Harris appeal to this Court. We reverse, in part, finding and holding that there is no ambiguity in the written Trust and that the Trust shall be distributed in accordance with its clear written directions. We affirm the remainder of the trial court's order. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Clement Homes, Inc. v. Beth Chilcutt a/k/a Beth Correll
This is a breach of contract case. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff but did not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 52.01, we vacate and remand. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Davis, M.D. v. Jackson Tennessee Hospital Company, LLC
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment. After reviewing the record, we find that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Smith, et al vs. Lane Family VIII, LLC, et al
These consolidates lawsuits involve claims by Linda Smith, Melinda Mischlich, Jennifer Hayles, and Fernando Hayles ("Plaintiffs") surrounding two homes purchased by plaintiffs located in a subdivision developed by Harry Lane or an affiliated limited liability company. The trial court granted rescission of the contracts and awarded plaintiffs their attorney fees. The trial court stated that the amount of attorney fees would be determined at a future hearing. Prior to the hearing on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, several defendants filed a notice of appeal. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Vickie P. Jacobs, Surviving Spouse of Harris N. Jacobs, Deceased; and for the benefit of herself and the minor children of Harris N. Jacobs, Deceased v. Nashville Ear, Nose & Throat Clinic et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. Vicki P. Jacobs ("the Plaintiff") alleges that the failure of Stephen A. Mitchell, M.D., an otolaryngologist, and K. James Schumacher, M.D., a neuroradiologist, to diagnose cancer in the left sinus of her late husband, Harris N. Jacobs ("the Decedent"), in May 2000 caused his death in November 2001. The trial court granted all defendants summary judgment. The court held that the plaintiff, in the face of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the element of causation. The court's ruling was premised, in part, on the court's holding that the affidavit of one of the experts was not timely filed and also because, according to the court, the plaintiff's experts gave deposition testimony that superseded and canceled out their assertions in affidavits. Plaintiff appeals, challenging the court's grant of summary judgment and an earlier order allowing the defendants to conduct ex parte interviews of treating physicians of the decedent. We vacate both orders and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Angela Brandenburg et al vs. James Steven Hayes et al
Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Husband and Wife seeking injunctive relief. Wife filed a counterclaim and cross-claim against Plaintiff and Husband alleging fraudulent conveyance, conversion, and misappropriation of assets. After a bench trial, the trial court found that Plaintiff and Husband devised a scheme to cloud the ownership of the business jointly owned by Husband and Wife and to hide assets from Wife during an impending divorce. The trial court awarded damages totaling $175,000 to Wife. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Caleb J.B.W.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her son. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the mother knowingly failed to protect her child by not immediately seeking medical care and by not immediately reporting her child's injuries to medical providers or the authorities. Therefore, the trial court terminated the mother's parental rights. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Glenda Hampton v. Northwest Tennessee Human Resource Agency
This is a personal injury case. The Appellant/Defendant's employee backed a van into a vehicle which the Appellee/Plaintiff was driving. Until the accident, the Plaintiff had not had any problems with her right shoulder. The morning after the accident the Plaintiff had pain and soreness in her shoulder. She was treated by three different orthopedic surgeons and ultimately had arthroscopic right shoulder surgery. The parties stipulated to liability. However, the Defendant disputed causation. A bench trial was held and the trial court found that the accident caused the Plaintiff's shoulder injury which necessitated the shoulder surgery. Defendant appealed from the trial court's judgment. We affirm. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Glenda Hampton v. Northwest Tennessee Human Resource Agency
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Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Cary Murphy v. Tennessee Department of Revenue
The chancery court upheld the administrative decision based on Tenn. Code Ann. _ 55-4-226(f) (2004); however, the statute was amended in a material way in 2009, during the pendency of this case, which was not brought to the attention of the court. The Department has acknowledged in this appeal that the current statute provides that a former "appointed" municipal court judge, such as Appellant, may obtain a judicial license plate. We have determined the 2009 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 55-4-226(f) provides the relief Appellant is seeking; therefore, the issues on appeal are moot. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for mootness. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gladys Davis v. Nissan North America, Inc.
Gladys Davis ("Plaintiff") filed this retaliatory discharge case against her former employer, Nissan North America, Inc. ("Defendant"). Plaintiff claims Defendant retaliated against her for filing several workers' compensation claims. Prior to Plaintiff's discharge, she underwent a comprehensive medical examination and, based on this examination, two physicians who are board certified in occupational and preventive medicine opined that there was a high risk of re-injury should Plaintiff be returned to work. Relying on the medical opinions of these two physicians, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court concluded, among other things, that Defendant had negated an essential element of Plaintiff's claim and Defendant, therefore, was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Drake L.
Mother appeals the trial court's change of custody of the parties' minor child to Father. Father appeals the trial court's determination of Mother's child support obligation and its failure to award him a judgment for child support retroactive to the date he was awarded temporary custody. Both parties contest the trial court's findings of contempt. We affirm the trial court's change of custody to Father. We reverse its finding of contempt as to Mother and the denial of retroactive child support for Father. We remand the matter to the court for a determination of Mother's child support obligation. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Dickson Housing Authority v. Ida Pearl Grimes, et al.
The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff Dickson Housing Authority in this eviction action. Finding the trial court admitted no evidence which would support the Housing Authority's allegations of amounts earned by Defendant tenant, we reverse. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals |
