Calvin Benn vs. Public Building Authority of Knox County, et al
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Billy Joe Stricklan
This appeal involves contested wills and a settlement agreement involving minors. After the death of Billy Joe Stricklan ("Decedent"), his daughter, Teresa Diane Stricklan Coleman ("Daughter"), filed two wills for Probate. Finding the first will valid would result in the entirety of Decedent's estate being awarded to Daughter, while finding the second will valid would result in the estate, minus $100 to Daughter, being divided among Decedent's greatgrandchildren. After the probate court certified the case to circuit court for a will contest, Daughter and the guardian ad litem for the great-grandchildren negotiated a settlement. These parties obtained the probate court's approval of the settlement over the objection of the proponent of second will, Decedent's brother, Reed Stricklan ("Brother"). The probate court also ordered a partial distribution of the cash assets now held in the estate to Daughter. Brother appeals. We vacate the settlement order. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Madison N.J.M.
This is a case involving the custody of a minor child, Madison N.J.M. ("the Child"). The Child lived with her mother, K.S. ("Mother"), until she was four. After 1 the Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected, she was placed in the temporary custody of her maternal grandmother, L.R. ("Grandmother"). Grandmother later sought permanent custody. A paternity suit was filed and it was ultimately determined that C.A.M. ("Father") is the Child's biological father. Soon after paternity was established, Father entered into a mediated agreement which provided that Grandmother would remain as the Child's primary caregiver with parenting time for Father. A final order adopting the terms of the mediated agreement was entered and Grandmother was granted custody of the Child. Father actively pursued a parental relationship and increased time with the Child; he later sought full custody. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court ordered a change of custody from Grandmother to Father based upon its finding of a material change in circumstances and its determination that custody with Father is in the best interest of the Child. On appeal de novo to the trial court, the judgment was affirmed. Grandmother appeals. We also affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Lara L. Battleson vs. Dean L. Battleson
Approximately 29 months after the parties' divorce became final, Lara L. Battleson ("Wife") filed a motion in the trial court asking that Dean L. Battleson ("Husband") be held in contempt because of his failure to pay child support. Wife served a copy of the motion and notice of hearing on Douglas R. Beier ("Counsel"), the attorney who had represented Husband in the divorce action. Counsel filed a motion to dismiss supported by an affidavit stating that he no longer represented Husband and that his mail to Husband had been returned undeliverable. The trial court found that service on Counsel was sufficient. As a consequence of this ruling, the court denied Counsel's motion to dismiss; it also granted the motion for contempt. Husband appeals. We vacate the trial court's judgment of contempt and remand for further proceedings. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tyler M.
At an earlier time, i.e., November 1, 2004, the trial court, inter alia, ordered Pamela M. ("Mother") to pay Gregory L. E. ("Father"), the then-custodian of their child, Tyler M. ("the Child"), a child support arrearage of $7,920 (through October 31, 2004) and prospective monthly child support of $165 plus $35 to be applied on the arrearage. Over the years that followed, several petitions were filed, the disposition of which are not germane to the issues on this appeal. On November 23, 2005, Mother filed a petition for modification based upon the fact that the Child was then in her custody under an order of the trial court. The trial court entered an order on February 15, 2006, providing that "current support is terminated because [Mother] now has custody of the [C]hild." The record contains a number of subsequent pleadings and orders that also are not relevant to this appeal. Finally, on January 16, 2009, Mother filed a petition for modification seeking "to terminate all arrearage and liquidate arrearage to [F]ather." The trial court entered an order on July 17, 2009, determining that "the arrearage balance was proper based on the fact that child support cannot be modified retroactively." The court did reduce Mother's monthly arrearage payment from $50 to $35. Mother appeals and both sides raise issues. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kay & Kay Contracting, LLC vs. Tennessee Department of Transportation
Kay and Kay Contracting, LLC ("Contractor") entered into a contract with the Tennessee Department of Transportation ("TDOT") to build a bridge in Campbell County, Tennessee. Contractor subsequently entered into a subcontract with Whitley County Stone, LLC ("Subcontractor") to provide the excavation and grading work on the project. Subcontractor does not have a written contract with TDOT. Both Contractor and Subcontractor filed claims with the Claims Commission alleging they were owed money by TDOT. Subcontractor was dismissed as a party because it did not have a written contract with TDOT, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 9-8-307(a)(1)(L). The Commissioner, however, determined that Contractor was allowed to prosecute Subcontractor's claim as a "pass-through" claim. The sole issue on this interlocutory appeal is whether Tenn. Code Ann. _ 9-8-307(a)(1)(L) removes the State's sovereign immunity such that Contractor can assert a "pass-through" claim against TDOT on Subcontractor's behalf. We conclude that sovereign immunity from such a claim is not removed, and we reverse the judgment of the Claims Commission. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Regina D. Wiser vs Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr.
This appeal concerns post-divorce modification of alimony and child support. The parties had two children; during the marriage, the wife remained at home and cared for the parties' children. The husband was self-employed through his solely owned company. Ultimately, the parties divorced on stipulated grounds, and the husband was ordered to pay child support. The husband was awarded his business. The trial court awarded two commercial buildings to the wife and ordered the husband to pay the associated mortgage. The husband was ordered to pay alimony until the buildings were paid off, after which the wife's income was to be derived from the buildings. After the divorce, the income of the husband's company increased substantially and the husband refinanced the buildings. Two years after the divorce, the wife filed a petition for modification of alimony and child support. After a trial, the trial court declined to increase the alimony. It granted an increase in the husband's child support obligation to the maximum under the guidelines, but declined to award more than the guideline amount. The trial court also declined to award the wife attorney fees. The wife now appeals. We find that the increase in the income of the husband's company was a substantial and material change in circumstances, and that the decision not to increase alimony was an abuse of discretion, and therefore modify the alimony award. We affirm the trial court's refusal to grant an upward deviation from the guideline amount of child support. We reverse the trial court's denial of the wife's request for attorney fees with respect to child support and alimony, but affirm the denial of attorney fees for the refinancing of the two buildings awarded to the wife. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Glen Cruzen vs Ayman Awad
This case arises out of the alleged breach of a contractual agreement entered by and between Appellant and Appellee for the repair and renovation of a commercial building. Appellant filed suit, asserting that Appellee had failed to fully compensate Appellant for his work on the building. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant was an unlicensed contractor under Tenn. Code Ann. _62-6-102, and that his recovery was, therefore, limited to actual documented expenses under Tenn. Code Ann. _62- 6-103(b). Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shawn Howell, Individually and as Administrator for the Estate of Jesse Franklin Browning, Jr. vs Claiborne and Hughes Health Center
This is a medical malpractice action. Appellant originally filed a claim in 2007 in the name of an estate. The original claim was subsequently non-suited. Less than one year later, the claim was then re-filed, also in the name of an estate. With permission of the court, the Appellant later amended the complaint to name the administrator of the estate as the plaintiff. However, upon the Appellee's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint finding: (1) the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations as there were no allegations in the complaint which would invoke the savings statute; (2) the complaint failed to state with particularity the specific acts of negligence; and (3) that the Appellant failed to comply with the notice requirements for a medical malpractice action found in Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 29-26- 121. Finding that the trial court erred, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Parsley vs. Elmer Price
Charles Parsley ("the plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, sued Elmer Price ("the defendant") in the General Sessions Court for Hawkins County. In attempting to allege his cause of action, the plaintiff employed a civil warrant form with the pre-printed designation, "Detainer Summons." The general sessions court transferred the case to the trial court. The trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff's suit was not a detainer action but rather a suit "in the nature of either quiet title or of ejectment." Following a bench trial on September 22, 2009, the court incorporated its written memorandum opinion into an order and granted "judgment in favor of the defendant." Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel C. Wicker, II, et al. vs. Commissioner, Tennessee Department of Revenue
Plaintiffs were assessed, and paid taxes under the Drug Tax, which was later declared unconstitutional. Plaintiffs sought refunds individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated. The trial court certified the class, and the Department filed this interlocutory appeal challenging certification. Because the Taxpayer Remedies Statute, which must be strictly construed as a derogation of sovereign immunity, does not contemplate the maintenance of a class action, we reverse the trial court's grant of class certification. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Dara Demetra Owens vs. Daniel Lee Owens
Husband seeks to set aside a divorce decree and permanent parenting plan entered by default on the ground that the provisions of such differed significantly from the relief sought in Wife's complaint for divorce and proposed parenting plan. We reverse the trial court's decision insofar as it failed to grant Husband the relief sought. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Dutton, et al. vs. Farmers Group, Inc., et al. - Concurring
I agree with the majority that, given the present state of the record in this case, summary judgment is not appropriate. As the record now stands, “[w]hether the plaintiff[s] exercised reasonable care and diligence in discovering the injury or wrong is . . . a fact question for the [trier of fact] to determine.” Wyatt v. A-Best Company, 910 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tenn. 1995). In other words, there is a genuine issue as to this material fact. At trial, the finder of fact must determine if the plaintiffs filed suit within one year of the point in time when they first knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should 1 have known that an actionable injury had occurred. Id. at 856-57. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Dutton, et al. vs. Farmers Group, Inc., et al.
Plaintiffs' home flooded and incurred severe water and mold damage when the hot water tank burst. Plaintiffs began to experience varying illnesses after moving back into the home. Despite Defendants' assurances that the home was safe, three years after moving back into the home, Plaintiffs discovered that their home was contaminated with toxic mold. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants alleging various claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint asserting that the statute of limitations barred the claims. After a hearing, the trial court agreed and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment; the trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Corey N.A., Kayla M.A. and Robert L.A.
The Department of Children's Services petitioned the Court to terminate the parental rights of both parents to the minor children. Following trial, the trial judge ruled that grounds to terminate the parental rights by clear and convincing evidence existed, as well as clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the parents. The parents have appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the trial court. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Robert E. Covington vs. Barbara Covington
In this divorce case following a twenty-one year marriage, the trial court designated Barbara Covington ("Wife") as primary residential parent, distributed the marital property, and awarded Wife transitional alimony. Robert Covington ("Husband") appeals claiming the trial court incorrectly determined that the entire amount of each party's pension was separate property. Husband also appeals the award of transitional alimony, claiming that both the amount and the length of time he was ordered to make payments were excessive. Wife claims she should have been awarded rehabilitative alimony after the transitional alimony ended. We hold that the trial court incorrectly classified as separate property those portions of the parties' pensions earned during the marriage. We also conclude, however, that the overall property division nevertheless was equitable, and so we find the error to be harmless. We agree with Husband that the amount of transitional alimony awarded was excessive and modify the award. As so modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Allen Mathis, et al. v. State of Tennessee
TN Claims Commission - This is an appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission. The Commission dismissed the appellant's claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(b) for failure to prosecute. In its order, the Commission also denied a motion to transfer the claim to the Wayne County Circuit Court for consolidation with a companion case. We affirm. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Robert J. Davidson and wife, Jeanette Davidson v. Riley Wilson
This case involves a contract for the sale of real property and a subsequent verbal agreement. The trial court found that the seller breached the contract. We reverse and remand. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. vs. Dale Penney, d/b/a DLP Construction Co.
Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. ("Hartford") filed this suit against Dale Penney, d/b/a DLP Construction Co. ("Mr. Penney"), seeking compensation for additional workers' compensation insurance premiums, as well as court costs and service of process fees. The trial court awarded judgment in favor of Hartford for $12,316 plus costs. Hartford subsequently filed a motion seeking pre-judgment interest, which was granted after a hearing resulting in an additional award of $4,823.77. Mr. Penney appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Luna vs. Roger Deversa, M.D. and Hamilton County Hospital Authority
This appeal arises from a medical malpractice claim. A surgeon performed a procedure on the plaintiff at the defendant hospital. The defendant hospitalist physician monitored the plaintiff's post-surgery recovery. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit asserting that the defendant hospitalist was negligent in releasing her from the hospital prematurely. The defendant hospitalist filed a motion for summary judgment, as did the hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment to both. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Michelle Pearson vs. Paul Jason Pearson
This appeal arises from the dismissal of an ex parte order of protection filed by Wife. After finding that Wife failed to prove the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court dismissed the order of protection and assessed the costs against Wife. Wife appeals. We reverse. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Dr. William P. Harman vs. The University of Tennessee
This appeal involves the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The plaintiff professor was a department head at the defendant university. As the department head, the plaintiff evaluated a subordinate professor. The dean of the university instructed the plaintiff to remove negative information from the evaluation; the plaintiff refused. The plaintiff was then removed from his position as department head. He continued at the university as a tenured professor. The plaintiff sued the university asserting a claim under the Public Protection Act, alleging that he was discharged or terminated for refusing to participate in or remain silent about illegal activities. The trial court granted the university's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis, inter alia, that the plaintiff was neither terminated nor discharged. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the removal of the plaintiff from his position as department head, when he remained employed as a professor, is not a termination or discharge under the Public Protection Act. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Memphis Area Teachers Credit Union v. David Jones
This appeal involves dismissal for failure to prosecute. After receiving an adverse judgment in general sessions court, the defendant appealed to the circuit court. At the circuit court hearing on his appeal, the defendant failed to appear because he mistakenly went to the wrong court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute and remanded the case to general sessions for entry of a final judgment. The defendant now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In The Matter of The Conservatorship of Donald E. Todd vs. Tonya Todd Justice
This is a conservatorship case. Appellee filed a petition to appoint a conservator for her father, the Appellant herein. The trial court granted the petition, appointing co-conservators for Appellant, and charging fees and expenses to the Appellant's funds, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 34-1-114. Appellant appeals. Finding that the record is incomplete and, as such, does not support, by clear and convincing evidence, a finding that Appellant was in need of the court's assistance, and that the trial court failed to properly follow the statutory mandates required for appointment of a conservator, we vacate and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
William Robert Lindsley vs. Lisa Whitman Lindsley
The plaintiff had filed suit for divorce against defendant and defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had a prior marriage and theirs was a bigamous relationship. The Trial Judge held that defendant had a prior marriage and voided the parties' marriage ab initio and dismissed the action. Plaintiff has appealed. We hold that under Texas law where they married, and California law where they resided prior to coming to Tennessee, they could, under the statute, enter into a common-law marriage after the spouse was divorced in the prior marriage. The disputed issue of fact in the summary judgment is whether the parties entered into a common-law marriage after the plaintiff's prior marriage ended. We remand for a determination of this factual issue. |
Blount | Court of Appeals |
