Bobby Gerald Riley, and wife, Tanya Riley, Individually and as next of kin for Hunter Riley v. James Orr
This is an appeal of a jury verdict. The plaintiff was hunting with his son. The defendant was also hunting in the general area, and accidentally shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for negligence, and included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his son. The parties stipulated as to the defendant's liability, and a jury trial was held on the issue of damages. The jury instructions included instructions on the plaintiff father's mental pain and suffering and the son's emotional injury, but did not separately address the plaintiff father's emotional injury. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff father as well as an award for the son's emotional injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The defendant now appeals. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on several elements of damages, and argues that the inconsistency in the jury instructions on emotional injury necessitates a new trial. We affirm in part, vacate in part, suggest remittitur as to the awards for future medical expenses and for emotional injury, and remand for further proceedings. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela C. Bess v. Properties, L.P., et al.
Car A was traveling north on a two-lane highway. Car B, a city police vehicle with its lights and siren on, was also traveling north on the same highway to answer a call. Car A could not pull off the road to the right to yield to Car B and instead turned left as Car B was passing. A collision ensued in which the driver of Car A suffered serious injuries. The driver of Car A sued the city. The trial court found the city 75% liable for the accident. The city appealed. We reverse the trial court's judgment, finding the driver of Car A more than 50% responsible for the accident. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
Rocky Glen Ross vs. Donna Angela Ross
This is a divorce case. The trial court granted the husband a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and awarded the husband what appears to be a sizable majority of the parties' assets. The trial court, however, did not adjudicate the wife's counterclaim for spousal support. Because the order appealed does not adjudicate all of the claims, rights, and liabilities of the parties, it is not a final judgment that is appealable of right. We dismiss. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Charles McBee vs. Patricia Anne Greer, et al.
Plaintiff was violently attacked as he was attempting to serve process on the defendant in a divorce case. Plaintiff had been employed by a law firm to serve the divorce complaint on the defendant in the divorce case and the firm had attached a written statement to the process "Be forewarned he's an ex-cop with anger issues". Plaintiff's claims for recovery against defendants were intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrageous conduct, negligent misrepresentation and negligence. The trial court dismissed the action responding to defendants' Tenn R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, we hold that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress/outrageous conduct, but vacate the dismissal of the claim for negligence against defendants, and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: Nathan T.
Mother appeals the termination of parental rights to her child, asserting that the findings of the Juvenile Court that she abandoned the child by failing to provide a suitable home, that the conditions which led to the removal of the child persisted, and that termination of her rights were in the best interest of the child are unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Christine Greenwood v. Kirby Family Dentistry, P.C., et al.
The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment in this action for dental malpractice. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles E. Jackson, III v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville et al.
The matters at issue pertain to the alleged negligence of a Davidson County probation officer and the quasi-judicial immunity defense. Plaintiff, a probationer who was arrested and detained in jail on a probation violation warrant, filed this action alleging he was unlawfully arrested and jailed because his probation officer negligently failed to recall a probation warrant after he cured the deficiencies for which it was issued. The trial court granted the probation officer's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss based on the defense of quasi-judicial immunity because the complaint asserted that she was acting in her capacity as his probation officer when she failed to recall the warrant. Plaintiff insists this was error, contending the probation officer is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because she was not performing a function essential to the judicial process and she had no discretion but to recall the warrant. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Ann Winn v. Welch Farm, LLC and Richard Tucker
This is an appeal from the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to the Appellees. After reviewing the record, we find that the order granting summary judgment fails to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, as it does not "state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or grants the motion." Consequently, this Court cannot proceed with our review and must vacate the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Christopher M., Jr., et al
K.C. ("Grandmother") filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of C.W.M. ("Father") to the minor children Christopher M., Jr. and Darius M. ("the Children"), and to adopt the Children. The case was tried and the parties stipulated that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. __ 36-1-113(g)(6) and (g)(7). After trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Father's parental rights finding and holding, inter alia, that it was in the best interest of the Children for Father's parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals to this Court the finding that it was in the best interest of the Children for his parental rights to be terminated. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Self Help Ventures Fund v. Glenna Robilio
The pro se defendant in an unlawful detainer action appeals an award of summary judgment in favor of the ultimate purchaser at foreclosure. Because the purchaser has demonstrated undisputed facts that show the existence of the elements of its unlawful detainer action, and because the defendant has failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. We further dismiss the defendant's remaining issues. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Self Help Ventures Fund v. Glenna Robilio
The pro se defendant in an unlawful detainer action appeals an award of summary judgment in favor of the ultimate purchaser at foreclosure. Because the purchaser has demonstrated undisputed facts that show the existence of the elements of its unlawful detainer action, and because the defendant has failed to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. We further dismiss the defendant’s remaining issues. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Erin McLean vs. Jason Eric McLean
This appeal arises from a post-divorce case in which the trial court found the appellant to be in criminal contempt. Procedural deficiencies by the trial court require reversal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Randall D. Kiser v. Ian J. Wolfe & Consumers Insurance Company
This interlocutory appeal considers an issue of uninsured motorist coverage following an automobile accident in which Plaintiff Randall D. Kiser was permanently injured. The plaintiff was working within the scope of his employment, driving for a towing company, when his truck was struck by Defendant Ian J. Wolfe’s vehicle. The defendant driver tendered his liability policy limits to the plaintiff and is not a party to this appeal. The employer towing company was insured by Defendant Consumers Insurance Company. In anticipation of arbitration for determination of damages and liability, the insurance company moved for partial summary judgment. The trial court denied summary judgment but granted the insurance company permission for an interlocutory appeal to determine two issues, on which we hold: (1) On a policy of vehicle insurance, the statutory requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(a)(2) for a written rejection of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits or written selection of uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits lower than liability limits is met when the insured signs an application containing a lower selection but neglects to initial a block provided for that purpose; and (2) the insurer bears the burden of proof to show that the insured signed an insurance contract application containing a stated limit of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, but once that burden has been met, the insured must raise any issue that the insurer obtained the insured’s signature unlawfully under Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(a)(2). We vacate the trial court’s denial of the insurance company’s |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Keisheal N.E. et al
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his children. The trial court found three grounds upon which Father's parental rights could be terminated: lack of mental capacity to care for the children, abandonment by failure to visit, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The psychologist who testified at trial stated that Father was presently unable to properly care for his children due to the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. The psychologist also testified that it was possible Father could become a competent parent with the proper medication and treatment. The Department, however, provided no mental health services to assist Father. The statutory ground of mental incompetency as a basis for the termination of a parent's rights requires clear and convincing proof that the parent's mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely the parent will be able to care for the children in the near future. The Department proved that Father's mental condition was such that he could not presently care for the children; however, the Department failed to prove that Father's mental condition is likely to remain impaired to the degree that it is unlikely Father will be able to care for the children in the near future. We have also determined the Department was not excused from exerting reasonable efforts and yet it failed to establish that it exerted reasonable efforts to assist Father to accomplish the goal of reunification because it provided no services that dealt with the root of Father's problems, his mental illness. For the above reasons, we find the Department failed to prove any ground upon which Father's parental rights could be terminated. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father's parental rights. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
James P. Griffith, et al vs. Jellico Community Hospital, Inc.
Employee, whose employer provided services pursuant to a contract with hospital, sustained injuries from a fall while working on hospital's premises. Employee subsequently filed a negligence action against hospital. The trial court permitted employer to intervene in the suit. Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that hospital was the principal contractor pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-113 and the exclusive remedy rule barred employee's negligence suit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of hospital, and employee appealed. We affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Dana Corporation v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
This appeal involves the denial of a claim for job tax credits by the Commissioner of Revenue. The taxpayer asserts that it qualifies for the credits pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann._ 67-4-2109 (c)(2)(A). The trial court determined that the taxpayer, as a successor to the entity that originally earned the credits, is barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 67-4-2109(e)(1) from utilizing the remaining credits for the years at issue. The taxpayer appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Harold Dean McDaniel vs. Kimberly Ruth McDaniel
In this divorce case, Kimberly Ruth McDaniel ("Mother") appeals raising numerous issues, including a challenge to the admission of a tape recorded conversation between Mother and one of her children from a previous marriage. Neither party to this telephone conversation knew that it was being recorded. Admission of the tape recorded conversation damaged Mother's credibility because, prior to its admission, Mother expressly denied making numerous comments contained in this recording. In addition, Mother's father, Homer Jerrolds ("Jerrolds") appeals the Trial Court's finding that he was in criminal contempt for threatening the guardian ad litem outside the courtroom after the Trial Court announced its judgment from the bench. Jerrolds claims he did not receive proper notice pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42. We affirm the Trial Court's award of a divorce to Father based on Mother's admitted affair. However, we conclude that the tape recorded conversation should not have been admitted and that its admission was not harmless error. We further conclude that Jerrolds did not receive proper notice pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 42. The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Leonard vs. Leo's Exterminating Services, Inc.
In May 1997, Paul Leonard ("the Homeowner") discovered termites in his home. On June 11, 1997, he contracted with Leo's Exterminating Services, Inc., to treat his home. Leo's performed the initial treatment. The contract provided for annual renewals at a reduced rate. The Homeowner renewed twice. The last renewal was on June 11, 1999, which renewal qualified the Homeowner to receive, free of additional charge, retreatment for a "live infestation" until June 11, 2000. Unfortunately, the initial treatment did not eliminate the termites. The Homeowner reported a recurrence of termites several times between 1997 and 1999. Leo's made additional treatments. In 1998, Leo's assisted the homeowner with repairs to a sagging hallway over the area of infestation. In 1999, the Homeowner switched to another exterminator who installed a "bait" system to control the termites. On July 24, 2000, the Homeowner filed this action against Leo's in which he alleged that his home had been damaged as a result of deficient treatment by Leo's. He alleged a breach of contract and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA"), Tenn. Code Ann. _ 47-18-101 et seq. (2001). In the bench trial that ensued, Leo's challenged almost every aspect of the Homeowner's case including the causal connection between the deficiencies and the damage. Leo's also raised the defense that the contract limited the Homeowner's remedy to retreatment only, and that the statute of limitations had expired on the TCPA claim. In its opinion and order, entered as the final judgment, the trial court found that Leo's had failed to control the termites and that its failure amounted to a breach of the contract; that the Homeowner sustained damages of $39,910.87 as a result of the breach; and that Leo's was guilty of willful deception in violation of the TCPA, justifying trebled damages of $119,732.61. The trial court also awarded the Homeowner his resonable attorney's fees of $30,000. Leo's appeals. We affirm that part of the judgment awarding damages of $39,910.87 for breach of the contract. We reverse that part of the judgment awarding treble damages and attorney's fees under the TCPA because we find that the TCPA claim is barred by the statute of limitations. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Spencer P. et al.
Parents in a dependency and neglect proceeding appealed a juvenile court decision finding their six minor children dependent and neglected and awarding custody to DCS. The circuit court dismissed the parents' appeal as untimely; parents appeal the dismissal to this Court. Finding error, we reverse and remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
James E. Scales v. Civil Service Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County and the Metropolitan Police Department
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Norman Redwing v. The Catholic Bishop For The Diocese of Memphis - Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s analysis of the ecclesiastical doctrine and its holding that we do not have subject matter jurisdiction of Mr. Redwing’s claims of negligent hiring and retention, but that we do have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim of negligent supervision. I must dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that, as a matter of law, Mr. Redwing’s claim of negligent supervision is barred by the statute of limitations. I believe that, in this case, dismissal based on the pleadings is premature and that Mr. Redwing is entitled to conduct discovery on facts pertinent to whether the statute of limitations is tolled. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Norman Redwing v. The Catholic Bishop For The Diocese of Memphis
Plaintiff filed an action against the Catholic Bishop for The Diocese of Memphis, asserting the Diocese was liable for damages arising from the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of a priest, who Plaintiff alleged abused him when he was a child. The Diocese moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on the grounds that the statute of limitations prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104 had expired. The trial court denied the motions. It also denied the Diocese’s motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted the Diocese’s motion for extraordinary appeal under Rule 10. We affirm the trial court’s judgment with respect to subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim of negligent supervision, but hold that Plaintiff’s claims of negligent hiring and negligent retention are barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. We reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the expiration of the statute of limitations. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bluff Springs Apartments, LTD. et al. v. Peoples Bank of the South et al.
R. L. Ayers operates several apartment complexes, some individually and some in his capacity as the general partner of the limited partnerships, Bluff Springs Apartments, Ltd., and Village Apartment, Ltd. As a consequence of these interests, he maintained several bank accounts with Peoples Bank of the South. This litigation focuses on seven of those accounts. Ayers has admitted – and in fact has pleaded guilty – to defrauding Peoples and two other local banks by “kiting” checks. It is undisputed that Peoples sustained substantial losses when the other banks discovered the scheme and dishonored checks, leaving Peoples holding several hundred thousand dollars worth of bad checks; however, the precise amount of the loss is in dispute. In August 2003, Peoples froze the accounts that had been opened by Ayers, but, with one exception, waited until September 29, 2006, to offset the monies in those accounts against its losses. Ayers, Bluff Springs and Village (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) filed this action asking for a declaration that Peoples wrongfully converted the funds in the seven accounts and violated the contracts under which the funds were deposited. The Plaintiffs also sought punitive damages. Peoples coupled its answer with a counterclaim. In its counterclaim, Peoples alleged that, after giving the Plaintiffs all credits to which they were due, it was left holding $429,300 in bad checks; it demanded a judgment for that sum. After a bench trial, the court held that Peoples only had a right of setoff against two accounts owned by Ayers individually. The court held that Peoples did not have a right of setoff against the accounts owned by the entities or the one opened in Ayers’ name for tenant deposits. However, the trial court found in favor of Peoples on its counterclaim and awarded it a judgment against Ayers in the amount of $429,221.65, subject to certain credits to be given. Initially, the trial court awarded both Peoples and the Plaintiffs prejudgment interest at the rate of 10%. On Peoples’ post-trial motion, the court cut the interest rate to 1%. Peoples appeals, arguing, primarily, that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to conversion claims bars all of the Plaintiffs’ claims. The Plaintiffs raise their own issuesincluding a challenge to (1) the trial court’s refusal to order the return of funds held in accounts designated for a special purpose, (2) the trial court’s reduction of pre-judgment interest on a post-trial motion, and (3) the amount of damages awarded on the counterclaim. We affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Haley Mariah Anderson, et al vs. Paul E. Stanton, Jr., et al
Haley Mariah Anderson and Macey Elizabeth Anderson ("the Children") by next friend and father, Mac Todd Anderson ("Father"), sued Paul E. Stanton, Jr. ("Stanton"), Hal Knight ("Knight"), Deborah Defrieze ("Defrieze"), d/b/a East Tennessee State University, University School ("University School") (or collectively "Defendants"), and the Washington County Board of Education seeking, in part, to prevent University School from withdrawing the Children from enrollment in University School due to alleged actions of the Children's mother, Treda Anderson ("Mother"). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. TheTrial Court held a hearing on Defendants' motion for summary judgment, entered an order granting Defendants summary judgment, and certified the order as final pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. The Children appeal to this Court the grant of summary judgment primarily raising an issue regarding procedural due process. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Melissa A. Stewart et al. v. A.K.M. Fakhruddin, M.D. et al.
A man receiving outpatient treatment from a psychiatrist shot and killed his wife and himself. Patient's daughter filed wrongful death actions on behalf of her mother and her father and a negligence action on her own behalf. The trial court granted summary judgment with respect to the wrongful death claim on behalf of the mother and the individual claim of the daughter. The wrongful death claim on behalf of father was voluntarily dismissed. We have concluded that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 33-3-206 does not apply in this case and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to mother's and daughter's negligence claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
