COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Charles Patterson v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
W2009-01733-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tony Childress

This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by an inmate seeking review of his disciplinary conviction for assaulting a fellow inmate. TDOC did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and the certified record was filed with the trial court. Upon review of the record, the trial court denied the petition, and we affirm.

Lake Court of Appeals

Mary Jane Bridgewater v. Robert S. Adamczyk , et al.
M2009-01582-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr., J.
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith, Chancellor
The appellee, Mary Jane Bridgewater, has filed a Petition to Rehear pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39. In her petition to rehear, she asserts the court incorrectly stated a material fact and misapprehended a material fact or proposition of law. The issue raised in the petition pertains to Ms. Bridgewater's Affidavit of Heirship, filed in support of her motion for summary judgment, and whether all of the material facts stated therein are admissible. In our opinion we held that some of the material facts were not admissible and for that reason we reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in her favor and remanded the matter for further proceedings. In this opinion on her petition to rehear, we reaffirm and supplement our prior opinion in this matter as follows.

Smith Court of Appeals

Mary Jane Bridgewater v. Robert S. Adamczyk , et al.
M2009-01582-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr., J.
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith, Chancellor
The appellee, Mary Jane Bridgewater, has filed a Petition to Rehear pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39. In her petition to rehear, she asserts the court incorrectly stated a material fact and misapprehended a material fact or proposition of law. The issue raised in the petition pertains to Ms. Bridgewater's Affidavit of Heirship, filed in support of her motion for summary judgment, and whether all of the material facts stated therein are admissible. In our opinion we held that some of the material facts were not admissible and for that reason we reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in her favor and remanded the matter for further proceedings. In this opinion on her petition to rehear, we reaffirm and supplement our prior opinion in this matter as follows.

Smith Court of Appeals

Studsvik Logistics, LLC v. Royal Furniture Company
W2009-00925-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Kenny W. Armstrong

This appeal involves a judgment creditor's attempt to enforce a Mississippi default judgment in the general sessions court of Shelby County. The trial court concluded that the general sessions court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the judgment, and it set aside a conditional judgment entered by the general sessions court based on the Mississippi judgment. The judgment creditor appeals. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Eric H. McPherson v. William E. George, Inc., and John H. Roebuck & Associates, Inc.
W2008-02450-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin

This appeal involves the breach of a real estate contract. The plaintiff hired the defendant  auctioneer to sell his home at auction. After the defendant corporate purchaser was the high bidder at the auction, it signed a sales contract and made a substantial down payment on the property. The down payment was retained by the auctioneer as his commission. Shortly after that, the auctioneer promised the purchaser that the purchaser’s real estate agent would be paid a commission on the sale. Later, the defendant auctioneer refused to pay the purchaser’s agent a commission and, consequently, the purchaser refused to close on the sale. The auctioneer retained the earnest money. The seller filed this lawsuit against the purchaser for failing to close on the sale, and against the auctioneer for breach of fiduciary duty. The purchaser filed a counterclaim against the seller and a cross-claim against the auctioneer for breach of contract. All of the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller against the purchaser, but held in favor of the auctioneer against the seller. The trial court ordered the purchaser to pay damages to the seller for its breach of the sales agreement and permitted the auctioneer to retain the earnest money. The purchaser now appeals. We affirm, rejecting the purchaser’s claim of fraudulent inducement, and concluding that the seller is entitled to damages pursuant to the plain language of the sales agreement.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Studsvik Logistics, LLC v. Royal Furniture Company
W2009-00925-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Kenny W. Armstrong

This appeal involves a judgment creditor’s attempt to enforce a Mississippi default judgment in the general sessions court of Shelby County. The trial court concluded that the general sessions court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the judgment, and it set aside a conditional judgment entered by the general sessions court based on the Mississippi judgment. The judgment creditor appeals. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Charles Patterson v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
W2009-01733-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tony A. Childress

This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by an inmate seeking review of his disciplinary conviction for assaulting a fellow inmate. TDOC did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and the certified record was filed with the trial court. Upon review of the record, the trial court denied the petition, and we affirm.

Lake Court of Appeals

Bobby Gerald Riley, and wife, Tanya Riley, Individually and as next of kin for Hunter Riley v. James Orr
M2009-01215-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell

This is an appeal of a jury verdict. The plaintiff was hunting with his son. The defendant was also hunting in the general area, and accidentally shot the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant for negligence, and included a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of his son. The parties stipulated as to the defendant's liability, and a jury trial was held on the issue of damages. The jury instructions included instructions on the plaintiff father's mental pain and suffering and the son's emotional injury, but did not separately address the plaintiff father's emotional injury. After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff father as well as an award for the son's emotional injury. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The defendant now appeals. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict on several elements of damages, and argues that the inconsistency in the jury instructions on emotional injury necessitates a new trial. We affirm in part, vacate in part, suggest remittitur as to the awards for future medical expenses and for emotional injury, and remand for further proceedings.

Marshall Court of Appeals

Effie Rivers v. Northwest Tennessee Human Resource Agency
W2009-01454-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald E. Parish

This is a personal injury case. The defendant’s employee negligently backed the defendant’s vehicle into the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had reported discomfort in her shoulders to her physician. At some point after the accident, the plaintiff reported to her physician that she had pain in her right shoulder. Ultimately, the plaintiff required shoulder replacement surgery. The plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence. The parties stipulated to the defendant’s liability, and a bench trial was held on causation and damages. Based in part on deposition testimony of physicians, the trial court found that the accident caused the plaintiff’s injury and the ensuing surgery and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals. We affirm.

Carroll Court of Appeals

Melinda Long, as Administrator of the Estate of Opal Hughes v. Hillcrest Healthcare - West et al. - Concur
E2009-01405-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that, to the extent the allegations of the complaint allege medical malpractice1, the defendants are entitled to summary disposition of that claim. This is true because the material filed by the defendants in support of their motion clearly establishes that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the pre-filing requirements of the applicable statute as it pertains to a complaint sounding exclusively in medical malpractice. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (Supp. 20092). I cannot concur, however, that the allegations of the complaint sound exclusively in medical malpractice.

Knox Court of Appeals

Melinda Long, as Administrator of the Estate of Opal Hughes, v. Hillcrest Healthcare - West, et al.
E2009-01405-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

Opal Hughes sustained injuries while in the care of defendant Hillcrest Healthcare - West, and her administrator brought this action for damages. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff's complaint was a complaint for malpractice against defendant. Plaintiff argued that the complaint was for simple negligence, and the Trial Court held the complaint was for medical malpractice and since statutory requirements for filing a medical malpractice complaint had not been met, dismissed the case. On appeal, we affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

In Re Devon W., et al.
E2009-01326-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

Former foster mother and her new husband filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the adoption of three children by the current foster parents. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.

Blount Court of Appeals

Kevin Joseph McHugh vs. Carole Ann McHugh
E2009-01391-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry M. Warner

This appeal concerns the distribution of marital property. After a bench trial, the court entered the Final Decree of Divorce and distributed the marital property. Wife subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and for attorney's fees. The trial court denied the motion in part and awarded approximately $2,087.50 in attorney's fees and litigation expenses to Wife. Wife appeals. We affirm.

Cumberland Court of Appeals

Pam Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc.
M2009-01552-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

In this action charging retaliatory discharge, the Trial Court granted defendant a dismissal of action based on its Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rule 12 Motion. On appeal, we vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Villas on Blue Mountain, L.P., et al., v. Tennessee Housing Development Agency
M2009-01250-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

Plaintiffs attempted to submit an application for Low-Income Housing Tax Credit with the Tennessee Housing Development Agency. The Agency refused to accept the application and plaintiffs subsequently sued, asking the Court to require the Agency to accept and process their application. The Trial Court determined that the issue was moot and plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's summary judgment that the case was moot.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Robert Strine, et al vs. Joshua Walton, et al
E2009-00431-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex Henry Ogle

On July 7, 2005, Ashley Strine ("Plaintiff") was injured while riding in a vehicle being driven by Joshua Walton ("Walton"). The vehicle was owned by James Rice ("Father"), who had given the vehicle to his son, Kevin Rice ("Son"), for Son's personal use. On the day of the accident, Son had given Walton permission to use his vehicle to pick up Plaintiff. Walton and Plaintiff were planning on attending a birthday party later that day. Plaintiff originally sued only Walton and Father. As to Father, Plaintiff asserted liability based on the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. Over two years later, Son was added as a defendant. An order of compromise and dismissal was entered as to Walton. Thereafter, Father and Son filed a joint motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Father summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. With regard to Son, the Trial Court concluded that all claims against him were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Jefferson Court of Appeals

Bobby R. Hopkins vs. Doyle K. Riggs, et al
E2008-02811-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

Bobby R. Hopkins ("Hopkins") sued Doyle K. Riggs and Ruth Riggs ("the Riggs") alleging, in part, that the Riggs had contracted to construct a road on the Riggs' property for Hopkins' use and had failed to construct an adequate road. The Riggs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Trial Court granted them summary judgment. The Riggs then sought attorney's fees pursuant to the parties' contract. The parties then reached an agreement with regard to attorney's fees, an agreement which the Riggs subsequently alleged was breached by Hopkins. The Riggs then filed a motion and the Trial Court entered an order granting the Riggs additional attorney's fees. Hopkins appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney's fees. We affirm the grant of summary judgment, hold that the Riggs were entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to the parties' contract, vacate the Trial Court's November 25, 2008 Order granting additional attorney's fees, and remand this case to the Trial Court for entry of an order that complies with the parties' August 6, 2008 agreement.

Blount Court of Appeals

John Skipper and Brenda Skipper v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
W2009-01786-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

Wells Fargo purchased foreclosed property, which it then sold to the Skippers. The Skippers contracted to sell the property, but before the sale was completed, two IRS tax liens against the previous owners were discovered. The Skippers sued Wells Fargo, and the trial court awarded them their lost profits from the anticipated sale. Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.

Shelby Court of Appeals

John Skipper And Brenda Skipper v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
CH-07-1599-I
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

Wells Fargo purchased foreclosed property, which it then sold to the Skippers. The Skippers contracted to sell the property, but before the sale was completed, two IRS tax liens against the previous owners were discovered. The Skippers sued Wells Fargo, and the trial court awarded them their lost profits from the anticipated sale. Wells Fargo appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation v. Ida B. Street
W2007-02553-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Arnold B. Goldin

In 1991, Ms. Street executed a note and deed of trust in favor of National Bank of Commerce. National Bank of Commerce immediately assigned the deed of trust to Troy & Nichols, Inc. In 1994, Chase acquired Troy & Nichols, and in 2003, National Bank of Commerce released the deed of trust. Chase brought suit claiming that the deed of trust had been erroneously released, seeking to rescind the releases and to reinstate the deed of trust. The trial court granted summary judgment to Chase, and we affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

John H. Key, II, and Wanda Morrison v. Carolyn Lyle, et al
M2009-01328-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Laurence M. McMillan, Jr.

Appellees, as shareholders, leased a commercial building and property from a relative. When the relative died, the property was left to numerous heirs, including Appellees and the non-shareholder Appellants, and Appellee Carolyn Lyle was named property manager. Appellees fell behind on their rent owed pursuant to the lease, but ultimately repaid the arrearage, and disbursements were made to the property co-owners. Appellants sued, claiming that Lyle should be removed as property manager, that she was obligated to declare the lease in default and to re-let the property, and that the Appellees breached their fiduciary duties to the other property co-owners. The trial court denied Appellants' claims, and we affirm.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

Joseph Kevin Adams v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
W2009-00931-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The plaintiff made a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy after his house burned. The insurer denied the claim because, after the policy was issued, the plaintiff deeded the property to his sons so that it would pass to them if he died, and he did not notify the insurer. The plaintiff sued the insurer for breach of contract. The insurer claimed that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the property, that he breached a “warranty of ownership” under the policy, that he had a duty to disclose the change of ownership after the policy issued, and that he violated a provision of the policy addressing concealment and fraud. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the insurer to pay him approximately $72,000 in accordance with the policy limits. The trial court also awarded discretionary costs to the plaintiff, but it denied the plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest. The insurer appeals, claiming that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the policy for various reasons, and that the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff discretionary costs. The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in declining to award prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court’s award pursuant to the insurance policy and its award of discretionary costs, and we vacate the portion of the judgment denying the request for prejudgment interest and remand for such an award.

Chester Court of Appeals

Samantha Mackus Knight v. James Darrell Mackus
W2009-01099-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen R. Williams

At the parties’ divorce, Mother was named primary residential parent of their minor child and Father was allowed visitation. The parties continued living together for approximately one year following their divorce, and thereafter, they exercised alternating one-week visitation for  approximately one year. Father petitioned to be named primary residential parent citing his increased visitation with the child as a material change in circumstances. The trial court denied his petition without making the findings required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(2)(B)(i). We vacate the trial court’s order denying Father’s petition, and we remand to the trial court with instructions to make the necessary findings and then to render its decision accordingly.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Laura Wilburn, as the Personal Representative of Son Jones, Deceased v. City of Memphis
W2009-00923-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles O. McPherson

Decedent was struck and killed by an on-duty City of Memphis police officer while attempting to cross the street. The trial court awarded $7,500.00 in a wrongful death award. Decedent’s personal representative appeals, seeking an increased award. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Thomas Gazley, D/B/A Personalized Planting, Inc., v. Tulsi Associates, et al., and The Estate of Howard Sexton, for decedent Howard Sexton, et al., D/B/A Precision Construction Company
E2008-02490-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge O. Duane Slone

Plaintiff subcontractor, sued contractor, who constructed a hotel for co-defendant owner of hotel for breach of contract. Construction company cross-filed against defendant hotel owner. The Trial Court, after hearing proof, entered a joint settlement judgment against both defendants on behalf of the plaintiff and based the judgment on the terms of the settlement agreement which had been entered in a prior action in a suit between the defendants. The owner of the hotel appealed. We hold the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of the settlement agreement between the defendants, and set aside the judgment against appellant and direct that the contractor is liable for all the damages awarded, based on appellants' cross-action against the contractor.

Sevier Court of Appeals