Latoya Keaton v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., And Doyle Ray Atkins
Plaintiff alleged that she was robbed at knife-point on Wal-Mart’s parking lot, and Wal-Mart was negligent in failing to provide security to protect her from the robbery. Wal-Mart filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the Trial Judge ruled due to the paucity of crimes in the parking lot, Wal-Mart owed no duty to the plaintiff to provide security where the crime allegedly occurred. Plaintiff has appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
John Doe, Joe and Jane Doe v. State of Tennessee, Dept. of Children's Services
In this action, plaintiff charged that defendant had placed him on a “secret, government maintained ‘indicated’ perpetrator list”, without affording him due process of law. The Trial Judge, responding to a Motion to Dismiss, held that plaintiff’s action was not “ripe” for determination and dismissed |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Powell vs. Community Health Systems, Inc., National Health Care of Cleveland, Inc., d/b/a Cleveland Community Hospital
We granted an appeal pursuant to Rule 9, Tenn. R. App. P., to determine the extent of discovery that would be allowed of an infection control nurse who had investigated the infectious rates at the hospital, because the investigation was prompted by the hospital’s Quality Control Committee. Defendants argued that the investigation was confidential and privileged, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 63-6-219. The Trial Court allowed discovery and we affirm, setting forth parameters of the discovery. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Powell v. Community Health Systems, Inc., et al. - Dissenting
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Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Henry County, Tennessee, Operating Through Its Adult Oriented Establishment Board v. Charles Redden, d/b/a “The Foxy Lady” and d/b/a “The SugarShack” and Roger Inman d/b/a “The Office”
In this appeal, we are asked to determine: (1) whether there existed sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding Appellant guilty of indirect criminal contempt; (2) whether the circuit court erred in finding Appellant “willfully attempt[ed] to circumvent the requirements of the Act and Injunction Order of the Court[;]” and (3) whether the circuit court erred in fining Appellant for fifty contemptuous acts when the exact number of such acts is uncertain. We affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Edward Carpenter, Sr. v. Mary Alice Bobo Carpenter
This is a divorce case. The parties had a long-term marriage and enjoyed a high standard of living. The parties then filed for divorce. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court adopted the wife’s proposal for the distribution of marital property and ordered the husband to pay the wife substantial alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees. The husband now challenges the distribution of marital property as well as the award of alimony and attorney’s fees. Regarding the distribution of the marital estate, the husband argues that the trial court overvalued his law practice, undervalued the wife’s counseling business, and failed to give the husband credit for several tax liabilities that he assumed. He further argues that the trial court awarded the wife an excessive amount of alimony and attorney’s fees. We affirm in part as modified, determining that the facts as found by the trial court were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the distribution of marital property and award of alimony. We reverse the award of attorney’s fees. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Psalms, Inc. d/b/a Kirby Pines Estates. v. William Pretsch
Appellant nursing home appeals the trial court’s award of a portion of the damages it sought from Appellee, the son of one of its residents. The Appellee had previously signed a guaranty to cover expenses that his mother could not meet on her own. At the initial hearing, Appellant failed to meet its burden of proof concerning damages, and the trial court re-opened the proof on its own motion to allow Appellant more time to produce the missing evidence. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion in so doing, and that, in the absence of the new proof, Appellant failed to carry its burden, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Realty Center New Homes Division, LLC v. Dowlen Construction, LLC
This is a breach of contract case in which the plaintiff, reflected as “Realty Center New Homes Division, LLC” (“Realty Center”), a real estate broker, sued Dowlen Construction, LLC (“Dowlen”), a builder and developer, for unpaid commissions on sales of real estate. Realty Center signed the contracts at issue in a name slightly different from the name on its real estate broker’s license. The trial court held that Realty Center is entitled to commissions, prejudgment interest, and discretionary costs. Dowlen appeals. We hold, in accord with the general rule, that the misnomer in the contracts did not render those documents invalid or inoperative where there was evidence that Dowlen knew the identity of the real party and, in this circumstance, Dowlen was estopped to deny the existence of the entity with which it contracted. We further hold that the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act of 1973, Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-13-101 et seq. (“the Act”) does not expressly require a real estate broker to sign contracts in its licensed name, and we decline Dowlen’s invitation to construe the Act to find this requirement. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Lucille Ray Heirs of Howard Ray v. Magdalene Long and Joshua (“Josh”) Todd Crews
This is a will contest. The decedent had three children, two daughters who survived her and a son who predeceased her. Two months before the decedent’s death, she executed a will that left all of her property to her daughters and some of their family members, but left nothing to any of the six children of the predeceased son. After the decedent’s death, one of the daughters sought to probate the will. The deceased son’s children filed this petition to contest the will, arguing that it was procured through undue influence. After a jury trial, the jury found that the will had not been procured through undue influence and was, therefore, valid. The son’s children now appeal the jury verdict. We affirm, concluding that the evidence in the record supports the jury verdict. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Gregg Boles v. Timothy Moore and Moore Family Medicine, PLLC
This is a construction case. The plaintiff filed an action in general sessions court to collect money that he alleged that the defendants owed him under a construction contract. The general sessions court entered a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, and the defendants appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court also entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. After the circuit court denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial, the defendants appealed. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Julie A. Bellamy v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store,Inc. and Paul Ludovissie
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial judge erred by failing to exercise his role as thirteenth juror in denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial. In support of her argument, Appellant urges this Court to consider comments the trial judge made in ruling on Appellees’ motions for a directed verdict; the Statement of the Evidence, Response, Reply, and Surreply; and Appellees’ proposed order, in which the trial judge struck certain language. Appellees, however, contend that this material is either not properly reviewable by this Court or does not bear on the issue of whether the thirteenth juror standard was met. We reverse and remand for a new trial. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter OF Derrick B.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Ethel B. (“Mother”) and David B. (“Father”) to their son, Derrick B. (the “Child”), who was 11 at the time of trial. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that several grounds for terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights existed and that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Mother and Father appeal, challenging the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence of grounds to terminate were established at trial. Mother and Father also challenge the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence was presented that termination of the parents’ rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Town of Oakland, A Municipal Corporation of the State of Tennessee v. Town of Somerville, A Municipal Corporation of the State of Tennessee in its own capacity, et. al.
This is the second appeal in an annexation case involving two municipalities. The plaintiff smaller municipality passed an ordinance annexing adjoining property. The annexation was to be effective ninety days later. The annexed property also adjoined the defendant larger municipality. After the passage of the plaintiff’s annexation ordinance, but before its effective date, the defendant municipality passed an ordinance annexing the same property. The plaintiff then filed a declaratory judgment action, asking the court to find that the defendant’s annexation was invalid because it attempted to annex property that the plaintiff had already annexed. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiff municipality appealed. In the first appeal, we reversed and the case was remanded to the trial court. The defendant then filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that its greater population gave it annexation priority over the plaintiff under Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-110. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, finding that the plaintiff’s annexation of the disputed property took place upon the passage of the ordinance after its final reading, not the effective date of the ordinance. Consequently, it found, the statute giving annexation priority to the larger municipality was not applicable because the defendant larger municipality did not initiate annexation proceedings until after the plaintiff had already annexed the property. The defendant now appeals. We reverse, finding that the effective date of the annexation, not the date of final passage, is the operative date by which a municipality with a larger population must initiate annexation proceedings in order to take advantage of its statutory priority. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Harry W. Lofton v. Nelda Joan Lofton
This is a divorce case terminating a 40 year marriage. Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s division of marital property, award of alimony in futuro, and award of attorney’s fees to Wife/Appellee. In addition, Husband/Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting Wife/Appellee’s motions to re-open proof, and in denying Husband/Appellant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm as modified herein. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kina Crider, et al. v. The County of Henry, Tennessee
This case addresses the allocation of funds received by a county from the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Tennessee Valley Authority is exempted from state taxation, but makes payments to the county in lieu of taxes. Historically, the county has earmarked these funds for education and has allocated a portion of them to the special school districts within the county. In 2003, however, the county decided to phase out the allocation of funds to the special school districts. Subsequently, the plaintiffs in this action, parents of children in a special school district located in the county, sued the county, arguing that the county’s decision to stop sending funds to the special school district violated several statutory provisions. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that the case is controlled by the decision in Oak Ridge City Schools v. Anderson County, 677 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984), and that the county is entitled to summary judgment. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Patty Brown v. Chester County School District
This is a premises liability case against the county. The plaintiff attended a football game at a county high school. She fell on the steps leading to the bleachers in the football stadium and suffered back injuries. She claimed that the step on which she fell was dented prior to her fall, and that this caused her fall. The plaintiff filed this action against the school district, alleging that it was negligent in failing to correct a dangerous condition or in failing to warn her about the dangerous condition on the school district’s property. The school district filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the school district’s actual or constructive notice of the defective condition. Alternatively, it claimed that the school district was immune from suit under the GTLA. The trial court agreed with the school district and granted summary judgment based on both grounds. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse and remand, concluding that the plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether the school district had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous or defective condition, and that the school district is not immune from suit under the GTLA. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ruthie Mae Boykin Raymond Boykin v. Rubystein Casher
This appeal involves the administration of an intestate estate. The respondent was appointed administratrix of her mother’s estate. She administered the estate with the help of an attorney. At the time of the decedent’s death, the decedent and the respondent owned a joint banking account with the right of survivorship. The respondent determined that the proceeds in the account passed directly to her upon the decedent’s death, and so she did not include it in the decedent’s estate. The respondent made a final distribution to the heirs of the estate, and the estate was closed. Subsequently, the petitioner, one of the decedent’s heirs and the respondent’s brother, filed a motion to reopen the estate. He alleged that the respondent and her attorney mismanaged the estate and violated his claimed right to a portion of the decedent’s joint checking account. The trial court reopened the estate and appointed a successor administrator. After a hearing, the trial court granted the petitioner’s claim to some additional distribution, but determined that the petitioner was not entitled to a portion of his mother’s joint checking account. The petitioner now appeals. Because all of the petitioner’s claims were not adjudicated by the trial court, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Linda Estes, Alfonzo Holmes, and Kelly Taylor
This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. The children were taken into protective custody after the mother was arrested for striking her three-year-old child in the face and fleeing from police. The children were found to be dependent and neglected and placed in foster care. After the children were removed from her care, the mother was repeatedly in and out of jail, with the last incarceration for stabbing her boyfriend in the back with a pair of scissors. When she was not in jail, she was largely unemployed and living with either relatives or a boyfriend. DCS filed a petition for termination of the mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, abandonment by an incarcerated parent, substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan, and persistent conditions. After a trial, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother appeals, arguing that DCS did not make reasonable efforts at reunification, and that the termination of her parental rights is not in the children’s best interest. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports the trial court’s holding that DCS’s efforts at reunification were reasonable under the circumstances, and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Realty Development., Inc. v. State of Tennessee (Dept. of Transportation) and American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T)
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court erred in failing to allow Appellant to proceed with discovery after the State of Tennessee filed its Motion to Dismiss, in dismissing Appellant’s Complaint and Amended Complaint based solely on argument, without any proof by testimony or documentation, and in dismissing Appellant’s Complaint and Amended Complaint in regards to BellSouth which did not file a motion to dismiss or present evidence or documentation prior to the court’s dismissal. On appeal, Appellant contends that it was entitled to proceed with discovery before the court ruled on the State’s motions. Likewise, Appellant argues that the State should have been required to prove ownership of an easement right of way over Appellant’s property. Finally, Appellant contends that because BellSouth filed only a Notice of Appearance, Appellant’s claim against BellSouth should not have been dismissed. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Express Disposal, LLC v. City of Memphis
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether Express Disposal had a legal, vested right to conduct its garbage collection business for residences in Berryhill prior to its annexation by the city of Memphis, such that Memphis’ exercise of its exclusive right to provide municipal services in Berryhill constituted a taking of Express Disposal’s property rights without just compensation in violation of Article I, section 21 of the Tennessee Constitution. We find that Memphis’ takeover of residential garbage collection in Berryhill did not amount to a constitutional taking, such that Express Disposal was entitled to compensation. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of Express Disposal’s claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lasalle Bank National Association v. Louis Hammond
Memorandum Opinion - This is an appeal from an order of the trial court granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Lasalle Bank National Association (Lasalle Bank). The appeal is dismissed.
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Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Joyann E. Butler v. James Michael Butler
In this divorce proceeding, Wife appeals the trial court’s decision not to enforce the parties’ Marital Dissolution Agreement, the trial court’s distribution of the marital assets, and the trial court’s failure to sanction Husband for failure to comply with the discovery rules. After Wife filed for divorce, the parties executed a Martial Dissolution Agreement. The trial court, however, refused to enforce the Marital Dissolution Agreement because some of Husband’s property was damaged while within Wife’s exclusive control. The trial court admitted as evidence Wife’s attorney’s statement that he would not permit Wife to damage husband’s property. We affirm that attorney’s statement was properly admissible parol evidence and the trial court properly denied Wife’s motion to enforce the Martial Dissolution Agreement. Wife also argues that the trial court failed to equitably distribute the marital assets and that the court erred by failing to sanction Husband for discovery violations. This Court affirms the trial court’s division of marital assets, as modified, and its order denying Wife’s request for sanctions. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James E. Dyer, et al. v. Hill Services Plumbing and HVAC
This appeal arises from a dispute between an employee and employer over life insurance coverage under a group insurance policy. The facts of this case are relatively straightforward; the procedural history, however, is surprisingly complicated. Ultimately, we dismiss for lack of a final judgment and remand to the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Eller Media Company v. City of Memphis, et al.
This appeal concerns the value of property taken by the City of Memphis under its eminent domain power. The condemned land was subject to a leasehold interest held by the Appellant. The Appellant used the land as a site for a billboard, which it rented to advertisers. After taking possession of the land, the City compensated the owner, but not the Appellant. Appellant sought compensation for its property interest, and designated an expert witness to offer proof on its value. The City objected to the expert’s methodology, and asked the trial court to exclude his testimony. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the expert’s methodology was prohibited by this Court’s decision in State ex rel. Comm’r v. Teasley, 913 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Without the expert’s testimony, Appellant could not present proof on the value of its property interest and accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment for the City. Finding that the trial court erred when excluding Appellant’s expert, we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Melody Young v. Donald Gregory Godfrey
This appeal involves an order entered by an Alabama court in 1996 regarding child custody and support. The trial court modified the order to require the father to pay future and retroactive child support. We vacate the portion of the order dealing with modification, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the order, and remand for further proceedings. |
Marion | Court of Appeals |
