City of Jackson, Tennessee, ex rel. v. State of Tennessee, ex rel.
The City of Jackson appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its action against the Commissioner of Commerce and Insurance seeking reimbursement for building demolition expenses under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-102-122. Finding that sovereign immunity prohibits monetary claims against the state when brought seeking a declaratory order under either the Declaratory Judgment Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-101 et seq., or the Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §4-5-225, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Madison County, Tennessee v. Tennessee State Board Of Equalization
Several taxpayers appealed Madison County’s valuation of the taxpayers’ limited partnership property to the Tennessee State Board of Equalization. The administrative law judge scheduled a pre-hearing conference, with notice being sent to the taxpayers and Madison County. Some confusion arose, and no representative for Madison County attended the conference. The administrative law judge entered a default judgment against Madison County, and Madison County timely filed a petition to reconsider with the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge took no action on the petition, and after twenty days, the petition was deemed denied by operation of law. Madison County then failed to appeal the administrative law judge’s denial of the petition to reconsider within thirty days to the Assessment Appeals Commission. The Assessment Appeals Commission thereafter issued the Official Certificates of Assessment. Madison County filed a motion to reconsider the Official Certificates with both the administrative law judge and the Board of Equalization, seeking relief under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The administrative law judge denied the motion, but the Board of Equalization granted relief and remanded the matter to the administrative law judge. The taxpayer defendants then filed a petition with the Board of Equalization, challenging the Board’s order setting aside the default judgment. The taxpayers filed a petition for review in chancery court in Madison County. Thereafter, the Board held a hearing, reversed its prior order, and reinstated the default judgment against Madison County. Madison County filed a petition for review in chancery court in Madison County pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322, seeking review of the Board’s reinstatement of the default judgment. The chancery court granted the taxpayers’ motion for summary judgment. Madison County appeals, and we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Xerox Corporation v. Digital Express Graphic, LLC
This is an appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of the lessor in an action to collect the accelerated unpaid balance of $191,945.47 allegedly due under a lease agreement for digital printing equipment. After careful review of the record, we find that the lessee failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of a dispute of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Cory O. Johnson v. Ross Bates, Warden, WTSP Disciplinary Board
This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by an inmate. Following the investigation of a homicide at the prison, disciplinary charges were filed against the petitioner. The prison disciplinary board held a hearing and found the petitioner guilty of the charges. The petitioner was indicted by a grand jury and charged with second degree murder, but the case was later dismissed via nolle prosequi. The petitioner then filed his petition for writ of certiorari challenging the prison disciplinary board’s actions at the hearing, and the trial court dismissed it as untimely. The petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. David Stone, et al.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. filed a “Complaint for Declaratory Relief” with respect to the claim of David Stone seeking damages arising out of the death of his wife, Rhonda Stone,1 who was killed by the alleged negligent driving of an uninsured motorist. At the time of the accident, the Stones had a personal liability “umbrella” insurance policy with State Farm, which provided $1 million in personal liability coverage above and beyond the Stones’ underlying insurance policies, including their automobile liability insurance policy. Their umbrella policy does not, by its language, include uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage. However, Mr. Stone argues that UM coverage should be read into their umbrella policy because the Stones did not reject such coverage in writing, which Mr. Stone says is required by the applicable statute. State Farm argues that the statute in question, Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(a) (2000), applies only to automobile insurance policies and does not impose the rejection-in-writing requirement on umbrella policies. Based upon the parties’ “Agreed Stipulations,” the lower court, at a bench trial, agreed with Mr. Stone’s interpretation of the statute. We disagree with the interpretation placed upon the statute by Mr. Stone and the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
David Luke Harvey v. Dickson County, Tennessee, et al.
An inmate at the Dickson County Jail who was attacked by another inmate filed this action against co-defendants, Dickson County and the Sheriff of Dickson County to recover damages for his personal injuries. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint against both defendants without stating the legal grounds for its conclusion. The plaintiff contends the defendants breached their duty to prevent foreseeable harm because the defendants left a mop in the jail, which was not secured or locked away, and the defendants knew or should have known that a mop could be used by an inmate as a weapon. Penal institutions have a duty to use reasonable and ordinary care to prevent foreseeable attacks on inmates by other inmates. For a penal institution to be liable for injuries resulting from inmate-on-inmate assaults, the general rule is that the institution must have had prior notice of an attack. The defendants supported their motion for summary judgment with affidavits stating that they had no notice and no reason to believe that the plaintiff was likely to be assaulted. This shifted the burden to the plaintiff to establish that a dispute of fact exists concerning whether the defendants knew of or had reason to anticipate such an attack. The evidence presented by the plaintiff fails to create a dispute of this material fact. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Holly Thrasher v. Riverbend Stables, LLC, et al.
Plaintiff appeals the summary dismissal of her complaint arising out of the death of her Tennessee Walking Horse while the horse was being trained at Riverbend Stables, LLC. Plaintiff filed suit claiming the horse died as a result of the defendants’ negligence and gross negligence. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the claims of negligence were barred by the exculpatory provisions in the parties’ written agreement and Plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie claim of gross negligence. Finding the exculpatory agreement enforceable and the evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning the claims for gross negligence or recklessness, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Josh W. Newell v. Jeff Maitland, et al.
This appeal involves a negligence action filed after the plaintiff was charged with child rape. The plaintiff sued the sheriff’s deputy and Department of Children’s Services employee who interviewed the alleged victim; the sheriff; the county mayor; the county itself; a Department of Children’s Services supervisor; and the District Attorney General. The plaintiff contended that if a “child protective team” had interviewed the victim, he would not have been arrested and charged with child rape. The trial court dismissed the claims against the state employees for lack of jurisdiction, and it dismissed the claims against the county employees pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101, et seq. The sheriff’s deputy was also named as a defendant in his individual capacity, and the trial court granted his motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Rickie B. Clayton v. Rosie B. Clayton
This appeal arises out of divorce proceedings. The parties were married for fourteen years and had two children. The trial court declared the parties divorced based on stipulated grounds; divided the marital estate; designated the mother primary residential parent and the father alternate residential parent; and ordered the father to pay the mother $200 per month in alimony in futuro. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
R. Linley Richter, Jr. v. Seymour S. Rosenberg
This appeal involves a dispute between two attorneys over a contingency fee generated from a client’s case. The younger attorney worked as an associate at the senior attorney’s law firm, and both parties worked on the client’s case. When the case concluded, the associate sued the senior attorney, claiming that the parties had agreed to equally share the fee. The senior attorney testified that the associate had volunteered to work on the case for free. He further testified that pursuant to the parties’ arrangement, if he chose to pay the associate, he could unilaterally decide how much the associate’s services were worth. The trial court found that the parties had agreed to equally share the attorney’s fee generated in the case, and it awarded the associate one-half of the fee. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Beverly J. Farmer v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., et al.
This appeal involves concurrent findings of a special master and a trial court. The bank foreclosed on property and the owner filed suit, alleging wrongful foreclosure. The chancellor referred the matter to a special master for the determination of two factual issues. The special master found that the account in question was in arrears at the time of the foreclosure, and that no payments were made that were not properly credited to the account. The chancellor adopted the findings of the special master and granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment. The owner appeals, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine Smith Bowling, et al. vs. Todd Jones, et al.
Plaintiff homeowners sued defendant residential building contractors for breach of a home construction contract upon allegations of defective workmanship and abandonment of contract. The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and awarded actual damages in an amount based upon the finding that the house was of no value. The trial court also awarded damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act upon a finding that the defendants violated the Act by willfully and knowingly misrepresenting that they were bonded. Upon appeal, we find no error in the judgment of the trial court, and accordingly, the judgment is affirmed in all respects. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
David Goff, et ux, et al. v. Elmo Greer & Sons Construction Co., Inc.
This appeal involves a jury’s award of punitive damages. The construction company entered into a contract with the State of Tennessee to widen a portion of a highway. The homeowners entered into a contract with the construction company allowing the construction company to place excess materials generated from the highway project on the homeowners’ property. In exchange, the |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Shearer Rebecca Agee v. David Steven Agee
This is an appeal from the trial court’s modification of a child’s custody due to a material change in circumstances. Mother/Appellant appeals the trial court’s change of custody of her minor child to Father/Appellee. Specifically, Mother/Appellant asserts that the evidence does not support the finding of a material change in circumstances and also raises issues concerning trial court’s reliance on certain evidence. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
William Cason v. George Little, et al.
Appellant, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a pro se petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking review of the prison disciplinary board’s findings. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon Appellant’s alleged failure to execute his petition in compliance with the statutory requirements found at T.C.A §§ 27-8-104 and 27-8-106. Finding that Appellant had failed to have his petition notarized, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Appellant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Harold Wayne Harris vs. Sherry Edwards, et al
Plaintiff brought this action to void two deeds executed by the deceased shortly before he died. Plaintiff sought to void the deeds on the grounds that the grantees of the deed exerted undue influence on deceased in obtaining the deeds and that deceased was not competent to make the deeds. In a bench trial, the chancellor held that plaintiff did not prove undue influence and that the deceased was fully competent to contract and execute the deeds. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Audrey L. Linkous, et al. v. Hawkins County Deputy Daniel Lane, et al.
This wrongful death action was brought by the widow of deceased, who committed suicide in the county jail. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to defendant County on the grounds that the undisputed evidence established that the defendant’s suicide was not foreseeable. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Audrey L. Linkous, et al vs. Hawkins County Deputy Daniel Lane, et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Linkous’s Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment. I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that summary judgment was correctly granted in this case because I believe Ms. Linkous has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether her husband’s suicide was foreseeable under the circumstances, and whether the Defendants’ conduct was reasonable. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Dottie Diana Slaugher v. Henry Slaughter, Jr.
This is a divorce action in which the trial court declared the parties divorced pursuant to § 36-4-129(b) without attributing fault to either party, divided the parties’ property, awarded Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1500 per month, ordered Husband to pay for Wife’s health insurance, and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Husband appeals the division of property, the award of alimony, and the award to Wife of her attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Bart Kincade v. Jiffy Lube
Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee’s motion for involuntary dismissal. Appellant brought suit against Appellee under Tennessee Code Annotated § 24-5-111 for damage to his vehicle’s engine allegedly caused by Appellee’s negligent performance of an engine flush procedure. Following Plaintiff/Appellant’s proof, the trial court granted an involuntary dismissal in favor of Defendant/Appellee. Appellant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nicole Loren Baker, et al. v. Virginia Louise Smith
Petitioners, Father and his wife, filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment for failure to pay child support, persistence of conditions, and severe child abuse, and for adoption of child by Father’s wife. The trial court granted Mother’s motion for directed verdict at the close of Petitioners’ proof and dismissed the petition. Petitioners appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
O’Rane M. Cornish, Sr. v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc.
This appeal involves the lower court’s dismissal of a case on the basis of forum non conveniens. The plaintiff, a resident of Shelby County, brought suit in circuit court in Shelby County. The plaintiff alleged that he drank a glass of cranberry juice that contained a dead fly at one of the defendant’s restaurants, located in Tunica County, Mississippi. From that incident, the plaintiff alleges that he suffered emotional and physical harm. The defendant’s answer requested that the court dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens, contending that the more appropriate forum was a circuit court in Tunica County, Mississippi. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the claim on the basis of forum non conveniens. After the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, the trial court entered an order denying the motion and setting out its findings concerning its decision to decline jurisdiction. The plaintiff appeals, and we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Williams Rogers, M.D. v. State Volunteer Mutual Insurance Company
This case involves an endorsement to a medical malpractice insurance policy. The physician insured under the policy brought a declaratory judgment action seeking rescission of the endorsement based upon a mutual mistake of fact. We affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing the physician’s case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Brian E. Harris, M.D. v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company, et al.
Dr. Brian E. Harris (“Doctor”), the insured, brought this action for breach of contract and on the basis of various torts. He alleged that UnumProvident Corporation (“Insurance Company” or “the company”) had wrongfully canceled his disability policy and retroactively rejected his disability claim. The trial court granted Insurance Company summary judgment. The court found that Doctor had filed his suit outside the applicable limitations periods. Doctor appeals, claiming that his suit |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Donald W. McCuthcheon, et al vs. TND Associates, L.P., et al
A jury awarded the plaintiff homeowners judgment against their residential building contractor for damages sustained by the plaintiffs when the slope upon which their home was constructed failed. The defendant contractor appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing an expert witness to testify outside his area of expertise and by allowing another witness to testify as an expert when the plaintiff had failed to identify him as a witness before trial. Upon careful review of the record, it is our determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of the testimony of these witnesses. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Appeals |
