Bridgett Hill, et al v. NHC Healthcare/Nashville, LLC, et al
The administrators of the estate of a woman who died after being transported by ambulance from a nursing home to a hospital filed a wrongful death suit which named the nursing home and the ambulance service as defendants. The nursing home responded with a motion to compel arbitration, citing a provision in the admissions agreement which the decedent had signed, requiring both parties to submit any disputes to arbitration and to waive their rights to jury trial. The trial court found the arbitration clause to be unconscionable and denied the motion. The nursing home then filed a direct appeal to this court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-5-319. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Bridgett Hill, et al v. NHC Healthcare/Nashville, LLC, et al - Concurring
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of S.H.
Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to his three-year old daughter. Based upon the record that included persistent violent behavior directed at the child’s mother, we conclude the trial court did not err in terminating Father’s rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Carson v. Waste Connections of Tennessee, Inc.
This is the second appeal of a damage award for negligence. The plaintiff owned a house with a detached carport. During a delivery, the defendant company’s driver backed the delivery truck into one of the four columns supporting the carport structure, causing it to partially collapse. The plaintiff homeowner filed a lawsuit against the defendant company, alleging negligence and seeking damages. Liability was conceded and a trial proceeded on the amount of damages. There was disputed testimony on the condition of the roof structure of the carport before the defendant’s driver hit it. After the trial, the trial court found that the carport did not have a “roof” at the time of the accident, and so it deducted the cost of the “roof” of the carport from the damage award. The defendant company appealed. In the first appeal, we found that the record did not clearly indicate the trial court’s findings underlying the award of damages, and remanded the case for clarification. On remand, the trial court explained its damage award. The defendant company appeals again in light of the trial court’s clarification of the record. Finding that the preponderance of the evidence does not weigh against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
John Hohman v. James A. Town, et al.
This application for an extraordinary appeal concerns whether a trial court should consider matters outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(2) and (3). The trial court declined to consider matters outside the pleadings and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because the trial court should have considered the affidavits and other documents submitted by the parties in support of and in opposition to the motion to dismiss, we grant the application, vacate the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the motion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Lee Hayes v. Gibson County, Tennessee
This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action in which Plaintiff sought a declaration of his rights under Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-24-102 as amended in 2001. Plaintiff asserted that the 2001 amendments to the general statute repealed by implication a 2000 private act establishing the compensation of the Gibson County Juvenile Court Clerk. The trial court determined the amendments to the statute superseded the private act, and that the salary for the juvenile court clerk should be established according to Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-24-102 as amended in 2001. We reverse. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Don Drake et al. v. Jana M. Williams, M.D., et al.
The parents of a young man who committed suicide after being discharged from a psychiatric hospital sued the hospital and the treating psychiatrist for wrongful death. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the basis that the decedent’s act of suicide was an intervening, superseding cause. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert A. Ward and wife, Sally Ward v. City of Lebanon, Tennessee; City of Lebanon Gas Department; James N. Bush Construction, Inc.; Foster Engineering & Energy, Inc. & Water Management Services, LLC
Plaintiff, while excavating, struck a gas line which resulted in an explosion and fire, seriously injuring plaintiff. Plaintiffs brought this action against several defendants and the case went to trial against the City of Lebanon and Bush Construction Company, Inc. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and allocated percentages of fault as to both defendants and the plaintiff. The Trial Court entered Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and defendants appealed. We reverse the Trial Court Judgment and remand for a new trial on the grounds that a part of the charge to the jury was erroneous. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Janice Taylor, et al v. Jack Edward Taylor, et al
Two children of the late Bertie M. Taylor filed this action against two of their siblings, attorneys-in-fact for Ms. Taylor, to set aside a quitclaim deed conveying land of their mother executed through the use of a durable power of attorney. Plaintiffs alleged that the power of attorney was invalid due to Bertie Taylor’s lack of mental capacity; that the quitclaim deed was invalid because it contained the signature of only one of the attorneys-in-fact; and that the Defendants breached their confidential relationship with Ms. Taylor by engaging in self-dealing and/or undue influence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Hoyt on the issues of Ms. Taylor’s mental capacity and the required number of signatures on the quitclaim deed; and granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the issues of Defendants’ violation of their duties as attorneys-in-fact, violation of the confidential relationship and Defendant Jack Taylor’s undue influence of Ms. Taylor. The Court declared the quitclaim deed void and vested each Plaintiff with a one-fifth interest in the property. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the issues of Ms. Taylor’s mental capacity, Defendants’ violation of their duties as attorneys-in-fact and violation of the confidential relationship; we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue of Defendant Jack Taylor’s undue influence; we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue of the required number of signatures on the deed; and we affirm the relief granted Plaintiffs by the trial court. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Progress Printing Company, Inc. v. Reliable Printing & Graphic Design, Inc.
Progress Printing Company, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Sevier County, Tennessee (“Trial Court”) seeking to domesticate a foreign judgment obtained in Virginia against Reliable Printing & Graphic Design, Inc. (“Defendant”). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming, in part, that the Virginia court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant and, therefore, the Virginia judgment is void. The Trial Court entered an order on June 7, 2007, inter alia, denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the petition, and granting Plaintiff’s petition to domesticate the Virginia judgment. Defendant appeals to this Court. We affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss the petition, vacate that portion of the Trial Court’s order granting Plaintiff’s petition to domesticate the Virginia judgment, and remand to the Trial Court for further proceedings. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Billie Martin v. Gregory Kalmon
This Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) case was dismissed by the Trial Court after it concluded that it lost subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with this case once a voluntary dismissal was taken in the initiating tribunal in Maryland. The Trial Court concluded that the present case also must be dismissed because there had been at least two previous voluntary dismissals and the dismissal by the Maryland tribunal operated to bar the present case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(2). We hold that the Trial Court retained subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the voluntary dismissal of the petition by the initiating tribunal. We further conclude that the present case is not barred by the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(2). Accordingly, the judgment of the Trial Court is vacated and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of R. R. B.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her nine-year-old child. Her parental rights were terminated on several grounds, including abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plan, failure to remedy persistent conditions, and mental incompetence. The trial court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights based upon Mother’s failure to remedy persistent conditions and the best interest of the child. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
William C. Holcomb And Holcomb Company v. Edgar Cagle, Jr.
In this action for termination of lease and damages due to alleged breaches, the Trial Court terminated the lease and awarded damages. On appeal, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel Katrina Weeks, vs. Christopher D. Kirkland, In Re: Minor Child: Kyle Weeks, d.o.b. 7/16/96
The Trial Court entered Judgment for back child support, but barred the State from enforcing the Judgment though passport denial. We reverse the Trial Court. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Paul David Franklin v. Sherry A. B. Franklin, et al.
After nineteen years of marriage, Paul David Franklin (“Husband”) sued Sherry A.B. Franklin (“Wife”) for divorce. Gary Freeman (“Freeman”) was granted leave to intervene in the suit to establish the paternity of the younger of the two minor children (“J.A.F.”) born during the Franklins’ marriage. After a trial, the Trial court entered a Final Decree of Divorce, inter alia, granting Husband a divorce; holding that Freeman is the biological father of J.A.F., but that Husband is the legal father; distributing the marital property; and awarding primary residential custody of both minor children to Husband with Wife to have co-parenting time. Wife filed a motion to alter or amend. The Trial Court entered an order altering its decision in light of the then just released Tennessee Supreme Court opinion in In Re: T.K.Y., and terminating Freeman’s parental rights to J.A.F. on the grounds found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1). Wife and Freeman appeal to this Court raising issues regarding the termination of Freeman’s parental rights to J.A.F., the custody of J.A.F., and distribution of the marital property. We reverse the termination of Freeman’s parental rights to J.A.F., reverse the Trial Court’s order granting custody of J.A.F. to Husband, vacate that portion of the Trial Court’s order distributing the marital home, and remand this case to the Trial Court to effectuate the custody transfer of J.A.F. to Wife and for an overall equitable distribution of the marital property in light of our decision in this case. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Altice v. Nats, Inc. et al.
Plaintiff sued defendants to collect a judgment against a defunct nonprofit corporation, claiming defendants were the alter egos of the defunct corporation. The trial court declined to add a fourth defendant and granted summary judgment against the plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals both decisions of the trial court. We affirm in part and reverse in part the grant of summary judgment and reverse the decision not to add the fourth defendant. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
PDQ Disposal, Inc. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville-Davidson County
A corporation providing garbage collection services under a contract with Metropolitan Nashville brought suit seeking reimbursement for waste disposal fees allegedly due under the contract. After a trial, the chancellor found in favor of the disposal company and awarded it damages for breach of contract. Metro appeals the court’s interpretation of the contract. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Packers Supply Co. v. Eric H. Weber et al.
A corporation filed suit against two of its former employees for violating the terms of a non-compete agreement. The defendants argued that the agreement was rendered unenforceable by changes in the structure of the business and their relationship to it after the agreement was executed. The business was originally a sole proprietorship, and the defendants worked for it as independent contractors. Several years later, the business was chartered as a corporation, but with no change in its ownership or in its day-to-day operations. The defendants became employees of the corporation while keeping the same compensation, working conditions and duties as before. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employees, ruling that the corporation had no standing to sue because it was not a party to the original agreement. We reverse, because the non-compete agreement was assigned to the corporation by operation of law. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
MS Holdings, LLC v. Larry Malone
The Chancery Court of Shelby County entered judgment on an appraiser’s report of the value of a dissenter’s shares in MS Holdings LLC. The Court also assessed attorneys’ fees and costs against the dissenter. On appeal, the dissenter asserts that the appraiser failed to take into account the value attributable to MS Holdings’ imminent future plans and that the Court erred in assessing attorneys’ fees and costs against him. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Barry D. Smith v. Tamara Yvette Smith - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Dr. Victor A. Pestrak’s report was properly admitted and that this Court’s interpretation of Rule 706 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence in Dover v. Dover, 821 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), is too rigid. I submit that the majority's decision ignores the strict requirements of Rule 706 and opens the door for abuse of that rule. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Barry D. Smith v. Tamara Y. Smith
This appeal involves a dispute regarding the residential schedule for a twelve-year-old child. In the divorce proceeding filed in the Chancery Court for Sumner County, the trial court, at the parties’ request, appointed a psychologist to examine the parties and their child and to report his findings and conclusions to the court and the parties. After the psychologist completed and filed his reports, the trial court and the parties used them to fashion interim visitation orders. Despite the earlier use of the reports, the mother objected to the use of the reports at trial on the ground that she had not been afforded an opportunity to depose the psychologist. The trial court overruled the objection. After receiving the testimony of the parties and their child, the court designated the father as the primary residential parent and fashioned a residential schedule accordingly. On this appeal, the mother asserts that the trial court erred by (1) admitting and considering the psychologist’s report, (2) designating the father as the primary residential parent, and (3) declining to award her attorney’s fees. We have determined that the wife waived her opportunity to object to the introduction of the psychologist’s reports. We have also determined that the evidence presented at the trial is, by itself, sufficient to support the trial court’s designation of the father as the primary residential parent and that the trial court did not err by denying the mother’s request for attorney’s fees. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kala Dean And Lexie M. Dean v. Weakley County Board of Education
This is a negligence case. The plaintiff, a female high school student, was being verbally harassed by a male student. The plaintiff complained repeatedly to a school administrator, who assured her that he would take care of the situation. The male student’s taunts did not stop and he threatened to beat up the plaintiff. The school administrator was told about the threat and took no action. Subsequently, in the school hallway, a confrontation between the male student and the female plaintiff resulted in the male student punching the plaintiff in the face and causing serious injuries. A lawsuit was filed on behalf of the female student against the high school board of education. The trial court denied the school board’s motion for summary judgment, and the case was tried. The trial court found for the plaintiff, awarding damages and medical expenses. The school board argued that the award should be reduced under comparative fault principles, but the trial court declined to do so because it found that the male student was the instigator. The school board appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment, by not holding that the school board was immune under the public duty doctrine, by allocating no fault to the plaintiff, by not appropriately weighing judicial admissions of fault by the plaintiff, and by applying the clear and convincing evidence standard to determine whether the school board had established comparative fault. We affirm, finding that the denial of the summary judgment motion is not appealable after a trial on the merits, that the public duty doctrine is not applicable, that the trial court found that the male student was the instigator under the preponderance of the evidence standard, and that the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s decision, even considering the plaintiff’s judicial admissions. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of M. L. P. - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case, on the grounds that the proof does not support a finding of willful abandonment by the Father.1 Specifically, there is no evidence that the Father was aware of his duty to visit, a necessary element of willfulness. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of M. L. P.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate a father’s parental rights that was filed by the child’s great aunt, great uncle, and another couple who would like to adopt the child. The juvenile court dismissed the petition upon finding that the father did not willfully abandon the child. The court |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, v. Kent Cherry,et al.
In this appeal we must determine whether an injured party was a “farm employee” within the meaning of a farm owner’s liability insurance policy. The alleged employee is the farm owner’s father. He was grinding corn to feed the farm owner’s cattle when he was injured. The father and his wife filed suit against the son and his wife seeking to recover damages as a result of the accident. The son’s farm owner’s liability policy provided coverage for occurrences to “farm employees” in certain instances. The insurer filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the insureds because the father was not a farm employee. The trial court held that the father was a farm employee and ordered the insurer to defend and indemnify the insureds in the underlying lawsuit. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals |
