Ahmad Suleiman d/b/a Barksdale Market v. City Of Memphis Alcohol Commission
Following a trial de novo on writ of certiorari, the trial court reversed the City of Memphis Alcohol Commission’s denial of a beer permit, ruling that the evidence did not support a finding that the sale of beer from the applicant’s market would interfere with the public health, safety, and morals. It ordered the City of Memphis to issue a beer license to the applicant. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Martha Valentine v. Raymond Hobson
Pro se Appellant filed suit against Appellee Landlord for damages following a forcible entry and detainer. Appellant appealed the decision of the general sessions court to the Circuit Court at Fayette County. The circuit court found that Appellant had failed to meet her burden of proof and dismissed the appeal. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Golden v. Terry Murrell
Father and Mother are parents of a minor child born out of wedlock. After Mother regained custody of child, she petitioned the trial court for prospective and retroactive child support and medical insurance. Father also petitioned for retroactive child support. The juvenile referee set prospective child support and ordered Father to provide medical insurance for the child, but reserved the issue of retroactive child support pending the parties’ submission of their past years’ financial records. After multiple continuances and Father’s apparent unwillingness to comply with trial court’s discovery order, the Referee dismissed both parties petitions. A special judge affirmed. Father appealed and Mother cross-appealed. We remand the cause to the trial court to issue a ruling that contains a basis for the dismissal and for a determination of whether the trial court intended for its dismissal to serve as a denial of the parties’ petition for retroactive child support. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: JQW (D.O.B. 03/05/00) and LKW (D.O.B. 01/12/05)
This is a termination of parental rights case. On June 19, 2007, the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Madison County to terminate the parental rights of Nikia Kiwan Long (“Mother”) and Terry Lowvall Woods (“Father”) to their minor children, JQW, born March 2000, and LKW, born January 2005. In its petition, DCS asserted the statutory grounds of abandonment, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and persistence of conditions leading to the children’s removal from the home. Following a hearing on December 11, 2007, the trial court entered separate orders terminating Father’s rights and terminating Mother’s rights based on abandonment for failure to support, persistence of conditions that prevented the children’s return to Mother, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Only Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Lloyd M. Pegues v. Illinois Central Railroad Company
Plaintiff failed to comply with the trial court’s discovery order to produce two witnesses for deposition within forty-five days, and Defendant moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.02. Plaintiff appeals, asserting the trial court abused its discretion where there was no evidence of willful or dilatory conduct by Plaintiff. We vacate and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: B.R.W., et al.
The mother of five children appeals the termination of her parental rights. The juvenile court terminated mother’s rights on the ground of severe child abuse due to her failure to protect the children from sexual abuse by her husband. The court also found that terminating her parental rights was in all five children’s best interests. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby J. Burgess v. Kone, Inc.
A state maintenance worker was injured while cleaning water out of an elevator pit in the Legislative Plaza. The worker sued the contractor that provided elevator maintenance and repair services to the state. He claimed that the contractor was responsible for his injuries because the contractor violated its contract with the state by refusing to remove the water from the elevator pit and because it was negligent in not locking down the elevator when its employee knew people would be working in the pit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the contractor. The worker appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen E. DePasquale, M.D. v. Donald H. Chamberlain, M.D., et al.
Stephen E. DePasquale, M.D. (“Plaintiff”) was employed by Chattanooga Gyn-Oncology, LLC. Plaintiff’s employment was terminated in August 2006. The parties entered into a negotiated settlement agreement (the “Agreement”), whereby Plaintiff was to receive $49,500 in severance pay, conditioned upon his abiding by the terms of the Agreement. The Agreement also provided that if either party defaulted, the non-defaulting party was entitled to attorney fees if suit was filed to enforce the terms of the Agreement. When Plaintiff did not receive payment, he filed this suit to enforce the terms of the Agreement and sought damages in the amount of $49,500, plus interest and attorney fees. Donald H. Chamberlain, M.D. and Chattanooga Gyn-Oncology, LLC (“Defendants”) claimed Plaintiff had breached the terms of the Agreement and was not entitled to any severance pay. Defendants also sought an award of attorney fees. Following a trial, the Trial Court determined that Plaintiff had breached the Agreement and was not entitled to any severance pay. The Trial Court further determined that Defendants were not entitled to an award of attorney fees. Defendants appeal claiming the Trial Court erred when it refused to award them attorney fees. Plaintiff raises a separate issue, claiming that the Trial Court erred when it determined that he had breached the Agreement. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment against Plaintiff, and remand for the entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff for $49,500, plus attorney fees to be determined by the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Stafford Shell vs. Jon E. Shell
The plaintiff wife filed a Complaint for Divorce. The parties entered into a mediation which resulted in all issues being resolved in a mediated settlement, and the Final Report of the mediator was filed in Court. The plaintiff then voluntarily nonsuited her action for divorce, and refiled on the same date in Circuit Court. The Trial Court ultimately set aside the nonsuit, tried the issues raised, approved the mediated settlement and granted the parties a divorce. On appeal, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Pierre Pons, et al v. Barry Harrison d/b/a B. Harrison Housewrights
Defendant Homebuilder left plaintiff Homeowners’ job site before completing construction of their residence. Homebuilder appeals the chancery court’s confirmation of an adverse arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by refusing to enforce a provision of the contract that would have rendered the plaintiff Homeowners’ suit time barred. The limitation provision applied to suits for defective improvements to real estate. The gravamen of this breach of contract action was partial performance, not defective performance. Further, the arbitrator awarded to Homeowners the cost to complete the construction plus interest, attorney’s fees, and arbitration costs. Finding that the limitation period does not apply to this action, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Patty J. Cheatwood v. Crystal D. Curle And Bud Davis Lincoln Mercury, LLC
This appeal concerns the scope of an employer’s liability for its employee’s allegedly negligent operation of a motor vehicle owned by the employer. In this case both the employer and the employee were sued after the employee became involved in an automobile accident with another motorist. Arguing that there was no basis for holding it vicariously liable for any negligence on the part of its employee, the employer moved the trial court for summary judgment. The employer’s motion was granted. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Chris Cagle v. Mark J. Hybner, et al.
The plaintiff, a songwriter and recording artist, filed this action against his manager and publisher seeking a declaration that the Exclusive Management Agreement and the Exclusive Songwriter Agreement were invalid and unenforceable due to various alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and breaches of contract. The defendants filed Counterclaims seeking a declaration that the Management Agreement and the Songwriter Agreement were valid, and that they sought to recover damages and attorney’s fees. The music publisher additionally sought specific performance of the Songwriter Agreement and an injunction to prevent the songwriter from composing any songs for others until the plaintiff fulfilled his obligation to the publisher. The Chancellor summarily dismissed the plaintiff’s Complaint. The Chancellor also summarily ruled that the Management Agreement and the Songwriter Agreement were valid and enforceable, that the plaintiff was in material breach of both agreements. As for the Songwriter Agreement, the Chancellor found that the plaintiff was obligated to compose and deliver to the publisher an additional 76 songs of marketable commercial quality, for which the publisher was granted equitable relief in the form of specific performance as well as injunctive relief, whereby the plaintiff was enjoined from composing any songs for others until the songwriter fulfilled his obligation to the publisher. The defendants were also awarded $737,201 in damages, which included an award of attorneys fees of $171,704. The plaintiff appealed presenting numerous issues. We affirm the Chancellor’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s Complaint. We also affirm the Chancellor’s determination that the Management Agreement and the Songwriter Agreement were valid and enforceable and that the plaintiff was in material breach of both agreements for which the defendants are entitled to recover damages. We, however, have determined the Chancellor erred by granting the publishing company extraordinary equitable relief in the form of specific performance and injunctive relief under the Songwriter Agreement. Because of our decision concerning specific performance and injunctive relief, each of which are factors to consider when determining the amount of attorney’s fees the defendants may be entitled to recover, we find it necessary to vacate the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $171,704 and remand the issue, along with the issue of damages and other relief, if any, to which the defendants may be entitled. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Thornton, et al. v. Allenbrooke Nursing and Rehabilitation Center LLC, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute over an arbitration agreement, and stems from a nursing home abuse and neglect case. The decedent’s daughter signed all the paperwork associated with the decedent’s admission to the nursing home. An arbitration agreement was included in the admissions agreement. Decedent’s daughter, as next of kin, filed a complaint alleging nursing home abuse and neglect. The nursing home moved to stay the case and compel the matter to arbitration. The trial court held that daughter did not have authority to waive decedent’s constitutional right to a jury trial, and denied the nursing home’s motion. The nursing home appeals. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel Venessa Moore v. Michael Steven Moore
Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s modification of child support. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in setting support based upon eighty days of visitation as set out in Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg. 1240-2-4-.04(7)(a) rather than the 182.5 days used for fifty/fifty parenting situations as contemplated in Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg. 1240-2-4-.02(12). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Francis Roy, M.D. vs. The City of Harriman, et al. - Concurring
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Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Francis Roy, M.D. vs. The City of Harriman, et al.
This cause of action arises out of statements made by Dr. William E. Bennett to PHP Companies, Inc. (“PHP”), a health insurance company, regarding Dr. Francis Roy. Dr. Roy alleges that, in connection with PHP’s review of Dr. Roy’s application to become an approved PHP provider, Dr. Bennett made written statements that reflected poorly on Dr. Roy’s work history and qualifications. Dr. Roy claims that these statements were false and defamatory. In response to Dr. Roy’s complaint, Dr. Bennett filed a motion for summary judgment, contending, among other things, that the document containing the allegedly defamatory statements is privileged and inadmissible under the Tennessee Peer Review Law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219 (2004). The court granted Dr. Bennett’s motion. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Kenneth Allen Barbee v. Sherry Rosette Barbee
The State of Tennessee, acting on behalf of a father, filed a petition for contempt against the mother of the parties’ three minor children for her failure to pay child support. Following the contempt hearing, the trial court found the mother “might be slightly mentally retarded” but that she had the ability to pay and willfully failed to pay child support on eighteen occasions. Finding her guilty of criminal contempt, the trial court sentenced the mother to 180 days in jail. The mother appeals, contending the State failed to present sufficient evidence that she had the ability to pay child support and failed to present sufficient evidence that her failure to pay was willful. Finding the evidence in the record insufficient to prove that the mother had the ability to pay the amount of support as ordered and that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the mother’s failure to pay child support was willful, we reverse the trial court’s finding of criminal contempt. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Keymon Adams v. Anthony D. Adams
This is a divorce case. The parties began living together in 1998, and married in 2004. Some time before the marriage, the parties purchased a residential lot on which they constructed a home, financing the construction with a credit card in the wife’s name. Title to the home was in the wife’s name alone. The husband performed manual labor on the lot and the home during and after the construction. During the marriage, the parties operated a business that proved unsuccessful. The wife eventually left to start her own business in a different field. At approximately the same time, the wife filed for divorce. A trial ensued. The parties introduced evidence on the value of the home, various items of personal property, and a significant amount of credit card debt. After the close of the evidence, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife, and awarded the home and the debt associated with the home to her. It ordered the sale of some property and application of the proceeds to the parties’ debt. The remaining debt was not classified as marital or separate and was not divided. The parties appeal. The husband argues that the trial court erred in not awarding him a share of the parties’ business and the increase in value of the marital home. The wife argues that the trial court erred in failing to designate the assets and debts as marital or separate and to divide them between the parties. We affirm the trial court’s decision not to award the Husband a share of the failed business or a share of the increase in value of the parties’ home. We vacate the remainder of the judgment and remand for allocation of the personal property and the debt. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Fleet Business Credit, Llc v. Grindstaff, Inc.
This is an appeal from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant, seeking the balance allegedly due under a contract between the defendant and a third party. The plaintiff contended that it was the assignee of the rights, but not the obligations, of this contract. The defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that the third party manifested its intent to terminate the contract prior to the alleged assignment. In the alternative, the defendant argued that its performance was excused because the third party filed for bankruptcy, which was a ground of default. The defendant also disputed whether there was in fact an assignment between the plaintiff and the third party. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee ex rel. Sheron L. Jones v. Martin Leon May
Martin Leon May (“Father”) appeals an order of the trial court directing him to pay interest on a child support obligation. We hold that the doctrine of res judicata precludes the imposition of interest in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court entered May 24, 2007, nunc pro tunc November 14, 2006. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Greig Massey, et al vs. R.W. Graf, Inc., et al - Dissenting
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Greig Massey, et al. v. R.W. Graf, Inc., et al.
Plaintiffs brought this declaratory judgment action, asking the Court to declare that building restrictions on platted parcels of property from a common grantor applied to a non-platted parcel purchased by defendants from a subsequent grantor. The Trial Court, responding to a summary judgment motion, made detailed findings of facts, and concluded that the “subject to” language in the deeds was ambiguous and construed the language against the inclusion of restrictions on any portion of the property that lay outside the platted subdivisions. Plaintiffs have appealed, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
First Southern Mortgage Corporation of Tennessee v. Michael H. Weisser
A mortgage broker filed this breach of contract action against a real estate investor based upon the investor’s failure to pay a loan placement fee. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the mortgage broker. Because we find that there are genuine issues of material fact, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Louis Ernest Cunningham v. Cheryl Lynne Cheatham Cunningham
In this domestic dispute, Father appeals contending that the trial court erred in its retroactive treatment of child support and rehabilitative alimony, the assessment of interest, the accounting of payments made by Father to Mother, denying Father’s requested modification of his child support and alimony obligation, denying his requested modification of the parenting schedule and awarding attorney’s fees to Mother. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand the case to the trial court for recalculation of the statutory interest and arrearages and a redetermination of whether the facts in the case support an upward deviation from the Child Support Guidelines. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. v. ORNL Federal Credit Union, et al.
In this appeal, we determine the priority between two recorded deeds of trust. Homeowners entered into a line of credit with a credit union secured by a recorded deed of trust on the homeowners’ home. The homeowners subsequently refinanced their home with a bank. The bank paid off the homeowners’ debt to the credit union, and recorded its own deed of trust securing its loan. At that same time, the loan and deed of trust was assigned to a second bank. Despite the payoff of the homeowners’ debt by the assignor bank, the first deed of trust to the credit union was never released, and the homeowners continued to draw on the line of credit. When the homeowners began having financial problems, the assignee bank discovered that the credit union had never released its deed of trust on the homeowners’ property because of a provision in the deed of trust stating that its release was conditioned upon the borrower requesting the cancellation of the line of credit. When the homeowners defaulted on both loans, the question arose as to which party’s deed of trust had priority. The trial court ruled in favor of the assignee bank on the basis that the credit union was equitably estopped from asserting its deed of trust because, at the time of payoff, the credit union did not follow its self-imposed practice of advising if any action other than payoff was required before release of the deed of trust. After careful review, we reverse because we conclude that the assignor bank had the means of discovering that payoff alone was insufficient to trigger the release of the deed of trust and because, under state statutory law, it had prior notice of all prerequisites to release the deed of trust as a result of the credit union’s registration of such deed. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals |
