In Re M.L.P.
B.R.P. (“Father”) was sentenced to serve eighteen years in prison when his daughter was six years old. The trial court terminated his parental rights based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6), which provides for the termination of parental rights of a person who is incarcerated under a sentence of ten years or more if that person’s child is under the age of eight at the time of sentencing. In this appeal, Father argues that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6) is inapplicable because Father might not have to serve his entire sentence if he obtains postconviction relief. He also maintains that termination of his parental rights is not in the best interest of his daughter. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the possibility of postconviction relief is irrelevant to a trial court’s determination of whether the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-116(g)(6) have been met. We further hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of his daughter. Therefore, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kenyale Pirtle v. Tennessee Department of Correction
Upon review under common-law writ of certiorari, the trial court affirmed disciplinary actions against Petitioner/Appellant by the Tennessee Department of Correction. We affirm in part and remand. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Charles W. Darnell D/B/A European Service Werks v. Johnny W. Brown, et al.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action immediately following a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for temporary injunction. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Glenda White v. Fort Sanders-Park West Medical Center
Plaintiff sued her former employer on grounds of breach of contract, retaliatory discharge, and violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, as well as the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed and we affirm the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James Edward Williams v. Brent R. Watson, et al.
James Edward Williams and Gladys Pineda Williams were divorced on December 13, 2004, following a very contentious proceeding in the Chancery Court of Knox County. Mr. Williams filed the action at bar against his former attorneys and also against attorneys representing his former wife. He alleges against these attorneys various acts of tortious activities, malpractice and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court dismissed all of his claims, and Mr. Williams appeals. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Doris Britt v. Janny Russell Chambers
This is a boundary line dispute. The parties are adjacent landowners. In April 2003, a dispute arose between the parties over the exact boundary line between their properties. The plaintiff erected a seven-foot privacy fence on what she perceived to be the proper boundary line. The defendant dismantled the fence and removed it. The plaintiff brought this action for the trial court to set the appropriate boundary line and for damages related to the defendant’s removal of her fence. After a hearing, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff, determining that the boundary line should be set according to a 1997 survey conducted when the plaintiff purchased her property and awarding the plaintiff damages for the removal of the fence. The defendant now appeals. We affirm, concluding that, in the absence of a trial transcript or a proper statement of the evidence, we must presume that the trial court’s decision was supported by the evidence. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Paulette Dobbins v. Jeffery F. Dabbs, Jr., Jeanette Dabbs, Jeffery F. Dabbs, Sr., and Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., A California Corporation
This case involves accord and satisfaction. The defendants fraudulently transferred real property |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Julie Pollard v. James Casteleman
This is a petition for contempt for failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the trial court entered |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Carson v. The Challenger Corporation and Daniel R. Jones, M.D.
This case involves a commercial lease. During the lessor’s divorce, his wife brought suit against the tenant to collect its current rent payments. The wife claimed that the underlying realty was marital property and she was entitled to the rent. The husband-lessor filed a motion to intervene in that case, but the trial court never addressed his motion. The husband signed some consent orders in the case and filed a motion on his own behalf, but he was never formally named as a party. After that case had concluded, the husband brought suit against the tenant for past due rent and other damages under the lease. The tenant claimed that his suit was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, but the trial court disagreed. After the trial court entered a judgment for the husband-lessor, the tenant appealed to this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Debra Jane Grey v. Bobbie Lee Brooks
Bobby Lee Brooks has appealed, seeking dismissal of an Order of Protection entered by the Trial Court. No record of the evidence has been filed. We affirm the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Angie Sorhagen v. Williamson County Animal Shelter, a Division of the Williamson County Government
The plaintiff filed this action against Williamson County alleging the County failed and/or refused to return her dog and cat for which she sought monetary damages. The County filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, contending the negligence claim asserted pertained to a discretionary function for which the County was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Lyn S. Summers v. Christopher J. Ryan
In this interlocutory appeal, the issue we address is which trial court – the Rhea County Family |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
In Re. Mikayla Grace Clark, Samuel Kent Clark v. Leah Joy Cerden
This is a child custody dispute. The biological parents of the child involved in this action met in Georgia, where the child was born in December 2002. The parties lived together with the child, but never married. Initially, the parties moved several times with the child, following job opportunities for the father. When the child was about nine months old, the parties moved to Jackson, Tennessee. Not long after that, the mother and the child returned to Georgia to live with the mother’s parents in Georgia, in order for the mother to seek professional help for depression. About nine months later, after an altercation between the mother and the child’s maternal grandmother, the mother told the father that she could not care for the child and asked him to assume custody. Accordingly, the father took the child to live with him in Jackson. About two months later, the father filed the instant petition for legitimation of the child and to seek custody. The mother opposed the father’s petition and filed a counter-petition for custody. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the father was comparatively more fit than the mother and designated him as the primary residential parent. The mother now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s determination. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Dale Anthony Scott, et al. v. Marion Yarbro, et al.
This is the second appeal of a property case involving the ownership of three parcels of real property held by tenants-in-common. We dismissed the first appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the trial court's order did not constitute a final judgment. On remand, the trial court entered a supplemental decree. After reviewing the record and the supplemental decree, we find that there is still not a final appealable judgment. We must, therefore, dismiss this second appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Cargo Master, Inc. v. Ace USA Insurance Company, Steven W. Hines, D/B/A S & A Trucking, and S & A Transportation, Inc. D/B/A S & A Trucking
This is an insurance case. The plaintiff cargo company entered into a carrier agreement with an independent trucking company to transport freight, in which the trucking company agreed to indemnify the plaintiff for any loss or damage to the freight transported. The trucking company obtained a motor truck cargo liability insurance policy, which insured property while in due course of transit. In the process of transporting a shipment of tires for the plaintiff, the driver for the trucking company parked the trailer portion of the tractor-trailer behind a shopping center and left it overnight. During the night, the cargo was stolen. The trucking company submitted a claim against its cargo insurance policy and the claim was denied. The plaintiff sued the trucking company and the cargo insurance company for breach of contract, seeking to recover the value of the stolen cargo. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment against the defendant cargo insurance company and, in response, the defendant insurance company filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the cargo insurance company, finding that the shipment of tires was not “in transit” when it was stolen and that, consequently, there was no coverage under the policy. The plaintiff cargo company appeals. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rosalind Pruitt, Individually and as Mother and Next of Kin of Domonique Pruitt, a Minor v. City of Memphis
This is a negligence case brought under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The plaintiff’s minor daughter slipped and fell at a public swimming facility and broke her arm. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant swimming facility, alleging that her minor daughter slipped |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Allstar Consulting Group, a/k/a Allstar Consulting Group, LLC v. Trinity Church & Christian Center and Trustmark National Bank
This is a breach of contract case. The plaintiff finance broker and the defendant church entered into an agreement under which the plaintiff broker was to assist the church in obtaining a loan, and the church would pay the plaintiff a 3% broker’s fee for this service. The plaintiff broker negotiated a financing arrangement as requested by the church. Independent of the plaintiff, the church obtained financing from a different lender. The plaintiff then claimed a right to its broker’s fee under the parties’ agreement, claiming that it had an exclusive arrangement with the church. The church refused to pay the fee, denying that it had an exclusive arrangement with the plaintiff broker. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against the church to recover its broker’s fee. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiff, concluding that the parties’ agreement was exclusive. The church now appeals. We affirm, finding that the issue turns on the credibility of the witnesses. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Seth Zamek, et ux. v. Sean O'Donnell, et. al
This case involves an automobile accident that occurred on a road maintained by Madison County. The plaintiff sued the negligent driver who struck his vehicle, the other driver’s parents, and Madison County. Relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the design of the road and inadequate signs and road markings contributed to the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to Madison County, finding that it was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
CitiFinancial Mortgage Company, Inc. v. Augustus Beasley, et al.
Appellants Augustus and Sheila Beasley (the Beasleys) seek to challenge the denial of their request to appeal an adverse unlawful detainer judgment to circuit court and to set aside the foreclosure of their residence. Specifically, the Beasleys appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to CitiFinancial Mortgage, Inc. (Citi) and denial of their petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas, filed after the deadline for appealing the judgment as of right. The court denied the petition on the grounds that it did not set forth sufficient merits for removal to circuit court for a trial de novo. In the petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas, the Beasleys advanced as grounds for review the insufficiency of funds for filing a timely appeal and premature foreclosure on their residence in violation of the deed of trust. On appeal, they contend these allegations constituted sufficient merits as required by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-18-129. We reverse and remand. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Jackson v. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board, et al.
Petitioner/Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his appeal under a writ of certiorari arising from the decision of the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board to terminate his employment with the Criminal Court Clerk’s Office. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio D. Adams
Appellant appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his appeal from the Juvenile Court of Shelby County. The Criminal Court found that Appellant’s notice of appeal was not timely filed under T.C.A. § 37-1-159. Finding that the Appellant’s appeal was timely, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Dawn Winton Haines v. Lee Alan Haines
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court granted the petition of Lee Alan Haines (“Father”) to change the custody of the parties’ two minor children from Lisa Dawn Winton Haines (“Mother”) to Father. The change in custody followed a bench trial at which the trial court heard, in chambers, the testimony of the children as elicited by the leading questions of the Guardian Ad Litem (“the GAL”). The examination took place outside the physical presence of counsel for the parties. Mother appeals, (1) challenging the change of custody; (2) questioning evidentiary rulings by the trial court; and (3) asserting that the trial court erred in allowing the children to be questioned in chambers by the GAL outside the physical presence of counsel for the parties. We hold that the in-chambers proceeding, as designed and conducted by the trial court, constitutes error. Because we deem the error to be a violation of due process and prejudicial to the judicial process, we vacate the trial court’s judgment in toto and remand for a new trial before a different judge. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Neva Jane Marcrum v. Thomas T. Marcrum, Sr.
The sole issue in this appeal involves the division of property upon the divorce of the two parties. Having reviewed the record, we modify the division as to one specific finding of fact and affirm the judgment as modified. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Conley, as Executor and Personal Representative of the Estate of Martha Stinson, Deceased v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., et al. - Concurring
Although I concur in the result and reasoning of reached by the majority opinion, I think it important to emphasize one point. I agree with the trial court that none of the allegations regarding Ms. Stinson’s stay at the nursing home prior to January 1, 2000, state any cause of action warranting relief. They were properly dismissed because there was no causal connection between those alleged incidents or omissions and the injuries suffered by Ms. Stinson due to the assault by Mr. Johnson. That determination eliminates most of the allegations supporting the TAPA claims that Plaintiff wanted to add. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Conley, as Executor and Personal Representative of the Estate of Martha Stinson, Deceased v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., et al.
The estate of a former nursing home resident brought this wrongful death action, asserting sundry claims against the nursing home arising out of an attack on Mrs. Stinson by another resident. As a result of the attack, Mrs. Stinson was hospitalized and treated for injuries including a broken hip. She died four months later of pneumonia. Initially, the claims against the nursing home sounded principally in medical malpractice, with the plaintiff contending the attack, injuries, and death were the result of a variety and series of acts and omissions of the nursing home, including failing to properly screen and/or subsequently discharge the resident who attacked Mrs. Stinson. The plaintiff additionally asserted claims against Genesis of Jackson, Inc., a provider of psychiatric services, and the State of Tennessee, contending they, along with the nursing home, were responsible for determining whether the resident who assaulted Mrs. Stinson should have been admitted or retained as a resident at the nursing home. The plaintiff’s claim against Genesis was dismissed by the trial court, and the claim against the State was denied by the Claims Commission. The plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to add a claim for attorney fees against the nursing home under the Tennessee Adult Protection Act. The trial court dismissed the TAPA claim finding the plaintiff’s claims sounded in medical malpractice and therefore, by statute, the exclusive remedy was under the Medical Malpractice Act. The plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims against the nursing home went to the jury. Following a six-day jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded $130,000 in compensatory damages against the nursing home. The plaintiff and the nursing home appeal. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the surviving claims for a new trial. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals |
