COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Lisa Dawn Winton Haines v. Lee Alan Haines
E2005-02180-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court granted the petition of Lee Alan Haines (“Father”) to change the custody of the parties’ two minor children from Lisa Dawn Winton Haines (“Mother”) to Father. The change in custody followed a bench trial at which the trial court heard, in chambers, the testimony of the children as elicited by the leading questions of the Guardian Ad Litem (“the GAL”). The examination took place outside the physical presence of counsel for the parties. Mother appeals, (1) challenging the change of custody; (2) questioning evidentiary rulings by the trial court; and (3) asserting that the trial court erred in allowing the children to be questioned in chambers by the GAL outside the physical presence of counsel for the parties. We hold that the in-chambers proceeding, as designed and conducted by the trial court, constitutes error. Because we deem the error to be a violation of due process and prejudicial to the judicial process, we vacate the trial court’s judgment in toto and remand for a new trial before a different judge.

Jean E. Hood v. J. Daniel Freemon, et al.
M2004-01889-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert L. Holloway

The owner of a tract of undeveloped commercial property in the city of Lawrenceburg asked the trial court to enjoin the lessees of that property from subletting it to the city for the purpose of building a retention pond. She claimed that such a use would constitute waste or create a permanent and private nuisance on the land. The trial court declined to issue the injunction and certified its decision as final for purposes of appeal. We reverse.

Anita Wadhwani v. Peter White
M2005-02655-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

A former spouse challenges the extension and modification of an Order of Protection, contending the proof was insufficient to justify either the extension or modification. Finding the record contains sufficient evidence from which the trial court could determine an extension and modification of the Order was necessary, we affirm.

William James Jekot v. Pennie Christine Jekot - Dissenting and Concurring
M2006-00316-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Corlew

I respectfully both concur and dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I agree with the majority that the Trial Court’s judgment should be modified to award alimony in futuro to Wife because Wife is not capable of being totally rehabilitated and that the amount of alimony awarded should be altered. However, I cannot concur with the amount awarded by the majority. 

My difficulty with the amount of alimony awarded by the majority is two fold. First, the majority operates under the assumption that this fifty-five year old adult, well educated and in good health, must be assumed, not proved but assumed, to have absolutely zero earning capacity.  This assumption, I believe, is contrary to both the evidence in this case and to the public policy of this state as established by the Tennessee Legislature by the enactment of the relevant statutory provisions related to alimony. Second, I believe the majority’s award of $9,000 per month in alimony in futuro exceeds Wife’s proven needs.

The majority correctly notes that Wife seriously inflated her stated expenses by literally thousands of dollars. For example, despite the fact that Wife testified that the marital home awarded to her in the property division is in “sound” condition, her claimed necessary expenses for
“home maintenance, labor, and repairs” run over $31,000 a year. This does not include the almost $5,000 per year for “equipment and replacement fund for the residence” that Wife claims is necessary. Nor does it include the over $14,000 per year for “lawn and garden maintenance” that Wife has included. Wife also includes $45,000 per year for her “savings fund.” Clearly the record shows that Wife’s proven expenses, and therefore her resulting need, is far less than the $9,000 per month awarded by the majority. Additionally, what should not be forgotten is that Wife, according to the majority, received assets totaling $1,468,758.00 in the property division. 

Of even greater concern to me is what I believe to be the majority’s failure to give effect to the Legislature’s stated public policy for this state. It is clearly the public policy of this state that where an economically disadvantaged spouse may be able to be rehabilitated, such a rehabilitation is the goal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2). Likewise it is clear that alimony in futuro is appropriate to, in effect, make up the difference “where a spouse may be only partially rehabilitated....” See Teen. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(4). I believe it is the clear public policy of this state, as shown by the statutes enacted by our Legislature, that each divorcing adult has to accept, to the extent feasible for that adult, responsibility for his or her own support. 

Despite the complete absence of any supporting evidence, the majority assumes that Wife, a healthy and well educated adult, has absolutely zero earning capacity and will always have zero earning capacity. It is equally clear from the evidence in the record and in the majority’s
opinion that Wife has made no effort to obtain gainful employment, while continuing to work virtually full time at her avocation, the animal shelter. While I believe the majority is correct that Wife cannot be sufficiently rehabilitated so as to obviate the need for any alimony in the future, there is absolutely nothing in the statutes or case law that requires or even permits this Court to assume that this healthy, well educated, fifty-five year old adult who has displayed the ability to work long
hours by her volunteer work at her avocation has zero earning capacity.

What is exceptionally telling is Wife’s statement in her brief, made with no citation to any supporting evidence, that “[a]t her age of 55, obtaining further education and training to improve her earning capacity to a reasonable level is not practical.” Apparently, the majority wholeheartedly accepts this conclusion despite all the evidence to the contrary. Likewise, it appears to be Wife’s position, and apparently is a position accepted by the majority, that if she cannot improve her earning capacity to what she believes is a “reasonable level”, she has zero earning capacity and never has to work at a job for pay. Again, I believe there is a total absence of evidence in the record supporting this conclusion by Wife as accepted by the majority. I believe the conclusion that a healthy, intelligent, and well educated fifty-five year old adult has zero earning capacity is both patronizing and unsupported either by the evidence in the record or the law of this state. I am unaware of anything in Tennessee law that requires Husband to continue to cover 100%
of Wife’s living expenses so that she may devote her full time to her avocation, the animal shelter, no matter how worthy such a cause may be. 

Taking all the above into consideration, I would, respectfully, vacate the Trial Court’s award of alimony and remand this matter to the Trial Court to receive additional proof to determine the appropriate amount of alimony in futuro to be awarded to Wife. On remand, I would instruct the
Trial Court that the alimony in futuro award must take into consideration Wife’s actual needs and likewise must consider her earning capacity. I would further instruct the Trial Court on remand that Wife, a healthy, smart, and well educated fifty-five year old adult who, in effect, works full time at her avocation rather than a vocation, cannot be found to have zero earning capacity. I believe such instructions on remand to be both necessary and appropriate given the record before us and relevant
Tennessee law.

From the record before us, it is without dispute that Wife is a fifty-five year old healthy, smart, and well educated adult who is prevented in no way from earning at least some minimal amount of income at a some full time paying employment. While such employment may well prevent Wife from continuing to devote her full time to her avocation, the animal shelter, I am aware of nothing in Tennessee law that says Wife should be permitted to continue her avocation rather than a vocation all at Husband’s continued expense. I believe the public policy of this state
as established by our Legislature requires no less. I believe it is clear public policy that a divorcing adult must be responsible, to the extent feasible given that adult’s circumstances and situation, for supporting himself or herself, and that each such adult’s earning capacity must be considered in determining whether or not alimony is appropriate, and if so, the amount. I believe to hold otherwise treats that adult as a dependent child solely because she or he is now a former spouse. I believe such a result is contrary to the clear public policy of this state, and I therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion as to the amount of alimony awarded. I concur in the remainder of the majority’s opinion.

Frances E. DeFord v. Harpeth Valley Utilities District
M2005-02640-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her breach of contract action against her former employer, Harpeth Valley Utilities District. The plaintiff entered into a Deferred Compensation Agreement with Harpeth Valley at the beginning of her employment in 1998 that afforded her a retirement benefit if she remained employed until the year 2012. The plaintiff voluntarily left the employment of Harpeth Valley in 2003 after only five years of employment. One year later, she filed this action contending that a handwritten modification was made to the Agreement which provided that she was entitled to receive the retirement benefit and death benefit specified in the Agreement. The trial court dismissed her Complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. We affirm.

Risa Stock v. Morris Stock
W2005-02634-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jerry Stokes

This appeal involves a trial court’s distribution of marital property in a divorce proceeding. The parties owned their own business, and the husband generally ran its operations while the wife handled its financial aspects. After the business caught fire, the husband found $240,000 in the company safe. He took the money to a bank and placed it in a safety deposit box. The company’s head of security accompanied the husband to the bank and testified about these events at trial. The wife also had access to the box, and the bank records revealed that she accessed it over thirty times in the next five years. The husband and the security officer returned to the safety deposit box when he learned that the wife intended to file for divorce, but there was no cash remaining in the box. The trial court determined that the wife had dissipated the marital estate in the amount of $240,000 and subtracted half that amount, $120,000, from her award of the marital property. The wife appealed.  For the following reasons, we affirm.

Harvey Dalton v. Linda Jane Faasen Dalton
W2006-00118-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

This case involves a trial court’s division of marital property following a divorce.  The wife came into the marriage with substantial assets, but the husband had no assets and owed a large debt to the IRS.  During the marriage, the wife was continuously employed, and the husband was often unemployed.  After the wife found out that her husband had quit one of his jobs, he executed a quitclaim deed conveying his interest in their house to the wife. When they later divorced, the trial court appointed a special master to classify certain assets and debts as marital or separate property. The trial court affirmed the special master’s report with modifications. Both parties now challenge the classification of certain assets and the court’s division of the marital property.  For the following reasons, we affirm.

Mary Elizabeth Stillwell, Decedent by and through Husband, H. Chester Stillwell v. Kenneth Wayne Hackney, Sr., et al.
M2005-02218-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

Invitee fell in gravel driveway of rental property, allegedly due to a partially hidden concrete divider. Invitee ultimately died as result of the fall and invitee, by and through her husband, filed an action against rental property owners. Property owners filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, finding that Plaintiff failed to establish an exception to the general rule of landlord non-liability. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Hal Gerber v. Robert R. Holcomb
M2005-02731-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

Attorney filed an action against client to collect unpaid installments due under a promissory note. The trial court entered a consent final decree awarding attorney the sum currently due under the note. Attorney filed a second action against client to collect the then unpaid installments due under the same promissory note. Client answered alleging affirmative defenses which attacked the validity of the note and which were not raised in the first proceeding. Attorney filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that client was precluded from asserting the defenses under the doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court denied the motion and attorney filed an extraordinary appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Marc Eskin, et al. v. Alice B. Bartee, et al. - Concurring
W2006-01336-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen R. Williams

I agree with the result reached by the majority and the substance of the majority’s reasoning.  I write separately only to note that I disagree with a portion of the majority’s reading of Ramsey v. Beavers, 931 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1996), and in particular its reliance on Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). 

Marc Eskin, et al. v. Alice B. Bartee, et al.
W2006-01336-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen R. Williams

Parents, individually and on behalf of their two minor children, sued various defendants for damages resulting from an automobile accident caused allegedly by the negligence of defendants.  The complaint, in addition to seeking damages for the personal injuries sustained by one of the minor children, seeks damages on behalf of the mother and one minor child for negligent infliction of emotional distress. An uninsured motorist insurance carrier filed an answer in the cause and subsequentlymoved for summary judgment, which ostensibly involved only the claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion but failed to denote that the grant was only a partial summary judgment for that particular claim. We modify the trial court's order by granting only a partial summary judgment and further reverse and remand that grant.

Bobby L. Holland and Wife, Rita Holland v. Amelia Jo Dinwiddie, DDS d/b/a Jo Dinwiddie, DDS
W2006-00523-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

The plaintiff patient visited the defendant dentist periodically between 1998 and 2003. Between 2001 and 2003, the defendant performed dental work on the plaintiff including root canals, fillings, and crown work. Over this period, the plaintiff’s dental condition became significantly worse. The plaintiff developed abscesses and infection in his mouth and suffered from substantial dental pain.  The plaintiff’s last visit to the defendant was in October of 2003. Over the 2003 holidays, the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to contact the defendant for relief from his increasingly painful condition. The plaintiff ultimately received treatment from another dentist throughout 2004. After receiving the plaintiff’s dental records from the defendant in October of 2004, the treating dentist informed the plaintiff that the defendant’s treatment had been negligent. The plaintiff filed a dental
malpractice action against the defendant on January 12, 2005. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the one-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, finding that the plaintiff should have discovered the injury by the time of the plaintiff’s last visit to the defendant in October of 2003.  The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.  We affirm.

Robert W. Fink, et al. v. Fred M. Crean, et al.
M2005-01364-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Timothy L. Easter

The defendant, Mitchell Lee Blankenship, was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years, with one year to serve in confinement. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing by improperly weighing enhancement factors, not applying mitigating factors, and not granting him full probation. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient. Although the trial court erred in applying the multiple victims enhancement factor, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial court was justified. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jerry Peterson, et al. v. Henry County General Hospital District, et al.
W2006-01393-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles C. Mcginley

This is a premises liability case. Plaintiff/Appellant allegedly suffered injuries after slipping in a pool of water that was allowed to stand on the Hospital/Appellee’s floor. The trial court ruled that Hospital/Appellee had no actual or constructive notice of the water and entered judgment in favor of Hospital/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellant appeals.  We affirm.

Steven A. Davis, Jr. v. April Dawn (Blackmon) Davis
M2005-02620-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tom E. Gray

Appellant appeals the denial of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from a Final Decree of Divorce as it relates to child custody. Appellant asserts that the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA due to the entry of a previous order of protection in the Alabama family court. We affirm.

John Ruff v. James G. Neeley, Tennessee Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development, and EPerformax, Inc.
W2006-01192-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Walter L. Evans

This case involves a claim for unemployment benefits after an employee was terminated for failing to follow company policy and refusing to follow his supervisor’s instructions. A female co-worker had previously complained about the claimant’s repeated attempts to ask her out on dates and several occasions when he had followed her to her car, all of which had made her uncomfortable. The claimant was suspended for two days at that time. A few months later, another female co-worker complained to her supervisor about the claimant’s behavior after he continued asking her out on dates for over a month, waited for her at her car, and eventually hugged her at work after she rejected another invitation to go out with him. A meeting was held about the claimant’s conduct, and his female co-worker and his supervisors asked that he agree not to communicate with the co-worker in the future. The claimant would not agree to stop contacting his co-worker, and he was terminated from his employment the next day. He filed for unemployment benefits, which were initially approved by the Department of Labor. On appeal, the Appeals Tribunal found that the claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits because he had been terminated for work related misconduct.  The finding was affirmed by the Board of Review, and later by the chancery court.  For the following reasons, we affirm.

Opal Jean Woodruff, by and through the Guardian of Her Estate, National Bank of Commerce v. W.C. Sutton, Jr., et al.
W2006-00434-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

In 1997, an Arkansas state court adjudged the plaintiff/ward to be incapacitated and appointed a bank to be the conservator of her estate. The conservator bank, acting on the behalf of the incapacitated plaintiff/ward, filed a complaint in 2002 against the defendants. The plaintiff sought to set aside a quit claim deed for property located in Shelby County, Tennessee. The plaintiff/ward had executed the deed in 1996 and transferred title for the property to the defendants. The co-defendant bank, which had obtained an interest in the property through the defendants in 2002 but was not named as a defendant in the complaint, answered the complaint in 2003 and moved for a dismissal. The plaintiff sought to amend the complaint and name the bank as a co-defendant. The co-defendant bank moved to strike the amended complaint.  The originally named defendants filed an answer later in 2003, and in 2004 they moved for dismissal based upon the statute of limitations.  In 2005, the defendants moved for a dismissal based upon their original defenses and for the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the complaint.  The plaintiff set a trial date in the chancery court, and the defendants moved to strike the trial date. The trial court held a hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss and granted the defendants’ motion for dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute.  The plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the judgment, and the trial court denied the motion.  The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Ann Marie Gillespie v. Andrew Mark Gillespie
E2006-00734-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Sharon G. Lee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Vance

The issue presented in this case is whether the Wife’s alimony award is modifiable due to her remarriage when the divorce decree does not classify the alimony award, stating only that “the [Husband] shall pay alimony to the [Wife] in the amount of five hundred dollars per month for a
period of two years.” The trial court, presented with Husband’s petition to modify spousal support, held that the alimony award was “periodic/rehabilitative alimony,” and terminated Husband’s spousal support obligation to Wife because of her remarriage. We hold that the award of alimony is properly classified as alimony in solido, because (1) both the alimony award in the divorce decree and the parties’ marital dissolution agreement provided for a sum certain – $500 per month for two
years – with no contingencies that would cause termination of the alimony, such as Wife’s death or remarriage; and (2) the trial court made no finding in the divorce judgment regarding the relative economic status of the parties, nor of the Wife’s need or potential for rehabilitation. Therefore,
because an award of alimony in solido is not subject to modification, we reverse the judgment of the trial court terminating Wife’s alimony payments.

Melissa A. Rhymer, Legal Custodian of Robert A. Trivett and wife, Maria Trivett, v. 21st Mortgage Corporation and Southern Showcase Housing, INC., d/b/a Homes America
E2006-00742-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson, II

In this case defendants moved to arbitrate the dispute since plaintiff signed a contract to arbitrate. Plaintiff pled incompetence to contract, but the Trial Court held that issue was subject to arbitration. We vacate and remand and instruct the Trial Court to decide the issue of incompetency.

R.D.M. v. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, In the Matter of: D.J.M.M., Jr., D.O.B. 8/28/2000
E2006-00283-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas A. Austin

Appellant, who was married to the mother at the birth of the child, claims the Trial Court erred in failing to engage in a comparative fitness test in awarding the child to a person who by DNA testing was shown to be the biological father.  We affirm.

C.S.C., et. al. v. Knox County Board of Education, et al.
E2006-00087-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler

In this class action lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, the Knox County Board of Education and its superintendent, were guilty of statutory, regulatory, and constitutional violations in the design and implementation of theBoard’s evening alternative education program for students who are expelled or suspended from their regular schools.  The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenges.  The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

In the Matter of: S. L. A.
M2006-01536-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Paul Crouch

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, contending the evidence was not clear and convincing that she abandoned her child and that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the child. The trial court found the mother had abandoned the child by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her child, which conduct included ingesting drugs while pregnant and while breast feeding, and the manufacture of methamphetamine in the family home. We affirm.

Lost Mountain Development Co. v. Rufus King v. Matthew B. Kezar, et al. - Concurring
M2004-02663-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart

I concur in the opinion of the Court and write separately in order to re-emphasize and reaffirm the sound rules of law stated in Holt v. Citizen Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn.1984).  Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Holt, an innocent purchaser at a foreclosure sale had constantly to look back over his shoulder for fear that someone would challenge the validity of the foreclosure sale in equity under the “shock the conscience of the court” standard. Holt makes it clear that, in the absence of misconduct or fraud, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale where the property brings less than true value is free from a constant cloud upon his title.

Lost Mountain Development Co. v. Rufus King v. Matthew B. Kezar, et al.
M2004-02663-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart

This case involves a creditor’s entitlement to a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure sale in which the creditor was the only bidder, and in which he paid considerably less for the large tract of mountaintop property than the debtor alleged it was worth. The trial court awarded the creditor’s successor-in-interest a deficiency judgment of over $4 million, holding that in accordance with the rule of Holt v. Citizens Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. 1984), the debtor should not be permitted to challenge the legal presumption that the value of the property at the time of foreclosure was equal to the sale price because there was no evidence of “irregularity, misconduct, fraud or unfairness on the part of the mortgagee.” Since the Holt case did not involve a deficiency judgment, we believe it is inapplicable. After examining both the law of Tennessee and that of other jurisdictions, we conclude that the trial court should have permitted the defendant to challenge the presumption by attempting to prove that the sale price was grossly inadequate. We accordingly reverse.

Edwin R. Oliver, Individually as Next Friend of Edwin C. Oliver, a Minor v. Prologis Trust
W2006-00584-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge John R. McCarroll, Jr.

In this premises liability case, the minor plaintiff received a severe foot injury while assisting an independent contractor straighten concrete poles with a forklift on defendant premises owner’s property. The plaintiff’s father sued the independent contractor and the premises owner on his minor
son’s behalf, alleging negligence and workers’ compensation liability. The trial court tried the workers’ compensation claim first and entered a judgment for the plaintiff. The Special Workers’ Compensation Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed as to the premises owner, finding that the premises owner was not the statutory employer of the plaintiff. The case returned to the trial court for trial of the negligence claim. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the independent contractor from the action, leaving the premises owner as the only defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the premises owner, finding that the premises owner owed no duty to prevent the independent contractor from hiring the plaintiff, and finding that the facts of the case did not fall into any exception to the general rule that a premises owner is not liable for the negligence of its independent contractor. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, alleging that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment. We affirm.