John Ruff v. James G. Neeley, Tennessee Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development, and EPerformax, Inc.
This case involves a claim for unemployment benefits after an employee was terminated for failing to follow company policy and refusing to follow his supervisor’s instructions. A female co-worker had previously complained about the claimant’s repeated attempts to ask her out on dates and several occasions when he had followed her to her car, all of which had made her uncomfortable. The claimant was suspended for two days at that time. A few months later, another female co-worker complained to her supervisor about the claimant’s behavior after he continued asking her out on dates for over a month, waited for her at her car, and eventually hugged her at work after she rejected another invitation to go out with him. A meeting was held about the claimant’s conduct, and his female co-worker and his supervisors asked that he agree not to communicate with the co-worker in the future. The claimant would not agree to stop contacting his co-worker, and he was terminated from his employment the next day. He filed for unemployment benefits, which were initially approved by the Department of Labor. On appeal, the Appeals Tribunal found that the claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits because he had been terminated for work related misconduct. The finding was affirmed by the Board of Review, and later by the chancery court. For the following reasons, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Opal Jean Woodruff, by and through the Guardian of Her Estate, National Bank of Commerce v. W.C. Sutton, Jr., et al.
In 1997, an Arkansas state court adjudged the plaintiff/ward to be incapacitated and appointed a bank to be the conservator of her estate. The conservator bank, acting on the behalf of the incapacitated plaintiff/ward, filed a complaint in 2002 against the defendants. The plaintiff sought to set aside a quit claim deed for property located in Shelby County, Tennessee. The plaintiff/ward had executed the deed in 1996 and transferred title for the property to the defendants. The co-defendant bank, which had obtained an interest in the property through the defendants in 2002 but was not named as a defendant in the complaint, answered the complaint in 2003 and moved for a dismissal. The plaintiff sought to amend the complaint and name the bank as a co-defendant. The co-defendant bank moved to strike the amended complaint. The originally named defendants filed an answer later in 2003, and in 2004 they moved for dismissal based upon the statute of limitations. In 2005, the defendants moved for a dismissal based upon their original defenses and for the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the complaint. The plaintiff set a trial date in the chancery court, and the defendants moved to strike the trial date. The trial court held a hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss and granted the defendants’ motion for dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the judgment, and the trial court denied the motion. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
C.S.C., et. al. v. Knox County Board of Education, et al.
In this class action lawsuit, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, the Knox County Board of Education and its superintendent, were guilty of statutory, regulatory, and constitutional violations in the design and implementation of theBoard’s evening alternative education program for students who are expelled or suspended from their regular schools. The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenges. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
R.D.M. v. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, In the Matter of: D.J.M.M., Jr., D.O.B. 8/28/2000
Appellant, who was married to the mother at the birth of the child, claims the Trial Court erred in failing to engage in a comparative fitness test in awarding the child to a person who by DNA testing was shown to be the biological father. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Ann Marie Gillespie v. Andrew Mark Gillespie
The issue presented in this case is whether the Wife’s alimony award is modifiable due to her remarriage when the divorce decree does not classify the alimony award, stating only that “the [Husband] shall pay alimony to the [Wife] in the amount of five hundred dollars per month for a |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Melissa A. Rhymer, Legal Custodian of Robert A. Trivett and wife, Maria Trivett, v. 21st Mortgage Corporation and Southern Showcase Housing, INC., d/b/a Homes America
In this case defendants moved to arbitrate the dispute since plaintiff signed a contract to arbitrate. Plaintiff pled incompetence to contract, but the Trial Court held that issue was subject to arbitration. We vacate and remand and instruct the Trial Court to decide the issue of incompetency. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: S. L. A.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, contending the evidence was not clear and convincing that she abandoned her child and that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the child. The trial court found the mother had abandoned the child by engaging in conduct that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of her child, which conduct included ingesting drugs while pregnant and while breast feeding, and the manufacture of methamphetamine in the family home. We affirm. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Lost Mountain Development Co. v. Rufus King v. Matthew B. Kezar, et al.
This case involves a creditor’s entitlement to a deficiency judgment after a foreclosure sale in which the creditor was the only bidder, and in which he paid considerably less for the large tract of mountaintop property than the debtor alleged it was worth. The trial court awarded the creditor’s successor-in-interest a deficiency judgment of over $4 million, holding that in accordance with the rule of Holt v. Citizens Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. 1984), the debtor should not be permitted to challenge the legal presumption that the value of the property at the time of foreclosure was equal to the sale price because there was no evidence of “irregularity, misconduct, fraud or unfairness on the part of the mortgagee.” Since the Holt case did not involve a deficiency judgment, we believe it is inapplicable. After examining both the law of Tennessee and that of other jurisdictions, we conclude that the trial court should have permitted the defendant to challenge the presumption by attempting to prove that the sale price was grossly inadequate. We accordingly reverse. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Lost Mountain Development Co. v. Rufus King v. Matthew B. Kezar, et al. - Concurring
I concur in the opinion of the Court and write separately in order to re-emphasize and reaffirm the sound rules of law stated in Holt v. Citizen Central Bank, 688 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn.1984). Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Holt, an innocent purchaser at a foreclosure sale had constantly to look back over his shoulder for fear that someone would challenge the validity of the foreclosure sale in equity under the “shock the conscience of the court” standard. Holt makes it clear that, in the absence of misconduct or fraud, a purchaser at a foreclosure sale where the property brings less than true value is free from a constant cloud upon his title. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Edwin R. Oliver, Individually as Next Friend of Edwin C. Oliver, a Minor v. Prologis Trust
In this premises liability case, the minor plaintiff received a severe foot injury while assisting an independent contractor straighten concrete poles with a forklift on defendant premises owner’s property. The plaintiff’s father sued the independent contractor and the premises owner on his minor |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Adam Charles Partin v. Delores Lourraine Wallis
Adam Charles Partin (“Father”) filed a petition to modify his child support obligation claiming that a significant variance existed between his income at the time his child support obligation was originally calculated and his current income. The case was tried and the Trial Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that a significant variance did exist making the child support order eligible for modification. The Trial Court then reduced Father’s child support. Delores Lourraine Wallis (“Mother”) appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in calculating Father’s income and that a significant variance does not exist. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Oscar Sevilla v. Douglas Cox
The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this negligence action. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Eugene L. Lampley, et al. v. Melvin D. Romine, et al.
In a boundary dispute, the trial court refused to find estoppel by deed since the party raising the estoppel had not relied on the erroneous deeds. We affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., f/k/a Holiday Inns Franchising v. States Resources, Inc., et al.
The issue presented in this priority dispute between a first deed of trust holder and a judgment lien creditor involves the legal effect of the inadvertent and erroneous release of the deed of trust. States Resources Corporation (SRC), Defendant/Appellant, holds two liens on the same real property: one as successor-in-interest to a judgment creditor and the other as assignee of a promissory note for a construction loan, secured by a deed of trust originally held by Trust One Bank. Plaintiff/Appellee Holiday Hospitality Franchising (Holiday) also holds a judgment lien that, in relation to SRC’s filings, was filed last in time. SRC appeals summary judgment entered in favor of Holiday and contends that as assignee of Trust One’s note and first-filed deed of trust, it occupies the most senior lien position, notwithstanding the mistaken release of the deed prior to the assignment. Because Trust One’s release was inadvertent and unintended, and because restoring the deed of trust to its original priority position would not prejudice the rights of Holiday, an intervening judgment lien creditor, we hold that, as a matter of law, the mistaken release should be cancelled in part and the deed as to Lot 30 should be restored to its position as first deed of trust. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Highwoods Properties, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ cause of action as time-barred under Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 6-51-102(a)(1) & 103. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richard John Jolly v. Lynette Suzanne Jolly
After a decree was entered in a divorce proceeding in Kansas, wife attempted to enforce the decree in Tennessee as it pertains to, inter alia, a division of marital property. The case reached the Supreme Court, and that Court determined that relief sought involved the enforcement of the Kansas decree, and that the decree had not been properly registered and notice given, required by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The case was remanded to the trial court to insure that the registration and notice procedures of UIFSA were followed and that husband be allowed to present defenses thereto. The trial court made a division of the parties' marital property in Tennessee and allowed credit to wife for arrearage of child support decreed by the Kansas court. Husband has appealed. We affirm. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Jones v. State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. Keva Coleman
This is an appeal from the ruling of the Juvenile Court of Shelby County overruling the juvenile Referee’s finding that Appellant’s voluntary acknowledgment of paternity should be set aside under T.C.A. § 24-7-113. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding concerning fraudulent procurement, we vacate the Order of the trial court and remand for reinstatement of the previous Judgment of the trial court affirming the Referee’s Judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Small-Hammer v. Edward C. Troutt, et al.
In this breach of contract action, the plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment following a jury trial. She contends the trial court erred by denying her Motion in Limine and by giving the jury an erroneous jury instruction. Finding the plaintiff failed to raise either issue in a motion for new trial, which is a mandatory condition precedent, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Galadriel Basham v. Mark K. Greaves - Concurring
This appeal is yet another effort to provide the courts with a permissible vehicle for circumventing the legislatively mandated “locality rule” uniquely applicable to medical malpractice cases. Galadriel Basham seeks to hold the trial court in error for using an instruction based on the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions. She insists that the trial court should have given a broader instruction equating the nationwide “community” of board-certified emergency room physicians with the geographical concept of “community” plainly embodied in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115(a)(1) (Supp. 2006). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Galadriel Basham, Individually and as Next-Of-Kin of Baby Girl Basham, Deceased v. Mark K. Greaves, M.D.
In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff contends the emergency room physician failed to comply with the applicable standard of care, which she contends is the standard for board-certified emergency room physicians, regardless of the locale in which the physician practices, and that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury concerning the applicable community. The novel issue presented is whether the term “community,” as it applies to the so-called locality rule, can be construed to mean the medical community of specialists who are board-certified as emergency room physicians without regard to the geographic location of their practice. Although we find the issue intriguing, the facts of this case render the issue moot. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Phillip Wayne Crocker v. Nancy Jo Reece Crocker
This case involves a divorce ending a five year marriage. Wife/Appellee was awarded a divorce on grounds of Husband/Appellant’s inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court awarded Wife/Appellee alimony in futuro. Husband/Appellant appeals the award of alimony in futuro. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry P. Conway and Marilyn J. Conway v. Eastern Savings Bank, FSB
This is a petition to set aside a foreclosure sale. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, borrowed over $1.1 million from the defendant bank in order to buy the subject home. The plaintiffs later defaulted on the loan. The husband filed a petition in bankruptcy and listed the home as a part of his bankruptcy estate. The bank obtained relief from the automatic stay, accelerated the debt, and began foreclosure proceedings. The day before the scheduled foreclosure sale, the wife filed a petition in bankruptcy and listed the home as part of her bankruptcy estate. The foreclosure sale was postponed. The bank obtained relief from the automatic stay in the wife’s bankruptcy case, and the foreclosure sale was conducted. The bank purchased the home for a credit bid of $750,000. Eight months later, the husband and wife filed this action for injunctive relief and to vacate the foreclosure sale. They alleged, among other things, inadequate consideration and lack of proper notice. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted based in part on earlier findings by the bankruptcy court in the plaintiffs’ bankruptcy proceedings. The husband and wife now appeal, again arguing inadequate consideration and lack of notice. We affirm, finding that the plaintiffs failed to proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Volunteer Concrete Walls v. Community Trust & Banking Co., and Construction Consultants, Inc.
In this breach of contract action, the Chancellor dismissed the Complaint and Counter-Complaint and Ordered plaintiff to remove the lien on the property where the construction of a wall was placed. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jeanne L. Schuett v. Egon Horst Schuett, Jr.
This is the second appeal of a divorce case involving alimony and child support. In the original divorce proceeding, we reversed the trial court’s holding that the increase in value of the wife’s inheritance was separate property, as well as its award of child support, based on a floating schedule. The case was remanded for the trial court to recalculate the child support, equitably divide the appreciation in value of the inheritance, and then reconsider the division of the marital assets and the award of alimony and attorney’s fees. On remand, the trial court divided the appreciation in value of the inheritance, recalculated the child support obligation, and reaffirmed its remaining rulings. The husband now appeals for the second time, arguing that the trial court erred in awarding the wife alimony in solido and in not applying the new incomes shares child support guidelines. We affirm, finding no abuse of discretion in the award of alimony in solido, and holding that the husband cannot raise the revised child support guidelines for the first time on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Paul H. Martin v. Billy W. Long
This case is based on the existence of an oral contract. The trial court determined that there was insufficient proof on damages to allow the plaintiff any recovery. We remand the case for findings about the existence and terms of the alleged oral contract. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals |
