Chris Birdwell, and wife Virginia Birdwell, v. David Psimer and Patty S. Psimer
Action for Judgment on loan was defended on grounds defendant sold note to plaintiffs. The Trial Court held agreements violated statute of frauds and plaintiff failed to prove loan. On appeal, we reverse.Action for Judgment on loan was defended on grounds defendant sold note to plaintiffs. The Trial Court held agreements violated statute of frauds and plaintiff failed to prove loan. On appeal, we reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Castleton Capital Company, LLC. v. Lucius E. Burch, III
The Plaintiff filed suit seeking to recover a deficiency on a loan executed by the Defendant and another left owing after foreclosure upon real estate. The Defendant had purchased a parcel of real estate from a company in which he was a director, and had assumed responsibility for repayment of a loan secured by that real estate. The Defendant denied liability, and alleged mutual mistake and negligent misrepresentation surrounding the loan against the lender because the loan documents he signed contained language regarding cross-collateralization involving a separate parcel of real estate formerly owned by the company in which the Defendant was a director, which real estate was sold two days prior to assumption of the loan obligations by the Defendant. Following a bench trial, the Chancellor granted judgment for the Plaintiff for $134,127.65 and attorneys' fees totaling $73,417.37, for a total judgment of $207,545.02. The Defendant appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Great River Insurance v. Edison Automation, Inc.
The Plaintiff filed suit for Declaratory Judgment seeking the order of the Court declaring that losses suffered by the insured were not covered losses under a general policy of business insurance. At issue is the interpretation of the insurance contract and a determination as to whether insurance coverage existed where the insured expended money and time fabricating parts for a custom project upon the mistaken belief that it had obtained a sub-contract, but where no such agreement existed inasmuch as the purchase order upon which the insured relied was forged by an employee of the insured. Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by each party. The Trial Court granted the insurance company's motion for Summary Judgment, from which the insured appealed. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the Trial Court, and also determine that Declaratory Judgment should be granted in favor of the insurance company, determining that no coverage exists for the loss suffered by the insured. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William W. York v. Tennessee Board of Parole
Appellant is an inmate of the Department of Corrections serving two life sentences for two first degree murder convictions with sentences imposed in 1978. He became eligible for parole, and on July 3, 2001, a hearing was held before the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. His application for parole was denied on July 3, 2001 and review of parole was set for July of 2011. Final disposition denying parole was entered October 2, 2001. On October 29, 2001, Appellant petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, which petition was dismissed by the trial court on January 10, 2003. We affirm the trial court Order of Dismissal relative to the merits of the denial of parole but hold that postponement of parole review until July of 2011 was an arbitrary exercise of power by the parole board and, therefore, reverse the Order of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gloria Windsor v. DeKalb County Board of Education, et al.
This appeal involves an attempt by a dismissed tenured teacher to obtain common-law certiorari review of her dismissal. After voluntarily dismissing her own Petition for Review properly filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-513, she challenges the chancellor's Order dismissing her Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari. We affirm the action of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Patrick N. Lawson v. Bridget O'Malley
This case involves the subject matter jurisdiction of Juvenile Court. The mother and the father were divorced by final decree entered in Chancery Court in 1990. The final Chancery Court decree provided that the mother would have custody of the parties’ two children, and that the father would pay child support to the mother. Subsequently, the father filed a dependency and neglect action in Juvenile Court, and he was awarded permanent custody of the children. Subsequently, he filed a petition in the Juvenile Court below for child support. The Juvenile Court granted the father’s petition, ordering the mother to pay child support to the father. The mother now appeals. We reverse, finding that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to decide matters of child support between these parties, because the Chancery Court had previously assumed jurisdiction over such issues. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charlie Spell, III D/B/A CNS Management, et al., v. Patti Labelle, et al.
Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based upon an arbitration provision contained in the parties’ contract. The trial court entered an order staying litigation pending arbitration but found the site provision, providing that all disputes shall be settled by arbitration in Chicago, Illinois, unconscionable. The trial court reformed the parties’ contract so that the arbitration would be governed by Tennessee law and occur in Memphis, Tennessee. Defendants appealed this decision. We reverse in part, affirm in part and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Monumental Life Insurance Company v. Linda Elain Donoho, et al.
In this interpleader action, two former spouses of the decedent who are mothers of the decedent's three surviving children filed conflicting claims under two marital dissolution agreements alleging beneficial interests in a $50,000 life insurance policy. One claimed an interest for herself; the other claimed an interest for her two children. The matters in dispute arise from inconsistencies in marital dissolution agreements resulting from the decedent's two divorces, and pertain to the duty of the decedent to maintain life insurance and the beneficiary designations. The trial court granted one of two competing motions for summary judgment ruling against the second wife by dividing the proceeds equally among the decedent's three children. We reverse and modify holding that the second wife, not the decedent's third child, was the designated beneficiary of the disputed policy pursuant to the second marital dissolution agreement and that the decedent's first two children had vested interests in the insurance proceeds as mandated by the first marital dissolution agreement. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Howard Fisher v. State of Tennessee
An inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction filed a claim in the Tennessee Claims Commission for the loss of seventy-eight cartons of cigarettes, which he alleged were removed from his prison cell during a search. The Commission denied his claim. We affirm the Claims Commission. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re: A.M.F and Z.T.F, State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. Lisa Frazier, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The parents appeal from the order of the Juvenile Court of Maury County, terminating their parental rights. Specifically, the parents assert that the grounds cited for termination are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Dept of Children's Srvcs v. Juanita Culbertson; In the Matter of W.J.R.C. and S.D.H.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother appeals from the order of the Juvenile Courtof Marshall County, terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Mother asserts that the grounds cited for termination are not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
The Lauderdale County Bank v. Lisa Wiggins, et al.
Plaintiff Lauderdale County Bank filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the obligations of the parties arising from its payment of a forged check. The trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant Newcourt Financial, holding Newcourt Financial was entitled to the proceeds of the check. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Martin v. Martha Martin
After a sixteen-year marriage and two children, Husband and Wife both filed for divorce. Wife stipulated that Husband was entitled to a divorce. After hearing the evidence, the trial court fashioned a parenting plan which named Mother the primary residential parent with visitation for Husband; accepted the parties' stipulation with respect to the marital property; divided the remaining contested marital property; and ordered the parties to pay their own attorney's fees. Husband appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Stephen Satterfield v. Renata E. Bluhm, M.D., and Occupatient Medical Services, P.C.
Plaintiff's claims for defendants aiding and abetting the State in terminating him and for libel and slander, tortious interference with his employment contract, outrageous conduct, and negligence were dismissed in the Trial Court by summary judgment. Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court's Judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
JJ & TK Corp., et al. v. Board of Commissioners of the City of Fairview, Tennessee, et al.
In this case the defendant, the Board of Commissioners of the City of Fairview, declined to grant a certificate of compliance to the plaintiffs, who sought to operate a retail liquor store at the entrance of Bowie Nature Park in Fairview, Tennessee. The plaintiffs contend they met all the legal requirements in effect at the time of their application; and that the defendant based its decision on a pending ordinance which required a minimum distance of 1000 feet between liquor stores and public parks. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Lee Stevenson v. Tracy Dawn Stevenson
This appeal arises from the trial court’s award of primary residential custody of the parties’ minor |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Nelson Keith Foster v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiff's civil rights action against an Assistant District Attorney for prosecutorial misconduct was dismissed by the Chancellor. On appeal, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Guy Varnadoe v. Shelton McGhee, Jr., et al. - partial Concurrence/Dissent
I concur in the majority opinion’s affirmance of the trial court’s money judgment against defendants in the amount of $10,464.80. However, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion that awards post-judgment interest on the money judgment from the date of entry of the trial court’s judgment in the first trial of this case that was reversed and remanded by this Court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Guy Varnadoe v. Shelton McGhee, Jr., et al.
Following a remand by this Court, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in the amount of $10,464.80 plus post-judgment interest from the time of filing of the trial court’s original judgment. Defendants appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
City of Chattanooga v. Cinema , Inc., et al.
David Franklin ("Franklin") operates an adult bookstore in Chattanooga known as Cinema 1, Inc. ("Cinema 1"). Numerous undercover visits by Chattanooga Police Department officers discovered a significant amount of sexual activity happening at Cinema 1. This sexual activity violated the Chattanooga city ordinance regulating adult oriented establishments. Based on police reports detailing what the undercover officers observed at Cinema 1, the Mayor of Chattanooga revoked Franklin's adult oriented establishment license, a decision later affirmed by the Chattanooga City Council and then the Trial Court. The primary issues on appeal concern whether the Chattanooga ordinance regulating adult oriented establishments provides the necessary procedural safeguards required by the First Amendment to be considered facially constitutional under the federal Constitution. We conclude the licensing scheme provides the necessary First Amendment procedural safeguards. We further conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented to revoke Franklin's license. The judgment of the Trial Court, therefore, is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Julie Jiles, et al. v. State of Tennessee
Julie Jiles ("Plaintiff") and her husband, Bryan Jiles, sued the State of Tennessee ("State") for medical malpractice regarding medical care Plaintiff received at the Sevier County Health Department. The case was tried before the Claims Commission and an Order of Judgment was entered in March of 2003, holding, inter alia, that the standard of care was not breached and dismissing Plaintiff's case. In dicta, the Judgment also suggested that another health care provider was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth W. Mitchell, et al., v. Homer E. Chance, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between neighbors regarding the use of a county road in rural Humphreys County. After one of the landowners began to use the road to cross the neighboring landowners' property, the neighboring landowners erected barricades in the road and later filed a trespass action in the Chancery Court for Humphreys County. The landowners who desired to use the road counterclaimed to establish their right of way along the road. Following a bench trial, the trial court sided with the landowners desiring to use the road. On this appeal, the landowners who desire to prevent the use of the road take issue with the trial court's refusal to consider parol evidence regarding the meaning of the references to the road in the deeds. We affirm the trial court's decision that the references to the road in the deeds are not ambiguous, as well as its decision to admit extrinsic evidence to determine the location of the road. We have also determined that the evidence fully supports the trial court's decision regarding the location and dimensions of the road. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
James O. Ward v. Susan Ampferer Ward
Wife appeals trial court’s ruling on remand that former husband did not dissipate substantial marital assets through extramarital relationship, specifically asserting that the trial court failed to properly consider or apply the two-prong test set forth by the appellate court for determining whether dissipation has occurred. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
AT&T Corp. v. Ruth Johnson, et al.
This appeal concerns a challenge to the Commissioner's franchise and excise tax assessment. On cross-motions for summary judgment the chancellor found for the Commissioner. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven D. Elliott v. Ginger W. Elliott (Ecton)
This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute regarding stock options that were part of the marital estate. The Circuit Court for Davidson County approved a marital dissolution agreement in which the husband agreed to transfer one-half of his employee stock options to the wife as part of the division of the martial estate. After the husband's employer and the employer's brokerage firm declined to transfer the stock options to the wife, she orally requested the husband to exercise the options on her behalf. The value of the employer's stock fell after the husband did not exercise the options. The wife sought to hold the husband in contempt or to modify the divorce decree. The trial court declined to hold the husband in contempt but found that he had impermissibly impeded the division of the martial estate. Accordingly, the court awarded the wife $59,759.25, the stock options' before-tax value had they been exercised on the day the divorce decree was entered. In addition, the court ordered the husband to immediately sell the options originally awarded to the wife and to pay her the proceeds as a credit against the judgment. The court also ordered the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees, as well as prejudgment interest. The husband has appealed. We have determined that the trial court properly concluded that the husband unreasonably impeded the wife's acquisition of the value of the stock options. However, we have determined that the trial court erred by valuing the stock options as of the time of the divorce rather than the time the wife and the husband orally agreed to exercise the options and that the court erred by requiring the husband to exercise his options to pay the judgment. We have also determined that the court erred by awarding the wife prejudgment interest but properly awarded the wife her attorney's fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
