COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Melody Lynn Michael v. John William Michael, Jr.
E2003-01214-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Dale Young

On September 6, 2002, Melody Lynn Michael ("Wife") filed suit against her husband, John William Michael, Jr. ("Husband"), seeking a divorce, custody of the couple's minor child, and ancillary relief. The complaint reflects that Husband is an active-duty member of the United States Air Force. Service of process on Husband was attempted through the Secretary of State "by certified or registered mail" directed to Husband at his acknowledged address in Waldorf, Maryland. The Secretary of State notified the clerk of the trial court that his correspondence to Husband was returned by the United States Postal Service with the notation that it was "refused." When there was no response filed by Husband to Wife's complaint, Wife, on November 25, 2002, filed a motion for default judgment. The motion was heard and granted on January 6, 2003, and subsequently memorialized in a default judgment and judgment of divorce entered January 24, 2003. A motion to set aside the default judgment and judgment of divorce was filed by Husband on February 14, 2003. Following a hearing on April 7, 2003, the trial court entered an order on May 6, 2003, denying the motion. Husband appeals. We affirm.

Tanikia Yolanda Boone v. Houston Gibson, Jr.
E2003-00226-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jacqueline E. Schulten

Tanikia Yolanda Boone (“the tenant”) sued Houston Gibson, Jr. (“the landlord”), seeking damages and other relief for wrongful eviction and for the wrongful withholding of her personal possessions, pursuant to the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“the URLTA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-101, et seq. (1993 & Supp. 2003). The tenant attempted service on the landlord by having the landlord’s process served on Donna Gibson, the landlord’s former wife. After the landlord failed to respond to the complaint, the tenant filed a motion for default judgment. The trial court granted the motion and awarded the tenant damages of $20,000 and attorney’s fees and costs totaling $3,500. Approximately two years later, in response to the tenant’s efforts to execute on her judgment, the landlord filed a motion to dismiss the default judgment on the ground that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Following a hearing on the landlord’s motion, the trial court held that the landlord’s former wife had authority as his agent to accept service of process on his behalf. We affirm.
 

Wincor, Inc. v. John Dunlap
W2002-02522-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge D'Army Bailey

This case involves Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant committed legal malpractice while representing
Plaintiff in certain bankruptcy proceedings. The Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging that the applicable statute of limitations bars the malpractice action, as does the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion, and Plaintiff filed the instant appeal. For
the following reasons, we affirm the ruling of the lower court.

Wellesley Builders, L.L.C. v. Village of Cherry Glen Association, Inc.
M2002-03102-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Special ChancellerClaudia C. Bonnyman

The Homeowners' Association of a residential subdivision organized as a planned unit development assessed maintenance fees against the owner of twenty-two unimproved lots in the subdivision. The owner of those lots filed a suit to obtain a declaration that it was not liable for those fees, alleging that the developer had waived all assessments on vacant lots. The trial court found that the Association was entitled to rescind the waiver, granted summary judgment to the Association, and ordered the lot owners to pay the fees, as well as significant late charges and attorney fees, for a total of over $45,000. We reverse the judgment because there is no evidence in the record that the Board of Directors of the Homeowners' Association ever officially rescinded the waiver, and there is thus a material question of fact as to whether its assessments were valid.

In Re: Estate of Erin Murray Jones
M2002-03073-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Frank Clement, Jr.

This appeal is from a will contest. The trial court entered judgment according to the terms of a settlement agreement between the parties. Appellants contend they withdrew their agreement to the settlement before approval of the agreement by the trial court. They accordingly submit the agreement is not enforceable. We affirm judgment of the trial court enforcing the terms of the settlement agreement.

Crew One Productions, Inc., v. State of Tennessee
M2003-00585-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner W.R. Baker

This is an employment tax case. The State of Tennessee appeals the determination of the Tennessee Claims Commission that Crew One Productions is not liable for Tennessee employment tax by virtue of a federal safe harbor provision known as section 530. We reverse, holding Tennessee is not bound by the federal safe harbor provision.

Mark Edward Igou v. Dinah Carol Igou
E2003-00253-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III

Mark Edward Igou ("Husband") sued Dinah Carol Igou ("Wife) for a divorce. After trial, the Trial Court awarded Wife alimony only to the extent of requiring Husband to "pay all cost of tuition, books, fees, and other charges relating to [Wife's] obtaining a master's degree whether it's in education or any other related field which will increase her compensation" with the restrictions that Wife must complete the course of study within five years from the entry of the Trial Court's order and that Wife must achieve passing grades. Wife appeals the Trial Court's judgment as to alimony and attorney fees. We affirm.

Janice Forsyth, et al., v. Mary N. Cross
E2003-01338-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frank V. Williams, III

This is a boundary-line case. The Defendant's survey evidence was excluded, and reputation evidence offered by the Plaintiff as to the common boundary line was admitted. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Samuel Timothy Collins, v. Knox County, Tennessee, et al., - Concurring
E2003-01421-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I do so because I believe the record before us
reflects undisputed material facts that negate an essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action, i.e., the element of “proximate causation” of the appellant’s damages. I do agree with the appellant that there remains a genuine issue of material fact for the trier of fact as to the element of “cause in fact.” I believe a jury could reasonably find that there is a “cause and effect relationship between the defendant’s tortious conduct and the plaintiff’s injury or loss.” White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W. 2d 525, 529 (Tenn. 1998). As the Supreme Court has pointed out, “cause in fact” addresses the “‘but for’ consequences of an act.” Id. However, in my judgment, the conduct of the Sheriff’s Office, once the deputies arrived at the bank and thereafter took the appellant into custody, conclusively militates against a finding of proximate causation tying the bank’s conduct to the appellant’s damages.

Samuel Timothy Collins v. Knox County, Tennessee, et al.
E2003-01421-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Wheeler A. Rosenbalm

This appeal arises out of a complaint filed by the Appellant, Samuel Timothy Collins, against the
Appellee, NBC Bank, for damages he allegedly incurred as a consequence of his erroneous arrest and incarceration by the Knox County Sheriff’s Department. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

John F. McCarthy v. UT- Battle, L.L.C
E2003-02052-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Russell E. Simmons, Jr.

The Plaintiff was an at-will employee of the Defendant when he was terminated for an asserted cause. In this action he alleges that he was wrongfully terminated because the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Handbook afforded him a contractual right of peer review. The motion of the Defendants for summary judgment was granted upon a finding that the Handbook was not an employment contract. We affirm.

Linda G. Johnson v. Mark Reineke, et al.
E2003-01972-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri S. Bryant

The Petitioner was discharged from her executive position as Director of the Lenoir City Housing Authority for misconduct connected with her employment. The Authority was awarded McKinney Act funds, an audit of which revealed that $156,000.00 of these funds were inappropriately expended, which led to the discharge of the Petitioner.

Linda Ward, Individually and as Natural Child and Surviving Next of Kin of Nellie M. Curlin, Deceased v. Ami Sub (SFH), Inc., et al.
W2003-00965-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rita L. Stotts

This appeal arises from a medical malpractice action. The trial court awarded Defendant Luis A.
Fiallo, M.D., summary judgment based on the statute of limitations and statute of repose. We
affirm.
 

Patricia A. Dye and Roger L. Quillen, Co-Administrators of the Estate of Jimmy Doyle Dye, Deceased, et al. v. R. Louis Murphy, M.D., et al.
W2003-01521-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clayburn L. Peeples

This appeal arises from the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the Defendant in a medical malpractice action. The trial court awarded summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. We affirm.
 

Roy V. Smith, II v. Grace Hutchison (Blair)
W2003-00214-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles V. Moore, Jr.

Father filed a petition for an initial determination of custody against the Mother. Father alleged that he was the fit and proper person for the custody of the child. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the juvenile court entered a judgment and permanent parenting plan which found that the Mother was more comparatively fit to continue serving as the primary residential caregiver. Father appeals the trial court’s judgment. We affirm.
 

Joseph Spivey v. Terry Page, et al.
M2002-00674-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This appeal involves a question of valuation of the shares of a withdrawing shareholder from a professional corporation. We reverse the trial court's determination that the shares had no value and hold that the valuation should have been made as of the date of withdrawal. We also hold that the withdrawing shareholder may recover the value of his shares from the sole remaining shareholder who removed the corporation's assets after the notice of withdrawal.

J.L. Mac-TN, Inc. v. - State of Tennessee, et al.
M2003-01057-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain

J.L. Mac-Tn, Inc. and the State contracted for J.L. Mac's provision of tire shredding services at the various county disposal facilities requiring those services. Subsequent to that contract, the state legislature established new procedures for tire disposal requiring the counties to find an end use for the shredded tires, and eventually prohibiting the land filling of shredded tires. The amount of services required of J.L. Mac under the contract were significantly reduced. J.L. Mac commenced this action seeking damages for alleged breach of the contract for shredding services. The Claims Commission granted summary judgment to the State. From that summary judgment J.L. Mac appeals. We affirm.

The Bradley Factor, Inc., v. Pat Holmes
E2003-01571-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri S. Bryant

In this action based on a personal guaranty agreement, the Trial Court determined there were no disputed issues of material fact and awarded summary judgment on the agreement. Defendant has appealed. We affirm.

Farmers Mutual of Tennessee v. Athens Insurance Agency, Charles W. Spurling and wife, Carolyn Spurling
E2003-01258-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge John B. Hagler, Jr.

In a declaratory judgment action by the insurance company, the Trial Court held insured was entitled to recover under the policy and awarded prejudgment interest and imposed bad faith penalty. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Danny R. Blalock v. Carolyn S. Blalock
E2003-01151-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex Henry Ogle

A mediated agreement provided that Husband would sell his one-half interest in Pigeon Forge property to Wife for $500,000.00, but if the purchase price was not paid in one year, the property would be sold at auction and the net proceeds divided. The property was sold at auction for $244,429.00, net. Wife claims this amount plus $255,271.00 and the trial court agreed.

Jason G. Gulvartian v. Shenna Hope Gulvartian
E2002-03117-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge William H. Russell

The Trial Court in this divorce action awarded child support for the two children of the parties and attorney's fees to the mother. The father appeals. We affirm, as modified.

Dominic Pellicano v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
M2003-00292-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carol L. Soloman

Plaintiff, who had a pre-existing herniated disk, was rear-ended in a vehicular accident seven weeks after the first injury. A diskectomy was performed six months later. Treating physician equivocated when asked whether the diskectomy was necessitated by the second injury, testifying, "maybe yes; maybe no." Trial court found that Plaintiff's need for surgery was caused by incident and awarded Plaintiff judgment against Defendant for all medical expenses related to the surgery, lost wages and pain and suffering. Plaintiff did not present sufficient proof to establish that incident was cause in fact of need for surgery for physician could not state with reasonable degree of medical certainty that need for surgery was the result of the incident. Further, lay testimony of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's brother was insufficient to prove cause in fact of Plaintiff's need for surgery. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court.

Fred Slaughter, et al., v. Laura Leigh Slaughter, et al.
E2003-01146-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor G. Richard Johnson

In this appeal from the Chancery Court for Washington County the Appellant, Daniel Bruce Crowe, contends that the Chancery Court erred in finding Mr. Crowe and his attorney in contempt and in its award of attorney fees. We affirm and remand.

Basil Marceaux v. The Citizen David Norton
E2003-02199-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III

Basil Marceaux (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against “The Citizen David Norton.” David Norton (“Defendant”) is the Soddy Daisy City Court Judge. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit because Defendant had found him guilty of violating the Tennessee Financial Responsibility Law and imposed a fine. Plaintiff claims these actions by Defendant violated his federal constitutional rights. The Trial Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint after concluding, inter alia, that Defendant was judicially immune. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

In re: M.E.A. by: Elizabeth Joy Argo Exum, et al. v. Kimberly Darlene Moody, et al.
W2003-01669-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry McKenzie

This is an appeal of a termination of parental rights case. Appellant mother contends that the
petitioners have no standing to bring the petition and also that the petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds for termination and that the termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm.