COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

In the Matter of the Estate of Nola Layne Deskins, Nona Deskins Sanders, Lioubov V. Deskins, and Estate of Thomas A. Deskins, v. Randall Deskins and Thelma Deskins & Thelma Deskins
E2003-00427-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jeffrey D. Rader

In this Estate dispute, the Trial Court dismissed claims of two claimants. We affirm, dismissal of claimant who died on grounds his Estate had no standing to proceed. We reinstate the action of the other claimant on grounds she is not estopped to maintain her action.

Sevier Court of Appeals

John McConkey v. State of Tennessee
M2002-02671-COA-R12-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner W.R. Baker

John McConkey ("Plaintiff") had a vasectomy performed by a state-employed doctor. Plaintiff experienced swelling and pain after the operation, which he claimed caused him to lose time at work and caused problems in his marriage. Plaintiff underwent two subsequent surgeries including the removal of his left testicle. Plaintiff brought this claim against the doctor who performed the vasectomy. Plaintiff had no expert witness at trial. After trial, the Claims Commission ("Commission") entered an order holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff did not carry his burden of proof to establish a res ipsa loquitur case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Court of Appeals

Angela Kamille Draper, as parent, survivor, and next friend of Bryanna Faith Draper, deceased v. State of Tennessee
E2002-02722-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Commissioner Vance Cheek

In action against the State of Tennessee and a state employee, the Commissioner held he had no jurisdiction of the claims. On appeal, we affirm.

Sullivan Court of Appeals

Linda Laws, Estate of Mary Eula Sloat, Deceased v. Water and Light Commission of Greeneville
E2002-01152-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben K. Wexler

This appeal questions whether the Trial Court erred in its judgment against the Appellant/Defendant, Water and Light Commission of the Town of Greeneville, Tennessee, for personal injuries sustained by a Greeneville resident as a result of the smoking of sewer lines by the Appellant. We affirm This appeal questions whether the Trial Court erred in its judgment against the Appellant/Defendant, Water and Light Commission of the Town of Greeneville, Tennessee, for personal injuries sustained by a Greeneville resident as a result of the smoking of sewer lines by the Appellant. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

Greene Court of Appeals

Shawn E. McWhorter v. Randall Bare
E2002-02896-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: W. Neil Thomas, III
Professional pilot Shawn E. McWhorter ("Plaintiff") sued Randall Barre ("Defendant") for defamation based upon a letter Defendant wrote to the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") containing allegations that plaintiff was medically unfit to be a pilot. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages and $42,500 in punitive damages. The trial court entered its judgment, as later amended, in favor of plaintiff against defendant for $105,820.01, consisting of compensatory damages of $25,000, punitive damages of $42,500, and attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $38,320.01. The trial court's award of attorney fees and expenses was based upon defendant's refusal to admit liability in response to requests for admission. Defendant appeals. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

In Re: Lillie Odessie Green, Decedent
M2002-01672-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Royce Taylor
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.
The court is asked to construe the following language contained in a form will: "I give all my estate to my children, if any, who survive me in equal shares, per stirpes." The testatrix was survived by four of her five children. The trial court held that the two children of the testatrix's child who predeceased her did not take any of her estate. We hold likewise.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Barbara Lee Bunce Kerce v. Stephen Paul Kerce
M2002-01744-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Lee Russell
The appellant Stephen Paul Kerce challenges the divorce decree entered in Moore County Circuit Court, alleging that the court erred in its valuation and distribution of the marital estate. We affirm.

Moore Court of Appeals

In Re: The Estate of Merle Halliburton Neal Myers v. Farmers & Merchants Bank Corp., Inc. Brooksie Byers, Douglas Myers, James Myers
M2002-00888-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

After the death of their elderly mother, her sons discovered that the decedent's stepson and his wife had used a power of attorney to transfer the funds from the decedent's $20,000 CD to themselves. The decedent's son filed a petition to have the money restored to her estate. The trial court held that the CD was a valid inter vivos gift from the decedent. We reverse, because there is no evidence in the record that such a gift was ever made.

Stewart Court of Appeals

M2002-02661-COA-R3-CV
M2002-02661-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Department of Children's Services v. C.L. & M.T.
M2001-02729-COA-R3-JV
Trial Court Judge: Andrei E. Lee
At issue in this appeal is the petition filed by the Department of Children's Services to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father to nine of their children. After a trial, the trial court granted the petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father based on abandonment, failure to comply with the Permanency Plans, and persistence of the conditions which led to the removal. Each parent independently appeals the decision of the trial court, arguing that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's ruling. Because we find that grounds for termination were not proved as to either parent, we reverse the judgment terminating Father's and Mother's parental rights.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Jasmine A. Ali v. Eric N. Fisher, et al.
E2003-00255-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
After an automobile accident in which she suffered serious injuries, Jasmine A. Ali ("Plaintiff") sued both the driver of the automobile, Eric N. Fisher ("Fisher"), and the owner of the automobile, Thomas Scheve ("Scheve"). The claim against Scheve was based on negligent entrustment. Prior to trial, Plaintiff and Scheve were in sharp disagreement as to whether Scheve's alleged negligent entrustment resulted in Scheve's being vicariously liable for Fisher's conduct, or whether Scheve's negligence should be apportioned by the jury pursuant to comparative fault principles. The trial court concluded Scheve's alleged negligent entrustment should be apportioned by the jury pursuant to comparative fault principles. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and apportioned fault, 80% to Fisher and 20% to Scheve based on his negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Fisher. The trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment asking the trial court to reverse its earlier pre-trial ruling and hold Scheve vicariously liable for Fisher's negligence because Scheve negligently entrusted the vehicle to Fisher. The trial court granted the motion and amended the judgment which, in effect, held Scheve and Fisher jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the jury's award. Scheve appeals. We hold the trial court erred when it amended the original judgment after concluding, post- trial, that Scheve was vicariously liable for Fisher's conduct. We vacate the amended judgment and reinstate the original judgment of the trial court entered in accordance with the jury's verdict apportioning fault.

Sullivan Court of Appeals

Lindsay Alford vs. Oak Ridge City Schools
E2002-03133-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
Lindsay E. Alford ("the plaintiff") and her father, David R. Alford, IV, sued The Oak Ridge City Schools ("the high school") under the Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA") for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she slipped on a hallway floor at Oak Ridge High School, where she was a student. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's proof, the trial court granted the high school's motion for an involuntary dismissal, finding that, while the plaintiff had proven the existence of water on the floor, she had failed to prove that the high school knew or should have known about the water. From this ruling, the plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Anderson Court of Appeals

TGJ & Co. vs. Michael E. MaGill
E2003-00298-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John F. Weaver
Margaret E. Bowers ("the Claimant") appeals the judgment of the trial court, which reversed an administrative determination of the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development ("the Commissioner"). The Commissioner had held that the Claimant is eligible for unemployment compensation as a result of the termination of her employment with TGJ & Co., Inc. ("the Employer"). Because we hold that the Claimant voluntarily quit her employment without good cause, we affirm the trial court.

Knox Court of Appeals

W2003-00129-COA-R3-CV
W2003-00129-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood

Crockett Court of Appeals

Dianna Dawn Mcgahey v. Davis Lee Mcgahgey
W2003-01051-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon

Carroll Court of Appeals

In Re: The Estate of Lowell Frazier
E2002-01203-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
This appeal concerns two separate suits filed in the Chancery Court for Campbell County in connection with the administration of the Estate of Lowell Frazier. The first suit was brought by Sam Lough, individually, and also, along with his wife, Debbie Lough, as parents and guardians of Matthew Lough, and Darryl Herron and Elizabeth Herron, as parents and guardians of Chelsea Herron. It sought to establish a lost or spoilated will of Mr. Frazier, which was dated January 30, 1998 ("the first will"). The second suit was brought by Matthew Lough and Chelsea Herron by and through their guardian ad litem, appointed in the first case, contesting a later will dated May 24, 2000 ("the second will"). The cases were consolidated below and the suit seeking to establish the first will was tried first. Under an agreement of the parties, the first case must be decided in favor of the minors before they would have standing to contest the second will. After a plenary trial a jury found as to the first case that the Plaintiffs proved by clear and convincing evidence that Lowell Frazier did not destroy the first will. Thereupon, the second trial was had before the same jury, which found against the second will on the ground that due execution was not proved and that Glenda Faye Smith, who was the sole beneficiary of the second will, and at the time it was executed was attorney-in-fact for Mr. Frazier, did not overcome the presumption of undue influence over Mr. Frazier by clear and convincing evidence. Ms. Smith raises a number of issues, many of which merit a critical examination, but our review of the record persuades us that the issue which contends that she was entitled to a directed verdict in the first case is the dispositive issue in this appeal. We find that the Court was in error in not directing a verdict in her favor in the lost will case and reverse the judgment rendered therein. This results in the Plaintiffs not having standing to pursue the second case, which is reversed and dismissed.

Campbell Court of Appeals

James Tate v. Glenda Tate
M2002-01749-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
This appeal concerns the propriety of the trial court's property division between divorcing parties. As part of its division of the marital property, the trial court ordered that Husband transfer a home, which was his separate property, to Wife. The trial court also awarded Wife $4,500.00 as her interest in a Mercedes automobile which the parties purchased for $15,000.00. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Robertson Court of Appeals

Donovan Davis v. Ray Maples
M2002-02564-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
An inmate brought this action to seek judicial review of the Board of Paroles decision to deny him parole. Because a prisoner has no liberty interest in early release, we affirm the dismissal of the due process claims brought herein. We affirm dismissal of that portion of the petition that alleges that the denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious, but specifically hold that Mr. Davis may pursue administrative appeal of that denial. We reverse dismissal of the claim that the Board's decision to defer Mr. Davis's next meeting with the Board for eleven years is not arbitrary and capricious, and remand that claim for further proceedings.

Davidson Court of Appeals

00521-COA-R3-JV
00521-COA-R3-JV
Trial Court Judge: Barry R. Brown

Sumner Court of Appeals

Ernest W. Sipe v. F. Raymond Porter
E2002-02938-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
Ernest W. Sipe ("Plaintiff") sued F. Raymond Porter, M.D. ("Dr. Porter") regarding Dr. Porter's medical care of Gladys Louise Sipe. Plaintiff filed his expert's affidavit. Plaintiff's expert then was deposed. During this deposition, defense counsel questioned Plaintiff's expert about portions of Ms. Sipe's medical record that Plaintiff's expert had not reviewed previously. Dr. Porter then filed a motion for partial summary judgment. After his deposition, Plaintiff's expert reviewed all of the previously unreviewed records, and Plaintiff then filed a supplemental affidavit of his expert. The Trial Court applied the rule of cancellation and found that Plaintiff's expert's opinions were contradictory and that his testimony as an expert witness should be cancelled and disregarded as competent proof in this case. The Trial Court then granted Dr. Porter's motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand.

Knox Court of Appeals

Sheryle Hydas vs Herman Hydas
E2002-02943-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
In this divorce action the Trial Court valued marital and non-marital property and divided marital property. Husband appealed the Trial Court's decision on these issues. We affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Judy Carolyn Lawson vs. Cynthia Gale Rines
E2002-02152-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
This is a wrongful death action. The Trial Court excluded proof of the deceased's Social Security benefits at trial. Judy Carolyn Lawson ("Plaintiff") made an offer of proof showing only the amount of monthly Social Security benefits received. The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff's favor, and the Trial Court granted Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest. Service Radio Cab Co., Inc. ("Defendant") appeals the award of prejudgment interest. Plaintiff appeals regarding the exclusion of proof of Social Security benefits. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.

Knox Court of Appeals

Sevier County vs. John Waters, Trustee
E2002-02309-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II
This is a land condemnation case. On November 18, 1988, Sevier County ("the County") filed a petition for condemnation seeking to condemn property in the county for a new jail. The petition was tried to a jury some 13 plus years later, on June 19 and 20, 2002. The jury awarded compensation of $335,500. This verdict was $158,500 more than the amount deposited in court by the County. The trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict; the trial court supplemented the award by an award of pre-judgment interest of $267,468.75 and decreed that the total judgment of $425,968.75 would accrue interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The County appeals, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in excluding evidence pertaining to a controversy over the ownership of the property; (2) that pre-judgment interest is discretionary with the court and that the court below should have considered the disputes among the property owners as a factor impacting the delay in getting this matter to trial; (3) that the trial court erred in the way it calculated pre-judgment interest; and (4) that the trial court erred in decreeing that the judgment of $425,968.75 would accrue post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum. We affirm.

Sevier Court of Appeals

Donald Xiques vs. Charme Knight
E2003-00435-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
Plaintiff sued defendant claiming defendant divulged confidential information to FBI and that agency refused to hire him, due to defendant's action, which violated his constitutional right to privacy. The Trial Court ruled that plaintiff was estopped to maintain action because he had been unsuccessful in a prior action in the federal court against the same defendant. On Appeal, we affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

Bill Goins vs. Creditcorp
E2002-01927-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
This appeal reaches us in the form of several consolidated class action lawsuits. In each action the Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants, who are owners and/or operators of check cashing companies, effectively made short-term loans to Plaintiffs and charged them exorbitant and usurious interest rates, in violation of various state and federal statutes. After negotiation, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which was presented to and approved by the Trial Court. At issue in this appeal is the interpretation of a provision in the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs filed a "motion to enforce" which alleged that Defendants violated the settlement agreement by willfully failing to forgive and release certain debts of Plaintiffs resulting from transactions taking place on or before September 30, 1997. Defendants argued, among other things, that the agreement did not require them to release the debts at issue. The Trial Court dismissed Plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement agreement. We vacate the Court's judgment and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.

Bradley Court of Appeals