Vesta Mosley vs. Tennessee Water Service & Sales E2000-01713-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Anderson County the Defendant/Appellant, Tennessee Water Service and Sales, Inc., appeals the Circuit Court's order which denied Tennessee Water's motion for a new trial and overruled its objection to entry of a final judgment in favor of Plaintiff/ Appellee, Vesta G. Mosley. It is our finding that Tennessee Water did not receive notice of the hearing which resulted in the final judgment against it and, therefore, we vacate such judgment and reverse the Circuit Court's order overruling Tennessee Water's objection to entry of the judgment and its motion for a new trial. We remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Anderson
Court of Appeals
Harold Lovelace, D/B/A The Last Chance Club, et al vs. City of Knoxville E2000-01609-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
In this Declaratory Judgment action the Trial Court held portions of a City Ordinance unconstitutional relative to notice provisions, the term "open for business" and "open display". We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Roy Malone vs. Harleysville Mutual In. Co. E2000-01308-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Howell N. Peoples
This matter involves a dispute concerning a fire and casualty insurance policy ("Policy") which covered an apartment complex, Star Chase Apartments. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company ("Defendant") was the insurance carrier, and the named insured was John L. Oliver, LLC ("Oliver"). A fire in one of the apartment buildings caused substantial damage. Approximately six months later, Oliver sold Star Chase to Roy M. Malone, Sr. ("Plaintiff"), prior to starting any repairs to the burned building. Oliver also assigned to Plaintiff his right to the proceeds under the Policy, and Defendant acknowledged this assignment. The Trial Court found that Plaintiff, as Oliver's assignee, was entitled to recover the replacement cost of the burned building, plus prejudgment interest. The Trial Court denied Plaintiff recovery for business loss. Plaintiff appeals the amount awarded to him as the replacement cost and the Trial Court's denial of any additional recovery for business loss. Defendant argues that the assignment of the "proceeds" to Plaintiff did not entitle Plaintiff to recover any amount as replacement cost for repairs done after the assignment. Defendant also objects to the amount of the replacement cost found by the Trial Court and to the awarding of prejudgment interest. We reverse the Trial Court's award of prejudgment interest and affirm all other aspects of the judgment.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Judy (Kendrick) Shoemake vs. Timothy Lee Kendrick E2000-01318-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: William M. Dender
In this appeal from the Chancery Court for Hamilton County the Appellant, Judy (Kendrick) Shoemake questions whether the Trial Court erred in granting a petition to modify custody filed by the Appellee, Timothy Lee Kendrick, and whether the Trial Court erred in its determination of the amount due her for child support arrearage and unreimbursed medical expenses paid by her on behalf of the parties' minor children. We reverse in part, modify in part and remand for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of the appeal against Judy (Kendrick) Shoemake and Timothy Lee Kendrick equally.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
FTA Enterprises, Inc. vs. Pomeroy Computer Resources, Inc. & Daniel Cole E2000-01246-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: John S. Mclellan, III
In this action for interference with business relations, interference with contract, breach of fiduciary duty, et., a jury awarded both compensatory and punitive damages in differing amounts against the defendants. The Trial Judge approved the jury verdicts and defendants have appealed. We affirm.
In this suit the Plaintiffs seek damages for injuries received by Barbara Jo Heck when she slipped on a patch of ice and fell on property owned by the City of Sevierville. The Trial Court found that the City had no actual or constructive notice of the presence of the ice causing Mrs. Heck to fall and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint. We affirm under Rule 10(a) of the Court of Appeals.
This appeal arises from a landlord-tenant dispute over damage to residential property. After the landlords obtained a $3,600 judgment in the Smith County General Sessions Court, the tenants appealed to the Circuit Court for Smith County. A jury awarded the landlords $4,500. On this appeal, the appellants assert that the trial court erred by (1) permitting the landlords' lawyer to exercise a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner, (2) permitting the landlords' lawyer to make prejudicial statements to the jury during opening argument, (3) providing a supplemental instruction in response to the jury's question, and (4) failing to enter a detailed order denying their motion for new trial. We find nothing deficient in the trial court's order denying the motion for new trial. In addition, the absence of either a transcript or a statement of the evidence or proceedings prevents us from considering the substance of the tenants' other issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and find that the appeal is frivolous.
In this case the plaintiffs are seeking damages for personal injuries received in a vehicle accident. The plaintiffs were exiting the interstate and were bumped from the rear by the vehicle driven by Mrs. Warren. While other facts relating to the accident were disputed, it was undisputed that there was no physical injury to either of the vehicles or their contents. The police were not called to the scene and no report was made. The plaintiffs filed suit to collect damages for injuries to Mrs. Hapney's neck which she claimed were received in the accident. The jury found no negligence on the part of the defendants. One of the doctors, who saw Mrs. Hapney, testified for the defendants in the case as to causation of Mrs. Hapney's injuries. In their motion for a new trial and on appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the doctor. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The plaintiffs appeal challenging the jury verdict and the admission of the doctor's testimony. We affirm the trial court.
Sevier
Court of Appeals
Ronald L. Davis v. Donal Campbell M1997-00234-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner serving a 99-year sentence and the Department of Correction regarding the calculation of the prisoner's release eligibility date. After the Department declined to issue a declaratory order changing his release eligibility date, the prisoner filed an action in the Chancery Court for Davidson County asserting that the Department had incorrectly classified him as a Class X felon because he had not been convicted of a Class X crime, and he had not received credit for jail time served prior to his prison sentence. The Commissioner of Correction moved to dismiss the complaint, and the trial court, after converting the Commissioner's motion to a motion for summary judgment, dismissed the prisoner's complaint. On this appeal, the prisoner essentially reargues the same issues raised in his complaint. We have determined that the trial court correctly concluded that the material facts are not in dispute and that the Commissioner is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment
The biological father appeals the termination of his parental rights which allowed the adoption of his two children by the stepfather after the mother's death. Although the evidence that the father abandoned his children was clear and convincing, the proof, when supplemented with post-judgment facts, was insufficient to determine whether termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We remand for a hearing on the children's best interests.
This case concerns the modification of a child support award. In addition to the child for whom support was set in the instant case, the obligor father had three other children. At one point in the past, he was required by court order to support these three other children; but, by the time of the hearing below, his obligation had been terminated except for an arrearage on which he was continuing to pay. In determining the proper award in the instant case, the trial court considered the father's other three children and deviated from the Child Support Guidelines due to the father's "hardship." The State, as assignee of the mother's right to child support, appeals. We modify the trial court's award.
The controlling issues in this appeal are (1) whether under the terms of an employee policy manual the dismissed employee was something other than an employee at will, and (2) whether the action of the Board of the Shelbyville Housing Authority in upholding the dismissal was arbitrary or illegal or lacked material evidence to support it. The Chancery Court of Bedford County reviewed the record and found that the Board’s action was supported by substantial and material evidence and was not arbitrary nor illegal. We affirm.
Bedford
Court of Appeals
Katrinka Stalsworth, et al vs. Robert Grummon M2000-02352-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Arthur E. Mcclellan
This appeal involves the dismissal of a patient's medical malpractice complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. After the patient voluntarily dismissed her first complaint following opening arguments, the Circuit Court for Sumner County ordered her to pay her surgeon $3,023.85 in discretionary costs. The patient did not pay the discretionary costs she had previously been ordered to pay. After the patient refiled her complaint, the trial court stayed the proceedings on the surgeon's motion and later dismissed the patient's complaint for failure to prosecute and for failure to comply with the court's order directing her to pay the surgeon's discretionary costs. On this appeal, the patient asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing her renewed complaint. We affirm the trial court because the patient had ample warning that her claim was subject to dismissal and had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the trial court's order directing her to pay the surgeon's discretionary costs.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
Orion Pacific, Inc. vs. Exchange Plastics Company M2000-02345-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
The defendant Ohio company purchased truckloads of plastic from the Tennessee division of a Texas company. When the Ohio company refused to pay for all the plastic, the Texas company filed suit for the balance in a Tennessee court. The defendant argued that it did not have sufficient contact with Tennessee to subject it to personal jurisdiction in this state's courts. The trial court disagreed, and following a hearing, rendered a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $11,288. We affirm.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Elizabeth Moxham vs. Eric Crafton, et a l M2000-00803-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
During the trial of a construction dispute, the parties reached a settlement in the hallway of the courthouse, and subsequently announced the terms of their agreement to the trial court. Before the agreed order was entered, however, the plaintiff attempted to withdraw her consent. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred by signing and entering the agreed order, and by denying her motion to set it aside. We affirm the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Michael Ray Brenneman vs. Margaret Ann Redd Brenneman M2000-00890-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
This appeal involves the dissolution of a 31-year marriage by the Circuit Court for Wilson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the parties divorced and divided their marital property but declined to award the wife spousal support. On this appeal, the wife asserts that the trial court erred by declining to grant her spousal support. We have determined that the trial court placed too much emphasis on the value of the wife's share of the marital estate when it declined to grant her spousal support. Accordingly, we have determined that the judgment should be amended to award the wife spousal support in the amount of $200 per month until she reaches sixty-five years of age. We also remand the case to the trial court to calculate a reasonable award for the wife's legal expenses.
Wilson
Court of Appeals
Sharon Glenn v. Gordon Construction, Inc., et al. M2000-01805-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
Plaintiff filed suit against construction company for negligent repair of tornado damage to her home. Parties submitted an Agreed Order of Compromise, Settlement, and Dismissal which was signed by the trial court and filed on the same day it was received. The construction company retained new counsel and filed a motion to set aside the order. Plaintiff sought contempt because the construction company refused to comply with the Agreed Order. Months later Plaintiff issued execution against construction company after failure to comply with the terms of the Agreed Order and garnished over $11,000 from its bank account. The trial court denied a motion to quash execution filed by the construction company. The construction company appeals arguing that the agreed order could not have been entered after one of the parties withdrew consent for the settlement. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Daniel Sherwood v. Microsoft M2000-01850-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Daniel Sherwood v. Microsoft M2000-01850-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
Davidson
Court of Appeals
State vs. Ewing W2000-01190-COA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Roy Morgan
This is an appeal by a juvenile from an order of the circuit court granting the State's motion to dismiss her petition for post-commitment relief. The grounds stated in the petition are that she was given an illegal sentence when the juvenile court, having found her delinquent in that she committed "theft under $500.00, violation of aftercare," imposed a determinate sentence of 2 years. We reverse and remand.
Madison
Court of Appeals
Walter Cunningham/David Cunningham vs. John Patterson W2000-01486-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers
This is a tort case involving trespass, assault and battery. The plaintiffs, father and son, sued the defendant, the son's neighbor, after an altercation between the father and the neighbor. Following a bench trial, the trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed trespass against the son, and assault and battery against the father, and the trial court awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The defendant neighbor appeals. We affirmed in part, reverse in part and modify, finding that there is not clear and convincing evidence to support an award of punitive damages, and that the evidence preponderates in favor of a reduced amount of compensatory damages.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Kristen Bridges vs. Carla King W2000-01919-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George E. Blancett
Paternity of minor child was established by a juvenile court consent order entered November 26, 1991, and custody of the child was awarded to Mother. In January, 2000, Father filed a petition to change custody on the basis of change of circumstances and the best interest of the child which was granted by the juvenile court referee. The referee's findings and recommendations were confirmed and made the decree of the court on May 25, 2000. Subsequently, on Mother's petition, an evidentiary hearing was held before the juvenile judge, and on July 6, 2000, after the evidentiary hearing, an order was entered reconfirming the referee's ruling of May 25, 2000. Mother has appealed. We reverse.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Charter Lakeside Behavioral Health vs. Tennessee Health Facilities Comm., et al M1998-00985-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal involves a dispute arising out of the construction of a mental health treatment facility in Shelby County. As the facility neared completion, a corporation operating a competing facility filed a petition with the Tennessee Health Facilities Commission seeking a declaratory order that the new facility could not begin operating until it obtained a certificate of need. After the Commission declined to render a declaratory order, the competing corporation petitioned the Chancery Court for Davidson County for a declaratory judgment that the new facility could not begin operating without a certificate of need. The trial court initially dismissed the petition because of the competitor's delay in challenging the construction of the facility. After this court reversed and remanded the case for further consideration, the trial court remanded the case to the Commission to determine whether the new facility had been constructed before the certificate of need laws had been expanded to cover such facilities. On this appeal both the competing corporation and the Commission assert that the trial court erred by not rendering a declaratory judgment based on the existing administrative record. While this appeal was pending, the competing corporation sold its Shelby County facility to another corporation but retained its interest in this litigation. We have determined that this appeal no longer involves a justiciable issue because the competing corporation no longer operates a facility in Shelby County and, therefore, is not entitled to judicial relief. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial court with directions to dismiss the petition for declaratory judgment.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Keehn Hosier vs. Crye-Leike Commercial, Inc. M2000-01182-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal involves a dispute regarding the application of an attorney's fees provision in a property management agreement. The property owner filed suit against the property manager in the Chancery Court for Sumner County alleging not only breach of contract but also fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the property owner a $1,600 judgment for breach of contract and dismissed his remaining claims. Thereafter, the trial court awarded the property owner an additional $15,944 for his legal fees and $219 in discretionary costs. The property manager has appealed only from the award for legal fees, asserting that the property owner is not entitled to reimbursement for the legal fee associated with his unsuccessful tort claims. We have determined that the challenged legal services were necessary to counter the property manager's exculpatory clause defense and that the challenged legal fees, under all the circumstances, are reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's $15,944 award for legal fees.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
AT & T v. Ruth Johnson M2000-01407-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This case involves (1) the issue of the liability of AT&T for sales and use taxes assessed by the Commissioner for the years 1990 through 1994, and (2) the issue of whether the Chancery Court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim for refund of taxes where the taxpayer failed to file a formal claim for each of the years, 1993 excepted, "under oath and supported by proper proof." AT&T sold telephone central office equipment and provided engineering services to BellSouth and insisted that these sales and services were industrial machinery and therefore exempt from sales and use taxes.
