Jerry Lynn Shorter vs. Margaret Mae Shorter - Concurring
In this divorce action the Trial Court decreed the parties’ separate marital property, divided the marital estate, and granted the parties a divorce pursuant to T.C.A. §36 -4-129(b).
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Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Beam vs. United Services
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Court of Appeals | ||
Reagan vs. Malone
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Westwood vs. Moore
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Court of Appeals | ||
Parman vs. Swatzell
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Court of Appeals | ||
Dick Moore vs. GreenTree Financial
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Devona Mills vs. Immual Mills
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jenkins Subway vs. Lynn Jones
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Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Jan Cagle vs. Steve Cagle
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Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn Love vs. Shelby Co.
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Court of Appeals | ||
Dannenhold vs. Knoxville Pathology Group
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Dannenhold vs. Knoxville Pathology Group
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sommerville vs. Sommerville
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Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Dept. of Human Services vs. Fineout
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Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Peggy Jean Bradford, v. James William Anderson and Myra Alea, In Re: Rachel Anderson, D/O/B 10/20/1990
This is a custody dispute between the child's father and the child's maternal grandmother, who was nominated as the custodian in the will of the child's mother. The Circuit Court of Coffee County awarded custody to the father and his mother. We affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Blick vs. Kent
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Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Barnett vs. Barnett
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Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Baltz vs. Knight
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Maury | Court of Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Court of Appeals | ||
Deborah H. Steele v. Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc., and David Twombley - Concurring
The plaintiff, Deborah H. Steele (“Steele”), brought this action against her former employer, Superior Home Health Care of Chattanooga, Inc. (“Superior”), and her former supervisor, David Twombley (“Twombley”)1, alleging that she was the victim of, among other things, sexual harassment, outrageous conduct, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. After various other claims were dismissed by the trial court2, the case proceeded to trial before a jury on Steele’s claim of sexual harassment against both Superior and Twombley under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, T.C.A. § 4-21-101, et seq. (“THRA”), and her claim of outrageous conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress, against Twombley alone. The jury found in favor of Steele on all of the remaining theories of recovery and awarded her $1.2 million in compensatory damages and $60,000 in punitive damages. The trial court also awarded Steele attorney’s fees and costs against both defendants. After Steele accepted a remittitur that eliminated the punitive damages award and reduced the compensatory damages award to $850,000, both Superior and Twombley appealed, raising in substance the following issues for our consideration: 1. Did the trial court err in allowing inadmissible hearsay testimony from witnesses who did not have first-hand knowledge of the events in question? 2. Did Steele’s counsel make improper and prejudicial statements during closing argument, thus warranting a new trial?
6. Did the trial court err in not suggesting a further remittitur of the jury’s verdict?
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda J. Crowder, M.D., v. Brent D. Laing, M.D. and John D. Green, M.D., David Dobyns, First Medical Group and Healthcare Consultants, Inc., et al.
We granted the Rule 9, T.R.A.P., application of the appellant, Brent D. Laing, M.D. (“Laing”), in order to review the propriety of the trial court’s denial of Laing’s motion to amend his answer filed in litigation instituted against him and others by the appellee, Brenda J. Crowder, M.D. (“Crowder”). In the same order, we consolidated that interlocutory appeal with the appeal of Laing’s separate suit against Crowder, which latter appeal is before us as of right. See Rule 3(a), T.R.A.P. The claims asserted by Laing in the second suit are identical to those in the counterclaim which Laing attempted to pursue, albeit unsuccessfully, in the earlier litigation. We reverse the trial court’s denial of Laing’s motion to amend in the first suit. We dismiss, as moot, the appeal of Laing’s subsequent suit against Crowder. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Gary Wayne Robertson v. Lori Vanhooser Robertson - Concurring
This is a divorce case. The trial court granted Lori Vanhooser Robertson (“Wife”) a divorce on the ground set forth at T.C.A. § 36-4-101(3)1; awarded the parties joint custody of their 16-year-old son; ordered Gary Wayne Robertson (“Husband”) to pay Wife child support of $387 per month plus 21% of part of Husband’s future increases in net income; awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony of $250 per month for 12 months, beginning with the month of October, 1997; divided the parties’ property and debts; denied Wife’s request for attorney’s fees; and made other decrees not relevant to a resolution of the issues now before us. Wife appealed, raising issues that present the following questions for our review. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy P. McManamay v. Charles T. McManamay
In this divorce case, the defendant husband has appealed from a decree awarding the plaintiff a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences and dividing the marital estate. The husband has presented the issues in the following form: |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Lucy L. Bond v. Belle Meade Fund Partners, L.P., et al. - Concurring
The plaintiff sued for injury suffered when she stepped into a hole in the asphalt surface of a parking lot provided for customers of Kroger Company. Kroger was dismissed by nonsuit, and the remaining defendants were dismissed by summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed and presented the following issue: I. Whether a genuine issue of material fact has been raised by the plaintiff/appellant, so as to warrant this cause to be tried on its merits. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |