State of Tennessee v. Stevean Wilson - dissenting

I dissent from the majority conclusion affirming the trial court’s imposition of confinement in this case. The trial court did not engage in any findings of fact to support its determination of confinement as required by law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C) (2014) (whether confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct; whether confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant); see also Shannon Ann Maness and Daryl Wayne Maness, No. W2012-02655-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 350429, at *16-17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2014) (noting that the trial is still required to place on the record its reasons for imposing the specific sentence and remanding for new sentencing hearing because the record did not support the trial court’s finding of confinement based on deterrence); State v. Robert Joseph Harr, No. W2011-02735-CCA-R3CD, 2013 WL 5422801, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2013) (Tipton, P.J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that he did not believe “our supreme court intended in Bise or Caudle to do away, in wholesale fashion, with Tennessee jurisprudence developed over the last thirty years upon which the Sentencing Act is based and in which the Act’s provisions are interpreted”).