State of Tennessee v. William Goldsberry, Jr. - Dissent

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion on two grounds. First, although not addressed by the majority, I find the exceedingly late issuance of the November 19, 2024 violation of probation warrant to be problematic. A strong argument can be made that the November 19, 2024 warrant, which was issued more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s sentence expired on June 23, 2002, and decades after the new criminal offenses in Oklahoma and California were allegedly committed, would violate the Defendant’s due process rights under the test for pre-accusatorial delay. Though perhaps not as strong, an argument can also be made that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the November 19, 2024 violation of probation warrant, which alleged the Oklahoma and California offenses, because this second warrant was issued more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s probationary sentence expired on June 23, 2002. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-311(a)(1) (stating that “[w]henever it comes to the attention of the trial judge that a defendant who has been released upon suspension of sentence has been guilty of a breach of the laws of this state or has violated the conditions of probation, the trial judge shall have the power to cause to be issued under the trial judge’s hand: . . . (A) A warrant for the arrest of the defendant as in any other criminal case; or (B) For a technical violation brought by a probation officer, and subject to the discretion of the judge, a criminal summons.”); see also State v. Moon, No. M2023-01192-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 1672885, at *12 n.7 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 13, 2025) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 311(a) (reiterating that probation revocation proceedings “may only be commenced within the applicable probationary period”). Because the November 19, 2024 warrant was issued decades after the criminal offenses in Oklahoma and California and more than twenty-two years after the Defendant’s sentence expired, this court could have concluded either that this warrant violated the Defendant’s due process rights or that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over this matter.