State of Tennessee v. Keelan Washington
Defendant, Keelan Washington, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for judicial diversion. Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to set forth its reasons for denying diversion and by failing to comply with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. After a review of the record, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Doryon Booth
The Defendant, Doryon Booth, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original four-year sentence in confinement, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that he violated the terms of his probation and by failing to make adequate findings in support of its decision to revoke his suspended sentence. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mario Perkins v. State of Tennessee
Mario Perkins, Petitioner, appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to reopen his post-conviction proceeding because the “grounds alleged in the petition do not satisfy any of the criteria set out in Tenn[essee] Code Ann[otated section] 40-30-117 as ground to reopen, and have clearly been raised outside the statute of limitation[s]. . . .” Because the notice of appeal in this case fails to satisfy the requirements for an application for permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c), we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Russell Lee Maze and Kaye M. Maze v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioners, Russell Lee Maze and Kaye M. Maze, seek post-conviction relief from their respective convictions related to their infant son’s death in 2000 from abusive head trauma (“AHT”). The post-conviction court afforded the Petitioners an evidentiary hearing at which they presented purported “new scientific evidence” through various experts in an effort to establish their actual innocence. The State, through the Office of the District Attorney General for the Twentieth Judicial District (“District Attorney”), admitted the facts asserted by the Petitioners and agreed that the Petitioners were actually innocent of these offenses. Nonetheless, the post-conviction court determined that the Petitioners had failed to carry their burden of producing clear and convincing proof to establish their actual innocence, a determination which the Petitioners now challenge. On appeal, the State, through the Office of the Attorney General and Reporter (“Attorney General”), contends that the Petitioners failed to prove their actual innocence based on new scientific evidence, instead proffering only new opinions on previously presented evidence, which supports the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. In addition to the underlying substantive merits of their actual innocence claims, the Petitioners also raise certain procedural issues: (1) whether review of Mr. Maze’s appeal, which began as a motion to reopen his prior post-conviction petition, is permissive or an appeal as of right; (2) whether Mrs. Maze’s petition for post-conviction relief, her first, is time-barred; (3) whether the State improperly changed its position on appeal in violation of due process, judicial estoppel, and waiver; (4) whether the post-conviction court’s ruling infringed upon prosecutorial discretion and violated the party-presentation principle; (5) whether the post-conviction court erred by denying Mrs. Maze relief without independent review of her actual innocence claim; and (6) whether this case should be remanded to the post-conviction court for consideration of the original medical examiner’s recent recantation of his trial testimony, which has occurred during the pendency of this appeal. After review, we determine that a remand is unnecessary and affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Takyris Seandale Simms v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Takyris Seandale Simms, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from the Petitioner’s guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder and his twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Russell Lee Maze and Kaye M. Maze v. State of Tennessee (Concurring in part/Dissenting in part)
TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I join the court in affirming the post-conviction court’s rulings based on the record that was properly before it at the time. Its analysis is both well-reasoned and persuasively stated. But I respectfully dissent from the decision to deny the motion for a limited remand—and thereby deny the post-conviction court the opportunity to consider how Dr. Bruce Levy’s affidavit bears on the findings it previously made Finality is a fundamental value in our system—but it is not the only one. When the State’s own chief medical examiner recants the very testimony that established the cause and manner of death, the effect is not just to raise new questions. If credited, it calls into doubt the foundation of the trial and the reliability of the post-conviction court’s findings, which relied on that same testimony. If a foundation is in question, it usually calls for an inspection of the ground. In my view, a limited remand answers that call. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jacquiz McBee v. State of Tennessee
In 2017, the Petitioner, Jacquiz McBee, pled guilty to aggravated assault and was placed on judicial diversion for a period of three years. Following his later conviction for another crime in April 2022, the trial court rescinded the diversion, entered an adjudication of guilt, and sentenced the Defendant to serve a term of three years for the aggravated assault conviction. In 2024, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in his aggravated assault case and that his original plea was invalid. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as being untimely, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we agree that the post-conviction petition was untimely and that principles of due process did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryan Ray Dudley
The Defendant, Bryan Ray Dudley, appeals his Franklin County Circuit Court convictions of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus thirty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his suicide attempt following the victim’s murder and by neglecting to instruct the jury regarding proximate causation. Because we conclude that both the Defendant’s motion for a new trial and notice of appeal were untimely filed and that the interests of justice do not merit the waiver of the untimeliness of the Defendant’s notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Damon Bridges
In 2021, the Defendant, Damon Bridges, pled guilty to multiple drug-related offenses, including several that were subject to enhanced penalties under the Drug-Free Zone Act. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration. In 2024, the Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, asserting that later amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act rendered his sentence unlawful. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s request for relief, and the Defendant appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Whitcliffe McLeod v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Whitcliffe McLeod, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition for failure to prosecute. Based on our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David A. Yost, Jr.
The Defendant, David A. Yost, Jr., appeals from his guilty-pled convictions for unlawful |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Louis Nelson
The Defendant, Jonathan Louis Nelson, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ezekiel Abraham Schmaltz
The Defendant, Ezekiel Abraham Schmaltz, appeals his Knox County jury convictions of |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Courtney Means v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court on the pro se Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. See T.C.A. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10(B). The Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief because his sentence in the above-referenced cases was enhanced by prior convictions that were subsequently invalidated by a federal court. See T.C.A. § 40-30-117(a)(3). The State has responded in opposition to the motion, arguing that the federal court did not invalidate the Petitioner’s prior convictions but merely ordered that he be resentenced. Upon our review of the application and the State’s response, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Petitioner’s motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio Bonds v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court on the pro se Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. See T.C.A. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10(B). The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-117. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the State and deny the application. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Domonic Sales
The Defendant, Michael Domonic Sales, was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of first degree premeditated murder for which he received a life sentence. The Defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 because he was not sentenced by a jury, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John F. Curran, III
The Defendant, John F. Curran, III, appeals his Hardin County convictions for passing a worthless check and filing a false lien, for which he received a total effective sentence of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to establish territorial jurisdiction because the offenses took place on federal property; (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to recuse; (3) the trial court erred by denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw when counsel explained he lacked knowledge and experience in federal maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction; (4) the trial court violated the Defendant’s due process rights by initially granting his pretrial motion to present affirmative defenses but later ruling those defenses could not be presented to the jury; (5) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction for passing a worthless check because the payment was for a pre-existing debt and not to induce services; (6) the State committed two Brady1 violations when it failed to disclose evidence proving the State lacked jurisdiction over the case, which led to false testimony from State witnesses; and (7) the trial court erred by imposing a sentence other than the statutory minimum and by imposing an illegal sentence when it failed to cite the victims for each count, failed to order restitution for passing a worthless check, and took no action to remove the lien from the property at issue. After review, we affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Wert
The Defendant, Joseph Wert, appeals from his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, for which he received a six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by excluding a text message exchange between two non-testifying individuals discussing the victim’s statement on the day of the shooting; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the State to read in front of the jury several unauthenticated text messages on the victim’s ex-wife’s cell phone between the victim, his ex-wife, and their minor daughter; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument when it referenced the text messages between the victim, his ex-wife, and their minor daughter, and the trial court erred by overruling his contemporaneous objection thereto; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to provide a jury instruction regarding the presumed reasonableness of his use of deadly force against the victim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-611(c), commonly known as “castle doctrine.”; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to disprove his self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, he contends that cumulative error entitles him to a new trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alan Joseph Robertson
The Defendant, Alan Joseph Robertson, appeals the Hickman County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his sale of methamphetamine in an amount of 0.5 gram or more conviction and ordering him to serve the remainder of his ten-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dennis Wade Suttles v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Dennis Wade Suttles, has filed an application for permission to appeal from the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(c); Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 10B. The Petitioner asserts that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023) (“SFFA”), announced a new rule of constitutional law that should be applied retroactively to his case. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robb Thompson
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal is hereby DENIED. The Defendant’s Motion to Supplement the Record is also DENIED as moot. Costs associated with this appeal are hereby taxed to the Defendant. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jarvis T. Emerson
Jarvis T. Emerson, Defendant, appeals from his convictions for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated burglary, three counts of assault, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of felon in possession of a firearm. He received an effective sentence of fifty-five years. Defendant argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to establish his identity; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the assault charges because the proof did not show the victims reasonably feared imminent bodily injury; (3) the evidence was insufficient to show Defendant was previously convicted of a felony; (4) the conviction for especially aggravated burglary should be reduced to aggravated burglary because the State relied on serious bodily injury to prosecute both the attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated burglary convictions; (5) the trial court erred in ordering partial consecutive sentencing by failing to find the required State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995), factors; (6) the State failed to prove Defendant was a Range II, multiple offender; and (7) Apprendi mandates that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt the serious bodily injury enhancement for attempted first degree murder and that this requirement makes the enhancement for attempted first degree murder the “functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.” After a thorough review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that serious bodily injury is not an element of attempted first degree murder, such that a prosecution for both attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated burglary are prohibited by statute. We also determine Defendant has waived any challenge under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and any challenge to his offender classification. However, we remand for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to make the requisite findings before ordering partial consecutive sentencing. Accordingly, Defendant’s convictions are affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the manner of service of the sentences. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leon Noel
The Defendant, Leon Noel, pled guilty to several offenses over a period of years, and the trial court suspended each of his sentences to probation. In 2024, the State alleged that he violated a special condition requiring inpatient drug treatment. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court found a violation on that basis and ordered him to serve the balance of each of his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his conduct amounted only to a technical violation and that the trial court erred in revoking all of his suspended sentence. Upon our review, we conclude that the record does not establish whether the treatment condition applied to the suspended sentences in four of the cases, and we remand those cases for additional findings. As to the remaining case, which includes suspended felony and misdemeanor sentences, we hold that the violation constituted a first instance of a technical violation. The trial court, therefore, lacked authority to revoke the suspended felony sentence, but the revocation of the suspended misdemeanor sentence was within its discretion. We accordingly affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gavin Allen Clark
A Coffee County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Gavin Allen Clark, with first-degree felony murder by aggravated child abuse (count one), first-degree felony murder by child neglect (count two), aggravated child abuse (count three), and aggravated child neglect (count four). Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide in counts one and two, and he was convicted as charged in counts three and four of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect. He received an effective sentence of twenty-three years in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for review: (1) as an issue of first impression in Tennessee, whether the verdict is defective for ambiguity because within each count the jury simultaneously convicted and acquitted; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to act or serve as the thirteenth juror; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated child neglect; (4) whether the trial court erred in deciding the McDaniel motions when the trial judge employed an erroneous legal standard and conducted an arbitrary hearing; (5) whether the trial court erred in permitting witnesses to testify about the Defendant’s callous demeanor; (6) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress data from the Defendant’s cell phone; (7) whether the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument; (8) whether the State violated the Defendant’s speedy trial rights; and (9) whether the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal. 1 Upon review, we conclude that the verdicts returned by the jury in this case were ambiguous because they purport to simultaneously convict and acquit the Defendant. As such, the verdicts are unenforceable and cannot be given full effect. Under the circumstances of this case, we also conclude that the Defendant’s convictions are not barred from retrial based on double jeopardy principles, and we remand for a new trial. We further conclude that the trial court failed to fulfill its duty as the thirteenth juror, which also mandates reversal of the Defendant’s convictions, and remand for a new trial. We address the Defendant’s remaining issues in the event of further appellate review. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gavin Allen Clark (Concurring in part/Dissenting in part)
While I agree with the lion’s share of the majority opinion’s meticulous review of the issues presented by Defendant on appeal, there are a couple of distinct issues on which I disagree: whether the trial court erred in failing to act or serve as the thirteenth juror; and the proper remedy for retrial of offenses, based upon an ambiguous verdict. For the reasons set forth below, I find that the trial court satisfied its role as the thirteenth juror. Furthermore, on retrial, I conclude that the State can proceed on the original charges of felony murder (counts 1 and 2), aggravated child abuse (count three), and aggravated child neglect (count four). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion on these issues. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals |
