Martha L. Patlan-Cano v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Martha Patlan-Cano, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse and resulting effective sentence of life plus twenty years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tracy Graves
A Hamblen County jury convicted the Defendant, Tracy H. Graves, of driving under the influence (“DUI”) second offense, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his DUI conviction because his vehicle was not in a location named in the indictment. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffery Miller v. Jewell Steele, Warden
Petitioner, Jeffery Miller, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harold Holloway v. David Sexton, Warden
In an indictment returned by the Hamilton County Grand Jury, Petitioner, Harold Holloway, Jr., was charged in count 1 with felony murder during the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a theft. He was also charged in count 2 with felony murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate robbery. Additional counts alleged offenses which are not pertinent to this case on appeal. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of second degree murder in both counts which charged felony murder. The conviction in count 2 was merged with the conviction in count 1. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the murder conviction. State v. Harold Holloway, Jr., No. E2004-00882-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1981791 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16, 2005). Petitioner now appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for habeas corpus relief without an evidentiary hearing. The habeas corpus petition alleged that Petitioner was entitled to relief because (1) each count of the indictment that charged felony murder was invalid, and therefore led to a void judgment because it failed “to include the statutory element of specific ‘intent’ for the underlying offense;” and (2) the convicting criminal court erroneously amended the felony murder counts of the indictment with its jury charge. After review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in this case. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James A. Adkins
The Defendant, James A. Adkins, entered a best-interest plea of guilt to driving while declared a motor vehicle habitual offender, failing to obey a traffic-control device, violation of the financial responsibility law, and reckless aggravated assault. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Freda Darlene Garrett
The State obtained a probation revocation warrant seeking to revoke the probation of appellant, Freda Darlene Garrett, for committing new criminal offenses, failing to report, and failing to pay court-ordered restitution. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation in the case listed on the warrant (case number 08-028) and also on a case not listed on the warrant (case number 01-359). On appeal, appellant argues that she did not have notice of the probation revocation in the latter case and that her probationary sentence in that case had expired and was not subject to revocation. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court revoking appellant’s probation in case number 01-359 and affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking appellant’s probation in case number 08-028. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenny Kimble
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kenny Kimble, was found guilty of rape of a child. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. In his only issue raised on appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony. The State argues that this issue is waived because the motion for new trial was untimely filed, having been filed more than thirty days after entry of the judgment of conviction. We reject the State’s argument concerning the timeliness of the motion for new trial. The judgment of conviction was not stamp-filed by the clerk, and thus there is nothing in the record to show that the motion for new trial was filed late. However, after review of the issue on its merits, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenny Kimble - Concurring
I am writing separately to express my disagreement with the majority opinion's assertion that a trial judge's ruling with regard to hearsay is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. I am persuaded that the analysis of State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2009), is the appropriate method for reviewing issues involving hearsay. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeremy Young v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jeremy Young, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends (1) that his guilty plea to first-degree murder was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys allowed their hired agents to unduly influence him into pleading guilty, failed to seek a change of venue, and led him to believe that he could get his conviction overturned on post-conviction relief. After consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dallas Jay Stewart
The Defendant, Dallas Jay Stewart, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of nine counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies; fourteen counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies; and one count of exhibition of harmful material to a minor, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522; 39-13-504; 39-17-911 (2010). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to twenty-five-years’ confinement for each count of rape of a child, twelve-years’ confinement for each count of aggravated sexual battery, and eleven-months, twenty-nine-days’ confinement for exhibition of harmful material to a minor. The counts against each victim were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective fifty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions, (2) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress, (3) the trial court erred in failing to merge some of his aggravated sexual battery convictions, and (4) his sentence was excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court for exhibition of harmful material (Count 1), five counts of aggravated sexual battery (Counts 10, 13, 23, 24, and 25), and one count of rape of a child (Count 2). We vacate the aggravated sexual battery judgment for Count 26 and dismiss the charge. Because the trial court failed to merge the convictions for eight counts of aggravated sexual battery (Counts 4, 6, 8, 12, 15, 17, 19 and 21) and eight counts of rape of a child (Counts 3, 5, 7, 11, 14, 16, 18, and 20), we vacate the convictions and order the trial court to enter judgments reflecting merger of these aggravated sexual battery convictions into the rape of a child convictions. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Jermaine Harris v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Michael Jermaine Harris, was convicted of aggravated arson in 2009 and was sentenced to nineteen years. He unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence. See State v. Michael Jermaine Harris, No. E2009-01383-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3155196, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 10, 2010). Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to prepare adequately for trial, failed to obtain an expert witness, failed to procure an alibi witness, and failed to adequately cross-examine one of the police officers involved. Following our review of the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio T. Wyatt v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Antonio Wyatt, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the court wherein he was convicted. Upon motion of the State, the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing based upon Petitioner’s failure to show in the petition “that his judgments are either void or that his sentence has expired.” Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal. Petitioner asserts the judgments are void because the trial court ordered Petitioner to serve the one-year portion of incarceration of a split confinement sentence “day for day 100%” and because the trial court refused to allow Petitioner statutorily mandated pre-trial jail credits. While some of the documents in the record presented by Petitioner indicate irregularities in the judgments which could lead to a determination that the sentencing portions are void, we conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he is no longer “restrained of his liberty” by the challenged convictions. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ralph Byrd Cooper, Jr.
Upon remand by our supreme court, see State v. Cooper, 321 S.W.3d 501 (Tenn. 2010), Defendant Ralph Byrd Cooper, Jr., was resentenced by the trial court to serve sixty (60) years as a career offender for his conviction of aggravated rape, a Class A felony. Defendant appeals his sentence, asserting as his sole issue that the trial court erred by determining he was a “career offender.” After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Latonya Deon Dalton
Upon her indictment for six counts of aggravated child abuse and six counts of aggravated child neglect, the defendant, Latonya Deon Dalton, pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated child abuse, a Class B felony. In exchange for her pleas, the defendant received concurrent, ten-year sentences as a Range III offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the court ordered that the defendant serve one year in confinement, followed by probation for the remaining balance of the agreed-upon sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court failed to “give due consideration” to the principles of sentencing and also failed to give her nearly four months of jail credit. Following our review, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court. However, we remand for the trial court to determine the amount of jail credit to which the defendant is entitled and apply that toward the one-year portion of her sentence to be served in confinement. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Duvale Vashawn Pruitt
In this procedurally complex case, the Defendant, Duvale Vashawn Pruitt, pled nolo contendere to multiple drug-related charges, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years of probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed two probation violation warrants, one in September and another in October of 2007. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve ninety days in jail and then start his probationary sentence again. In February 2011, the Defendant’s probation officer filed a third probation violation warrant based upon the Defendant’s possession of a switchblade knife at a courthouse, and the trial court issued a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his ten-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the trial court’s revocation of the Defendant’s sentence on appeal. State v. Duvale Vashawn Pruitt, No. E2011-01995-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4762115, at *1, 6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 8, 2012), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. On December 11, 2012, after our opinion was filed, the Defendant filed a “Motion seeking recall of the previously adjudicated probation violation warrants in which [the trial court] sentenced and ordered Petitioner on May 27, 2011, to serve the balance of his sentence, or ten years at thirty percent, in confinement.” The trial court dismissed the motion, and the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his motion because the capias and detainer lodged against him for a probation violation should have been recalled because he had satisfied his sentence by serving time in federal custody. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude the Defendant has no right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion. As such, the Defendant’s appeal is dismissed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Reginald D. Hughes v. Dwight Barbee, Warden
Petitioner, Reginald D. Hughes, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of the pro se third petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Petitioner. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Harding Dalton
The Defendant, James Harding Dalton, pleaded guilty to especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-404 (2010). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Davis
The appellant, Christopher Lee Davis, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; carjacking, a Class B felony; and attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. On direct appeal, our supreme court affirmed the appellant’s convictions but remanded for resentencing on the issue of consecutive sentencing. See State v. Davis, 354 S.W.3d 718, 721-22 (Tenn. 2011). On remand, the trial court again ordered partial consecutive sentencing, which resulted in an overall effective sentence of forty-nine years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Anthony Flevaris
Defendant pled guilty to fourteen counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies; one count of burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony; four counts of theft of property with a value in excess of $10,000 but less than $60,000, Class C felonies; seven counts of theft of property with a value in excess of $1,000 but less than $10,000, Class D felonies; one count of theft of property with a value in excess of $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony; and five counts of theft of property with a value less than $500, Class A misdemeanors. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years for each aggravated burglary, two years for the burglary of the automobile, six years for each Class C felony theft of property, four years for each Class D felony theft of property, two years for each Class E felony theft of property, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each misdemeanor theft of property. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing, resulting in an overall effective sentence of twenty-two years. The defendant now appeals the trial court’s sentencing decision, urging that the trial court erred in its application of certain enhancement and mitigation factors. Because a trial court’s mere error in the application of statutory enhancing and mitigating factors no longer provides any basis for reversing a defendant’s sentence, and because the defendant’s sentences are generally consistent with the principles and purposes of the Sentencing Act, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jay Earl Haynes
Appellant, Jay Earl Haynes, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury in August 2009, for two counts of rape in connection with the anal rape of the two mentally-incapacitated grandsons of Appellant’s live-in girlfriend. Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because he could not have known that the victims were mentally incapacitated and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is ample evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find that Appellant knew of the victims’ mental incapacity and that his criminal activity was so extensive as to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leman Earl Russell Jr.
Appellant, Leman E. Russell, pled guilty to one count of possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver in Dyer County in January 2006. He received a sentence of ten years with six months incarceration and nine and a half years on Community Corrections. Because of various violations and adjudications, Appellant was placed on probation on February 3, 2011. On September 27, 2011, a probation violation warrant was filed alleging that Appellant violated the terms of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original ten-year sentence in confinement. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation and imposing his original sentence because there was evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court that a violation of the conditions of probation occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Daniel Vaughn
James Daniel Vaughn (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of second degree murder and three counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael L. McMahan v. State of Tennessee
Michael L. McMahan (“the Petitioner”) entered a guilty plea to one count of aggravated burglary, five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and two counts of aggravated robbery. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-five years. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that his plea was constitutionally invalid and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his plea submission hearing. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Scott Chapman v. Henry Steward, Warden
Petitioner, Christopher Scott Chapman, pled guilty to aggravated assault in Davidson County in 2005. As a result, he was sentenced to four years in incarceration. The sentence was suspended, and Petitioner was ordered to probation. In 2008, Petitioner was indicted by the Sumner County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder. After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Petitioner was sentenced to six years in incarceration to be served consecutively to the Davidson County sentence. Petitioner filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus in August and September of 2012 in the Lake County Circuit Court challenging the Sumner County conviction. The petitions were denied because they were unverified and did not present proper grounds for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner filed two additional petitions for habeas corpus relief in Lake County, again challenging the Sumner County conviction for aggravated assault. The habeas corpus court denied the petitions, determining that the claims were not cognizable in a petition for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the habeas corpus court improperly denied habeas corpus relief. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the habeas corpus court properly denied habeas corpus relief where Petitioner failed to show that his judgment was void. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leon Barnett Collier v. Arvil K. Chapman
The pro se petitioner, Leon Barnett Collier, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because the State failed to comply with the statutory requirement of attaching to its response its authority for detaining him. Because the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals |
