Russell Jensen v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Russell Jensen, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which the trial court summarily dismissed. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Broderick Devonte Fayne
The defendant, Broderick Devonte Fayne, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of aggravated burglary and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, both Class C felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive terms of three years at 30% for the aggravated burglary conviction and to six years at 100% for the employing a firearm during a dangerous felony conviction, for a total effective sentence of nine years in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial following the prosecutor’s introduction of his defense counsel as employees of the public defender’s office; (3) whether the trial court properly allowed the defendant’s accomplice to testify regarding his understanding of the charges against him; (4) whether his right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s arguing alternate theories of his guilt; and (5) whether the trial court erred by denying his request for jury instructions defining possession and constructive possession. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Madkins v. State of Tennessee
Richard Madkins (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed his petition without a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner presents three claims: (1) that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights when it sentenced him to twenty-five years for his especially aggravated robbery conviction; (2) that the trial court did not have authority to sentence the Petitioner as a Range I offender because the State waived Range I sentencing when it filed a notice of intent to seek Range III punishment; and (3) that the Petitioner’s sentence violates principles of double jeopardy. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s summary dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus relief. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerome S. Barrett v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jerome Sidney Barrett, was convicted of first degree murder stemming from a murder that occurred in Davidson County in 1975 and received a life sentence. State v. Jerome Sidney Barrett, No. M2010-00444-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2914119, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jul 18, 2012), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2012). He was unsuccessful on appeal to this Court. Id. at *32. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis. In his petition, he argued that the DNA evidence used at this trial was not independently evaluated and that the forensic pathologist, Dr. Bruce Levy, who testified at his trial regarding the DNA evidence, was not a credible witness because he was arrested for drug crimes in Mississippi more than a year after Petitioner’s trial. The lower court dismissed the petition without a hearing. After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition as untimely. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Shane Hayes
The State appeals the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress filed by the Defendant, Joshua Shane Hayes. The State contests the trial court’s finding that the "Exclusionary Rule Reform Act," which took effect July 1, 2011, did not apply retroactively to the search wherein officers seized drugs from the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Morris Cobb v. State of Tennessee
The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petitions for writs of error coram nobis. Having determined that the petitions were properly dismissed, this Court hereby affirms the orders of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dameion Nolan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dameion Nolan, filed in the Knox County Criminal Court a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to explain that he would be required to remain on the sexual offender registry for life as a result of his guilty pleas to five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary and the resulting effective twenty-five-year sentence. The petitioner also contended that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. In addition to his ineffective assistance claim, the petitioner maintains that the post-conviction court erred by allowing trial counsel to remain in the courtroom during the proceedings. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Todd Whitaker and David Paul Coffey
The Defendants, Gregory Todd Whitaker and David Paul Coffey, were both indicted for manufacturing twenty or more, but less than 100, marijuana plants, a Class C felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417(g)(3), -425(a)(1). The Defendants both filed motions to suppress the evidence recovered during a search of Defendant Whitaker’s trailer home. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motions and dismissed the indictments. In this appeal as of right, the State contends that the trial court erred by granting the Defendants’ suppression motions. Following our review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Beau Clayton Epperson - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that a trial court may impose both a period of partial confinement for a misdemeanor domestic assault conviction and a two-year probationary period. I write separately, however, to explain more fully the reasoning supporting my conclusion. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert C. Scott
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Albert C. Scott, of two counts of rape. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve months of incarceration, followed by nine years of probation. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the State’s evidence against him, asserting that the State failed to prove the Defendant possessed the requisite mens rea for the crime. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude there exists no error. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Beau Clayton Epperson
Defendant, Beau Clayton Epperson, entered a “best interest” guilty plea in the Circuit Court of Sevier County to the offense of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. There was no negotiated plea agreement as to the length or manner of service of the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court announced the following sentence: eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days in the county jail, specifying that under the “sentencing structure” the sentence was to be “one hundred percent of seventy-five percent of eleven months and twenty-nine days.” The trial court declined to grant a fully suspended sentence, but imposed a sentence of split confinement, with ninety (90) days to be served by incarceration, with the balance of the sentence suspended, to be served on supervised probation. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303(c)(2)(B), the trial court ordered the probationary period to be two (2) years. Defendant has raised two issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence which exceeded the maximum statutory allowable sentence. Second, he argues the trial court erroneously ordered a two year probationary period when it failed to make mandatory findings of fact. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Malcolm Witherow
A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Malcolm Witherow, of first degree murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Witherow argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court erred in not allowing prior inconsistent recorded statements by a witness to be admitted as substantive evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(26), and the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based upon statements the prosecutor made in closing argument. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodney Dewayne Burton
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, Rodney Dewayne Burton, entered a "no contest" plea for criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, with sentencing to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to two years, suspended the sentence, and placed appellant on probation. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor when determining his sentence and asks that this court reduce his sentence to a one-year suspended sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lorenzoe Landell Wilson
The Defendant-Appellant, Lorenzoe Landell Wilson, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s imposition of consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement for his vandalism conviction in case number 117014 and eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 180 days to be served in confinement and the balance of the sentence to be served on probation, for his assault conviction in case number 118034. These sentences were imposed by the circuit court after it revoked Wilson’s probation in these cases. Wilson also appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s imposition of a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for his second assault conviction in case number 118603, which the court ordered to be served consecutively to the aforementioned sentences. On appeal, Wilson argues: (1) the circuit court wholly departed from the sentencing act when sentencing him for the second assault conviction, and (2) the circuit court, in revoking his probation, erred in failing to restart his probation anew, given his ability to comply with the terms of probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment showing that the percentage of service for the sentences in case numbers 118034 and 118603 is zero percent. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Ewing Kennedy
Appellee, Charles Ewing Kennedy, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for driving under the influence, second offense; speeding; and violation of the implied consent law. Appellee moved to suppress the evidence against him regarding the driving under the influence count. The trial court granted his motion to suppress. This court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court incorrectly applied a sufficiency of the evidence standard when granting appellee’s motion to suppress rather than making a probable cause determination. The State urges this court to reverse the trial court’s ruling and to conclude that the police had probable cause to arrest appellee for driving under the influence. Following our review, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Oscar Thomas v. State of Tennessee
Oscar Thomas (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his plea was constitutionally invalid due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. He also contends that his employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c). Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Malcolm J. Coble
The Defendant, Malcolm J. Coble, contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated when the trial court revoked his community corrections sentence on the basis of a 2010 violation warrant, later amended in 2012, because the warrants were not executed and an evidentiary hearing held until 2012. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Leonard Jasper Young v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Leonard Jasper Young, appeals from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief as it relates to the guilt phase of his trial. The post-conviction court granted the Petitioner relief as to the sentencing phase, and the State did not appeal this ruling. A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft over $1,000. He received an effective sentence of death plus seventy-two years. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase of his trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Curtis Keller
After a trial by jury the defendant, Curtis Keller, was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping (against Tamika Jones and M.B.), Class A felonies; one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery (against Andrew Morrow), a Class B felony; one count of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; three counts of aggravated assault (against Andrew Morrow, Tamika Jones, and M.B.), Class C felonies; and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony,” a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of two hundred and forty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the jury instructions concerning the especially aggravated kidnapping charges were inadequate in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), (2) the jury instructions concerning the employment of a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” were erroneous, and (3) his eight separate convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his crime spree “was one continuous act.” After careful review, we conclude that: (1) the jury instructions were inadequate in light of White, but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the jury instructions concerning the employment of a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” were erroneous because they did not foreclose the possibility that the jury used one of the especially aggravated kidnappings—which, as stated in the indictment, were based on the defendant’s use of a firearm—as predicate felonies. As the State concedes, the statute prohibiting an individual’s use of a firearm during the commission of a “dangerous felony” expressly forbids charging a defendant for a violation of that statute “if possessing or employing a firearm is an essential element of the underlying dangerous felony as charged.” T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(c). Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony is reversed. In addition, it was plain error for the defendant to be convicted of both especially aggravated burglary and attempted especially aggravated robbery based on the same act of causing serious bodily injury to victim Andrew Morrow. The defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated burglary is reduced to a conviction of aggravated burglary, and a new sentence of fifteen years is imposed on this count. With respect to his other claims, the defendant has failed to establish any entitlement to relief, and his convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated assault are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Raymond Hayden v. Wayne Carpenter, Warden
The petitioner, Raymond Hayden, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his 2012 petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he sought to challenge his 2009 Putnam County, guilty-pleaded conviction of the sale of cocaine. Following our review, we affirm the order of the circuit court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Warren Hildred
The defendant, Warren Hildred, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, challenging both the exclusion of certain evidence and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edward Thomas Kendrick, III v. State of Tennessee
Edward Thomas Kendrick, III (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we are constrained to conclude that the Petitioner established that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, because it is reasonably likely that a jury would have convicted him of a lesser degree of homicide absent the deficiencies in his trial counsel’s performance. Accordingly, we must reverse the Petitioner’s conviction and remand this matter for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry Keith Huddle v.State of Tennessee
In June 1998, petitioner, Larry Keith Huddle, entered a “no contest” plea to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an eight-year sentence, with thirty-five percent release eligibility, to be served in community corrections. His sentence expired in 2004, but he remained under community supervision for life. In 2011, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he pleaded guilty without knowing that he would be subject to community supervision for life. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the petition was not timely. On appeal, petitioner contends that Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn.2010), announced a new rule of constitutional law that should be applied retroactively, which would toll the statute of limitations and render his petition for post-conviction relief timely. He further argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the State now carries the burden of proving that the failure to advise him of the condition of community supervision for life was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edgar Bailey, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Convicted of felony murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and setting fire to personal property, petitioner, Edgar Bailey, Jr., filed the instant petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that the indictment under which he was tried and convicted for felony murder was defective in that it did not bear a return date from the grand jury and that the State withheld it from him prior to trial. He further claims that the allegedly defective indictment constitutes newly discovered evidence for the purpose of error coram nobis proceedings. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory G. Kilgore v. State of Tennessee
Following a bench trial, a Montgomery County Circuit Court convicted the Petitioner, Gregory G. Kilgore, of aggravated robbery and possession with the intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twelve years for each conviction to be served concurrently, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and this Court affirmed the conviction. State v. George C. Kilgore, No. M2009-01539-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2483546, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 21, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. October 20, 2010). The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial, claiming that his attorney’s failure to adequately cross-examine a witness and to procure a surveillance video constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals |
