State of Tennessee v. James Scott O'Brien
The defendant, James Scott O’Brien, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order that he serve in confinement nine months of the 30-month sentence imposed for his conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. Because the record supports the sentencing order, we affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William T. Bryant v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William T. Bryant, filed a petition to test DNA evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Louis Fitzgerald, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jerry Louis Fitzgerald, Jr., was indicted in March of 2008 by the Gibson County Grand Jury for possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, unlawful sale of over .5 grams of cocaine, and unlawful delivery of over .5 grams of cocaine. Petitioner ultimately entered guilty pleas to three counts of selling over .5 grams of cocaine. As a result of the guilty pleas, he was sentenced to twenty years for each count, to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. Following the entry of judgment, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied without a hearing. Petitioner appealed. See State v. Louis Fitzgerald, Jr., No. W2009-02520-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 703, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 20, 2010). This Court remanded the case for a hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. On remand, the trial court held a hearing and again denied the motion. There was no direct appeal from this denial. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in November of 2011, seeking a delayed appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. In June of 2012, a consent order was entered allowing a delayed appeal from the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. On appeal, Petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because the trial court failed to determine: (1) whether Petitioner was denied effective counsel; (2) whether the plea was knowingly and involuntarily made; and (3) whether manifest injustice exists as a ground for withdrawal of the pleas. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas where there was substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s conclusion. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. LaShun Gray and Stanley Williams
The Defendants, Lashun Gray and Stanley Williams, were tried jointly before a Shelby County Criminal Court jury. Defendant Gray was convicted of attempt to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-12-101, 39-17-1324 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive sentences of twenty-four years for the attempted first degree murder conviction and ten years for the firearm violation, for an effective thirty-four-year sentence. Defendant Williams was convicted of first degree murder, attempt to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See id. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive terms of twenty-four years for the attempted first degree murder conviction and ten years for the firearm violation, for an effective sentence of life plus thirty-four years. On appeal, Defendant Gray contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for attempted first degree murder, (2) the trial court erred by allowing the medical examiner to testify about the effects of a gunshot wound on a living person, and (3) the court erred during sentencing. Defendant Williams contends that |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Douglas Killins v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Douglas Killins, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2003 conviction for second degree murder and Range II thirty-eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nathan Daniel Puckett
The defendant, Nathan Daniel Puckett, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reduce his Range II, 35-year sentence for second degree murder. Because the record shows that the motion was untimely, we affirm the order of the criminal court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alan Robert Benjamin
The appellant, Alan Robert Benjamin, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to two counts of robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I, standard offender to five years for each offense, with the sentences to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of fifteen years. The court ordered the appellant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days confinement for each offense, with the remainder of the sentence to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court, the imposition of consecutive sentencing, and the denial of full probation. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing the appellant to choose between two proposed sentencing options. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for resentencing in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quanya Revell Prewitt
The defendant, Quanya Revell Prewitt, appeals her Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver dihydrocodeinone, a Schedule III substance, in a school zone, claiming that the trial court erred by limiting the scope of cross-examination of two of the State’s witnesses and that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Allen Gibbs
The Defendant, Michael Allen Gibbs, was convicted by a Haywood County jury of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated burglary, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on accomplice testimony. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court should have instructed the jury with respect to the legal status of the State’s witness but that the error was harmless. However, because the Defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated burglary is precluded by statute, that conviction is modified to one for aggravated burglary with imposition of a five-year sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mario Green v. State of Tennessee
Mario Green (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of second degree murder. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Petitioner to twenty years’ incarceration. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jessie Dotson
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Jessie Dotson, of six counts of premeditated first degree murder and three counts of attempted first degree murder. The jury sentenced the defendant to death for each conviction of first degree murder. Following a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to forty years for each conviction for attempted first degree murder, to be served consecutively to each other and to the first degree murder sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) testimony regarding one of the victims’ statement to police was hearsay and its admission violated the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; (3) the admission of the defendant’s custodial statements violated his rights under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; (4) the admission of testimony that the defendant invoked his right to counsel violated his due process rights; (5) the admission of testimony regarding the defendant’s history of imprisonment violated his right to a fair trial; (6) the trial court’s treatment of defense counsel in the jury’s presence violated his right to a fair trial; (7) the admission of the pathologist’s testimony regarding autopsies that she did not perform violated the defendant’s confrontation rights; (8) the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victims; (9) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to provide DNA analysis of all those who came in contact with the crime scene; (10) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for production of the statements of those not to be called as witnesses for the State; (11) the trial court improperly defined “reasonable doubt” in instructing the jury; (12) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on facilitation of first degree murder as a lesser included offense; (13) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to strike aggravating circumstances; (14) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a probable cause finding regarding the aggravating circumstances; (15) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for disclosure of information regarding the proportionality review; (16) the admission of victim impact evidence was improper; (17) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to argue last during the penalty phase; (18) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its argument to the jury; (19) the trial court erred in allowing the death verdicts to stand; (20) the defendant’s sentences for his three convictions for attempted first degree murder were excessive; and (21) cumulative error requires reversal. Based upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Auqeith Lashawn Byner v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Auqeith Lashawn Byner, pled guilty to driving on a suspended license, and a Davidson County jury convicted him of possession with the intent to sell or deliver over twenty-six grams of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve an effective sentence of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed his convictions but withdrew his appeal on February 11, 2010. On February 14, 2011, the Petitioner, pro se, timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and was thereafter appointed an attorney. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court issued an order denying the Petitioner relief. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of his claim. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Coleman Benefiel v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kenneth Coleman Benefiel, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-529(a), (e)(1). On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George Campbell Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, George Campbell, Jr., was convicted by a jury in Memphis of felony murder and aggravated assault and sentenced to life in prison in 1994. See State v. George Campbell, Jr., No. 02-C-01-9408-CR00165, 1996 WL 368224, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 28, 1996), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jan. 6, 1997). His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Id. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief and this Court affirmed the decision of the post-conviction court. See George Campbell, Jr. v. State, No. W2002-00703-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 WL 1042112, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Sept. 10, 2001), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 27, 2001). Then Petitioner sought relief via the writ of habeas corpus on the basis that his convictions were void for various reasons. The trial court denied relief and this Court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief on appeal. See George Campbell, Jr. v. Bruce Westbrooks, No. W2002-02086-CCA-R3-CO, 2003 WL 22309471, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 6, 2003). Petitioner also sought redress in the form of a motion of writ of error coram nobis in which he claimed that newly discovered evidence may have resulted in a different judgment at trial had the evidence been admitted at the trial. See George Campbell, Jr. v. State, No. W2007-00820-CCA-R3-CO, 2008 WL 2219305, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 28, 2008). This Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition for writ of error coram nobis on the basis that it was untimely and “nothing in the record implicate[d] any due process concerns that would require that the statute of limitations be tolled.” Id. at *2. Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of error coram nobis that is the subject of the appeal herein. After a hearing concerning the timeliness of the petition, the trial court entered an order finding that Petitioner’s claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations pertaining to coram nobis petitions and that due process did not require the rolling of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the determination made by the trial court. The petition was filed more than one year after the judgment became final. Further, Petitioner has shown no reason that due process would require the tolling of the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vershawn McCoy v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Vershawn McCoy, was convicted by a Shelby County jury for second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to a twenty-year sentence to be served at 100%. He unsuccessfully appealed to this Court. State v. Vershawn McCoy, No. W2009-01222-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4540076 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 9, 2010). Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has been unable to prove either deficient performance on the part of trial counsel, or prejudice even if deficient performance had been found. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Colton D. Whitelow
The Defendant, Colton D. Whitelow, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and reckless homicide and acquitted of the aggravated assault charge. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-211, -215. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective ten-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the length of his sentences were excessive; and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darquan Swift
A Shelby County grand jury indicted appellant, Darquan Swift, for one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324. Following a trial, a jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder and guilty as charged on all remaining counts. The trial court sentenced appellant to an effective sentence of ninety-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals his convictions on the following grounds: (1) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324 can be applied in a case involving robbery; (2) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324 can be applied to lesser included offenses of the dangerous felony upon which the State relied; and (3) whether the trial court improperly limited the testimony of appellant’s expert witness. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamour Ashleigh Sligh
The defendant, Lamour Ashleigh Sligh, was charged by information in the Blount County Circuit Court with possession with intent to deliver not less than one-half ounce of marijuana, a charge to which he pleaded guilty in 2007, agreeing to a suspended, two-year, Range I sentence. Following a series of probation revocations, the trial court revoked the probation in 2012 and ordered the defendant to serve the balance of his original sentence. We affirm the trial court’s order. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charlie Burks
The State filed a motion to correct a clerical error pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, seeking to clarify sentence alignment for three sentences imposed upon appellant, Charlie Burks. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order clarifying that appellant’s sentences were to be served consecutively. It is from this order that he now appeals. Based on our review, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel E. Pottenbaum, Sr.
The Petitioner, Daniel E. Pottebaum, Sr., contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his retrial and cites the following bases in support of that contention: (1) trial counsel’s failure to object to the Petitioner’s testimony from his first trial being read into the record at his second trial where he chose not to testify; (2) trial counsel’s failure to move for a severance of the domestic assault offense from the unrelated sexual abuse offenses; and (3) trial counsel’s failure to object to the jury instruction on flight. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Grandberry - Dissenting In Part and Concurring In Part
After review of the record in this case, I am unable to agree with majority’s conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for especially aggravated robbery. The majority bases is conclusion upon the fact that the evidence established only mere presence at the scene on the part of the Defendant rather than an intent to participate in the ongoing crime of robbery. The majority acknowledges that the Defendant is guilty of aggravated assault. I conclude that there is no logical reasoning behind the aggravated assault except in furtherance of the robbery. When “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution” as is the required standard, see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, I disagree that the evidence fails to establish that the Defendant “knowingly, voluntarily and with common intent joined with the principal offender in the commission of the robbery.” See Sherman, 266 S.W.3d at 408. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwaylan Dupree House
The Defendant, Dwaylan Dupree House, contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his jury convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial, and (3) that the trial court’s imposition of a ten-year sentence and $2,882.22 in restitution was excessive. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for vandalism and burglary, reverse the sentence imposed, and remand for resentencing. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Grandberry
Antonio Grandberry (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of especially aggravated robbery. Pursuant to an agreement between the Defendant and the State, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eighteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Additionally, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the offense of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of especially aggravated robbery or any of the lesser-included offenses pertaining to robbery but is sufficient as to the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Accordingly, we modify the Defendant’s especially aggravated robbery conviction to aggravated assault and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry D. Rothwell
Appellant, Larry D. Rothwell, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-one years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant has presented the following issues for our review on appeal: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by excusing a juror; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow introduction of portions of a witness’s pretrial interview; (3) whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence about how the fight between Appellant and the victim started, determining that evidence from Betty Lewis was collateral; (4) whether the trial court improperly refused to enforce a subpoena for Betty Lewis on behalf of Appellant; (5) whether the trial court improperly denied Appellant the opportunity to impeach Brandy Smith; (6) whether the trial court improperly allowed hearsay testimony; (7) whether the trial court improperly excluded Randy Rothwell’s testimony about the description of a knife removed from the victim’s body; (8) whether the trial court improperly declared Randy Rothwell a hostile witness; (9) whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence of Brandy Smith’s prior felony conviction; (10) whether the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress; (10) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; (11) whether cumulative errors of the trial court require reversal of the conviction; and (12) whether the sentence was excessive. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence did not preponderate against the denial of the motion to suppress where the evidence supported a finding of exigent circumstances; the trial court did not err in excusing a juror; the trial court properly excluded impeachment of Brandy Smith by prior inconsistent statement where she admitted to an inconsistency in one prior statement and the other statement was not inconsistent; the trial court properly determined that the testimony of Betty Lewis was excluded by the collateral fact rule; the trial court properly admitted the statements of Randy Rothwell; the trial court properly excluded the testimony of Leo Andy about the knife on the victim’s person as hearsay; the trial court properly determined that Randy Rothwell was a hostile witness; the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the admission of Brandy Smith’s prior conviction was more prejudicial than probative; the evidence was sufficient to support the lesser included offense of second degree murder; and the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry D. Rothwell - Concurring
I concur in results only. My primary disagreement with the majority’s opinion is the reliance therein upon State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) and State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) for the proposition that “Appellate review of hearsay issues is guided by the de novo standard of review.” Judge Witt wrote both of these scholarly opinions, and quite candidly, I am unable to conclude that the conclusion reached therein on the issue in question is not the most appropriate legal conclusion. Nevertheless, our supreme court cited Gilley in a footnote in Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 871 n.26 (Tenn. 2008) and declined to adopt the de novo standard of review. After noting that Judge Witt “advocates for review of . . . rulings on whether the proffered testimony was hearsay under a de novo standard of review” in his dissent in this court in Pylant v. State, No. M2005-02721-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 1890178, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2007) (Witt, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), the supreme court, in effect, declined to accept what Judge Witt advocated as the definitive standard of review and concluded the footnote by stating, |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals |
