State of Tennessee v. Alonzo Maurice Rogan - Concurring
I write separately to explain why I am concurring in results only in this case. The record reflects that Defendant’s counsel adamantly asserted that aggravated assault was a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder. Just as adamantly, the State argued that aggravated assault was not a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder under our supreme court’s decision in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). The record also reflects that while the trial court had reservations about the appropriateness of charging aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense, it was ultimately persuaded to do so by arguments of Defendant’s counsel. Counsel’s conduct may or may not be grounds for relief to Defendant in a post-conviction proceeding, but that must be decided at a later hearing on a later date. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alonzo Maurice Rogan
The defendant filed a delayed appeal, alleging error: (1) in denying the defendant the opportunity to file an amended motion for new trial; (2) in the failure to amend the indictment for attempted first degree murder to aggravated assault; (3) in the failure of the indictment for evading arrest to contain statutory language; and, (4) in admitting the defendant’s confession in violation of an in limine order during the second phase of a bifurcated trial. We conclude that no reversible errors were attendant and affirm the convictions. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Octavian Reeves
The defendant appeals his conviction for second degree murder and the sentence of twenty-five years. After review, we conclude that the restrictions placed on the defendant's cross examination of the witness were within the discretion of the trial court. Further, we affirm the conviction and sentence imposed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stacy L. Mack and Martress Shaw
The defendants appeal their convictions of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. The defendants allege error in the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant and denial of their motions for judgment of acquittal. Upon review, we reverse the failure to suppress the search warrant and reverse and dismiss the convictions of both defendants. The conviction of Stacy Mack is reversed due to insufficiency of the evidence, and Martress Shaw’s conviction is reversed due to insufficiency of evidence after suppression of the search warrant. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stacy L. Mack And Martress Shaw - Dissenting/Concurring
While I concur in the majority’s reversal of Defendant Mack’s conviction based upon insufficient evidence of constructive possession of cocaine, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion that holds that the search warrant did not sufficiently describe the premises to be searched, because it omitted the street address, to meet constitutional standards. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Bostic, 898 S.W.2d 242, does not apply under the facts of this case because “[w]e are not confronted herein with an ambiguous description, i.e., one that is susceptible to multiple interpretations, but rather the omission of important details in the description.” I believe warrant, which was cured by Detective Tutor’s knowledge of the location to be searched. To hold otherwise effectively ignores the precedent established in Bostic. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stacey F. Baldon v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Stacey Baldon, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The issues presented for review are whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel and whether the guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered. The judgment is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Levar Gray
The defendant, Levar Gray, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court imposed sentences of twelve years for each of the four offenses. Because the trial court ordered partially consecutive sentencing, the effective sentence is twenty-four years. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the sentence is excessive. Because the record does not support the imposition of maximum sentences for each conviction and because consecutive sentences were not warranted, the judgments must be modified to reflect concurrent sentences of ten years for each conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Floyd Lee Perry, Jr., v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Floyd Lee Perry, Jr., filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Obion County Circuit Court. In his petition, the petitioner raised several issues, with his two chief complaints being that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder and that trial counsel was ineffective. Subsequent to an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court dismissed the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Atta Najjar
The defendant was convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery. He contends on appeal that 1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, and 2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to aggravated rape. The judgment for aggravated robbery is affirmed. We conclude that a constructive amendment of the indictment for aggravated rape occurred because the jury was permitted to convict the defendant based on an element different from that which was charged or included within the indictment. Accordingly, the judgment for aggravated rape is reversed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Allen Larkins, Jr.
A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Gary Allen Larkins, Jr., of attempted aggravated assault, a Class D felony; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of seven years, six months, and thirty days, respectively. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the defendant’s convictions but remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment for the attempted aggravated assault. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Lusk, Jr.
The defendant, James Lusk, Jr., appeals from his twenty-five-year sentence imposed by the Hamilton County Criminal Court following his guilty plea to attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony. The defendant claims that the trial court failed to apply and weigh mitigating factors properly. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy David McElroy
The state in this interlocutory appeal challenges the McMinn County trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. In suppressing the evidence, the trial court found the informant’s information in the affidavit referred to a different property location than the property authorized to be searched; therefore, the trial court found a lack of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derrick L. Dillard
Defendant, Derrick L. Dillard, argues in this appeal that the trial court erred by imposing an illegal sentence following a hearing in which the trial court found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his Community Corrections sentence. The State agrees that the trial court erred. After a full review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Skinner
The defendant, Gregory Skinner, was convicted of two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and one count of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, a Class E felony, and sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years for each of the two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, to be served concurrently, and to three years for the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of thirteen years. This sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a previous sentence. The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in applying a nonstatutory factor in setting his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments in Counts 2 and 3. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harry David Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Harry David Johnson, was convicted in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of the first degree murder of his wife, Katherine Trotter Johnson, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel during his trial. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing, ultimately determining that the petitioner had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel was ineffective. The petitioner timely appealed this ruling. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a new trial. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dexter Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dexter P. Jones, appeals from the Wilson County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his four convictions for assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and resulting consecutive eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentences. He contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made because the trial court did not advise him that he was waiving a double jeopardy claim. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glen Holt
A Morgan County jury found the Defendant, Glen Holt, guilty of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years in prison for the aggravated robbery charge, to be served concurrently with a life sentence for the murder conviction. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred when it allowed a photograph, offered by the prosecution, to be admitted into evidence without a proper foundation; (3) that the jury did not follow the trial court’s instructions with regard to felony murder; and (4) that he did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his constitutional right to testify in his own defense. Although we conclude that issues (1), (2) and (3) are without merit, the record is insufficient for us to determine whether the Defendant personally and knowingly waived his right to testify. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the Defendant’s right to testify was violated, and if so, whether the violation of the Defendant’s right to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glen Holt - Concurring and Dissenting
I concur in most of the conclusions and reasoning in the majority opinion, but I dissent from the remand in this case. I believe that the record sufficiently shows that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to testify. The failure to follow the specific Momon requirements should not disturb the judgment in this case. Counsel told the trial court, in open court with the defendant present, that he had advised the defendant of his rights to testify and not to testify and that he thought the defendant understood those rights. When the record states that the “Defendant indicates affirmatively” in response to the trial court’s asking him if he understood his rights and was not going to testify, I have no problem in concluding that the defendant intentionally relinquished his right to testify. Moreover, given the fact that counsel at the motion for new trial hearing indicated that the defendant had consulted with him and had made a decision not to testify further justifies my conclusion. To require a Momon hearing under the circumstances in this case would be putting form above substance. I would affirm the trial court.
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Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwight Miller
The appellant, Dwight Miller, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison in 1996. On December 29, 1998, this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to the Haywood County Circuit Court for a new trial. See State v. Dwight Miller, No. 02C01-9708-CC-00300, 1998 WL 902592 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Dec. 29, 1998). At the conclusion of the second trial, appellant was convicted again by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. The issues presented for our review include: (1) whether the trial court erred in permitting the prior recorded testimony of a witness to be read into the record; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after a bomb threat occurred during the course of the trial; and (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for first degree murder. Appellate review is available for the sufficiency of the evidence despite the appellant's failure to file a timely motion for new trial under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b). The review of the issues, however, is also dependent upon either a timely filed notice of appeal, or in the interest of justice, a waiver of the timely filing of a notice of appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). Because the appellant filed an untimely motion for a new trial, his notice of appeal is likewise tardy. Additionally, the appellant has not sought a waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Under these circumstances we conclude that the appellant has waived review of these issues on appeal. Nevertheless, we have in the interest of justice, reviewed the primary issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. The evidence is more than sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Holly Fant
The appellant, Holly Fant,1 pled guilty to aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Holly Fant - Concurring
I agree that the defendant’s sentence should be affirmed. In my view, however, it was error for the trial court to apply enhancement factor (6), that the defendant treated the victim with exceptional cruelty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(6). Application of this factor requires a finding of cruelty over and above that inherently attendant to the crime for which the defendant is convicted. State v. Embry, 915 S.W.2d 451, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). In other words, such evidence must “denote[ ] the infliction of pain or suffering for its own sake or from the gratification derived therefrom, and not merely pain or suffering inflicted as the means of accomplishing the crime charged.” State v. Kelly Haynes, No. W1999-01485-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 14, 2000). Enhancement factor (6) has typically been applied insituations where the victim was tortured or abused. See State v. Davis, 825 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). This court has upheld the application of this factor based on proof of extensive physical abuse or torture, see State v. Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), as well as proof of psychological abuse or torture, see State v. Thomas Lebron Mills and Carl Franklin Mills, No. 936 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 19, 1985) (holding that acts of mental cruelty, by themselves, can be as vicious and scarring as acts of physical cruelty). Here, there is no evidence that the defendant tortured or abused the victim or that she inflicted pain and suffering greater than that necessary to complete the offense. Rather, after shooting the victim, the defendant dialed 911 and waited with him until emergency assistance arrived. Nevertheless, I concur with the majority that the four-year sentence, one year above the minimum, was warranted. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Walter Eugene Ingram v. State of Tennessee
The defendant, Walter Eugene Ingram, filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” in the Shelby |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry Graham
The defendant, Barry Graham, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to concurrent sentences of thirteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the theft conviction, to be served consecutively to a sentence in a previous case. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the circumstantial evidence at trial was sufficient to establish his guilt of the offenses. We conclude the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find him guilty of aggravated burglary and theft under $500 beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
MacArthur English v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to two counts of felony reckless endangerment, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcillo Anderson
The appellant, Marcillo Anderson, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty years as a Range One, Standard Offender. His release eligibility was classified as violent, requiring him to serve one hundred percent (100%) of his sentence. In this direct appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s denial of a jury instruction on self-defense. We hold that none of the issues raised by the appellant warrant a reversal and affirm the conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |
