State vs. Calvin Otis Tankesly
|
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs. William Davis, Jr.
|
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs. Ricky Dale Langford
|
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
|
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
|
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs. Frankie E. Casteel
|
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marico Finnie
|
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State vs. Dennis Bondon
|
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
W1998-00455-CCA-MR3-CD
|
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
03C01-9810-CR-00376
|
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
|
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
|
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
|
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
|
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
|
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Victor James Cazes v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Victor James Cazes, appeals as of right from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying him post-conviction relief from his 1990 convictions for felony murder, aggravated rape and first degree burglary. The petitioner was sentenced to death for the murder conviction and received twenty-five-year and six-year sentences, respectively, for the aggravated rape and burglary convictions. The judgments of conviction were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn. 1994). In this post-conviction appeal, the petitioner raises the following issues: |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Ronald Wayne Smith
The Defendant, Ronald W ayne Smith, pleaded guilty in the C ircuit Court of Dickson County to possession of cocaine for resale and possession of marijuana for resale, reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question of law is whether there were sufficient spec ific and articu lable facts to justify the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle and/or whether the duration of the stop excessive. We find that there were not sufficient specific and articulabe facts to justify the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. Because we conclude that the stop was illegal, we reverse the order of the trial judge overruling the motion to suppress. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Ronald Reece Cross
On July 21, 1998, Ronald Reece Cross (the “defendant”) pled gu ilty to the following charges arising out of a single incident: violating an habitual traffic offender order, evading arrest, driving under the influence of alcohol (eighth offense), running a stop sign, reckless driving, and violation of registration. Following a sentencing hearing on the above charges, the trial court denied alternative sentencing for the defendant, and instead ordered the defendant to serve an effective ten (10) year, eleven (11) month, and twenty-nine (29) day sentence. The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing to the defendant, and (2) whether the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to serve consecutive sentences. Because we find that the trial court sentenced the defendant appropriately, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Arthur Copeland
The appellant, Arthur Copeland, was convicted by a Blount County jury of one (1) coun t of simple assa ult, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days in the county jail and ordered tha t the appellant’s sentence for assault run consecutively to his sentence for a prior aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in (1) im posing sentence immediately after the jury rendered its verdict without affording the appellant a separate sentencing hearing; and (2) ordering consecutive sentences. After thoroughly reviewing the record before this Court, we conclude that th ere is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for another sentencing hearing. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Paul Seals vs State of Tennessee
The petitioner, John Paul Seals, entered a guilty plea to first degree murder on December 12, 1988. The state had originally sought the death penalty. The trial court imposed a life sentence. Six years later, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, post-conviction relief. The trial court, which treated the petition as one for post-conviction relief, dismissed based upon the statute of limitations. This court affirmed on direct appeal. John Paul Seals v. State, No. 03C01-9409-CR-00319 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Feb. 22, 1995), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. 1995). On January 7, 1998, the petitioner filed this claim for post-conviction relief alleging several constitutional violations. The petitioner argued that the statute of limitations should not apply because he had been mentally incompetent since before the commission of the offense. The petitioner also contended that none of the grounds had been waived or previously determined because the first petition had been filed by someone other than himself. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition at the preliminary stage. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(a), (f). In John Paul Seals v. State, No. 03C01-9802-CC-00050 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 6, 1999), this court reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court to allow the petitioner to present evidence on the issue of his mental capacity as it related to the statute of limitations: If the petitioner carries his burden of proving facts which require tolling the statute of limitations due to mental incompetence, then the trial court shall proceed to the merits of the constitutional issues presented in the petition. On the other hand, if the petitioner does not carry his burden of proving mental incompetence as regards the statute of limitations, the trial court shall dismiss the petition as untimely. Id., slip op. at 8. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
01C01-9901-CC-00027
|
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
|
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
03C01-9810-CR-00358
|
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
03C01-9906-CR-00222
|
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melvin Sawyer vs. State
|
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |