Allen Jean Stephens v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Allen Jean Stephens, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory Allen Cathey v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Gregory Allen Cathey, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Le Tonio Swader v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Le Tonio Swader, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Rutherford County Circuit Court from his convictions for first degree felony murder; second degree murder, a Class A felony; attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of an offense, a Class E felony. The murder convictions were merged. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of life plus two years. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, which is not a proper post-conviction claim, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for which the petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proof. He also argues for the first time in this proceeding that his convictions amounted to double jeopardy. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gayle Thomas Crawford
The defendant, Gayle Thomas Crawford, was convicted by a Gibson County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony; possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years at thirty-five percent in the Department of Correction. In a timely appeal to this court, he raises essentially five issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) whether the rule of sequestration was violated; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to offer his opinion on the street value of the drugs; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing an officer to testify that an unknown black male listed in the warrant was the defendant; and (5) whether the search warrant was invalid. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana, the rule of sequestration was not violated, the trial court did not err in allowing the officer’s testimony with respect to the street value of drugs and the identity of the unknown black male, and that the defendant has waived the issues with respect to the validity of the search warrant. We further conclude, however, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s convictions for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver and reverse and dismiss the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrence Gardner
The defendant, Terrence Gardner, was convicted of first degree (felony) murder, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to life for the murder, to ten years for the Class B felony, and to four years for the Class C felony. The convictions for the murder and aggravated robbery were set to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the aggravated assault, for a total effective sentence of life plus four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in not permitting him to present a witness to be impeached. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Latonya Yvonne Taylor v. State of Tennessee
A Rutherford County jury convicted the Petitioner of three counts of premeditated first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life without parole plus twenty years. The Petitioner then timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dennis J. Rountree, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Dennis J. Rountree, Jr., appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition because it found the petition to be barred by the statute of limitations. Following our review, we reverse the order of dismissal and remand this case to the post-conviction court for a hearing on the merits of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William J. Johnson
The defendant, William J. Johnson, appeals his convictions and sentences for violation of habitual motor vehicle offender status, driving under the influence fifth offense, and driving while license revoked fourth offense. The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support hisconvictions and that his effective twelve-year sentence was excessive. We affirm the convictions and sentences imposed by the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Tierney
The Defendant, Travis Tierney, was charged with one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210(c), -102(d)(1), -16-503(b). He was found guilty as charged following a jury trial and sentenced to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years for second degree murder, six years for each aggravated assault, and six years for tampering with evidence, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of second degree murder; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years for second degree murder. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brandon Wallace v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Brandon Wallace, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He is presently serving an effective sentence of forty years after being found guilty of two counts of attempted first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and felony reckless endangerment. He claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. After review, we conclude that the petitioner’s sentencing claim was previously determined and that he failed in carrying his burden of proving that trial counsel was ineffective. The judgment from the post-conviction court denying relief is affirmed. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Calvin R. Cannon v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Calvin R. Cannon, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his four petitions for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, for this Court to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion. We grant the motion and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary E. Aldridge v. James Fortner, Warden, and State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Gary E. Aldridge, was convicted in 1997 of one count of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, one count of rape, and two counts of simple assault, all perpetrated upon his estranged wife. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty years, with a sentence of seventeen months and twenty-nine days to be served consecutively. The judgments were affirmed on direct appeal, and our supreme court denied permission to appeal. State v. Gary Eugene Aldridge, No. 01C01-9802-CC-00075, 1999 WL 632299, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 1999), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Jan. 31, 2000). Subsequently, the petitioner began a series of post-conviction filings. This appeal resulted from the dismissal of his fourth petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State argues that the notice of appeal was untimely and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed. We agree and dismiss the appeal. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Erskine Leroy Johnson v. State of Tennessee
I acknowledge that the majority opinion does not grant error coram nobis relief to this defendant but merely remands the case to the trial court for the purpose of the trial court applying the proper standard of review. I simply disagree with the majority’s conclusion; therefore, I dissent. The State argues that the one-year statute of limitations bars proceeding with the petitioner’s claims. The majority is unsure as to what date the statute began running under the facts of this case but has concluded, in any event, that due process requires the tolling of the statute. I conclude that the statute began to run thirty days after the judgment of conviction was entered on June 27, 1985. Our supreme court has specifically held that, as to a petition for writ of error coram nobis, “[a] judgment becomes final in the trial court thirty days after its entry if no post-motions are filed” and that “[i]f a post-trial motion is timely filed, the judgment becomes final upon entry of an order disposing of the post-trial motion.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 670 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 4(c); State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996)). The petitioner did not file his petition for writ of error coram nobis until April 22, 2005. Because I agree with the State that the so-called new information either could or should have been discovered during the first trial, I disagree with the majority that due process requires tolling the statute of limitations. Thus, I would dismiss the petitioner’s claim as time barred. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Erskine Leroy Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Erskine Leroy Johnson, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Shelby County Criminal Court, claiming that newly discovered evidence entitled him to a new trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition on the basis that the petitioner was at fault for timely failing to discover the evidence. The petitioner appeals, maintaining that the newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. He also argues that the coram nobis court applied the incorrect standard in denying his petition for coram nobis relief, that the court did not address all of the evidence in denying his petition, and that a review of all the evidence shows he should receive a new trial. The State argues that the coram nobis court should have dismissed the petition because it was untimely filed and that, in any event, the court properly denied the petition. Based upon our review, we conclude that due process required tolling the statute of limitations in this case and agree with the petitioner that the coram nobis court denied the petition based upon the incorrect standard. Therefore, the court’s denial of the petition is reversed, and the case is remanded to the coram nobis court for reconsideration of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lois Brasfield
Appellant, Lois Brasfield, was convicted by a Shelby County Jury of felony reckless endangerment and misdemeanor assault. As a result, she was sentenced to eighteen months in incarceration. The trial court ordered her to spend 90 days in jail and the balance of the sentence on probation. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to give the missing witness instruction to the jury at trial. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant failed to show that the instruction was warranted. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gerald Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Gerald Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief in which he argued that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner also argues on appeal that the post-conviction court improperly excluded evidence at the post-conviction hearing related to his diminished mental capacity. We determine that Petitioner has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance or that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Glenn Wiley - Concurring
I agree with the majority that, in spite of numerous misdeeds committed by the State, the defendant is not entitled to relief. However, rules of discovery and rules of disclosure of exculpatory evidence exist for a reason. They are a necessary part of our notion of due process and ensure the accused an opportunity to adequately prepare for trial. If the State violates the rules, whether intentionally or negligently, the result, even if correct, is tarnished. As Justice Douglas aptly pointed out over forty years ago, “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Such is the case herein. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Glenn Wiley
At the conclusion of his second trial, Defendant-Appellant, William Glenn Wiley (hereinafter “Wiley”) was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The jury sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a concurrent twenty-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, Wiley argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal when the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery; (2) he should be granted a new trial because of several violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); (3) he should be granted a new trial because of several Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 violations; (4) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his Knights Inn employment application and Arrowhead Motel receipt; (5) the trial court erred in admitting prior bad act evidence in the form of Michelle Scheffel’s testimony and rebuttal evidence of a prior assault;(6) his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is excessive; and (7) the trial court erred in denying his request for co-counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sean Brett Browder
Appellant, Sean Brett Browder, was indicted for one count of theft over $10,000 and one count of theft over $500 by the Montgomery County Grand Jury. Appellant entered an open guilty plea to one count of theft of property over $1,000 and one count of theft of property over $500. At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five years for the first count and three years for the second count to be served concurrently to each other in the Department of Correction. Appellant now argues on appeal that the trial court erred in imposing the length of sentence and in not ordering alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is no basis for reversal of the length of his sentence and there was adequate support for the denial of alternative sentencing. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Joe Headley
Appellant, Ricky Joe Headley, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury in October of 2007 for four counts of official misconduct in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-402, as a result of actions taken while serving as the Sheriff of Williamson County. Appellant was also indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in October of 2007 in a multi-count indictment for thirty-three drug related charges that arose out of his unlawful acquisition of prescription medication from a pharmacy in Davidson County while he was wearing his Williamson County uniform and driving a Williamson County law enforcement vehicle. The cases were consolidated, and Appellant eventually pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit official misconduct and four counts of simple possession, all Class A misdemeanors, in exchange for an effective sentence of four years, eleven months, and twenty-five days. Appellant was ordered to serve the sentence on probation,three years of which was to be supervised. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion. Appellant appeals this denial. We determine that the trial court considered the factors required for the grant or denial of judicial diversion and did not abuse its discretion in denying judicial diversion to Appellant. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shairiq Seabrooks
The defendant, Shairiq Seabrooks, was indicted on charges of first degree felony murder and first degree murder. After a jury trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the felony murder charge and the charge of first degree murder remained. The jury convicted the defendant of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and the defendant was sentenced as a standard Range I offender to serve twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant has appealed, raising the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding the victim’s prior arrest for the unlawful possession of a weapon; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony as inadmissible hearsay; (4) whether the jury charge concerning reasonable doubt was unconstitutional; and (5) whether the court erred in charging the jury on second degree murder. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Monique Y. Croom v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Monique Y. Croom, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that she received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: (1) maintain proper records, (2) adequately investigate her case and interview certain witnesses, (3) expedite her mental health evaluation, and (4) explain the types of homicide and the difference between consecutive and concurrent sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Anthony Cline
The Defendant-Appellant, John Anthony Cline, was convicted by a Henry County Circuit Court jury of theft of property worth $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. The State filed a notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment based on several prior convictions. The trial court sentenced Cline as a Range II, multiple offender and imposed an eight-year sentence at thirty-five percent. In this appeal, Cline challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence and (2) the sufficiency of the State’s notice to seek enhanced punishment. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Thomas Stagner v. State of Tennessee
On November 3, 2006, the petitioner, Donald Thomas Stagner, pled guilty to aggravated burglary and theft over $500 and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years and one and onehalf years, respectively. The court ordered that the sentences would be served concurrently and suspended after ninety days. On October 18, 2007, the petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that his pleas of guilty were unknowing and that trial counsel was ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief by order entered on February 4, 2008. The defendant filed his notice of appeal on March 13, 2008, and the State argues that the notice of appeal was untimely and, thus, this appeal should be dismissed. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Don Wayne Williams
The defendant, Don Wayne Williams, was convicted by a Madison County jury of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, and felony failure to appear, a Class E felony. He was later sentenced by the trial court to six months for the resisting arrest conviction and as a career offender to six years for the failure to appear conviction. His sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for failure to appear. Based on our review, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find the defendant guilty of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |
